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updated and corrections / mise à jour et corrections: 10 December 2008
 

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by / par ©François Lareau, 2003, Ottawa, Canada
First posted on the web site: 22 May 2003

Selected Bibliography on Limitation Periods, Prescription and
Statutes of Limitation in Criminal Law
-------------------------
Bibliographie choisie sur la prescription en droit pénal
------
See also / Voir aussi : Comparative Law / Droit comparé
------

Réflexion:
La prescription n'est-elle pas une conséquence nécessaire du respect que l'on doit accorder à la présomption d'innocence? (François Lareau, 11 septembre 2003)

ANAND, Sanjeev S., "Criminal Trial Procedure -- Lecture 4 [time limitations and the right to be tried within a reasonable time]", available at http://www.law.ualberta.ca/courses/anand/crim_procedure/lecture_04.htm (accessed on 4 May 2003);
 

___________"Should Parliament Enact Statutory Limitation Periods for Criminal Offences?", (2000) 44 The Criminal Law Quarterly 8-14;

"The Charter already provides a means for accused to ensure their fair trial rights are not infringed because of loss of evidence due to the lengthy gap between when the alleged offence occurred and when the prosecution is initiated.  Under the Charter, courts engage in fact-specific contextual analyses, attempting to balance the state's interest in the prosecution and apprehension of offenders with the accused's fair trial rights.  A statutory limitation period for criminal offences would not be fact-specific and contextual.  Instead it would operate iniformly and in many cases, especially from the perspective of victims of crime, unfairly." (p. 14)

ATRENS, Jerome, The Charter and Criminal Procedure: The Application of Sections 7 and 11, Toronto and Vancouver: Butterworths, 1989, see Chapter 5, "Section 11(b) at pp. 5-1 to 5-36, ISBN: 0409806595;

"The right to a trial within a reasonable time is not a constitutional limitation period that begins to run at the time of the commission of an offence.  Canadian courts, influenced by the interpretation placed on similar rights in other international conventions and constitutions,¹⁷⁸ including the European Convention¹⁷⁹ and the U.S. Constitution,¹⁸⁰ have held that s. 11(b) does not come into play until a prosecution has been launched.  This is consistent not only with the purpose of s. 11(b) but also with the wording of the Charter."
------
¹⁷⁸  See, e.g., the discussion of Commonwealth, European, American and International Covenant jurisprudence in Re Carter (1983), 9 C.C.C. (3d) 173 (B.C.S.C.); affd sub nom. Carter, 26 C.C.C. (3d) 572 (S.C.C.).

¹⁷⁹  See Corigliano Case, judgment of December 10, 1982, Eur. Court H.R., Series A., vol. 157, at 13; P. van Dijk and G. van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (Deventer, Netherlands: Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1984), at 254-56; F. Jacobs, The European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), at 107-08.

¹⁸⁰  See U.S. v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 30 L. Ed. 2d 468 (1971); U.S. v. Lovasco, 431, 431 783, 52 L. Ed. 2d 752 (1977)." (p. 5-24)

BARIBEAU, Louis, "Les dossiers 'survivants'.  Défi: rattraper le temps perdu"; (Décembre 2008) 40(12) Le Journal -- Barreau du Québec 3; ne traite pas de la prescription mais d'une grande utilité sur les effets du temps écoulé;

BARTON, P.G., "Why Limitation Periods in the Criminal Code?", (1998) 40 The Criminal Law Quarterly 188-199;
 

BÉLIVEAU, Pierre, 1947-, et Jean Pradel, La justice pénale dans les droits canadien et français : documents et commentaires, Montréal (Qué.) : Y. Blais; Paris: Cujas, c1986, xxxviii, 298 p., voir "Un obstacle commun aux deux droits: la prescription", aux pp. 180-184, ISBN: 2890735877;
 

BÉLIVEAU, Pierre, 1947-, et Martin Vauclair, Traité général de preuve et de procédure pénales, 9e éd., Montréal : Éditions Thémis, c2002,  xxxix, 1197 p., voir "Un obstacle à la poursuite: la prescription", aux pp. 549-553, ISBN:  2894001614;
 

BÉLIVEAU, Pierre, 1947-, "Le droit d'être jugé dans un délai raisonnable", (1997) 31(1) Revue juridique Thémis 1-44disponible à  http://www.themis.umontreal.ca/revue/rjtvol31num1/beliveau.pdf; aussi avec le même titre dans (1995) 66 Revue internationale de droit pénal 455-492;
 

BUTTERWORTHS LEGAL EDITORIAL STAFF, Federal limitation periods: a handbook of limitation periods and other statutory time limits, Toronto: Butterworths, various paginations, ISBN: 0409845418; copy at the library of the Supreme Court of Canada, KF 450 L55 J64; note: very informative and well made;
 

CANADIAN BAR ASSOCIATION, National Competition Law Association, "Submission on reform of Section 45 of he Competition Act (Conspiracy)", February 2003, 31 p., and Annex A (11 p.), Annex B (5 p.) and Annex C (5 p.), available at  http://www.cba.org/CBA/submissions/pdf/03-05-eng.pdf  (accessed on 19 June 2005); available in English only; see "Limitation Period" at p. 30 and Annex C, "Limitation Periods";

"C. Public Policy Considerations

The general public policy considerations which favour limitation periods with respect to all potential legal proceedings are applicable in the circumstances of offences and civil actions under the Competition Act. Basic policy considerations favouring limitation periods include the following.

(i) Evidentiary Concerns ...
(ii) Economic Considerations...
(iii) Public Interest..." (Annex C, pp. C-4 and C-5)

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, section 7 and subsections 11(b) and (d), available at  http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/charter/index.html (accessed on 19 April 2003);  also available in French/aussi disponible en français: Charte canadienne des droits et libertés, article 7 et les paragraphes 11b) et c), disponible à http://lois.justice.gc.ca/fr/charte/index.html (visionné le 19 avril 2003);

"Legal Rights

[Life, liberty and security of person]
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
...

[Proceedings in criminal and penal matters]
11. Any person charged with an offence has the right ...
    (b) to be tried within a reasonable time;
    ....
    (d) to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal;"
.......................

"Garanties juridiques

[Vie, liberté et sécurité]
7. Chacun a droit à la vie, à la liberté et à la sécurité de sa personne; il ne peut être porté atteinte à ce droit qu'en conformité avec les principes de justice fondamentale.

[...]

"[Affaires criminelles et pénales]
11. Tout inculpé a le droit  [...]
   b) d'être jugé dans un délai raisonnable;
   [...]
   d) d'être présumé innocent tant qu'il n'est pas déclaré coupable, conformément à la loi, par un tribunal indépendant et impartial à l'issue d'un procès public et équitable;"

CANADA, Canadian Forces, Judge Advocate General, Annual Report of the Judge Advocate General to the Minister of National Defence on the administration of military justice in the Canadian Forces: a review from 1 september 1999 to 31 march 2000, [Ottawa]: Office of the Judge Advocate General], 2000, vii, 117 p., see chapter 5 at p. 31; available at http://www.dnd.ca/jag/office/publications/annual_reports/2000annualreport_e.pdf (accessed on 4 April 2003); information on the French version/informations sur la version française: Forces canadiennes, Juge Avocat général, Rapport annuel du Juge-avocat général au ministre de la Défense nationale sur l'administration de la justice militaire dans les Forces canadiennes: Une revue du 1er septembre 1999 au 31 mars 2000, Ottawa: Cabinet du Juge-avocat général, 2000, v, 123 p., disponible à

"Another important recent area impacting on court martial jurisdiction is the elemination of the three-year limitation period.  So as not to frustrate disciplinary action in respect of service offences that are either not reported or disclosed within this period, or are complex and lenghty to investigate, the three-year limitation period has been repealed. In cases where the offence is a civil offence that has been incorporated into the Code of Service Discipline pursuant to section 130 NDA, the accused will have the benefit of any applicable civilian limitation period." (chapter 5, p. 31)

CANADA, Canadian Forces, Judge Advocate General, Annual Report of the Judge Advocate General to the Minister of National Defence on the administration of military justice in the Canadian Forces: a review from 1 April 2006 to 31 march 2007, [Ottawa]: Office of the Judge Advocate General], [2007], viii, 146 p., ISBN:978 0 662 49972 5; available at http://www.dnd.ca/jag/office/publications/annual_reports/2007annualreport_e.pdf (accessed on 2 December 2007); information on the French version/informations sur la version française: Forces canadiennes, Juge Avocat général, Rapport annuel du Juge-avocat général au ministre de la Défense nationale sur l'administration de la justice militaire dans les Forces canadiennes: Examen portant sur la p/riode du 1er avril 2006 au 31 mars 2007, [Ottawa]: Cabinet du Juge-avocat général, 2007, viii, 146 p., ISBN:978 0 662 49972 5, disponible à http://www.dnd.ca/jag/office/publications/annual_reports/2007annualreport_f.pdf (vérifié le 2 décembre 2007);

CANADA, Department of National Defence, The Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces (1994 Revision), 4 vol., [Ottawa]; vol. 1 is entitled   Adninistrative but contains relevant matters to discipline; vol. 2 is  Disciplinary; vol. 3 is Financial ; vol. 4 contains the Appendices; see volume 2, Disciplinary, Chapter 102 -- "Disciplinary Jurisdiction" available at http://www.dnd.ca/admfincs/subjects/qr_o/vol2/ch102_e.asp#102.22 ;  information on the French version/renseignements sur la version française: Ordonnances et règlements royaux applicables aux forces canadiennes (Révision de 1994), 4 vol.; le vol. 1 a pour titre Adninistration mais contient des dispositions pertinentes à la discipline; vol. 2 : Discipline;  vol. 3:  Finances; et le vol. 4: Appendices; voir le volume 2, Discipline, chapitre 102 -- "Juridiction disciplinaire"disponible à http://www.dnd.ca/admfincs/subjects/qr_o/vol2/ch102_f.asp;
 

___________SPECIAL ADVISORY GROUP ON MILITARY JUSTICE AND MILITARY POLICE INVESTIGATION SERVICES, Report of the Special Advisory Group on Military Justice and Military Police Investigation Services, [Ottawa]: [Department of National Defence], 25 March 1997, viii, 73 p. and other paginations with the Annexes, see Part III -- Sevice Tribunals, Chapter 8,"Limitations periods for service offences" at pp. 58-61 (series; Report to the Prime Minister), (Chairman: The Right Honourable Brian Dickson; Members: Lieutenant General Charles H. Belzile (Retired) and Mr. J.W. Bird), this report also know as "Dickson Report I" is available at  http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/minister/eng/Dickson/justictc.htm (accessed on 4 April 2003); note that the footnotes are not reproduced on the internet html format; also published in French/aussi publié en français (texte anglais/français tête-bêche) : Groupe consultatif spécial sur la justice militaire et les services d'enquête de la police militaire, Rapport du Groupe consultatif spécial sur la justice militaire et sur les services d'enquête de la police militaire, [Ottawa]: [Ministère de la défense nationale], 25 mars 1997, vii, 78 p. et annexes, voir la Partie III -- Les tribunaux militaires, Chapitre 8, "Prescriptions pour infractions d'ordre militaire" aux pp. 63-66 (Président: Le très honorable Brian Dickson; membres: Lieutenant- général Charles H. Belzile (retraité) et M. J.W. Bird) (Collection: Rapport au Premier ministre); ce rapport, aussi connu sous le nom "Rapport Dickson I", est disponible à http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/minister/fr/Dickson/justfrtc.htm(visionné le 4 avril 2003); on ne retrouve pas les notes dans la publication format html sur l'Internet;

 
"CHAPTER 8: LIMITATION PERIODS FOR SERVICE OFFENCES

    With the exception of a limited number of offences, there exists a limitation period under the Code of Service Discipline requiring that a charge be laid and a trial commenced within three years of the offence occurring.

    During the course of our work, it has come to light that this three-year limitation period has precluded the laying of charges and the trying of individuals allegedly involved in certain serious incidents, for example, at the Bakovici Hospital in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Hence, we have had to consider whether the limitation period contained in s. 69 of the National Defence Act should be retained, amended or discarded altogether.

    The three-year limitation period draws its roots from early English military law. While the rationale for this time limit is not clear, it would seem to have been linked to the historic civilian distrust of standing armies in England. The earliest written English laws do not appear to provide a limitation period for prosecuting military offences. However, a customary three-year time limit for military prosecutions seems to have been established by the early 1700s, which subsequently gave rise to the first formal limitation period under English military law in 1760. By 1869, the three-year limitation rule had become firmly established in the English military justice system, which continued to apply this time limit until 1987.

    The limitation periods for prosecuting military offences in other Anglo-American jurisdictions vary. A three-year limitation was formerly applied in the United Kingdom according to legislation specific to each service affiliation, but the British Attorney-General was authorized to consent to the prosecution of military offences outside the three-year limitation on a   case-by-case basis. Limitations for military offences in the U.K. forces have now been removed under military law, although accused persons can claim the benefit of applicable civil statutory limitations before service tribunals. Similarly, Australia has dispensed with general limitation periods for military offences while recognizing the application of civil limitations to military proceedings.

    New Zealand's basic statutory limitation is clearly modelled after the former counterpart British three-year limitation, but further incorporates other civilian statutory limitations to afford an accused at military trial the greatest benefit of available statutory time limits. The New Zealand limitation rule, however, includes an override provision which enables the Attorney-General to allow prosecutions, notwithstanding that such actions would otherwise be statute-barred under civilian or military limitation periods.

    Article 43 of the United States Uniform Code of Military Justice has adopted limitation periods ranging from five years in certain circumstances to six months in others, and has exempted the application of limitations for certain serious offences similar to those at subsection 69(2) of the National Defence Act in Canada. Notably, the American limitations constitute absolute defences, and are not subject to executive override. To determine what limitation period applies in a given situation, a careful reading of the limitation provisions at article 43 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice is required since there are a number of exceptions and caveats. In comparison to the above-mentioned military justice systems, the U.S. limitations system appears to be the most complex as it entails a somewhat convoluted application.

    A review of various Canadian limitation periods fails to uncover any general rationale for the process of establishing statutory limitations for offences under disciplinary codes of conduct. Under provincial police legislation, a charge must typically be initiated within six months of the occurrence of the alleged disciplinary offence. However, the RCMP Act provides a one-year limitation period from the time the contravention and the identity of the member become known. A review of the legislation for various self-governing professional disciplinary tribunals is similarly unhelpful in ascertaining the broad principles behind limitation periods, due to the generally diverse nature of statutory time limits.

    We can see no acceptable rationale for a limitation period in respect of service offences tried before a court martial and favour its repeal, except to the extent that a limitation period is specifically provided for in statutes incorporated by reference pursuant to the National Defence Act. Therefore:

31. We recommend that the National Defence Act be amended to remove the three-year limitation period in respect of service offences and to provide that an accused tried by court martial has the benefit of any limitation period applicable to a civil offence incorporated in the Code of Service Discipline.

    On the other hand, there is some merit to a limitation period in respect of offences tried by way of summary trial. Summary trials are supposed to deliver swift justice and deal with minor disciplinary offences. In that regard, it would seem inconsistent to allow a service offence to proceed to summary trial several years after it has occurred. The choice of the exact period is to a certain extent arbitrary, but we believe that a one-year limitation period would be appropriate. Therefore:

32. We recommend that the National Defence Act be amended to prescribe a one-year limitation period for any offence tried by way of summary trial." (pp. 58-61; notes omitted)

CANADA, PARLIAMENT / PARLEMENT

ok- Bill C-60, An Act to amend the National Defence Act (court martial) and to make a consequential amendment to another Act, First reading, 6 June 2008;
FRANÇAIS :
Projet de loi C-60, Loi modifiant la Loi sur la défense nationale (cour martiale) et une autre loi en conséquence, première lecture, le 6 juin 2008

Canadian decisions on pre-charge delays:

A- Supreme Court of Canada

Carter v. The Queen, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 981 available at http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/pub/1986/vol1/index.html (accessed on 20 April 2003);
 

R. v. Kalanj, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1594; available at http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/pub/1989/vol1/index.html (accessed on 4 May 2003);
 

R. v. MacDonnell, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 305 available at http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/pub/1997/vol1/index.html; (accessed on 4 May 2003); appeal from a judgmentof the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal (1996), 148 N.S.R. (2d) 289, 429 A.P.R. 289, 47 C.R. (4th) 97, allowing the Crown's appeal from a judgment of MacDonald J. (1995), 141 N.S.R. (2d) 266, 403 A.P.R. 266, granting a stay of proceedings on a charge of non-capital  murder. Appeal allowed.MacDonnell, 1997 decision of the S.C.C
 

R. v. L.(W.K.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 1091; available at http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/pub/1991/vol1/index.html (accessed on 4 May 2003);

"The question is whether an accused can rely solely on the passage of time which is apparent on the face of the indictment as establishing a violation of s. 7 or s. 11(d) [of the Charter].

Delay in charging and prosecuting an individual cannot, without more, justify staying the proceedings as an abuse of process at common law. In Rourke v. The Queen, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 1021, Laskin C.J. (with whom the majority agreed on this point) stated that (at pp. 1040-41):

Absent any contention that the delay in apprehending the accused had some ulterior purpose, courts are in no position to tell the police that they did not proceed expeditiously enough with their investigation, and then impose a sanction of a stay when prosecution is initiated.  The time lapse between the commission of an offence and the laying of a charge following apprehension of an accused cannot be monitored by Courts by fitting investigations into a standard mould or moulds.  Witnesses and evidence may disappear in the short run as well as in the long, and the accused too may have to be sought for a long or short period of time. Subject to such controls as are prescribed by the Criminal Code, prosecutions initiated a lengthy period after the alleged commission of an offence must be left to take their course and to be dealt with by the Court on the evidence, which judges are entitled to weigh for cogency as well as credibility.  The Court can call for an explanation of any untoward delay in prosecution and may be in a position, accordingly to assess the weight of some of the evidence.

Does the Charter now insulate accused persons from prosecution solely on the basis of the time that has passed between the commission of the offence and the laying of the charge?  In my view, it does not.

Staying proceedings based on the mere passage of time would be the equivalent f imposing a judicially created limitation period for a criminal offence.  In Canada, except in rare circumstances, there are no limitation periods in riminal law.  The comments of Laskin C.J. in Rourke are equally applicable under the Charter.

Section 7 and s. 11(d) of the Charter protect, among other things, an individual's right to a fair trial.  The fairness of a trial is not, however, automatically undermined by even a lengthy pre-charge delay.  Indeed, a delay may operate to the advantage of the accused, since Crown witnesses may forget or disappear.  The comments of Lamer J., as he then was, in Mills v. The Queen, supra, at p. 945, are apposite:

Pre-charge delay is relevant under ss. 7 and 11(d) because it is not the length of the delay which matters but rather the effect of that delay upon the fairness of the trial.  [Emphasis added.] Courts cannot, therefore, assess the fairness of a particular trial without considering the particular circumstances of the case.  An accused's rights are not infringed solely because a lengthy delay is apparent on the face of the indictment.

I note, additionally, and in response to the trial judge's specific comments  regarding society's attitudes relating to sexual crimes, that the nature of this kind of offence provides additional support for my conclusion. The appellant was charged with several offences which amounted to sexual abuse.  It is well documented that non-reporting, incomplete reporting, and delay in reporting are common in cases of sexual abuse.  The 1984 Report of the Committee on Sexual Offences Against Children and Youths (the Badgley Report), vol. 1, explained at p. 187 that:

Most of these incidents were not reported by victims because they felt these matters were too personal or sensitive to divulge to others, and because many of them were too ashamed of what had happened.

After reviewing the evidence, the Report concluded that:

Female victims were more than twice as likely (23.8 per cent) as male victims (11.1 per cent) to have sought assistance. However, a majority of victims of both sexes had not done so. For three in four female victims and about nine in 10 male victims, these incidents had been kept as closely guarded personal secrets.

For victims of sexual abuse to complain would take courage and emotional strength in revealing those personal secrets, in opening old wounds. If proceedings were to be stayed based solely on the passage of time between the abuse and the charge, victims would be required to report incidents before they were psychologically prepared for the consequences of that reporting.

That delay in reporting sexual abuse is a common and expected consequence of that abuse has been recognized in other contexts.  In the United States, many states have enacted legislation modifying or extending the limitation period for the prosecution of sexual abuse cases, in recognition of the fact that sexual abuse often goes unreported, and even undiscovered by the complainant, for years.  This legislation has, to date, withstood constitutional challenges. (See, for example, Durga M. Bharam, "Statute of Limitations for Child Sexual Abuse Offenses:  A Time for Reform Utilizing the Discovery Rule" (1989), 80 J.Crim. L. & Criminology 842.)  Establishing a judicial statute of limitations would  mean that sexual abusers would be able to take advantage of the failure to report which they themselves, in many cases, caused.  This is not a result which we should encourage.  There is no place for an arbitrary rule." (Stevenson, J., pp. 1100-1101)

B-  Ontario Court of Appeal

R. v. Young (1984),  13 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Ont. C.A.); available at  http://www.dessus.com/TaxInfo/Cases/young.html (accessed on 10 May 2003);
 

C- Other Court Decisions of Interest

R. v. Tremblay, (1922) 38 CCC 125, 69 DLR 220 (Quebec Sessions of the Peace, Choquette, J., September 25, 1922);

"SEDUCTION -- CRIMINAL OFFENCE -- PLEA OF NOT GUILTY -- SUFFICIENCY OF AS COVERING PRESCRIPTION -- CR. CODE  R.S.C. 1906, CH. 146, SEC 1140.

A plea of not guilty to a criminal charge is general, and it is for the Crown to prove the charge, as well in fact as in law; the accused may set up under such plea to a charge of seduction that it was not brought within the statutory period of limitation (Cr. Code) sec. 1140.  An amendment as to the date of the offence will not be granted if it would be too late to lay a new charge, a plea of not guilty also comprises prescription, and if prescription is acquired the defendant should have the full benefit of it." (p. 125)
......

"The Crown prosecutors have argued that the defendant having appeared and pleaded not guilty, without  specially invoking prescription, has thereby renounced his right to raise it now.

The argument is untenable; a plea of not guilty, from the criminal point of view, is general, and it is for the Crown to prove the charge, as well in fact as in law, and a plea of not guilty also comprises prescription, and if prescription is acquired, the defendant should have the full benefit of it." (p. 126)

The Criminal Code, 1892 / Code Criminel, 1892

"[Time within which proceedings shall be commenced]
 841.  In the case of any offence punishable on summary conviction if no time is specially limited for making any complaint, or laying any information in the Act or law relating to the particular case, the complaint shall be made, or the information shall be laid within six months from the time when the matter of complaint or information arose, except in the North-west Territories, where the time within which such complaint may be made, or such information may be laid, shall be extended to twelve months from the time when the matter of the complaint or information arose.  52 V. c. 45, s. 4.

----------------------

"[Délai dans lequel les procédures devront être commencées]
841.  Dans le cas de toute infraction punissable sur conviction sommaire, si aucun délai pour porter plainte ou faire la dénonciation n'est spécialement fixé par l'acte ou la loi concernant le cas particulier, la plainte sera portée ou la dénonciation sera faite dans les six mois à compter du jour où la cause de la plainte ou dénonciation se sera produite; toutefois, dans les territoires du Nord-Ouest, le délai dans lequel la plainte pourra être portée ou la dénonciation faite sera prolongé à douze mois à compter du jour où la cause de la plainte ou dénonciation se sera produite. -- 52 V, c. 45, art. 5."

Criminal Code, Revised Statutes 1985, chapter C-46, section 786 available at  http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/c-46/39579.html (accessed on 20 April 2003); also available in French / aussi disponible en français: Code criminel, Lois Refondues 1985, chapitre C-46, article 786, disponible à  http://lois.justice.gc.ca/fr/C-46/index.html (visionné le 20 avril 2003):

"[Application of Part]
786. (1) Except where otherwise provided by law, this Part [Part XXVII: Summary Convictions] applies to proceedings as defined in this Part.

[Limitation]
(2) No proceedings shall be instituted more than six  months after the time when the subject-matter of the proceedings arose, unless the prosecutor and the defendant so agree.
R.S., 1985, c. C-46, s. 786; 1997, c. 18, s. 110."

---------------------

"[Application de la  présente partie]
786. (1) Sauf disposition contraire de la loi, la présente partie [Partie XXVII: Déclarations de culpabilité par procédure sommaire] s'applique aux procédures définies dans cette partie.

[Prescription]
(2) À moins d'une entente à l'effet contraire entre le poursuivant et le défendeur, les procédures se prescrivent par six mois à compter du fait en cause.
L.R. (1985), ch. C-46, art. 786; 1997, ch. 18, art. 110."

Criminal Codes -- Annotated used by practioners / Codes criminels annotés utilisés par les practiciens

 in English (published every year) /en anglais

GREENSPAN, Edward L. and Marc Rosenberg, annotations by, Martin's Annual Criminal Code 2005, Aurora: Canada Law Book Inc., 2005, 2236 p. (with 1560 pages devoted to the Criminal Code), ISSN: 0527-7892; note: the legislation is in English only;

WATT, David and Michelle Fuerst, annotations by, The 2005 Annotated Tremeear's Criminal Code, Toronto: Carswell, A Thomson Company, 2004, 2474 p. (with 1573 p. devoted to the Criminal Code), ISBN: 0459275658 (professional ed.), 0459275674 (student ed.), and 0459275631 (police ed.), ISSN: 1184-0293; note: the legislation in English only;

COURNOYER, Guy et Gilles Ouimet, Code criminel annoté 2005, Cowansville: Éditions Yvon Blais, une société Thomson, 2004, 2515 p. (1399 sur le Code criminel), ISBN: 289457327, legislation in English and French;

DUBOIS, Alain et Philip Schneider, Code criminel et lois connexes annotés 2005, Brossard: Publications CCH Ltée, 2004, 2744 p. (1476 p. sur le  Code criminel), ISBN: 2893664466, legislation in English and French; ISSN: 1707-0740;

DES ROSIERS, Natalie, "Limitation Periods and Civil Remedies for Childhood Sexual Abuse", (1992) 5 Canadian Family Law Quarterly 43-71; civil law but of interest for researchers; copy at Ottawa University, KE 532 .C352, Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

DOHERTY, David H., "Boron: Is Pre-charge Delay Relevant in Determining Whether s. 11(B) Has Been Infringed?", (1984) 36 Criminal Reports (3d) 338-345;
 

GARTON, Graham, edited with commentaries, Canadian Charter of Rights Decisions Digest, available at  http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/ccrdd/cdtoc.htm (accessed on 21 April 2003); also published in French / aussi publié en français: GARTON, Graham, Publié avec commentaires par, Recueil des décisions relatives à la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés, disponible à  http://canada.justice.gc.ca/fr/dept/pub/ccrdd/cdtoc.htm (visionné le 21 avril 2003);

See in particular / voir en particulier:

• section 7, "Pre-Charge and Appellate delay" at  http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/ccrdd/Section7-1.htm#[10] Pre-Charge and Appellate Delay;

• subsection 11(b), "Pre-charge Delay" at  http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/ccrdd/section11ssb.htm#[2] Pre-charge Delay;
 

GOLD, Alan D., "Charter - Pre-Charge Delay [ R. v. Young (June 27, 1984, Ont. C.A.)]", (1983-84) 26 The Criminal Law Quarterly 408-410;
 

___________"Notes and Comments: Limitation Period -- Included Summary Conviction Offence [R. v. Chausse (1986), 51 C.R. (3d) 332 (Que. C.A.)]", (1986-87) 29 The Criminal Law Quarterly 168 [1 p. only];
 

GREENSPAN,  Edward L., "Set the clock on criminal charges.  There are powerful reasons for establishing a statute of limitations", The National Post, Tuesday, June 29, 1999 (opinion), available at http://www.efc.ca/pages/media/national-post.29jun99.html (accessed on 4 May 2003); important contribution;

"American and European legislators and courts have long recognized that statutes of limitations are fundamental to the criminal law. Canada has recognized that time limitations on civil actions are essential. In order to protect our basic principles of justice and the community's sense of fair play and decency, it is high time that Parliament introduce a comprehensive statute of limitations for criminal charges".

HÉBERT, Jean-Claude, "La prescription en droit pénal québécois",  (1977) 37 Revue du Barreau 253-257;
 

ILLICO Inc., document de recherche, CR-2666, "Le délai pré-inculpatoire et l'article 11 b) («pre-charge delay»)"; titre noté dans mes recherches le 10 mai 2003 mais document non consulté;
 

INNES, William I., 1952-, Tax Evasion in Canada, Toronto: Carswell, 1987, xxvi, 326 p., and see "Limitation Periods", at pp. 194-198, ISBN:  0459305719; copy at the University of Ottawa, FTX General: KE 5728 .I55 1987; note: LL.M. thesis with the title: Tax Evasion in Canadian Law, York University, 1987, 133 p.with W. Neil Brooks as thesis supervisor;

okLAMER, Antonio, 1933-2007,  The First Independent Review by the Right Honourable Antonio Lamer P.C., C.C., C.D. of the provisions and operation of Bill C-25, An Act to amend the National Defence Act and to make consequential amendments to other Acts, as required under section 96 of Statutes of Canada 1998, c.35, Submitted to the Minister of National Defence, September 3, 2003, [Ottawa], 121, 3 p., available at http://web.archive.org/web/20050513015206/www.forces.gc.ca/site/Reports/review/en/report_e.pdf  and http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports/review/index_e.asp; tabled in the House of Commons, on 5 November 2003, sessional paper number 8560-372-828-01;
FRANÇAIS :
LAMER, Antonio, 1933-2007, Le premier examen indépendant par le rès honorable Antonio Lamer C.P., C.C., C.D., des dispositions et de l’application du projet de loi C-25, Loi modifiant la Loi sur la défense nationale et d'autres lois en conséquence, conformément à l’article 96 des Lois du Canada (1998), ch. 35, Présenté au ministre de la Défense nationale le 3 septembre 2003, [Ottawa],  124, 3 p.; disponible à http://web.archive.org/web/20060317102517/www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports/review/fr/report_f.pdf; and http://www.forces.gc.ca/site/reports/review/index_f.asp déposé à la Chambre des communes, le 5 novembre 2003, document parlementaire numéro 8560-372-828-01; 

LAREAU, François,"Selected Bibliography on Abuse of Process and Stay of Proceedings / Bibliographie choisie sur l'abus de procédure et l'arrêt des procédures" disponible à  http://home.achilles.net/~flareau/abuseofprocess.html (accessed on 20 April 2003);

LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, Classification of Offences, Ottawa: The law Reform Commission of Canada, 1986, viii, 92 p., and see "Limitation Periods", at pp. 44-45 (series; Working paper; number 54), ISBN: 0662545699; ; also published in French / aussi publié en français: La classification des infractions, Ottawa: La Commission de réforme du droit du Canada, 1986, viii, 98 p., et voir "Les délais de prescription", aux pp. 48-49 (Collection; document de travail; 54), ISBN: ISBN: 0662545699;

___________Contempt of Court, Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1982¸ [vii],  67 p., and see "Time limitation", at pp. 37-38 (Series; Report; 17), ISBN: 0662512995, also published in French / aussi publié en français: COMMISSION DE RÉFORME DU DROIT DU CANADA, L'outrage au tribunal, Ottawa: Ministre des Approvisionnements et Services Canada, 1982, [vii], 69 p., et voir "La prescription", aux pp. 40-41 (Collection; Rapport; 17), ISBN: 0662512995;
 

LÉTOURNEAU, Gilles et Pierre Robert, Code de procédure pénale du Québec, 5e éd., Montréal: Wilson & Lafleur, 2002, xii, 871 p., voir sur la prescription, les articles 13-16,  ISBN: 2891275535;
 

LIBMAN, Rick, 1956-,  The 2000-2001 Annotated Ontario Provincial Offences Act, Toronto: Carswell, 2002, lxvi, 508 p., see section 76, "Limitation" at pp. 173-174; ISBN: 045926061; notes: there is a more recent edition; the 1996 edition was co-authored with Murray Segal, 1949-; copy at the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa, KF9620 ZB3 O58;
 

MacINTOSH, Donald A., "Pre-Charge Delay", (1991-92) 1 National Journal of Constitutional Law 260-263; deals with  R. v. L.(W.K.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 1091;

McCOOEY, Paula, "Murder charges stayed in two 1990 killings.  Stewart, Mallory walk free 16 years after 'Cumberland murders'", The Ottawa Citizen, Wednesday, 28 February 2007, pp. B1 and B2; title at p. B2 is "Murders: 'I would like to see a public inquiry'"; new trial ordered for Mallory and Stewart by the Court of Appeal of Ontario in January 2007; case not on prescription but time is an element of consideration in the case    ;

MEDCOF, John C., "Time Limit Defences.  The Rule in Regina v. Karpinski, [1957] S.C.R. 343", (1958-59) 1 The Criminal Law Quarterly 74-76;
 

National Defence Act, R.S. 1985, c. N- 5 /  Loi sur la défense nationale, L.R. 1985, ch. N-5

"[Continuing liability]
    60. (2) Every person subject to the Code of Service Discipline under subsection (1) at the time of the alleged commission by the person of a service offence continues to be liable to be charged, dealt with and tried in respect of that offence under the Code of Service Discipline notwithstanding that the person may have, since the commission of that offence, ceased to be a person described in subsection (1).

[When person is liable]
    69. A person who is subject to the Code of Service Discipline at the time of the alleged commission of a service offence may be charged, dealt with and tried at any time under the Code, subject to the following:

(a) if the service offence is punishable under section 130 or 132 and the act or omission that constitutes the service offence would have been subject to a limitation period had it been dealt with other than under the Code, that limitation period applies; and

(b) the person may not be tried by summary trial unless the trial begins before the expiry of one year after the day on which the service offence is alleged to have been committed."

--------

"[Maintien du statut de justiciable]
    60. (2) Quiconque était justiciable du code de discipline militaire au moment où il aurait commis une infraction d'ordre militaire peut être accusé, poursuivi et jugé pour cette infraction sous le régime du code de discipline militaire, même s'il a cessé, depuis que l'infraction a été commise, d'appartenir à l'une des catégories énumérées au paragraphe (1).

[Prescription]
    69. Toute personne qui était justifiable du code de discipline militaire au moment où elle aurait commis une infraction d'ordre militaire peut être accusée, poursuivie et jugée pour cette infraction sous le régime de ce code, compte tenu des restrictions suivantes :

a) si le fait reproché est punissable par le droit commun en application des articles 130 ou 132, la prescription prévue par le droit commun pour cette infraction s'applique;

b) nul ne peut être jugé sommairement à moins que le procès sommaire ne commence dans l'année qui suit la prétendue perpétration de l'infraction."

ONTARIO, Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, sections 32 and 76; available at  http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/DBLaws/Statutes/English/90p33_e.htm (accessed on 28 April 2003); also available in French / aussi disponible en français, Loi sur les infractions provinciales, L.R.O. 1990, ch. P.33, voir les articles 32 et  76, disponible à http://www.e-laws.gov.on.ca/DBLaws/Statutes/French/90p33_f.htm (visionné le 28 avril 2003);

"Limitation

76.  (1) A proceeding shall not be commenced after the expiration of any limitation period prescribed by or under any Act for the offence or, where no limitation period is prescribed, after six months after the date on which the offence was, or is alleged to have been, committed.

Extension

(2) A limitation period may be extended by a justice with the consent of the defendant. R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, s. 76."

----------------------

"Prescription

76.  (1) Aucune instance ne doit être introduite après l'expiration du délai de prescription prescrit par une loi ou en vertu d'une loi relativement à l'infraction ou, si aucun délai de prescription n'est prescrit, plus de six mois après la date réelle de la perpétration de l'infraction ou celle à laquelle il est allégué que l'infraction a été commise.

Prorogation

(2) Un juge peut proroger un délai de prescription avec le consentement du défendeur. L.R.O. 1990, chap. P.33, art. 76."

"Ottawa.  Judge to rule today on a stay of incest trial", The Ottawa Citizen, 27 September 2005, p. C3; Ontario Superior Court Justice Albert Roy; Defence Counsel: Paul Lewandowski; assistant Crown attorneyL: Donna Eastwood; 74 year old accused of "sexually abusing his seven daughters and a sister-in-law" in the 1950s to 1980s; see also RUPERT, Jake, infra;

"...Lewandowski argued...that due to to the fading memories of witnesses and the deaths of people who could exonerate his client the case was impossible to defend.  He submitted that to allow the prosecution to continue would be a breach of his client's right to a fair trial."

Practice Note, "Time limit for prosecution", (1956) 22 Criminal Reports 302 (1 paragraphy only); deals with R. v. Paquin, (1956) 22 C.R. 302 (Que. Q.B.);
 

QUÉBEC, Code de procédure pénale du Québec, chapitre C-25.1, sur la prescription, voir les articles 13-16 et 184; also available in English/aussi disponible en anglais: Code of penal procedure, Chapter C-25.1, on prescription, see sections 13-16 and 184;
 

QUIGLEY, Tim, "Developments in Criminal Law amd Procedure: The 1990-91 Term", (1992) 3 The Supreme Court Law Review (2nd series) 121-210; see pp. 192-193 on R. v. L.(W.K.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 1091, which is available at http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/pub/1991/vol1/index.html (accessed on 4 May 2003);
 

RESEARCH (THE) FACILITY, ONTARIO LEGAL AID PLAN and LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA, "Research Memoranda",  number C7-3, "Pre-Charge Delay", 43 p., as published in January 27, 1995 of The Lawyers Weekly; there may be a research memoranda more updated version than 1995;
 

RUPERT, Jake, "Judge won't stay incest prosecution", The Ottawa Citizen, 28 September 2005, p. C9; see "Ottawa.  Judge to rule today on a stay of incest trial", supra;
 

Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act, Revised Statutes 1985, chapter R-10, article 43 available at  http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/r-10/text.html(accessed on 20 April 2003);  also published in French / aussi publié en français: Loi sur la gendarmerie royale, Lois Refondues1985, chapitre R-10, article 43;

"Formal Disciplinary Action

[Initiation]
43. (1) Subject to subsections (7) and (8), where it appears to an appropriate officer that a member has contravened the Code of Conduct and the appropriate officer is of the opinion that, having regard to the gravity of the contravention and to the surrounding circumstances, informal disciplinary action under section 41 would not be sufficient if the contravention were established, the appropriate officer shall initiate a hearing into the alleged contravention and notify the officer designated by the Commissioner for the purposes of this section of that decision.
...
[Limitation period]
(8) No hearing may be initiated by an appropriate officer under this section in respect of an alleged contravention of the Code of Conduct by a member after the expiration of one year from the time the contravention and the identity of that member became known to the appropriate officer.

[Certificate]
(9) A certificate purporting to be signed by an appropriate officer as to the time an alleged contravention of the Code of Conduct by a member and the identity of that member became known to the appropriate officer is, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, proof of that time without proof of the signature or official character of the person purporting to have signed the certificate.
R.S., 1985, c. R-10, s. 43; R.S., 1985, c. 8 (2nd Supp.), s. 16."

SCHABAS, William A., 1950-, Les infractions d'ordre sexuel, Cowansville (Quebec): Les Éditions Yvon Blais, 1995, xix, 378 p., voir "Prescription" aux pp. 167-170, ISBN: 2890739791; copie à la Bibliothèque de la Cour suprême du Canada, KF 9325 S32 1995 c. 01;
 

STEEL, Kevin, "367 days later it's still murder: Ottawa is removing the ancient year and a day time limit on homicide charges where a lingering victim fails to recover", (16 February 1998) 25(9) Alberta Report 21; about section 227 of the Criminal Code;

"Though 'the year and a day' law, as it is informally known, was incorporated into Canada's Criminal Code in 1892, the rule dates back to 14th-century England, according to Wayne Renke, professor of criminal law at the University of Alberta.  Prof. Renke cites a 1989 article in the Cambridge Law Journal which speculates that the year and a day rule may have its origin in time limits placed on private appeals in wrongful death cases."

SZABO, Denis, et Alain Joffé, "La répression des crimes contre l'humanité et des crimes de guerre au Canada", in Marcel Colin, 1914-, sous la direction de, Le crime contre l'humanité.  Textes réunis par Bruno Gravier et Jean-Marc Elchardus; sous la direction de Marcel Colin, Ramonville Saint-Agne [France]: Erès, 1996, 303 p., aux pp. 55-81 (Collection; Etudes, recherches, actions en santé mentale en Europe), ISBN: 286586376X; notes: "Les textes réunis dans le présent volume ont été élaborés à la suite du XXVIe congrès de l'Association française de criminologie organisé par l'Association lyonnaise de criminologie et d'anthropologie sociales, et publiés avec le soutien du comité européen: Droit, éthique et psychiatrie"; copie à la Bibliothèque du Parlement, JX 5418 C75; copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, MRT General, K 5301 .Z85 C75 1996;

    "Les modifications législatives ont entraîné deux ans plus tard, à Toronto, un procès retentissant connu communément sous l'affaire Finta [R. c. Finta, [1994] 1 Rapports de la Cour suprême du Canada 701, disponible à http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/pub/1994/vol1/] et qui dura plus de six mois.  A l'étonnement de tout le monde, le jury rendit un verdict de non-culpabilité sur tous les chefs, au désarroi de la Communauté juive du Canada.

    Le procès Finta, à l'instar de celui de Demjanjuck en Israël, reflète les difficultés de poursuivre plus de quarante-cinq ans après des personnes soupçonnées de participation à des crimes de guerre ou à des crimes contre l'humanité.  Les poursuites des criminels de guerre nazis aux lendemains de la Seconde Guerre mondiale ne causaient pas de problèmes juridiques insurmontables en raison de la fraîcheur des événements et du peu de garanties judiciaires dont jouissaient les accusés dans les procès qui eurent lieu dans chacune des zones d'occupation ou dans les territoires libérés du joug nazi.  Le processus judiciaire était régi le plus souvent par le droit militaire, un système qui n'est pas autant soucieux du respect des droits individuels que ne l'auraient été des juridictions britanniques ou canadiennes appliquant la Common Law en période de paix. [...]

    L'affaire Finta mit en lumière les difficultés de concilier les garanties constitutionnelles que le droit canadien accorde aux accusés dans le domaine du droit criminel avec les impératifs que revêt le châtiment des criminels de guerre nazis.  Le droit constitutionnel d'être jugé dans de telles circonstances par un tribunal composé d'un juge et d'un jury est, selon nous, pour quelque chose dans l'expérience difficile vécue par le ministère public dans l'affaire Finta, même si l'écoulement du temps fut également un facteur important dans l'issue du procès.  Si l'on ne peut que spéculer sur les raisons qui ont amené les membres du jury à acquiter Imre Finta, il faut reconnaître que l'extrême complexité des questions factuelles et juridiques qui se posaient dans ce procès a rendu la tâche du jury très ardue." (pp. 71 et 99)

WILLIAMS, Sharon A., "Nationality, Double Jeopardy, Prescription and the Death Sentence as Bases for Refusing Extradition", (1991) 62 Revue internationale de droit pénal 259-280, see "Prescription" at pp. 268-272;

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