updated and corrections / mise à jour et corrections: 28 December 2009

by / par ©François Lareau, 2002-, Ottawa, Canada
 

- To assist researchers, please do not hesitate to suggest titles to these bibliographies.  Thank you.
- Pour le bénéfice de tous, n'hésitez pas à suggérer des ajouts aux bibliographies.  Merci.
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Selected Bibliography on Provocation
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Bibliographie choisie sur la provocation
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Part/Partie II: Provocation
Comparative Law-- Authors
Droit Comparé -- Auteurs

H-O
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see also / voir aussi:

• Part II: Provocation -- Comparative Law -- Authors A-G
• Part II: Provocation -- Comparative Law -- Authors P-Z

• Part I : Provocation -- Canadian Law / Droit comparé

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HALE,  Matthew, 1609-1676,  Historia Placitorum Coronae - The History of the Pleas of the Crown, Savoy (in the): E.R. Nutt and R. Gosling, 1736, 2 vol., [xx], [8], 710 p. for vol. 1 and [4], 414, [198] p. for vol. 2; reprint in : Abingdon Oxon: Professional Books, 1987; series: Classical English Law Texts); see vol. 1 for homicide;
 

HAMILTON, John, "Manslaughter: Assessment for Court" in Robert Bluglass and Paul Bowden, eds., with an introduction by Nigel Walker, Principles and Practice of Forensic Psychiatry, Edinburgh and New York: Churchill Livingstone, 1990, xxi, 1405, 10, 84, 53 p., see "Provocation" at pp. 211-212, ISBN:  0443035784; copy at CISTI, Canada Institute for Scientific and Technical Information, Ottawa/ICIST, Institut canadien de l'information scientifique et technique, Ottawa, RA1151 P957;
 

HAREL, Alon, "Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law: The Case for a Criminal Law Principle of Comparative Fault", (1994) 82 California Law Review 1181-1229, see "Provocation" at pp. 1211-1217;

"Fairness consideration based on the equal costs model also support the doctrine [of provocation].  The provoker imposes extra costs on society.  His voluntary conduct (the provocation) lacks significant social value and therefore should not be rewarded by society.  Therefore, a fair distribution of protection should be determined by the equal costs model, which requires expending equal resources for the protection of provokers and nonprovokers.  Given the higher probability that provokers will become actual victims, society should expand fewer resources to punish people who commit homicide as a result of provocation.⁹⁹  ... .
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99.  It is also plausible to argue that the provocation doctrine is endorsed through the use of other mechanisms such as the enforcement policy of the police forces and the use of discretionary powers of judges and juries in criminal cases.  See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text." (p. 1217)

HAUS, J.J. (Jacques Joseph),  1796-1881, Principes généraux du droit pénal belge, 3e .édition, revue, corrigée, et augmentée, Gand (Belgique) : Librarie Générale de Ad. Hoste éditeur, 1879, vii, 572 p. pour le vol. 1 et 654 p. pour le  vol. 2; réimpression dans: Bruxelles : Editions Swinnen H., 1977, 2 v., copie à l'Université McGill, Montréal, KJK 3825 H38 1977;

"Pour que la provocation constitue une cause d'excuse il faut, ensuite, que le crime ou le délit ait été commis dans le mouvement d'emportement produit par la provocation ⁽¹¹⁾.  En effet, le principe de l'excuse invoquée par l'agent réside dans la violence de la passion qui jette le trouble dans son esprit et le précipite dans le crime; il est coupable d'avoir cédé à l'irritation ou à la crainte qu'il aurait dû surmonter; mais il est excusable, parce qu'il a agi sous l'empire d'un mouvement impétieux qui l'a surpris.  La provocation continue donc de produire l'excuse, tant que se prolonge l'émotion violente dont elle a été la cause.  Mais l'excuse vient à cesser, lorsque le crime a été commis après un intervalle assez long pour que la réflexion ait pu surgir; car alors l'action n'est plus commise dans un premier élan; elle est le résultat d'une délibération qui en aggrave la criminalité; ce n'est plus un acte de colère ou de crainte, mais de vengeance et de haine.  L'assassinat n'admet donc pas d'excuse.  Mais de là il ne suit point que, dans une accusation d'assassinat, la cour d'assises puisse refuser de poser au jury, sur une demande de l'accusé, la question de provocation; car il peut arriver que le jury, tout en répondant affirmativement sur le fait principal, écarte les circonstances de la préméditation, et alors l'homicide ne constituant plus qu'un simple meurtre, l'excuse devient admissible.  Mais le jury qui aurait répondu affirmativement sur la question de préméditation, ne pourrait plus admettre l'excuse de la provocation; car un assassinat excusable impliquerait contradiction." (vol. 2, pp. 109-110, paragraphe 832)
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    "(11) Tel est le sens des mots: immédiatement, en repoussant, à l'instant, dont se servent les art. 411, 412 et 413 C.p.  L'acte de provocation et l'acte de réaction peuvent donc être séparés par un intervalle qui n'empêche pas l'agent de faire valoir l'excuse.  J.J. HAUS, Exposé des motifs des art. 411 et suiv. Législat. crim. de la Bel., t. III, p. 226, n^o 58.  Voir ibid, p. 385, n^o 12." (vol. 2, p. 109)

HAWKINS, William, 1673-1746, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown: or a System of the Principal  Matters relating to that subject, digested under their proper Heads in Two Books, 2nd ed., London: Printed by E. Sayer for J. Walthoe, 1724-1726, 2 books, see Book I, Chapter 31, "Of  Murder" at pp. 78-87; reprint: of this edition in: New York: Arno Press, A New York Times Company, 1972, ISBN: 0405040202;

    "Sect. 20.  As to murder in the first sense, such Acts as shew a direct and deliberate Intent to kill another, as Poisoning, Stabbing, and such like, are so clearly Murder, that I know not any Questions relating thereto worth explaining: But the Cases, which have born dispute, have generally happened in the following Instances;
1. In Duelling.
2. In killing another without any Provocation, or but upon a slight one.
3. In killing one whom the Person killing intended to hurt in a less Degree." (p. 80)

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    "Sect. 32.  And now I am to consider the second Instance of this kind, viz. Such Murder as happens in killing another without any Provocation, or but upon a slight one; as to which it is to be observed, That where-ever it appears that a [Kelynge 27.] Man killed another, it shall be intended, prima facie, that he did it maliciously, unless he can make out the contrary, by shewing that he did it on a sudden Provocation, etc.

    Sect. 33.  Also it seems to be agreed, That no ^a [^aKelynge 135.  2 Rol. Rep. 460, 461.] Breach of a Man's Word or Promise, no Trespass either to ^b [^bKelynge 131, &c. Dalt. cap. 93.]  Lands or Goods, no Affront by bare ^c [^c Cro. El. 779.  Noy. 171.  1 Sid. 277.  1 Levin. 180.  Hob. 121.  Con. 1 Jon. 432. a.  Kelynge 131.] Words or Gestures, however false or malicious it may be, and aggravated with the most provoking Circumstances, will excuse him from being guilty of Murder, who is so far transported thereby, as immediately to attack the Person who offends him, in such a Manner as manifestly endangers his Life, without giving him Time to put himself upon his Guard, if he kills him in Pursuance of such Assault, whether the Person slain did all fight in his Defence or not; for so to base and cruel a Revenge cannot have too severe a Construction.

    Sect. 34.  But if a Person so provoked, had beaten the other only in such a Manner, that it might plainly appear that he meant not to kill, but only chastise him; [Kelynge 55, 61, 131.  Kelynge 61, 136.] or if he had restrained himself till the other had put himself on his Guard, and then in fighting with him had killed him, he had been guilty of Manslaughter only.

    Sect. 35. [Cro. Jac. 296.  12 Co. 87.]  And of the like Offence shall he be adjudged guilty, who seeing two Persons fighting together on a private Quarrel, whether sudden or malicious, takes Part with one of them, and kills the other.

    Sect. 36.  Neither can he be thought guilty of a greater Crime, who ^a [^aKelynge 137.  1 Vent. 158, 159.  Raym 212.  2 Keb. 829.] finding a Man in Bed with his Wife, or being actually ^b [^b Kelynge 135. 3 mod. 68.] struck by him, or pulled by the Nose, or sillipped upon the Forehead immediately kill him; or ^c [^cH.P.C. 57.  3 Inst. 55.] who happens to kill another in Contention for the Wall; or ^d [^dKelynge 137.] in the Defence of his Person from an unlawful Arrest; or ^e [^eH.P.C. 57.  Crom. 27 a.] in the Defence of his House from those who claiming a Title to it attempt forcibly to enter it, and to that Purpose shoot at it, etc. or in ^f [^f Kelynge 51.] the Defence of his Possession of a Room in a Public House, from those who attempt to turn him out of it, and thereupon draw their Swords upon him; in which Case the killing the Assailant hath been holden by some to be justifiable: But it is certain, That it can amount to no more than Manslaughter.

    Sect. 37.  [H.P.C. 48.  Cro. Jac. 296.  12 Co. 87.  1 Vent. 159]  Nor was he judged criminal in a higher Degree, who seeing his Son's Nose bloody, and being told by him, That he had been beaten by such a Boy, ran three Quarters of a Mile, and having found the Boy, beat him with a small Cudgel, whereof he afterwards died." (pp. 82-83)

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    "Sect. 38. [Kelyn, Mawgridge's Case.  H.P.C. 49.  50, 51, 52.] And now we are come to the third Instance of this kind, viz. Such Murder as happens in killing one whom the Person killing, intended to hurt in a less Degree; as to which it is to be observed, That where-ever a Person in cool Blood by way of Revenge, unlawfully and deliberately beats another in such a Manner, that he afterwards dies thereof, he is guilty of Murder, however unwilling he might have been to have gone so far.

    Sect. 39. [Cro. Car. 131. 1 Jon. 198. Palm. 545. H.P.C. 49.]  Also it seems, That he, who upon a suden Provocation executeth his Revenge in such a cruel Manner, as shews a cruel and deliberate intent to do Mischief, is guilty of Murder, If Death ensue; as where the Keeper of a Park finding a Boy stealing Wood, tied him to a Horse's Tail and beat him, whereupon the Horse ran away and killed him." (p. 83)
 

HELLER, Kevin Jon, "Beyond the Reasonable Man?  A Sympathetic but Critical Assessment of the Use of Subjective Standards of Reasonableness in Self-Defense and Provocation Cases", (1998) 26 American Journal of Criminal Law 1-120;
 

HERRING, Jonathan, Current Topic, "Provocation and Ethnicity", [1996] Criminal Law Review 490-493;
 

HERRMANN, Joachim., "Causing the Conditions of One's Own Defense: The Multifaceted Approach of German Law", [1986] Brigham Young niversity Law
Review 747-767; also published in Albin Eser et al., eds., Justification and Excuse: Comparative Perspectives, vol. 1, Dobbs Ferry (New York), Transnational Juris Publications, 1987, ISBN: 0929179226, pp. 745-774; Table of Contents (Brigham Young University Law Review): I. INTRODUCTION...747; II. PROVOCASTION OF SELF-DEFENCE...748;  A. Provocation: Purposely Promoting an Attack...749; B. Provocation: Not Purposely Induced...753; C. Professor Robinson's Theory: A Comparison...756; III. JUSTIFYING NECESSITY...757; A. Provoking Conditions of An Emergency...757; B. Responsibility for Necessity When Conditions are Not Purposely Caused...758; C. Actio Illicita In Causa...759;  IV. Excusing Necessity...760; V. VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION...763; A. Actio Libera In Causa...763; B.Voluntary Intoxication as an Independent Offense...765; VI. CONCLUSION...766;
 

HESNARD, A., Psychologie du crime : Au delà de l'infrastructure biologique, sociale et psychiatrique du crime.  Connaissance concrète de l'homme criminel en situation.  Conceptions compréhensives du crime: clinique élargie, psychanalytique, phénoménologique.  Vers une anthropologie criminelle, Paris: Payot, 1963, 354 p., voir "Les crimes pseudo-passionnels" aux pp. 165-170 et "Le crime passionnel" aux pp. 194-206  (Collection; Bibliothèque scientifique); copie à la Bibliothèque de la Cour suprême du Canada, Ottawa, numéro : HV 6080 H475; contribution importante au sujet du crime passionnel;

    "Si l'on a fait du criminel passionnel un type criminel à part, depuis Lombroso et Ferri, et presque même, parfois, une victime, c'est pace qu'il ne recherche pas d'intérêt particulier.   Parce qu'il ne fait pas disparaItre quelqu'un pour prendre sa place, qu'il ne tue généralement pas non plus dans un but directement sexuel.  Parce qu'au contraire il ne parle que de sa souffrance morale, de son besoin d'affection, de son besoin de justice.

    Or, fait remarquer de Greef, l'homme qui a commis un crime passionnel ne se présente pas à l'examen psychologique comme sympathique.  Homme d'un monstrueux égoïsme, d'une sensibilité parfois maladive, mais surtout restée primitive, non éduquée, incapable de se maîtriser. [...] " (p. 198)

HEUYER, Georges (Dr.), Psychoses et crimes passionnels, Paris, G. Doin, 1932, paginé 196-211; aussi publié dans (1932) 27 L'Hygiène mentale, journal de psychiatrie appliquée 196-211; copie du périodique à CISTI, Canada Institute for Scientific and Technical Information, Ottawa / ICIST, Institut canadien de l'information scientifique et technique, Ottawa,  SER  RA790 A1 H99;

"Il est anormal et illogique de réclamer la même peine, lourde et définitive pour le passionnel, criminel d'occasion, et pour le pervers, récidiviste constitutionnel, criminel amoral, inaffectif et inintimidable." (p. 211)

HOGAN, Brian, "The Killing Ground: 1964-73", [1974] Criminal Law Review 387-401, see on provocation pp. 395-397;
 

HOLMES, Oliver Wendell, The Common Law, Boston Little Brown, 56th printing (first published in 1881), xvi, 422 p., on provocation, see pp. 60-62;

    "The law of manslaughter contains another doctrine which should be referred to in order to complete the understanding of the general principles of the criminal law.  This doctrine is, that provocation may reduce an offence which would otherwise have been murder to manslaughter.  According to current morality, a man is not so much to blame for an act done under the disturbance of great excitement, caused by a wrong done to himself, as when he is calm.  The law is made to govern men through their motives, and it must, therefore, take their mental constitution into account.

    It might be urged, on the other side, that, if the object of punishment is prevention, the heaviest punishment should be threatened where the strongest motive is needed to restrain; and primitive legislation seems sometimes to have gone on that principle.  But if any threat will restrain a man in a passion, a threat of less than death will be sufficient, and therefore the extreme penalty has been thought excessive.

    At the same time the objective nature of legal standards is shown even here.  The mitigation does not come from the fact that the defendant was beside himself with rage.  It is not enough that he had grounds which would have had the same effect on every man of his standing and education.  The most insulting words are not provocation, although to this day, and still more when the law was established, many people would rather die than suffer them without action.  There must be provocation sufficient to justify the passion, and the law decides on general considerations what provocations are sufficient.

    It is said that even what the law admits to be 'provocation does not extenuate the guilt of homicide, unless the person provoked is at the time when he does the deed deprived of the power of self-control by the provocation which he has received.'¹  There are obvious reasons for taking the actual state of the defendant's consciousness into account to this extent.  The only ground for not applying the general rule is, that the defendant was in such a state that he could not be expected to remember or be influenced by the fear of punishment; if he could be, the grounds of exception disappears.  Yet even here, rightly or wrongly, the law has gone far in the direction of adopting external tests.  The courts seem to have decided between murder and manslaughter on such grounds as the nature of the weapon used,² or the length of time between the provocation and his act.³  But in other cases the question whether the prisoner was deprived of self-control by passion has been left to the jury.⁴
....
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¹ Steph. Dig. Cr. Law, Art. 225.
² Rex v. Shaw, 6 C. & P. 372.
³ Rex v. Oneby, 2 Strange, 766, 773.
⁴ Rex v. Hayward, 6 C. & P. 157." (pp. 60-62)
 

HOOKEY, J.F, "The 'Clapham Omnibus' in Papua New Guinea" in B.J. Brown, ed., Fashion of law in New Guinea; being an account of the past, present and developing system of laws in Papua and New Guinea/ Editor, B. J. Brown. Introduction by Geoffrey Sawer, Sydney, Melbourne [etc.] Butterworths, 1969, 254 p., at p. 117; notes: Papers discussed at a symposium on legal problems in Papua-New Guinea, held at the Australian National University in 1966"; title noted in my research but article not consulted yet; no copy of this book in the Ottawa area libraries;
 

HORDER, Jeremy Christian Nicholas, "Autonomy, Provocation and Duress", [1992] Criminal Law Review 706-715;
 

___________"Between Provocation and Diminished Responsibility", (1999) 10(2) The King's College Law Journal 143-166; copy at Ottawa University, KD 460 .K5532, Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

___________"Can the law do without the reasonable person? [A review of Mayo Moran, Rethinking the Reasonable Person (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003)]", (Spring 2005) 45(2) University of Toronto Law Journal 253-269;
 

___________Excusing crime, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004,  xx, 295 p., (series; Oxford monographs on criminal law and justice),  ISBN: 0198264828; copy at the SCC Library, KF9235 H67 2004;
 

___________The Historical Development and Philosophical Foundations of the English Doctrine of Provocation -- With Special Reference to the Doctrine of Chance Medley, D.Phil., University of Oxford, 1989, 321 p.; BLDSC reference no.: D96397/92; title noted in my research but thesis not consulted yet;
 

____________"The Problem of Provocative Children", [1987] The Criminal Law Review 655-662;

___________"Provocation and Loss of Self-Control", (1992) 108 The Law Quarterly Review191-193; 
 

___________Provocation and responsibility, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1992, xvi, 208 p. (series;  Oxford monographs on criminal law and justice); important contribution; copy at Ottawa University, FTX General, KD 7900 .H67 1992; see Table of Contents;
 

___________"Provocation's Reasonable Man Reassessed", (1996) 112 The Law Quarterly Review 35-39; discusses R. v. Morhall, [1995] 3 W.L.R. 338 (House of Lords); copy at Ottawa University, KD 322 .L37, Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

___________"Reasons for Anger: a response to Narayan and von Hisch's Provocation Theory", (Summer/Fall 1996) 15(2) Criminal Justice Ethics 63-69; contents: Introduction...63; The Impaired Volition Theory...64; The Justificatory Element in a Provocation Plea...66; The Moral Conflict Model...67; Conclusion: Distinguishing Excuse from Mitigation...68; Notes...68; copy at the library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa;
 

___________"Reshaping the Subjective Element in the Provocation Defence", (Spring 2005) 25(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 123-140;
 

___________"Sex, Violence, and Sentencing in Domestic Provocation Cases", [1989] Criminal Law Review 546-554;
 

HOROSZOWSKI, Paul, "Homicide of Passion and its Motives",  in International Symposium on Victimology (1st : 1973 : Jerusalem) and,  Israel Drapkin and Emilio Viano, eds., Victimology: A New Focus,volume 4, Violence and Its Victims,  Lexington, Mass. : Lexington Books, 1975, xx, 211 p. at pp. 3-23, ISBN: 0669957526 (for vol. 4) and 066995778X (for the set of 5 volumes); copy at the University of Ottawa, FTX General, HV 6030 .I54 1973 v. 4;

"From a detailed semantical and psychological analysis it follows that we have to differentiate between the direct purpose of our action and the 'motive' for it.  The decision to act in a particular way is called by the legislator 'criminal intent'; it is something other than motive, which indicates a kind of causal factor for the decision.  The term motive has the most ambiguous meanings in psychology, as well as in other branches of science, and in common use.  After a thorough, multilateral analysis I defined motive as an idea (or thought of a given state of facts -- in the past, present or future) under the influence of which we make our decision to act in a given way.  The motive -- based on right, or illusionary perceptions of facts, and other correct or incorrect mental processes -- is only one of the many more of less conscious, temporary or permanent psychic factors (related to our personality features) which influence our behavior.  It is neither the only nor the most important causative factor, especially in cases of homicide of passion.  As it is commonly accepted by behavioral sciences, our intellectual processes (to which the motives belong, according to the above indicated definition) would be inefficient without the stimulating power of the emotion, which is the incentive or the impulsion of our decision.  The impulsion is, therefore, the emotion which accompanies the motive in the process of making the decision." (p. 4; note omitted)

HORTON, R.A., Annotation, "Insulting Words as Provocation of Homicide or as Reducing the Degree thereof", (1965) 2 ALR 3d  1292-1310 with June 2001 Supplement, pp. 132-134; note: ALR = American Law Reports; copy at the library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa;
 

HOWARD, Colin, "Australian Letter - Provocation in Assault", [1966] Criminal Law Review 435-440;
 

___________"Provocation and Homicide in Australia", (1960) 33 Australian Law Journal 323-330 and for Part II, 355-361 (two columns per page);
 

___________"What Colour is the 'Reasonable Man'?", [1961] Criminal Law Journal 41-48;
 

HOWE, Adrian, Case Notes, "Green v. The Queen [(1997) 148 A.L.R. 659] The Provocation Defence: Finally Provoking its Own Demise?", (1998) 22(2) Melbourne University Law Review 466-490; copy at Ottawa University, KTA 0 .M454  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

___________"More Folk Provoke Their Own Demise: (Homophobic Violence and Sexed Excuses - Rejoining the Provocation Law Debate, Courtesy of the Homosexual Advance Defence)", (1997) 19 Sydney Law Review 336-365; Contents: 1. Introduction...336; 2. A Short Genealogy of HAD...339;  A. Homosexual Panic Defence - psychiatric origins...339;  B. Dismantling HPD and HAD...340; 3.  Mison Versus Dressler - The First HAD/Provocation Debate...344; 4. HAD in Australia...346; 5. New South Wales Attorney-General's Department Discussion Paper -- HAD/Provocation...348; 6. HAD in Australia - Critical Theoretical Receptions...350;  7. The Case Against HAD and Provocation...354; A. Deja Vu...354; B. Extending the Case Against Provocation -- Feminist Glosses on HAD...3578. Revisiting the Dressler/Mison Debate...359; 9. Horder's History...362; 10. Conclusion -- Closing the Case...363;  no copy at Ottawa University; check the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa;
 

__________"Provoking Comment: The Question of Gender Bias in the Provocation Defence - A Victorian Case Study" in Norma Grieves and Ailsa Burns, eds., Australian Women: Contemporary Feminist Thought, Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1994, xii, 356 p., at pp. 225-235 with notes at pp. 332-334, ISBN: 0195535030; copy at Ottawa University,  MRT General, HQ 1823 .A8778 1994;
 

__________"Reforming Provocation (More or Less)", (1999) 12 The Australian Feminist Law Journal 127-135; title noted in my research but article not consulted yet; no copy of this periodical in the Ottawa area libraries;
 

HUGHES, Alison Patricia, Provocation : a gender-specific defence? An investigation into the treatment of domestic violence and the defences available to battered women who kill, LL.M. thesis, University of Sheffield, Department of Law, 2001; title noted in my research but thesis not consulted;
 

HUGHES, Graham, "The English Homicide Act of 1957", (1958-59) 49 Criminal Law, Criminology & Police Science 521-532, see "Provocation" at pp. 528-529; volume 49 is missing from Ottawa University; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa;
 

HUIGENS, Kyron, "Homicide in Aretaic Terms", (2002) 6 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 97-146, see "Nourse on Provocation" at pp. 132-145;
 

HUME, David, 1757-1838 and Benjamin Robert Bell, Commentaries on the law of Scotland, respecting crimes by  David Hume; with a supplement by Benjamin Robert Bell, Edinburgh : Bell & Bradfute, 1844, 2 vol., xix, 591, 141 p. (vol. 1) and xiii, 630, 334 p. (vol. 2);  reprint: with  foreword by Lord Cameron; introduction by  David M. Walker, Edinburgh: Law Society of Scotland, c1986, 2 v., ISBN: 0902023160;

"[Culpable homicide on provocation.] 4.   I now pass from those situations, where the homicide is in this sense accidental, that the killer could not well foresee any such fatal consequence of his act, to those, certainly more criminal cases, where he has a mortal purpose, and yet is not in the first degree of guilt as a murderer:  Because he is not actuated by wickedness of heart, or hatred of the deceased, but by the sudden impulse of resentment, excited by high and real injuries, and accompanied with terror and agitation of spirits.

    [Grounds thereof.] It is true, it could not well be maintained, that such a homicide shall be judged as a pure involuntary act, like that of a brute or a madman, the object of neither praise nor blame.  For although, like other animals, we are subject to the feeling of resentment on injuries, which is necessary to our preservation; yet it is not in our species, as in theirs, a blind and ungovernable impulse; but has been placed by the Author of our nature, under the control of a superior principle, which may serve to restrain it within those just and salutory bounds, where it answers its proper ends; and by means of which, if duly and habitually exerted, not only the conduct of the individual may be regulated, but even the feeling itself may in great measure be chastened and subdued:  So that the very things which he does in self-defence, shall be done calmy and with temperance, and less out of anger or revenge, than from considerations of justice and necessity.  To gain this state of self-command is a part of every man's duty, according to the degree attainable in his way of education and course of life; and so far to fall short of it, as mortally to avenge any insult or injury not attended with danger to one's life, and not impossible to be repelled and chastised by gentler means, -- this is certainly a criminal excess, such as ought to be the source of much distress to the survivor, and cannot be passed over by the magistrate without serious reprehension.  A conclusion which will be the more confirmed, when he reflects on the great frequency of such scenes of provocation, and how strong the propensity to feel too keenly on occasion of all wrongs of this description.  To put men therefore on their guard in this respect, and form them, as far as may be, to a previous habit and disposition on the subject, which may serve as a corrective of sudden passion, the law of most civilized countries has condemmed all homicide that is done on provocation, though grievous and difficult to bear, as a high crime, and the fit subject of exemplary discipline.

    [Grounds of culpable homicide on provocation.]  But while we thus entertain a well-grounded jealousy of every man's partiality in his own case, and have a due regard to the peace and order of society, which are so deeply concerned in the repressing of such excesses; yet, on the other side, we cannot as men be insensible to the wide difference between that homicide which has no incentive but wickedness of heart, and that which is in retaliation only of grievous and alarming injuries suffered upon the spot, and has thus the double excuse of bodily smart, and perturbation of spirits.

    'Tis true, it may be argued, that in one point of view, there is more need of severity in the case of sudden than of wilful and malicious homicide; on account of the greater frequency of the inferior offence.  But no more on this than on other occasions, can we, in judging of human conduct, put the feelings of human nature out of question on views of policy; or forget what the degree of perfection is, to which our constitution permits us to aspire.  It is, indeed, a right and a necessary course, to keep the allowance for the frailties of our condition within as narrow bounds as may be; because by means of this wholesome discipline, men may improve and be corrected.  But to have some consideration of those frailties, so as to punish them only in their degree as such, and not in the same rank with the foulest and most odious crimes, -- this also is alike a just and a salutary rule; if the punishment is to have its due effect as an example, and the people are to be conciliated to the course of criminal justice.  And here let me add, that in one point of view, those who argue for the reception of such a plea, are not, as at first it might seem, pleading purely on the side of mercy.  For if the manslayer has in every case to make atonement with his life, without regard to the provocation, however high, which he has suffered; then may it be expected that juries will find a general verdict of not guilty, whensoever they cannot reconcile their conscience to such severity; and thus (as actually happened in Finhaven's case,) the offender shall be dismissed without even that punishment, which his intemperance deserves.  Now, by acknowledging the inferior sort of homicide, the law saves indeed the manslayer's life, but still exposes him to some correction, proportioned to his fault, and maintains this great wrong in its due place in the public opinion as a crime.

    All considerations issue, therefore, in one conclusion: The invader, who offered the injury, knowing as he did the resentment which it must excite, was therein guilty of a wrong; and he justly deserved to receive, upon the spot, a severe chastisement of his person.  And although, on the other part, the due measure has been far exceeded, yet it were (I had almost said) no less excessive, to condem this person to die for it; since he has not sinned out of cruelty or wickedness of heart, and is neither that object of aversion with his neighbours, nor the like irreclaimable felon, as the wilful murderer, on whom mercy would be thrown away.  Punished he ought to be, that he may stand corrected, and others be taught the lesson of forbearance by the example; but it, would not be right that he should seal his repentance with his blood, which in civilized times, neither the frequency of such incidents nor the public opinion will require.

    [Grounds of culpable homicide on provocation.]   These seem to be the obvious and reasonable grounds of dictinction between culpable homicide and murder; the one punishable with death, the other with some lower pain, pro modo admissi, at the discretion of the Judge.  Reference has also been made to the authority of the Jewish law, and of the Roman; but, for my own part, I rather think unnecessarily, and without success.  The texts of the civil law¹ seem rather to relate to those cases, where the homicide happens without any intention to kill, and not to those, where the mortal purpose may be excused.  And for the Jewish law², though some passages may seem to be ambiguous; yet on the whole, they rather tend to countenance this opinion, that even for a casual slaughter, such as happens by pure accident and misadventure, without any evil purpose, the manslayer stood in need of the shelter of the sanctuary, to screen him from the vengeance of the kindred of the deceased; and that to any but him, even the city of refuge was no protection.  And this is perhaps the natural course in the infancy of law and government, while the passions of men are violent, and crimes are punished not so much on any considerations of justice or policy, as to allay the passions of the parties injured or their kinsmen.

    [Murder and chaude melle; distinction of] But concerning these authorities, it is truly of little importance to inquire: Because clear it is, on the testimony of our ancient statutes³, that the distinction of murder and slaughter on suddenty, or chaude melle, as it was termed (hot quarrel), that is, or heat of blood,) had once been thoroughly established in the practice of Scotland. Not indeed on that correct plan, which is suitable to be improved jurisprudence of later times; but still in a substantial and an efficacious form, such as ordinarily served the purpose of saving the offender's life, and one which sufficiently marks the opinion of those times with respect to the degree of his offence, as contradistinguished to murder.  It was the appointment of those laws, that the manslayer on suddenty was to have the benefit of the girth or sanctuary: He might flee to the church or other holy place; from which he might indeed be taken for trial, but to be returned thither, safe in life and limb, if his allegation of chaude melle were proved. Thus, though the form of relief was defective, and the application of it irregular and uncertain, in as much as it depended on the circumstances of flying to and reaching the girth; yet still (like the benefit of clergy in England, which had the like supertitious origin,) it made a material difference in the law, and was an evidence of the sentiments of our people with respect to the two modes of homicide." (pp. 239-241)
-------------
"¹ L. 1, No. 3, ad leg. Corn. de sicariis.  L.1, Cod. ej. Tit.
² Exodus, chap. xxi, ver. 13, 14; Deut. ch. xix. ver. 4, 5, 6; Numbers, ch. xxxv. ver. 15. to 28.
³ See act 1425, c. 51; 1426, c. 89, 95; 1469, c. 35; 1491, c. 28; 1535, c. 23.  See also Mackenzie, Tit. Murder, No. 11.  See also prior to any of these, a Stat. of Robert II. in 1371, in Robertson's Parliamentary Records, p. 125." (p. 240)
 

"Le recours au critère de l'individu moyen, convenable ou normal, pose toujours des difficultés en rapport avec la diversité des cas, faits ou personnes concernés.  Cet individu dont les agissements supposés seront comparés avec ceux du meurtrier, personne concrète, ne doit pas être un prototype ou un être idéal.  Le type moyen doit correspondre aux caractéristiques principales du délinquant.  Le tribunal fédéral¹⁶⁹ tient compte de cet élément lorsqu'il précise que 'la personnalité de l'auteur doit être prise en considération.  Il faut se demander comment eût réagi une personne d'un milieu, d'une éducation, d'une mentalité analogues.'  Dans un arrêt non publié, il est d'ailleurs allé encore plus loin, ajoutant 'qu'il fallait également tenir compte de la personnalité telle qu'une autre civilisation l'avait façonnée'¹⁷⁰."
-----
169  ATF 100 IV 151/JdT 1975 IV 106.
170  Cité dans ATF 107 IV 162/JdT 1983 IV 3." (2^e édition, p. 47)

HUSAK, Douglas N., 1948-, "Partial Defenses", (1998) 11 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 167-192, see on provocation, pp. 176-177; contents: Introduction...167; I: The Nature and Existence of Partial Defenses...168; II: Obstacles to a General Theory of Mitigation: the Code-Relativity of Partial Defenses...173;  III: The Unifying Hypothesis...177; IV Easy Cases for the Unifying Hypothesis...181; V: Hard Cases for the Unifying Hypothesis...186; Conclusion...192;
 

H.W.A., "The Defence of Provocation", (1959) 75 The Law Quarterly Review 174-176; comments on R. v. Cunningham [1959] 2 W.L.R. 63 (Court of Criminal Appeal);
 

ILIFFE, J.A., "Provocation in Homicide and Assault Cases: The Common Law and Criminal Codes", (1954) 3 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 23-48;  Table of Contents: "I A. The reduction of murder to manslaughter...24; B. Provocation in circumstances where death does not ensue...25; II  What is required to be proved when the defence is raised in A or B above...28; 1. Discovery of a spouse in the act of adultery...30; 2. Words and Gestures...31; 3. An offence committed against a third person either in the presence of the accused or even, if the third person is related to the accused, in the latter's absence...37;  III (i) Knock for knock...38; (ii) The 'passion' must not have had time to cool...40; (iii) The Reasonable Man...42; (iv) Provocation must have come from the victim...46; IV The functions of Judge and Jury...48";
 

INDIA, Indian Penal Code 1860 (Act no. 45 of 1860), section 300, Murder;

"300. MURDER.
......
Exception 1 : When culpable homicide is not murder. - Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation or causes the death of any other  person by mistake or accident.

 The above exception is subject to the following provisos :-
(1) That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person.
(2) That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public servant.
(3) That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful exercise of the right of private defence.

Explanation : Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent the offence from amounting to murder is a question of   fact.
......
Exception 4 : Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a   sudden quarrel and without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.

Explanation : It is immaterial in such cases which party offers the provocation or commits the first assault."

INGBER, Stanley, "A Dialectic: The Fulfillment and Decrease of Passion in Criminal Law", (1974-75) 28 Rutgers Law Review 861-964, see "Provocation" at pp. 946-948; copy at the University of Ottawa, KFN 1869 .R88  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

IRELAND, Law Reform Commission, Consultation Paper on Homicide: The Plea of Provocation, Dublin : The Commission, 2003, viii, 162 p.; available at  http://www.lawreform.ie/Provocation%20Consultation%20Paper_final%20printer%20version_%5B20.pdf (accessed on 15 December 2003);
 

___________Consultation paper on sentencing, Dublin : The Commission, 1993, xv, 419 p., see Chapter 5, "Aggravating and Mitigating Factors" at pp. 118-153; copy at the library of the Supreme Court of Canada, KF 384 ZC6 C66 S46 1993;

"Provocation
5.55  Provocation is recognised as a defence to murder in Irish law, reducing the crime to 'voluntary manslaughter'.  However, for other crimes, the issue of provocation does not arise until the sentencing stage.  At the sentencing stage, provocation may be viewed as a factor which reduces the culpability of the offender, depending on the relative strength of the provocation itself and the degree to which the offender's retaliation was sudden and impulsive.  The weight and priority to be attached to each of these components is a matter which the courts will have to determine, but it is at least clear that swift and impulsive retaliation is far less blameworthy than planned and premeditatded revenge, and that offences motivated by strong provocation are less blameworthy than unprovoked offences because it is the provocation, rather than an intention to flagrantly disobey the authority of the law, which is the primary motivation for the offending conduct." (p. 133, notes omitted)

___________"Summary of Irish Law -- Irish Law Reform Commission: Provocation, Diminished Responsibility and Excessive [Self-] Defence", being Appendix C in The Law Commission, Overseas Studies, which is part of the Appendices to the consultation paper, Partial Defences to Murder, 31 October 2003, xiii, 249 p. (series; consultation paper; number 173); this study of the Irish Law Reform Commission, at pp. 98-124, is available at  http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/files/cp173apps.pdf(accessed on 28 April 2005); see also Appendix G, "Relevant Statutory Provisions and Proposed Provisions";

___________Report -- Defences in Criminal Law, Dublin: The Law Reform Commission, 2009, xix, 226 p.(series; report; LRC 95-2009), ISSN: 1393-3132; available at http://www.lawreform.ie/publications/rDefencesinCriminalLaw.pdf (accessed on 28 December 2009);
 

___________ Report on sentencing, Dublin : The Commission, [1996], xi, 84 p. (series; LRC, ISSN 1391-3132 53-1996); copy at the library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa, KF 384 ZC6 R46 LRC 53;

"SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS...
......
7. Sentencing guidelines should identify the following aggravating and mitigating factors:
......
Mitigating factors.....
    (2) Whether the offender was provoked;
........

12. Mandatory and minimum sentences of imprisonment for indictable offences should be abolished. (Chapter 5)" (pp. 65, 66-67 and 69)

ITALY,  The Italian penal code / translated by Edward M. Wise, in collaboration with Allen Maitlin; introduction by Edward M. Wise, Littleton (Colorado) : F. B. Rothman, 1978, xlvi, 249 p. see Article 62, "Ordinary Extenuating Circumstances" at pp. 22-23,  and Article 90, "Emotional and Passional States" at p. 33 (series; American series of foreign penal codes; volume 23), ISBN: 0837700434; copy at the University of Ottawa, FTX General, KJF 1061 .A7C7 1978;

 
"Article 62.  Ordinary Extenuating Circumstances.
    The following circumstances shall extenuate an offense, when they are not constituent elements thereof or special extenuating circumstances:
....
(2) having reacted in a state of rage induced by the wrongful act of another; ..." (p. 22)
 

"Article 90.  Emotional and Passional States.
    States of emotion or passion shall neither preclude nor reduce responsibility." (p. 33)

----------------------

"Art. 62 -- Circostanze attenuanti comuni
Attenuano il reato, quando non ne sono elementi costitutivi o circostanze attenuanti speciali, le circostanze seguenti:
...
2) l'aver agito in stato di ira, determinato da un fatto ingiusto altrui; ...."
 
 

"Art. 90 - Stati emotivi o passionali
Gli stati emotivi o passionali non escludono ne diminuiscono l'imputabilità."  (see  Codice penale)

JAANI.NET, "Criminal Law and Procedure -- Part  III -- Provocation", November 2004, 9 p.; Australian law; available at http://www.jaani.net/resources/law_notes/criminal_law/03_Provocation.pdf (accessed on 13 June 2006);  

JERVIS, John, Archbold's Summary of the Law Relative to Pleading and Evidence in Criminal Cases; with The Statutes, Precedents of Indictments, & c. and the Evidence Necessary to Support Them, Fourth American from the Seventh London Edition, Enlarged, with the Decisions to the Present Time, by John Jervis, New York: Published by Gould, Banks and Co. Law Booksellers, and by W. and A. Gould and Co., Albany, 1840, xxxvi, 701 p.;

"Killing upon provocation.] -- No provocation whatever can render homicide justifiable, or even excusable; the least it can amount is manslaughter.  If a man kill another suddenly, without any, or without a considerable provocation, the law implies malice, and the homicide is murder; but if the provocation were great, and such as must have greatly provoked him, the killing is manslaughter only.  Kel. 135; 1 Hale, 466; Fost. 290.  In considering, however, whether the killing upon provocation amount to murder or manslaughter, the instrument wherewith the homicide was effected must also be taken into consideration; for if it were effected with a deadly weapon, the provocation must be great indeed to extenuate the offence to manslaughter; if with a weapon or other means not likely or intended to produce death, a less degree of provocation will be suficient; in fact, the mode of resentment must bear a reasonable proportion to the provocation to reduce the offence to manslaughter.  Where some provoking words being used by a soldier to a woman, she gave him a box on the ear, and the soldier immediately gave her a blow with the pommel of his sword on the breast, and then ran after her, and stabbed her in the back; this was at first deemed murder; but it appearing afterwards that the blow given to the soldier was with an iron patten, and it drew a great deal of blood, the offence was holden to be manslaughter only.  R. v. Steadman, Fost. 292.  Where two soldiers demanded to be admitted to a public-house to drink, and the landlord refused, because it was eleven o'clock at night; one of them, however, upon the door being afterwards opened to let out company, rushed in, and whilst the landlord was struggling to get him out, the other soldier struck the landlord on the head with a sharp instrument, and killed him: this was holden to be murder, notwithstanding the struggle with the other soldier; besides, the landlord had a right to put him out of his house.  R. v. Willoughby, 1 East, P.C. 288; 1 Russ. 437.  So, where a park-keeper, having found a boy stealing wood, tied him to a horse's tail, and dragged him along the park, and the boy died of the injuries he thereby received: this was holden to be murder, 1 Hale, 454.  So, in all other cases, where, upon a sudden provocation, one beats another in a cruel and unusual manner, so that he dies, it is murder.  4 Bl Com. 199; and see R. v. Trantez et al.  1 Str. 499; Fost. 293.  An unwarrantable imprisonment of a man's person, however, has been holden sufficient provocation to make a killing, even with a sword, manslaughter only.  R. v. Buckner, Sty. 467; R. v. Witers, 1 East, P.C. 233.  Therefore, where a constable took a man without warrant, upon a charge which gave him no authority to do so, and the prisoner ran away, and J. S., who was with the constable all the time, ran after the prisoner, who, to prevent his being retaken, killed J. S.: it was holden to be manslaughter only, although, whilst under the charge of the constable, the prisoner struck the man who gave the charge; because a blow under the provocation of the illegal arrest would not justify the constable in detaining him, unless the blow were likely to be followed by dangerous consequences, and formed a new and distinct ground of detainer.  R. v. Curvan, 1 Mood. C.C. 132; see R. v. Thompson, post, p. 401.  Where A., to prevent B. from fighting with his brother, laid hold of him and held him down, but struck no blow, upon which B. stabbed A.; it was holden, that if A. did nothing more than was necessary to prevent B. from beating his brother, and had died of the stab, the offence of A. would have been murder; but that, if B. did more than was necessary to prevent the beating of A's brother, it would have been manslaughter only.  R. v. Browne, 5 C. & P. 120.  If a man pull another's nose, or offer him any other great personal indignity, and the other thereupon immediately kill him, it is manslaughter only.  Kel. 135; 4 Bl. Com. 191.  Or, if a man take another in adultery with his wife, and kill him directly upon the spot, this is manslaughter merely.  1 Hale, 486; R. v. Manning, T. Raym, 212; 1 Ventr. 159.  So, if a father see another person in the act of committing an unnatural crime with his son, and instantly kill him, it is manslaughter only, but if, hearing of it, he go in quest of the party and kill him, it is murder.  Reg. v. Fisher, 8 C. & P. 182.  Where a boy, after fighting with another, ran home bleeding to his father; and the father immediately took a small cudgel, and ran three quarters of a mile to the place where the other boy was, and struck him a single blow of the stick, of which blow the boy afterwards died; this was holden to be manslaughter only.  R. v. Rowley, 12 Co. 87; and see Fost. 294.  Where a mob threw a pickpocket into a pond, for the purpose of ducking him, but he was unfortunately drowned: this was holden to be manslaughter. R. v. Fray, 1 East, P.C. 236.  But it may safely be laid down as a general rule, that no words or gestures, however opprobrious or provoking, will be considered in law to be provocation sufficient to reduce homicide to manslaughter, if the killing be effected with a deadly weapon, or an intention to do the deceased some grievous bodily harm be otherwise manifested; but if effected with a blow of a fist, or with a stick, or other weapon not likely to kill, it is manslaughter only.  Foster 200, 291; 1 Hale, 455.

    But in all cases, to reduce a homicide upon provocation to manslaughter, it is essential that the battery or wounding, &c., appear to have been inflicted immediately upon the provocation being given; for, if there be a sufficient cooling time for passion to subside and reason to interpose, and the person so provoked afterwards kills the other, this is deliberate revenge, and not heat of blood, and accordingly amounts to murder.  Fost. 296.  See R. v. Thomas, 7 C. & P. 817. The prisoner and the deceased, who were previously on intimate terms, were at a public house drinking, when a scuffle ensued, and the deceased struck the prisoner in the eye and gave him a black eye, the prisoner called for the police, and went away upon the policeman coming up; in about five minutes, however, he returned and stabbed the deceased with a knife which he usually carried about him: -- Lord Tenderden, C.J., said, that it was not every slight provocation, even by a blow, which will, when the party receiving it strikes with a deadly weapon, reduce the offence from murder to manslaughter; and that, if there had been any evidence of an old grudge between the parties, the crime would probably be murder: but he left it to the jury to say, whether, in the interval during which the prisoner was absent, there was time for his passion to cool and reason to gain domination over his mind: if not, they should find him guilty of manslaughter only.  R. v. Lynch, 5 C. & P. 324.  Again, where the prisoner was at the house of the deceased's mother, who desired the deceased to turn the prisoner out, and he did so, giving him a kick at the time, upon which the prisoner said he would make him remember it, and went home, about 300 yards, passed through his bed-room to a kitchen adjoining, and into the pantry, where he kept a knife, and having got it, returned hastily and met the deceased coming towards him with his hat, when a conversation ensued, and they walked together, when the deceased giving the prisoner his hat, the prisoner swore he would have his rights, and stabbed the deceased in two places, saying, he had served him right; after this, the prisoner ran home, repassed through the rooms to the pantry, and went to bed, where he was shortly afterwards apprehended, and the knife found on the shelf in the pantry: -- Tindal C.J., told the jury,  that the principal question was, whether the wounds were given by the prisoner whilst smarting under a provocation so recent, and showing that he might be considered at the moment not master of his understanding, in which case it would be manslaughter only; or whether, after the provocation, there had been time for the blood to cool, and reason to resume its sway before the wound was inflicted, in which case the offence would be murder: the jury found the prisoner guilty of murder. R. v. Hayward, 6 C.P. 157.  If there be evidence of express malice, the killing will be murder, however great the provocation.  See R. v. Mason, Fost. 132; and see Fost. 296; R. v. Kirkham, 3 C. & P. 115." (pp. 392-394)

"L'imputabilité (Schuldfähigkeit)³⁶ désigne le minimum d'aptitude au discernement et à l'autonomie exigé par la loi pour la responsabilité pénale.  Si l'imputablité fait défaut, l'objet du reproche de faute tombe, parce que l'acte ne repose plus sur une formation de volonté reprochable. [...] L'imputabilité fait défaut également lorsqu'en raison d'un trouble mental, d'un profond trouble de la conscience, d'une faiblesse d'esprit ou d'une autre anomalie psychique grave, l'auteur n'est pas en état de se rendre compte de l'illégitimité de l'acte et d'agir en conséquence (§ 20 [du Code pénal allemand]).  Le concept de trouble mental englobe les maladies mentales proprement dites au sens psychiatrique du terme (psychoses).  Le cas principal du profond trouble de conscience est celui de l'état passionnel (haine, colère, jalousie); toutefois, la jurisprudence refuse ici d'exclure la responsabilité lorsque l'auteur aurait pu éviter la naissance de cet état³⁷.   Par faiblesse d'esprit, on entend les troubles graves et innés de l'intelligence. Enfin, les anomalies psychiques graves comprennent les psychopathies, névroses et perversions, que le droit allemand assimile aux maladies mentales véritables quand elles excluent la capacité de discernement et d'action de l'auteur³⁸.  La responsabilité est réduite pour les personnes dont la capacité de discernement et d'action est sensiblement diminuée pour les causes énumérées au § 20; pour elles, il n'y a cependant pas exclusion de responsabilité, mais seulement réduction facultative de peine selon le § 49, alinéa 1^er." (p. 271)
 

"36. KRÜPELMAN, Die Neugestaltung der Vorschriften über die Schuldfähigkeit, ZStW 88 (1976), p. 6 et s. -- LENCKNER, Strafe, Schuld und Schuldfähigkeit, in: Handbuch der forensischen Psychiatrie, 1972, vol. 1, partie A, p. 42 et s. -- SCHNEIDER, Die Beurteilung der Zurechnungsfähigkeit, 4^e éd., 1961 -- WITTERie Beurteilung Erwachsener im Strafrecht, in: Handbuch der forensischen Psychiatrie, 1972, vol. 2, p. 19 et s.

37.  OGH 25 avril 1950: OGHSt 3, 19 (23) -- BGH 1^er juill. 1952: BGHSt 3, 194 (199) -- BGH 10 oct. 1957: BGHSt 11, 20 (23).

38. KRÜPELMAN, Motivation und Handlung im Affekt, Festschrift für H. Welzel, 1974, p. 374 et s.  -- VOGT, Die Forderungen der psychoanalytischen Wissenschaft für die Interpretation der Merkmale der Schuldfähigkeit, 1979." (p. 290)
 

JOHNSTON, Burges, 1877-, The Lost Art of Profanity ; foreword by H. L. Mencken, drawings by Orson Lowell, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1948, 223 p.; title noted in my research but book not consulted yet; no copy in the Ottawa area libraries;
 

JOHNSTON, Peter, Critique and Comment, " 'More than Ordinary Men Gone Wrong' : Can the Law Know the Gay Subject?", (1995-96) 20 Melbourne University Law Review 1152-1191; copy at the University of Ottawa, KTA 0 .M454, Location: FTX Periodicals;

Summary
"[This article is primary concerned with how 'the homosexual' is constructed at law and how homophobia and heterosexism are put into legal discourse.  These concepts are explored through an examination of the homosexual panic and homosexual advance defences, as they have been employed in the Australian case of R v M.  The article provides a theoretical analysis of the law's power to signify and essentialise.  It argues that the law's reliance on religion and medicine in its understanding of homosexuality precludes it from addressing the needs of gay men and lesbians.  The law's constructions of homosexuality as sickness and sin become apparent in the article's dissection of the transcript.  An analysis of R v M also reveals the inadequacy of current legal doctrine to deal with homophobic violence.  Finally, the article discusses various strategies for change which may result in lesbians and gay men being truly equal under the law.  It is only through relying on theories and tactics that reflect the lived experiences of gay men and lesbians that the possibility of reverse discourses is created and that power can be resisted with counter-power.]" (p. 1152).

KAHAN, Dan M. and Martha C. Nussbaum, "Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law", (1996) 96 Columbia Law Review 269-374;
 

KAKAKHEL, Niaz A. Shah, "Honour Killings: Islamic and Human Rights Perspectives", (2004) 55 The Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 78-89;
 

KAMIR, Orit, "Responsibility Determination as a Smokescreen: provocation and the Reasonable Person in the Israeli Supreme Court", (2005) 2 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 547-570; available at  http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/osjcl/issue2_articles/Kamir-PDF-3-17-05.pdf (accessed on 30 April 2005);
 

KASUNMU, A.B. and S.A. Omabegho, "Provocation as a Defence under the Nigerian Criminal Code", (1965) 14 International and Comparaticve Law Quarterly 1399-1410; the Nigerian Criminal Code is based on Griffith's Queensland Code of Australia; contents: History and interpretation of the Code...1399; Definition of provocation under the Code...1400; Acts capable of amounting to provocation...1402; Words as insults...1405; Finding in adultery...1406; Killing of wrong person...1406; Proportionate retaliation and time for passion to cool...1407";
 

KAYE, J.M., "Early History of Murder and Manslaughter - Part I and II", (1967) 83 The Law Quarterly Review 366-395 and 569-601; copy at the University of Ottawa, KD 322 .L37, Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

KELKAR, R. V., "Provocation as a Defence in the Indian Penal Code", (1963) 5 Journal of the Indian Law Institute 319-355; copy at the library of the Supreme Court of Canada; contents: General Scheme of the Defence -- Defective Legislative Technique...320; II Importance of the Defence of Provocation in case  Murder...326; Present unsatisfactory position of law...328; Objective Standard of Provocation accepted...330; Drawbacks and limitations of the objective test...331; Emergence of 'Reasonable Man' -- What is he?...332; The expression 'reasonable man' is misleading...334; Relationship of the accused in cases involving intercourse as an act of provocation...334; Words alone can amount to provocation...337; Relation between the mode of resentment and the provocation...338; Fossilization of the reasonable man...344; Precedents to be accepted with care...345; Things Personal to the Accused -- How far Relevant in applying the Test of Reasonable Man...346; Provocation must be sudden...351; Regaining of self-control -- Objective standard of Reasonable Man not applicable...353;
 

KELMAN, Mark, "Interpretative Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law", (1980-81) 33 Stanford Law Review 591-673, see "Provocation" at pp. 637-640 and 645;
 

KIRSCHNER, Stuart M., Thomas R. Litwack and Gary J. Galperin, "The Defense of Extreme Emotional Disturbance: A Qualitative Analysis of Cases in New York County", (March-June 2004) 10(1-2) Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 102-133;
 

KNUDSEN, Are, "Traditional (in)Justice: Honour Killings in Pakistan", in Lone Lindholt and Sen Schaumburg-Müller, eds., Human Rights and Local/Living Law, Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff; Oslo: Nordic Human Rights Publications, 2005, x, 401 p., at pp. 105-126 (series; Human Rights in Development Yearbook; 2003), ISBN: 9004138765; bibliography at pp. 123-126; important contribution to the subject of "honour killings";
 

KOVALEWSKY (aussi Kovalevskii), Maxime, 1851-1916, Coutume contemporaine et loi ancienne: droit coutumier ossétien éclairé par l'histoire comparée, Paris: Librarie du recueil général des lois et des arrêts, 1893, x, 520 p.  (réimpression dans : Amsterdam: Éditions Rodopi, 1970); copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, bibliothèque de droit, FTX, DK 511 .08K6 1970;

[La vengeance]
[p. 250]  "Les historiens du droit admettent ordinairement que la vengeance ne pouvait être exercée que dans le cas de crimes graves tels que sur les meurtres et les mutilations.  Mais un examen attentif des monuments législatifs les plus reculés ne justifie pas une pareille assertion.  Si nous consultonsles codes barbares, nous y trouvons la preuve décisive que toute espèce de délits, sans en excepter les délits contre les biens, autorisaient un ancien Germain à se venger.  Les lois des Thuringiens admettent le meurtre du voleur, surpris encore nanti du corps du délit ⁽²⁾.  Celles des anciens Frisons accordaient de même l'impunité au meurtrier d'un voleur, mais à une double condition : le vol devait avoir été commis dans une maison ou dans une église et le voleur devait être surpris en flagrant délit ⁽³⁾.  La loi ripuaire permet au propriétaire de tuer le délinquant, mais seulement dans le cas où il ne réussit pas à le garrotter pour le livrer à la justice ⁽⁴⁾.  Les lois des autres nations germaniques, des
----
(2) Lex Angliorum et Werinorum hoc est Thuringorum, XXXIX et 1. VII, 4 Thonissen, Le droit pénal de la loi Salique, p. 184.
(3) Lex Fris., V, 1 (ibidem).
(4)Tit. LXXIX (al. LXXVII), ibid.
 

[p. 251]  Wisigoths, des Bavarois, des Burgondes, des Lombards, des Saxons, exigent encore que le vol soit accompli pendant la nuit et que le voleur soit tué au moment où on voulait s'emparer de lui de vive force ⁽¹⁾.  Cette condition rendait aussi le meurtre du voleur nocturne licite, d'après les coutumes des Francs-Saliens ⁽²⁾, et chose bien curieuse! Il en était de même d'après le plus ancien droit de Rome.

    Mais ce ne sont pas seulement les atteintes à la propriété qui légitimaient la vengeance.  Les témoignages, qui sont parvenus jusqu'à nous, ne nous permettent pas de douter qu'on l'admettait encore pour les injures faites à l'honneur des familles, et pour les violations de domicile.  Dans l'Historia Fancorum de Grégoire de Tours, les parents de la femme ou son mari, apparaissent comme les vengeurs de l'adultère; ils tuent les coupables, souvent même longtemps après que le crime a été commis.  Cependant la loi ripuaire pose, à ce sujet, quelques restrictions : le droit du mari de tuer le complice n'est reconnu que dans le cas où il le surprend flagrante delicto, et où le coupable refuse de se laisser garrotter. Si quis hominem super uxorem comprehenderit, dit le texte, et non prevaluerit ligare ⁽³⁾. Les lois bavaroise, burgonde et lombarde renferment, à peu près, les même dispositions.  La législation des Frisons, au contraire, se rapproche beaucoup plus de la loi Salique : elle n'exige pas, pour l'impunité du meurtre, la découverte de l'adultère, au moment de son accomplissement ⁽⁴⁾. Le droit grec, ainsi que le droit romain, reconnaît au mari le droit de tuer l'adultère ⁽⁵⁾.  L'époux
----
(1)  Lex Vis., VII, I, II, 15, 16. Lex Baiuv, tit. XXVII, 9, XXIX. Ed Rotharis., XXXII et (Thonissen, p. 183).
(2)  Ibidem, p. 185-187.
(3) T. 7**al. 77. [***impossible de lire la réimpression]
(4) Thonissen, Le droit pénal de la loi Salique, p. 79.
(5) Du même auteur, Le droit pénal de la république d'Athènes, p. 312 et Esmein, Le délit d'adultère à Rome.  Nouvelle Revue historique de droit français, janvier et février 1878.
 

[p. 252]  offensé pouvait le mutiler, le mettre en morceaux, le battre et le déshonorer; quoi qu'il fît, les juges admettaient, au dire d'Horace et de Valère Maxime, qu'il avait bien agi « jure fecit; ei fraudi non fuit.»  Le père avait les mêmes droits que le mari en cas de stuprum exercé sur sa fille.  Les récits de Grégoire de Tours, nous autorisent à penser que les Francs-Saliens admettaient, en ce cas, le droit de vengeance, sans aucune restriction.  La loi ripuaire assimilait, sous ce rapport, le stuprum à l'adultère, le coupable devait être surpris en flagrant délit, et il fallait qu'on eût vainement essayé de le lier ⁽¹⁾.  Le droit des anciens slaves reconnaissait au père le droit de tuer celui qui se rendait coupable du stuprum; c'est au moins ce que nous autorise à croire les dispositions contenues dans les lois tchèques.  Elles n'abolissent pas la vengeance, mais elle ne peut être exercée qu'en justice, après que l'offensé a prouvé le bien fondé de son accusation.  La vengeance qui atteint le ravisseur d'une fille vierge, entre dans la catégorie de celles qui sont exercées publiquement.  Si la fille reconnaît en justice qu'elle a consenti au rapt, lisons-nous dans le code tchèque, les deux coupables sont livrés au père qui est obligé de leur trancher la tête de sa propre main.  Mais si la fille soutient qu'elle a été enlevée malgré elle, c'est elle-même qui doit couper la tête de son ravisseur.  Si le coupable ne comparaît pas en justice, le père a, pour réaliser personnellement la vengeance, le droit qui appartiendrait au proche parent, en cas de meurtre ⁽²⁾.
----
(1) Thonissen, Le droit pénal de la loi Salique, p. 181.
(2) Zumpt, Das Criminalrecht der Römischen Republik, l. 1. -- Du droit criminel des Douze Tables, p. 379.  Thonissen, Le droit pénal de la loi Salique, p. 184 et suiv.
 

LAGACHE, Daniel, 1903-1972, "L'amour et la haine" dans G. Dumas, Nouveau traité de psychologie, Paris: Alcan, 1939, t. 6, fasc. 2, Les sentiments complexes, Paris: Alcan: 1939, pp. 115-152; aussi publié dans Oeuvres/ Daniel Lagache; édition établie et présentée par Eva Rosenblum; préface de Didier Anzieu, 6 tomes, Paris : Presses universitaires de France, c1977-1986 au volume I, Oeuvres I (1932-1946) aux pp.269-214; voir en particulier "La fin de l'amour" aux pp. 295-298 et "Le 'crime d'amour' et l'évolution du suicide au meurtre" aux pp. 298-301; copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, MRT General, RC 458 .L32 1977 v. 1; importante contribution; je recommande cet article à ceux et à celles qui s'intéressent à l'uxoride;

 
"LA FIN DE L'AMOUR [...]

    Les réactions de celui qui n'est plus aimé revêtent deux grandes formes, le chagrin d'amour et la revendication amoureuse.

    Le chagrin d'amour est une réaction dépressive à la perte l'objet, qui s'apparente à la mélancolie et au deuil.  C. Pascal en a souligné la valeur pathogène.  Toute une gamme d'attitudes s'y font voir, de l'abandon du désespoir à la lutte obsédante contre le souvenir de l'être aimé et l'espoir de le reconquérir, jusqu'au renoncement.  L'inévitable ressentiment peut s'y résoudre en une sorte d'agressivité psychique, qui annule par le refoulement la pensée de l'être aimé et la place qu'il tenait dans la vie.  Le renoncement courageux est le fait de ceux qui aiment le plus et qui, comme tels, acceptent l'être aimé tel qu'il est; il sublime les remous émotionnels dans une attitude digne, héroïque, où le narcissisme trouve son compte.

    La revendication amoureuse, réaction sthénique, s'oppose au chagrin d'amour.  Sa forme la plus typique est la jalousie vécue; la psychologie courante en distingue la jalousie-trait de caractère.  Souffrance éprouvée du fait qu'un bien que l'on souhaite propre est l'objet de la jouissance d'autrui, son sens est de créer un désiquilibre entre l'avoir et le désir même.  Devant la frustration réelle, elle repose sur une erreur, puisqu'elle souhaite conserver ce qui est déjà perdu et n'est pas susceptible d'être possédé comme une chose matérielle et inerte.  Lorsque la frustration est imaginaire la jalousie est l'effet soit d'une avidité extrême, soit d'une espèce d'impuissance à réaliser l'évidence de la possession, soit d'une insatisfaction profonde: elle naît aussi souvent du sentiment de ne pas être aimé que de la constatation que le partenaire aime un rival.  Elle entraîne des réactions agressives à l'égard du rival et du partenaire, réactions dont l'inhibition est une nouvelle source de tourment et d'anxiété.  Il est vrai de dire avec Stendhal que la jalousie est le plus grand de tous les maux." (pp. 295, 297-298)

____________La jalousie amoureuse, 2 volumes, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1947 (Collection; Bibliothèquie de philosophie contemporaine); l'Université d'Ottawa et l'Université Carleton possèdent la troisième édition: La jalousie amoureuse : psychologie descriptive et psychanalyse, Paris : Quadrige-PUF, 1986, 2 tomes en un volume de 729 pages,  MRT General, BF 575 .J4 L327 1986; Carleton, 155.3/L172;
 

___________"Passions et psychoses passionnelles" (1936) Évol. psychiatr. n^o 1 aux pp. 3-29; aussi publié dans Oeuvres/ Daniel Lagache; édition établie et présentée par Eva Rosenblum; préface de Didier Anzieu, 6 tomes, Paris : Presses universitaires de France, c1977-1986 au volume I, Oeuvres I (1932-1946) aux pp. 135-154; copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, MRT General, RC 458 .L32 1977 v. 1;
 

___________"Réflexions sur De Greeff et le crime passionnel" dans Autour de l'oeuvre du Dr. E. de Greeff,  Louvain : Nauwelaerts, 1956, vol.1, L'homme criminel; études d'aujourd'hui, aux pp. 67-71; on retrouve une bibliographie générale de l'oeuvre du prof. E. de Greeff au vol. 2, L'homme devant l'humain; études de psychologie et de psychopathologie, aux pp.193-208; copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, MRT General, HV 6028 .A9 1956 v.1 et v. 2; l'article "Réflexions sur De Greef et le crime passionnel" se trouve aussi dans Oeuvres/ Daniel Lagache; édition établie et présentée par Eva Rosenblum; préface de Didier Anzieu, 6 tomes, Paris : Presses universitaires de France, c1977-1986; copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, MRT General, RC 458 .L32 1977;
 

LAINGUI, André, La responsabilté pénale dans l'ancien droit: XVIe-XVIIIe siècle, Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1970, xii, 367 p., voir "L'excuse de provocation" aux pp. 295-313 (Collection; Bibliothèque d'histoire du droit et droit romain, t. 17); importante contribution

    "Tandis que la légitime défense efface le crime, la provocation détermine une excuse et laisse subsister l'acte criminel dont la gravité seule se trouve atténuée.

    La provocation suppose un délit commis par un auteur responsable, mu par une intention coupable.  Cependant, les anciens auteurs opposaient aux crimes 'commis par dol', les crimes 'commis dans un premier mouvement', mêlant ainsi, au sein de la notion de dol, les mobiles et les motifs.  Ils considéraient que le crime commis par dol était l'effet des passions les plus froides, en même temps que les plus méprisables : la haine, la cupidité, tandis que le crime commis dans un premier mouvement était 'celui qui se commet sans prémédiation et dans la chaleur d'une passion violente come de la colère, de la douleur, de l'amour ou de l'ivresse, ce qui s'entend lorsque ces passions sont portées à un tel excès qu'on peut dire qu'elles ne laissent pas une entière liberté d'esprit dans celui qu'elles possèdent, et qu'il n'y a lieu de présumer qu'il n'aurait point comis le crime, s'il n'avait été dans cet état' (180).  Il est difficille en effet, d'apaiser le courroux qu'une colère intense a soulevé en nous (181).  Et parce que la colère est bien cette folie d'un instant, dont parle le poète latin, l'individu qui a agi sous son empire ne peut-il alléguer en sa faveur les mêmes défenses que l'aliéné? (182)" (p. 295)
------------------
"(180) MUYART DE VOUGLANS, Lois criminelles, p. 13 et p. 14.  Cf. TIRAQUEAU, op. cit., cause 1, n^o 2: Quae ob ira, aliasque animi pertubationes, quaecumque necessario, vel natura hominibus accidunt, injuriam quidem faciunt, sed nondum idcirco sunt injusti, vel pravi.

(181) FARINACIUS, qu. 91, n^o 5 : Difficillimum enim est justum dolorem temperare, cum homo intenso dolore permotus, non fit in plenitudine intellectus.

(182) HORACE, Épîtres, 1, 2, 62: Ira furor brevis est, cité notamment par CLARUS, liber V, § Fin, qu. 60, n^o 9. L'auteur italien place ce développement à la suite de celui qu'il a consacré à la folie.  De même TIRAQUEAU avait rapproché les mouvements de l'âme déchaînée par lacolère et la douleur de ceux auxquels porte la folie. On remarquera le carctère imagé de l'analyse de Tiraqueau, pour qui l'homme en proie à la colère est comme 'hors de soi', véritablement aliéné : Horum autem in promptu causa est : is enim quem ira aut dolor occupat prope est, ut si furiosus, estque veluti extra se, suaeque mentis non est compos (...) Ideoque jurisconsulti (ut in omnibus rebus, ita et in hac quoque) prudentissimi sanxerunt delicta, quae ira, aut dolore concitati commisimus, non esse severius punienda idque statuerunt conscientia infirmitatis, fragilitatisque humanae naturae (cause 1, n^o 20 et 22)." (pp. 295-296)

LAM, A.T., "Culture as a defence: preventing judicial bias against Asians and Pacific Islanders", (1993) 8 Asian American and Pacific Islands Law Journal 49-68; title of article noted in my research but article not consulted; no copy of this periodical published by UCLA School of Law available in the provinces of Ontario or Quebec;
 

LANHAM, David, "Provocation and the Requirement of Presence", (1989) 13 Criminal Law Journal 133-150; contents: The Australian Cases...133; Early Law on Provocation and Absence...135; Confessions of Adultery...139; Lessons from America...143; Evaluation and Conclusion...147;  copy at University of Ottawa, KTA 0 .C735,  Location: FTX Periodicals;

LANHAM, D,J. (David J.),  B. Bartal, R. Evans and D. Wood,  Criminal Laws in Australia, Annandale, N.S.W.: The Federation Press, 2006, xlix, 526 p., see chapter 3, "Provocation", at pp. 97-147, ISBN: 9781862875586 and 1862875588; see table of contents and a few pages on chapter 3 at http://books.google.com/books?id=D97doQ1iZx4C&printsec=frontcover&dq=intitle:criminal+intitle:laws+intitle:in+intitle:australia&lr=&as_drrb_is=q&as_minm_is=1&as_miny_is=2009&as_maxm_is=12&as_maxy_is=2009&as_brr=0&as_pt=ALLTYPES#PPR7,M1  (accessed on 18 March 2009);  
 

LAREAU, François, "Selected Bibliography on Justification, Excuse and the Tripartite Theory of the Criminal Offence" / «Bibliographie choisie sur la justification, l'excuse et la théorie tripartite de l'infraction pénale»;
 

___________ Selected Bibliography on Motives in Criminal Law (with some elements of Philosophy) /
voir aussi ma  Bibliographie choisie sur le mobile/motif en droit pénal (avec des éléments de philosophie)
 

LASSERRE, Emmanuel (Jean-Julien-Emmanuel), Étude sur les cas de non culpabilité et les excuses en matière pénale suivant la science rationnelle, la législation positive et la jurisprudence, Toulouse: Bonnal & Gibrac, 1877, 375 p.; voir "Provocation", pp. 87-89 (droit romain, excuse absolutoire), pp. 156-157 (ancienne législation pénale, excuse absolutoire),  p. 162 (ancienne législation pénale, excuse atténuante), pp. 342-361 (législation pénale actuelle, excuse atténuante),; voir aussi pour le droit criminel romain: le droit de tuer en matière d'adultère aux pp. 73-78, droit du père sur le complice aux pp. 78-80, et droit de tuer concéder au mari aux pp. 80-83; voir aussi sur les passions dans l'ancienne législation pénale aux pp. 235-238; très beau livre sur le droit pénal; livre rare au Canada; copie à la Bibliothèque du Barreau du Québec à Montréal;

 
"PROVOCATION

    Au sujet de la provocation, nous trouvons au tit. 77 de la loi des Ripuaires, une disposition très étendue, qui établit dans divers cas, une excuse absolutoire.  Le tit. 77 indique les conditions, qui doivent être remplies dans ce cas, si l'on veut éviter d'être déclaré coupable d'homicide.

    [...]

    Dans les 'libertates et consuetudines Montispesullani,' le  § 9 contient une excuse légale de provocation : 'Plenam habent, et habere debent potestatem et licentiam ulciscendi suâ propriâ auctoritate.'

    La Coutume de Bigorre admet, dans le passage suivant, l'excuse de provocation : 'Nemo rusticorum militem cognitum invadat, nisi domum ejus cremaverit, aut boves abstulerit. ' (Coutume de Bigorre,  § 44.)

    La Coutume de Bayonne parle de la provocation, au tit. VI,  § 10.

    Il est question de provocation par injure, dans la Coutume de Toulouse. (Commentaire de Soulatges, 1re partie.)"
    (pp. 156-157)

----------------------------------

"DES PASSIONS [...]

    Quelques personnes ont voulu assimiler la puissance des passions humaines à l'aliénation mentale, la fureur de l'homme en proie à la jalousie ou au désespoir, à la fureur de l'aliéné.  Les avocats, devant les cours d'assises, ont essayé de prouver, qu'il pouvait y avoir des fous qui ne perdaient la raison qu'instantanément, par l'effet d'une grande douleur ou de toute autre cause pareille (Voir Barreau français, M. Bellart, plaidoyer pour Joseph Gras, accusé d'avoir tué sa maîtresse dans un violent accès de jalousie).  Une pareille doctrine doit être repoussée comme dangereuse.  Dans la passion même la plus délirante, l'homme a conservé la perception du bien et du mal; l'amour, la jalousie, la vengeance peuvent le subjuguer; il cède à l'entraînement de ses désirs, mais il a encore en lui des armes pour les combattre; les passions violentes peuvent affaiblir le jugement, mais elles ne le détuisent pas." (pp. 236-237)

----------------------------------

"PROVOCATION

    Il faut bien se garder de confondre la légitime défense et la provocation.  Danger et sauvegarde, voilà la légitime défense, lésion et vengeance, voilà la provocation.  Dans le premier cas, l'homme exerce un droit; l'esprit qui anime l'homme dans la défense légitime, est un esprit de fermeté, de justice, dénué de toute passion vindicative.  Dans le second cas, l'homme est poussé par un sentiment de vengeance; l'esprit qui l'anime est un esprit de passion de ressentiment.

    Mais la nuance est parfois insaisissable.  Quand cesse la légitime défense?  Quand commence l'acte commis en état de provocation?  Comment distinguer dans la lutte, l'esprit de colère et l'esprit de justice.  Ce problème a depuis longtemps embarrassé les jurisconsultes et les moralistes.

    La provocation peut être définie, la surexcitation produite chez l'agent par la lésion d'un droit appartenant, soit à lui-même, soit à tout autre.  Si le provoqué jouissait de toute sa raison, au lieu de se faire justice lui-même. il laisserait ce soin à la société, mais l'émotion qui le dominait, servira d'excuse à son infraction.

    La provocation peut résulter de la lésion des droits de l'agent ou des droits d'autrui; mais, comme dans la provocation, il s'agit d'un emportement qui a poussé l'agent à un acte coupable, il faut voir dans l'hypothèse de violences ou de lésions de droits faites à autrui, s'il existait entre l'agent et cette personne lésée quelque lien suffisant pour susciter et rendre excusable cet emportement.  Il n'y a pas à marquer ici de degré de parenté ou d'alliance : une affection intime, une relation de tutelle, de protection, le simple fait d'avoir une personne ou un enfant surtout sous sa garde, ne fût-ce que momentanément, peuvent produire cet effet; ce sera une appréciation à faire par le juge dans chaque cause.

    Le châtiment infligé à l'agresseur, doit être en quelque sorte proportionné au préjudice causé; s'il présentait un caractère de rigueur outrée, le prévenu pourrait être plus ou moins excusé, si l'intelligence et la liberté lui avaient plus ou moins fait défaut, pendant qu'il accomplissait son acte de vengeance; car en définitive, l'excuse de provocation repose sur l'indignation et l'irritation, qui viennent momentanément troubler la raison de l'agent.

    S'il s'est écoulé un certain temps, entre la lésion reçue et l'acte de vengeance qui a eu lieu, le premier mouvement étant passé et la réflexion ayant dû calmer le ressentiment, on ne pourra trouver une excuse dans la provocation." (pp. 342-344)
 

LEADER-ELLIOTT,  Ian D., "Negotiating Intentions in Trials of Guilt and Punishment" in Ngaire Naffine, Rosemary Owens and John Williams, eds., Intention in Law and Philosophy, Aldershot; Burlington, VT :  Ashgate/Dartmouth, c2001, xiii, 377 p. at pp. 73-105 and see on provocation, pp. 91-94 (series; Applied legal philosophy), ISBN: 0754621715; copy at the University of Ottawa, FTX General, K272 .I58 2001;

"It seems probable that the defence of provocation, which reduces murder to manslaughter, was once rationalised in a similar fashion, as a form of denial of intention or cause serious harm." (p. 91; note omitted)

___________“Passion and insurrection in the law of sexual provocation” in Ngaire Naffine and Rosemary J. Owens; with a foreword by Marcia Neave, eds., Sexing the subject of law, North Ryde, NSW : LBC Information Services, 1997, xxxii, 299 p., at  pp. 149-169, ISBN: 0455214697;  copy at McGill, title noted in my research but not article not consulted; no copy in the Ottawa aera libraries;
 

__________ "Sex, Race and Provocation: In Defence of Stingel", (1996) 20 Criminal Law Journal 72-96; contents: Gravity and self-control in provocation...74; Hypothetical projections of the ordinary person...77; Insults, taunts, flaunts, flouts and blasphemy...79; Four imaginary homicides...81; Provocation and the rationale of the objective test...83; Sex, race, culture and Stingel...87; The exception for immaturity...87; Racial and ethnic identity...89; Sexual identity...91; Coincidence of act and provocation...93; Conclusion...95; copy at University of Ottawa, KTA 0 .C735,  Location: FTX Periodicals;

Summary
"... This article presents an explanation of the objective test as it affects the gravity of provocation and a defence of the majority view that the ordinary person is without sex, race, religion or culture when self-control is in issue."  (p. 72; only part of the summary is reproduced)

LEE, Cynthia, 1961-, Murder and the reasonable man : passion and fear in the criminal courtroom,  New York : New York University Press, 2003, xii, 371 p., ISBN: 0814751156; title noted in my research but book not consulted; no copy in Ottawa area libraries covered by the AMICUS catalogue of Library and Archives Canada (verification of 18 January 2006);
 

___________" 'Murder and the Reasonable Man' Revisited: A Response to Victoria Nourse", (2005) 3(1) Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 301-306, available at http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/osjcl/Articles/Volume3_1/Review/Lee_3-1.pdf  (accessed on 30 April 2006); GWU [George Washington University] Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 172; GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 172; available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=839212 (accessed on 12 November 2005);
 

LEE, J.A., "Self-Defence, Provocation and Duress", (1977) 51 The Australian Law Journal 437-449; copy at the University of Ottawa, KTA 0 .A95, Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

LEES, Sue, "Naggers, Whores, and Libbers: Provoking Men to Kill" in Jill Radford and Diana E.H. Russell, eds., Femicide: The Politics of Woman Killing, Buckingham: Open University Press; New York: Twayne; Toronto: Maxwell Macmillan Canada, 1992, xviii, 379 p., at pp. 267-288,  ISBN: 0805790268 and 0805790284 (pbk.); copy at the University of Ottawa, MRT General, HV 6511 .F46 1992;
 

LEHR-LEHNARDT, Rana, "Treat Your Women Well: Comparisons and Lessons From An Imperfect Example Across the Waters", (Spring 2002) 26 Southern Illinois University Law Journal 403-442;
 

LEIGHT, L.H., "Review Article: A Philosophy of Provocation?" (1993) 56  The Modern Law Review 600-606 [reviews the book: Jeremy Horder, Provocation and Responsibility, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, xvi, 208 p.];
 

LÉVI-VALENSI, J., "Les crimes passionnels (L'homicide passionnel)", (avril 1931) Annales de Médecine Légale, de criminologie et de police scientifique 193-285; copie à CISTI, Canada Institute for Scientific and Technical Information/ICIST, Institut canadien de l'information scientifique et technique; aussi publié avec le titrre:  Les Crimes passionnels (l'homicide passionnel), Paris, J.-B. Baillière1931. In-8, 95 p. [91]; le dr. Lévi-Valensi est professeur agrégé à la Faculté de Médecine de Paris.  Médecin des hôpitaux;
 

___________Criminalité et passion amoureuse, Paris, G. Douin (s. d.), paginé 177-196; aussi publié dans (1932) 27 l'Hygiène mentale 177-196;  copie du périodique à CISTI, Canada Institute for Scientific and Technical Information, Ottawa / ICIST, Institut canadien de l'information scientifique et technique, Ottawa,  SER  RA790 A1 H99;
 

LITHGOW, Robert, “Provocation”, (2000) New Zealand Law Journal 21-22; comments on Panani v. R. [2001]¸1 NZLR 234 (Elias CJ, Keith and Panckhurst JJ);
 

___________“Provocation”, (May 2000) New Zealand Law Journal 159-162; comments on R v Rongonui (CA 124/99, 13 April 2000);
 

LITTMAN, Rachel J., "Adequate provocation, individual responsibility, and the deconstruction of free will", (1997) 60 Albany Law Review 1127-1170; copy at University of Ottawa, KFN 5069 .A42, Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

LOFF, Bebe, "Provocation and Domestic Murder: The Axe Murder Case", (1982) 7 Legal Service Bulletin 52-55; Australian periodical, ISSN:  0817-3516; copy at Ottawa University, KTA 0 .L43, Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

LOMBROSO, Cesare, 1835-1909, Le crime: causes et remèdes, deuxième édition, Paris: Félix  Alcan, 1907, xxiii, 583 p.; copie à la bibliothèque de la Cour suprême du Canada, Ottawa, HV 6038 L6514 1907; aussi publié en anglais / also published in English: Crime, its causes and remedies, by Cesare Lombroso, tr. by Henry P. Horton, M.A., with an introduction by Maurice Parmelee, Boston, Little, Brown, and company, 1911, xlvi, 471 p. (series; The modern criminal science series); reprint in: Montclair, N.J., Patterson Smith, 1968 [c1911], (series; Patterson Smith reprint series in criminology, law enforcement, and social problems; publication number 14), "Bibliography of the writings of Cesare Lombroso on criminal anthropology": p. [453]-464, ISBN: 0875850146, copy at Ottawa University,  FTX General, HV 6038 .L6 1968 and MRT General, HV 6038 .L613 1968;

    "Criminels par passion. -- C'est l'unique catégorie de criminels qui constitue une espèce à part et forme le contraste le plus complet avec le criminel-né par les lignes harmoniques du corps, la beauté de l'âme, l'excès de la sensibilité et de l'affectivité, de même que par le mobile du crime, toujours noble et puissant, tel que l'amour ou la politique; eh bien, elle ne s'en rapproche pas moins, malgré cela, par quelques côtés des épileptiques, comme par excès, par l'impulsivité, par eu, par l'instantanéité des accès et la fréquente amnésie (Voyez Homme criminel, p. 226, vol. II)." (p. 456)

----------

    "Nous avons vu quels sont, selon la nouvelle école, les meilleurs moyens de répression; examinons maintenant leur application directe selon le sexe, l'âge et les crimes. [...]

    Criminels par passion. -- Pour les vrais criminels par passion, le remords du crime est déjà la plus grande des peines; l'amende, la réprimande judiciaire ou l'éloignement de la ville ou des personnes lésées suffiront à en défendre la société, pour laquelle ils ne présentent aucun danger, tout en pouvant lui être très utiles, grâce à l'altruisme exagéré dont ils sont toujours doués." (pp. 495 et 502)

___________Homme criminel; criminel né, fou moral, épileptique, criminel fou, criminel d'occasion, criminel par passion. Étude anthropologique et psychiatrique, 2e éd. française, traduction sur la 5e éd. italienne, Paris : Félix Alcan, 1895, 2 v. (Collection; Bibliothèque de philosophie contemporaine), voir au vol. 2, "Criminels par passion", aux pp. 153-182; copie à l'Université Carleton, Ottawa, HV6045.L82 1895;

[p. 153]
"CHAPITRE PREMIER

Criminels par passion.

    Parmi les criminels il y a une catégorie qui se distingue de toutes les autres; c'est celle des criminels par passion, qu'on devrait plutôt appeler criminels par emportement (per impeto), parce que, comme, comme nous avons vu et comme nous le verrons mieux encore dans l'étiologie, tous les crimes ont pour substratum la violence de quelque passion.  Mais tandis que dans le criminel ordinaire l'impulsion de la passion n'est pas soudaine ni isolée, mais elle couve depuis longtemps, et se répète, se renouvelle constamment et s'associe presque toujours à la réflexion, ici, c'est tout le contraire qui a lieu.

    Voici les caractères qui, donc, distingueraient le mieux ces criminels:

    1. -- Rareté. -- En général, ces criminels sont très rares: en Prusse, en Pensylvanie et en Suisse, on a calculé une [p. 154] moyenne de 5 à 6 pour % des autres condamnés pour crimes avec effusion de sang.  'Les crimes de passion sont, selon Bettinger (Crimes of passion, 1872), à ceux de réflexion comme 1 à 27; et ceux de passions mauvaises à ceux de passions généreuses, comme 1 à 50'.

    2. -- Age. -- Tous ont commis leur crime à cette époque de la vie où la passion de l'amour l'emporte sur toutes les autres et trouve moins de contrepoids dans la raison. [...]  Voir tous les criminels politiques.

    3. --Sexe. -- Relativement aux autres crimes, spécialement à ceux avec effusion de sang, le nombre des femmes, ici, est supérieur à celui des hommes.  Sur 71 criminels étudiés par moi, je compte en effet 45 hommes et 26 femmes, c'est-à-dire 36 %, sans compter les infanticides; de sorte que, dans leur moindre proportion dans les crimes vis-à-vis des hommes, les femmes seraient ici quatre fois plus nombreuses que dans les autres crimes.  Ceci est naturel.  La cause la plus fréquente du crime est l'amour trompé; or si l'amour est une anecdote, un épisode dans la vie de l'homme, il est l'évènement le plus grave pour la femme, il est toute son histoire.  Et cela nous le verrons confirmé par la moyenne des suicides (voir ch. II), et par celle des crimes politiques et religieux.  J'ai toutefois démontré dans la Femme criminelle que dans les crimes la femme a un emportement moindre, une plus grande réflexion, ce qui l'approche aux criminels par occasion.

    4. -- Crâne -- Anatomiquement, nous ne pouvons en dire que peu de chose, n'ayant examiné que trois crânes [p. 155] seulement [...]

    5. -- Physionomie. -- En raison du plus grand nombre de sujets examinés, nous trouvons un caractère distinctif plus sûr dans la beauté de la physionomie et l'absence presque complètede ces caractères que l'on a remarqués si fréquemment chez les criminels et chez les fous [...]

[p. 156]
    6. -- Honnêteté. --  Et à la beauté du corps répond l'honnêteté de l'âme. [...]

[p. 159]
    7. -- Affectivité exagérée. -- Non seulement ils ne sont point apathiques comme les criminels-nés, mais ils sont plutôt d'une exitabilité exagérée et d'une affectivité excessive. [..]

[p. 160]
    8. -- Anesthésie.-- Cette hypéresthésie affective s'associe au suicide, comme nous le verrons (V. ch. II), et plus encore à des actes qui démontrent une véritable analgésie momentanée. [...]

[p. 161]
    9. -- Commotion après le crime. -- Loin de manifester la froide apathie (V. 1^er vol., 3^e partie) de l'assassin ordinaire, ils se montrent extrêmement, follement émotionnés, non seulement avant, mais encore après le crime. [...]

[p. 162]
    10. -- Suicide immédiat. -- Beaucoup d'entre eux, à peine le crime accompli et la violence de la passion satisfaite, éprouvent une réaction immédiate; ils se repentent amèrement et se suicident ou tentent de le faire sur le champ. [...]

[p. 163]
    11. -- Aveu -- Aussi, à l'opposé des criminels ordinaires, non seulement ceux-ci ne se procurent point l'alibi, [p. 164] non seulement ils ne cachent point leur crime, mais ils se complaisent à l'avouer aux jurés et aux juges, comme pour calmer leur douleur et leur remords. [...]

[p. 164]
    12. -- Amendement. -- Pour ce motif précisément, les criminels par passion (ou mieux par impulsion 'per impeto') sont les seuls, parmi les condamnés, qui donnent le maximum de l'amendment, 100% comme l'attestent les statistiques suédoises et prussiennes. [...]

[p. 165]
    13. -- Exceptions. -- Toutefois, le repentir et le remords font défaut dans les pays barbares ou demi-barbares, où la vengeance est un devoir, comme chez les coupables pour cause religieuse ou politique.  Dans ce cas, en effet, la grandeur du but aveugle le criminel, qui, sans être indifférent aux maux d'autrui, comme le criminel-né, et en concentrant, cependant, toutes ses affections dans la patrie ou en Dieu, devient insensibles pour les autres [...]

    14. -- Passions. -- Les passions qui excitent ces criminels ne sont pas de celles qui surgissent graduellement dans l'organisme, comme l'avarice et l'ambition, mais de celles qui  éclatent à l'improviste, comme la colère, l'amour platonique ou filial, l'honneur offensé; passions généreuses le plus souvent et souvent sublimes.  Au contraire, chez [p. 166] les criminels ordinaires, celles qui prédominent sont les plus ignobles et les plus féroces, comme la vengeance, la cupidité, l'amour charnel et l'ivrognerie.  Marc fait remarquer avec beaucoup de raison que 'quand l'amour charnel est satisfait, jamais ou presque jamais il ne conduit au crime par emportement, hors les cas de véritable satyriasis maniaque.'

    15. -- Mobile. -- Tandis que la cause qui pousse le criminel ordinaire est souvent très légère, ici au contraire il y a une vraie proportion entre le crime et la cause. [...]

    [p. 171]
    60 criminels étudiés par moi ont eu pour causes de leurs crimes: 1 la faim, 1 le désir de se soustraire à un crime, 1 la misère, 1 le goût des collections, 1 l'imitation, 1 la colère, 2 la vengeance, 3 l'amour de la patrie, 2 l'amour fraternel, 2 l'amour filial, 3 l'amour paternel, 2 des intérêts lésés, 3 l'honneur offensé; tous les autres 35, parmi lesquels 16 femmes sur 18, l'amour offensé ou la jalouise sexuelle.

    16. -- Duels, infanticides, passion politique.-- [...]

[p. 172]
    17. -- Date du mobile. -- Presque toujours la cause du crime passionnel non seulement est grave, mais elle date de peu de temps. [...]

    18. -- Accomplissement du crime.-- Ces crimes ne sont jamais exécutés en secret ni en guet-apens, ni au moyen de complices, ni avec des armes préparées de longue date. [...]

[p. 173]
    19. -- Armes. -- Parfois l'arme elle-même est mal choisie; c'est la première qu'ils trouvent, pierres, ciseaux (Marino), aiguilles, rasoirs, les dents (Zucca), les ongles, les mains, spécialement chez les femmes contre leurs rivales ou contre les nouveau-nés.

    20. -- Mode d'agir insensé. -- Souvent ils accomplissent l'homicide d'une manière insensée, frappant à droite et à gauche [...]

    21. -- Force. -- Souvent dans ces cas (comme il arrive, par exemple, à Verzeni, à Vergani) ils déploient une force musculaire extraordinaire dont ils ne furent jamais capables ni avant, ni après, et qui excite pour cela l'étonnement et les surprend eux-mêmes.

    22. -- Espèce de crime. -- Presque tous ces crimes par passion sont contre les personnes, blessures, homicides, plus rarement viols, très rarement contre les propriétés. [...]

[p. 174]
    23. -- Différences. -- Mais toujours dans ces cas, l'absence de guet-apens, l'honnêteté de la vie antérieure, le repentir immédiat, la cause très grave établissent une différence très nette avec les crimes inspirés par la passion, encore que non ignobles, aux criminels ordinaires qui en portent toute l'empreinte sur la face, sur le crâne et dans leur triste histoire antérieure.  Pour ces derniers, l'amour [p.175] ne fut qu'un simple prétexte pour accomplir leur crime et donner un libre cours à la méchanceté de leur âme; et cela, au moyen de guet-apens préparé de longue main, de complices, d'armes les plus traîtresses et tenues soigneusement cachées, particulièrement avec le poison.  Ils se sont préparés adroitement, froidement, un alibi, ou au moins une excuse apparente dans leur amour prétendu.  Ils connaissent par pratique la puissance de ce moyen de défense pour intéresser d'abord, et émouvoir ensuite, le vulgaire et les jurés qui, grâce à nos lois, sont un juge d'autant plus puissant que tous les autres qu'il est moins compétent et moins responsable. [...]

[p. 178]
    Chez les criminels, l'amour aura été aussi un des mobiles du crime, mais le fonds mauvais existait bien avant, et ce fut par un pur hasard que celui-ci émergea au-dessus des autres.

    24. -- Nombre des coups. -- [...]

    25. -- Analogie avec les épileptiques. -- Bien plus que des criminels ordinaires, ceux-ci se rapprochent des fous impulsifs et mieux encore des épileptiques, par l'impétuosité, l'instantanéité, la férocité des actes, de quelques-uns desquel;s -- qu'on remarque l'importante analogie -- ils ne se souviennent souvent qu'imparfaitement [...]

[p. 181]
    26. -- Etat sauvage. --  A ces crimes contribue encore l'état sauvage qui rend enclin à l'usage du couteau, à la vengeance, et qui, faisant apparaître comme grave la plus petite cause touchant à l'honneur, multiplie les délits par passion.  C'est ce qui s'est observé en Sardaigne et en Corse, où les plus légères contestations, le simple refus de mariage, voire même les dénonciations de vols, se terminaient à coups de fusil et de pistolet, qu'on devait ensuite venger sur les auteurs et sur leurs parents, sans exclure les femmes et les prêtres.  Dans ces cas, les meurtres par vengeance assument le caractère des crimes par passion, parce que, presque toujours, ils sont accomplis en plein jour, sans guet-apens, ni complices, ni assassin à gage, jamais avec le poison, jamais par cupidité, souvent par des personnes qui vécurent jusqu'à ce jour d'une vie honorée."
 

MACAULAY, Lord T.B. [Thomas Babington], J.M. MacLeod, G.W. Anderson and F. Millett., "Notes [on the Indian Penal Code by the Indian Law Commissioners]", in Miscellaneous Works of Lord Macaulay edited by his sister Lady Trevelyan, in Five Volumes, vol. IV, New York: Harper, 1880, 669 p., pp. 177-327, see "Note (M) - On Offences Against the Body",  at pp. 251-281, and more particularly on provocation, pp. 260-263; also in "A Copy of the Penal Code prepared by the Indian Law Commissioners, and published by Command of the Governor-General in Council", command number 673 in Sessional Papers [British Parliamentary Papers] (1837-1838) XLI, 463-587, note (M) , pp. 560-570 of the Sessional Papers and at pp. 98-108 of Command paper number 673;

 
    "We propose that all voluntary culpable homicide shall be designated as murder, unless it fall under one of three heads.  We are desirous to call the particular attention of his Lordship in Council to the law respecting the three mitigated forms of voluntary culpable homicide; and first to the law of manslaughter.

    We agree with the great mass of mankind, and with the majority of jurists, ancient and modern, in thinking that homicide committed in the sudden heat of passion, on great provocation, ought to be punished; but that in general it ought not to be punished so severely as murder.  It ought to be punished in order to teach men to entertain a peculiar respect for human life; it ought to be punished in order to give men a motive for accustoming themselves to govern their passions; and in some few cases for which we have made provision, we conceive that it ought to be punished with the utmost rigor.

    In general, however, we would not visit homicide committed in violent passion, which had been suddenly provoked, with the highest penalties of the law.  We think that to treat a person guilty of such homicide as we should treat a murderer would be a highly inexpedient course -- a course which would shock the universal feeling of mankind, and would engage the public sympathy on the side of the delinquent against the law.

    His Lordship in Council will remark one important distinction between the law as we have framed it and some other systems. Neither the English law nor the French code extends any indulgence to homicide which is the effect of anger excited by words alone.  Mr. Livingston goes still further.  'No words whatever,' says the code of Louisiana, 'are an adequate cause, no gestures merely showing derision or contempt, no assault or battery so slight as to show that the intent was not to inflict great bodily harm.'

    We greatly doubt whether any good reason can be assigned for this distinction.  It is an indisputable fact that gross insults by word or gesture have as great a tendency to move many persons to violent passion as dangerous or painful bodily injuries.  Nor does it appear to us that passion excited by insult is entitled to less indulgence than passion exited by pain.  On the contrary, the circumstance that a man resents an insult more than a wound is anything but a proof that he is a man of a peculiarly bad heart.  It would be a fortunate thing for mankind if every person felt an outrage which left a stain upon his honor more acutely than an outrage which had fractured one of his limbs.  If so, why should we treat an offence produced by the blamable excess of a feeling which all wise legislators desire to encourage , more severely than we treat the blamable excess of feelings certainly not more respectable?

    One outrage which wounds only the honor and the affections is admitted by Mr. Livingston to be an adequate provocation.  'A discovery of the wife of the accused in the act of adultery with the person killed is an adequate cause.'  The law of France, the law of England, and the Mahometan law are also indulgent to homicide committed under such circumstances.  We must own that we can not see no reason for making a distinction  between this provocation and many other provocations of the same kind.  We cannot consent to lay it down as a universal rule that in all cases this provocation shall be considered as an adequate provocation.  Circumstances may easily be conceived which would satisfy a court that a husband had in such a case acted from no feeling of wounded honor or affection, but from mere brutality of nature, or from disappointed cupidity.  On the other hand, we conceive that there are many cases in which as much indulgence is due to the excited feelings of a father or a brother as to those of a husband.  That a worthless, unfaithful, and tyrannical husband should be guilty only of manslaughter for killing the paramour of his wife, and that an affectionate and high-spirited brother should be guilty of murder for killing, in a paroxysm of rage, the seducer of his sister, appears to us inconsistent and unreasonable.

    There is another class of provocations which Mr. Livingston does not allow to be adequate in law, but which have been, and while human nature remains unaltered, will be, adequate in fact to produce the most tremendous effects.  Suppose a person to take indecent liberties with a modest female, in the presence of her father, her brother, her husband, or her lover.  Such an assault might have no tendency to cause pain or danger; yet history tells us what effects have followed from such assaults.  Such an assault produced the Sicilian Vespers.  Such an assault called forth the memorable blow of Wat Tyler.  It is difficult to conceive any class of cases in which the intemperance of anger ought to be treated with greater lenity.  So far, indeed, should we be from ranking a man who acted like Tyler with murderers, that we conceive that a judge would exercise a sound discretion in sentencing such a man to the lowest punishment fixed by the law for manslaughter.

    We think it right to add that, though in our remarks on this part of the law we have used illustrations drawn from the history and manners of Europe, the arguments which we have employed apply as strongly to the state of society in India as to the state of society in any part of the globe.  There is, perhaps, no country in which more cruel suffering is inflicted, and more deadly resentment called forth, by injuries which affect only the mental feelings.

    A person who should offer a gross insult to the Mahometan religion in the presence of a zealous professor of that religion; who should deprive some high-born Rajpoot of his caste; who should rudely thrust his head into the covered palanquin of a woman of rank, would probably move those whom he insulted to more violent anger than if he had caused them some severe bodily hurt.  That on these subjects our notions and usages differ from theirs is nothing to the purpose.  We are legislating for them, and though we may wish that their opinions and feelings may undergo a considerable change, it is our duty, while their opinions and feelings remain unchanged, to pay as much respect to those opinions and feelings as if we partook of them.  We are legislating for a country where many men, and those by no means the worst men, prefer death to the loss of caste; where many women, and those by no means the worst women, would consider themselves as dishonored by exposure to the gaze of strangers: and to legislate for such a country, as if the loss of caste or the exposure of a female face were not provocations of the highest order, would, in our opinion, be unjust and unreasonable." (pp. 260-263)

MacKAY, R.D. (Ronald D.), Mental Condition Defences in the Criminal Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, xii, 252 p. (series; Oxford monographs on criminal law and criminal justice), ISBN:  0198259956; see "Combining the Pleas of Provocation and Diminished Responsibility" at pp. 198-202; copy at Ottawa University, KD 7897 .M33 1995 FTX;
 

_____________"Pleading Provocation and Diminished Responsibility Together", [1988] Criminal Law Review 411-423; copy at Ottawa University, KD 7862 .C734  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

MacKAY, R.D. (Ronald D.), and B.J. Mitchell, "Provoking Diminished Responsibility:  Two Pleas Merging Into One?", [2003] The Criminal Law Review 745-759;

"Summary: In its current review of Partial Defences to Murder, the Law Commission has been requested to consider, inter alia, the law and practice of both provocation and diminished responsibility, including (1) whether they should continue to be partial defences to murder and (2) if so, whether they should remain separate or be combined.  In this paper we consider the implications of the decision in R. v Morgan Smith and argue that, as it is no longer practical or desirable to keep the two pleas separate, a combined defence would be an appropriate vehicle for reform." (p. 745)

___________"Replacing Provocation: More on a Combined Plea", [2004] The Criminal Law Review 219-223;
 

MacKLEM, Timothy and John Gardner, "Provocation and Pluralism", (2001) 64(6) The Modern Law Review 815-830; contents: The need for a provocation...817; Evaluating the provocation...820; The question of fact for the jury...827; Conclusion...829; copy at University of Ottawa, KD 322 .M62  Location, FTX Periodicals;

Summary
"What is the best way to reflect human diversity in the structure of the provocation defence and similar excusatory defenses in the criminal law?  The House of Lords recently concluded that the right way is to allow the jury to personalise and thereby qualify the apparently uniform 'reasonable person' standard mentioned in section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957.  In this paper we argue that this is not the right way at all.  We argue that the reasonable person standard unqualified already accomodates the only variations between people that the law should want to accomodate in an excusatory defence.  To defend this view we revive the common law's tripartite analysis of the 'objective' (or impersonal) issues in the provocation defence: first, was there an action capable of constituting a provocation? second, how provocative was it? and third, how much self-control should have been exhibited in the face of it?  We show that these questions each have a built-in sensitivity to certain variations between different defendants' situations, but that this does not detract from their objectivity (or impersonality).  We argue that no more sensitivity is needed in the name of human diversity, and what is more that no sensitivity is desirable." ( p. 815)

MANNING, Fiona, Self-Defence and Provocation: Implications For Battered Women Who Kill And For Homosexual Victims,  New South Wales Parliamentary Library, Research Service, Sydney, 1996, 28 p. (series; Briefing Paper number 33/96), ISSBN: 0731059751;  see  executive summary available at  http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/web/PHWebContent.nsf/PHPages/ResearchBf331996?OpenDocument;
 

MARSACK, C.C., "Provocation in Trials for Murder", [1959] Criminal Law Review 697-704; KD 7862 .C734  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

MARSHALL, Sandra E., "Punishing Women: Equal or Different" in M. Karlsson, O. Jonsson and E. Brynjardottir, eds., Recht, Gerechtigkeit und der Staat / Law, Justice and the State, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1993, xi, 467 p. at circa pp. 373-374 (series; Rechtstheorie; volume 15),  ISBN: 342807792X;  notes:  Proceedings of the 16th World Congress of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy; Reykjavik 1993; Verhandlungen; title of article noted but article not consulted yet; no copy of this book in the Ottawa area libraries; copy at University of Toronto, John P. Robarts Research Library (Humanities and Social Sciences), K/487/P65R434/1993X;
 

McAULEY, Finbarr, and J. Paul McCutcheon, Criminal Liability : A Grammar, Dublin : Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, lxxvi, 950 p., see Chapter 18, "Provocation" at pp. 849-885, ISBN: 1858000580 and 1858001552 (pbk.);
 

McAULEY, Finbarr, "Anticipating the Past: The Defence of Provocation in Irish Law", (1987) 50 The Modern Law Review 133-157; contents: I. THE BASIS OF THE DEFENCE...133; A. Provocation and the Principles of Criminal Liability...135; B. The Role of the Victim...136; II. THE NATURE OF THE DEFENCE...139; A. The Source of Provocation...139; B. The Meaning of Provocation...142;  C. The gravity of the Provocation...145; D. The Relevance of Personal Characteristics and Circumstances...146; E. Evidence of Temperament...148;  III. The JURISPRUDENCE OF PROVOCATION...150; A. The Early Modern Position...150; B. The Modern Authorities...151; C. The Position in Irish Law...152; D. The Principle of Proportionality...154; E. Loss of Self-Control...156;
 

___________"Provocation: Partial Justification, Not Partial Excuse"  in Stanley Meng Heong Yeo, ed., Partial Excuses to Murder, Leichhardt (N.S.W., Australia):  The Federation Press, 1991, xvii, 287 p. at pp. 19-36, ISBN: 1862870470;

"Summary
Provocation is usually understood as a partial excuse.  This essay tries to show that this way of looking at the plea fails to do justice to the jurisprudence of provocation which has always emphasised the justificatory components of the plea.  An alternative account of provocation as a partial justification is presented and defended." (p. 19)

McCOLGAN, Aileen, "General Defences"  in Donald Nicolson and Llois Bibbings, eds., Feminist Perspectives on Criminal Law, London/Sydney: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2000, xxx, 282 p., Chapter 8 at pp. 137-158, see in particular, "Justifiable force, provocation, duress and necessity" at pp. 144-146 and "Provocation and diminished responsibility" at pp. 148-152,  ISBN: 1859415261; copy at Ottawa University, FTX general, KD 7850 .F46 2000;
 

McCOY, Scott D., "The Homosexual-Advance Defense and Hate Crimes  Statutes: Their Interaction and Conflict", (2000-2001) 22 Cardozo Law Review 629-663; copy at the library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa;
 

McDONALD, Elizabeth, "Provocation, Sexuality and the Actions of "Thoroughly Decent Men", (1993) 9 Women's Studies Journal 126-147; title of article noted in my research but not consulted; no copy of this periodical available in the Ottawa area libraries;
 

McSHERY, Bernadette, "Afterword: Options for the Reform of Provocation, Automatism and Mental Impairment" (2005) 12(1) Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 44-49;

___________"Criminal Responsibility, 'Fleeting' States of Mental Impairment and the Power of Self-Control", (2004) 27(5) International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 445-457;

___________"Men Behaving Badly: Current Issues in Provocation, Automatism, Mental Impairment and Criminal Responsibility", (April 2005) 12(1) Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 15-22;
 

___________"Self-Defence and Provocation", (1992) 66(3) Law Institute Journal: the official organ of the Law Institute of Victoria 151-152; not at Ottawa University; copy at the library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa;
 

M.D.G., Note, "Manslaughter and the Adequacy of Provocation: The Reasonabless of the Reasonable Man", (1958) 106 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1021-1040; Contents: The reasonable man...1023; What is adequate provocation? -- The law in the area Assault  Anger...1024; Fear...1025; Illegal arrest...1028; Infidelity of the Spouse...1029; Mutual Combat...1031; Words...1032; Acts with respect to third parties...1034; Trespass upon property...1036; Reflections on what the law should be...1036; Conclusion...1040;

"CONCLUSION
    After many years of hidding behind the reasonable man, it is time that the law recognized the fact that the crucial issue in every homicide case is the state of the mind of the slayer and that it is the psychiatrist and not the reasonable man who will help the courts determine what that is. ...  Is it reasonable to contend that is the law says that you do not become adequately provoked under a given state of facts, that even if you do become so provoked, the law will refuse to recognize your passion?" (p. 1040)

METZ, René, "La responsabilité pénale dans le droit canonique médiéval" dans La responsabilité pénale, Travaux du colloque de philosophie pénale (12 au 21 janvier 1959), Paris: Dalloz, 1961, 564 p. aux pp. 83-116, voir "Les passions" aux pp. 102-103 (Collection; Annales de la Faculté de droit et des sciences politiques et économiques de Strasbourg; VIII);

    "Les passions. -- Les passions, comme l'amour, la haine, la colère, sont prises en considération pour établir la responsabilité pénale.  Gratien et les décrétistes en traitent généralement à propos de l'homicide; ils ne présentent pas une doctrine ferme, mais les indications qu'ils donnent suffisent à prouver qu'ils ont vu le problème.

    D'après Alexandre III, la passion, notamment la colère, peut inciter quelqu'un à un acte; la passion est une circonstance atténuante, qui peut devenir, dans certaines circonstances, une cause d'excuse.  Le pape cite l'exemple connu d'un homicide où la passion enlève à l'acte tout caractère délictueux (57) : c'est le cas de l'homme qui surprendrait un individu -- en l'occurence, le texte envisage le cas d'un clerc -- en flagrant délit avec sa mère, sa femme, sa soeur ou sa fille et qui le tuerait.  La colère est censée telle qu'elle fait perdre complètement la raison au meurtrier, si bien que le juge ne doit pas lui infliger de peine.  Mais s'il s'agit d'une parente moins rapprochée, le coupable est frappé de l'exommunication, déclare le pape; dans ce cas, la passion n'est qu'une circonstance atténuante.

    Il semble bien que la Lex julia de adulteriis et de stupro (58) a inspiré la décision d'Alexandre III, dont on trouve une réplique dans le Code pénal français (59)." (pp. 102-103)
---------------
"(57) Compilatio I, 5, 34, 4 = Décrétales de Grégoire IX, 5, 39, 3 (in fine)
(58) Code de Justinien, 9, 9 : notamment 9, 9, 4; voir aussi Digeste, 48, 5, 39, 8.
(59) L'article 324, second alinéa, est ainsi libellé : 'Dans le cas d'adultère..., le meurtre commis par l'époux sur son épouse, ainsi que sur le complice, à l'instant où il les surprend en flagrant délit dans la maison conjugale, est excusable'. " (pp. 102-103)
 

"So the passions are the representatives in the human being of excess and deviance, they are the uncontrolled elements of our (flawed?) human nature; these are claims which relate to as vast a project as one could imagine.  To address such a complex area of study and to assess the relationship between specifically 'human' nature and 'nature,' critical issues for philosophy and theology for millenniums, Meyer characteristically follows a historical pathway.  He offers a tapestry, a survey of the history of the philosophical approach to passions in the works of, for example, Aristotle, Saint Augustine, Descartes, Freud, Hobbes, Hume, Kant, Locke, Machiavelli, Mandeville, Marx, Nietzsche, Plato, de Rougemont, Rousseau, Saint Thomas, Smith, Socrates, Spinoza, and Wittgenstein." (Robert F. Barsky, Translator's Introduction, p. xxvii)

MIETHE, Terance D., "The Impact of Victim Provocation on Judgments of Legal Responsibility: An Experimental Assessment", (1984) 12 Journal of Criminal Justice 407-414;

MILGATE, Deborah E., "The Flame Flickers, but Burns On: Modern Judicial Application of the Ancient Heat of Passion Defense", (1998-99) 51 Rutgers Law Review 193-227; copy at the University of Ottawa, KFN 1869 .R88, Location:  FTX Periodicals;
 

MILLIGAN, J.R., "Provocation and the Subjective Test", [1967] The New Zealand Law Journal 19-20 and 22-24 (two columns on each page);

"From a practical point of view it is probable that a jury, in considering the conduct of the accused, would endeavour to compare his actions with some sort of a standard.  Under the old law the standard was the hypothetical reasonable man. To ask a jury to sift from the accused's traits those which are on the right side of an undefined line and to then use only those selected threats when considering the sufficiency of provocation, might be to ask too much." (p. 24)

MILLIGEN, John Gideon, 1782-1862, The Passions or, Mind and Matter illustrated by Considerations on Hereditary Insanity, &c. &c. &c., London: John and Daniel A. Darling, 1848, vii, 464 p., see "Anger", pp. 324-335; copy at Ottawa University, MRT General, BF 551 .M527 1848;

 
"[p. 324]
SECTION III.
ANGER
    Anger is an instinctive passion observable in all animals.  It arises from any interruption of their comfortable state, any disturbance of their mental or physical repose; any circumstance, in short, that can, directly or indirectly, interfere with their enjoyment of life or of pleasure--and in mankind, from any observation or expression that can militate against the good opinion he entertains of himself.

    The ancients, in calling this passion choler, attributed it to the agitation of the bile, [here, a word in Greek in the text that I can not reproduce]; hence they called it bilious passion,--and no doubt bilious temperaments are more exposed to its influence than any other.  The sanguineous it is true, are susceptible of violent fits of anger, described by Horace as the ira furor brevis, but the malevolent, the vindictive anger, is more observable in the bilious and the nervous, for they are more likely to be influenced by nervous excitability.

    [p. 325] Anger is uncontrollable by reason, inasmuch as its invasion is generally sudden, and arising from peculiar exciting circumstances.  Philosophers may descant very wisely on what they call the sedatives of anger. It arises from an intuitive impulse, various in its excitation according to temperament, and bids defiance to every ethical rule that wisdom can seek to inculcate.  Paley may submit to the consideration of the irascible 'the indecency of extravagant anger--the inconvenience and irretrievable misconduct into which our irascibility has sometimes betrayed us--the friendships it has lost us--the distresses and embarrassments in which we have been involved by it, and the sore repentance which, on account of others, it always costs us.'  'Most unquestionably, if man could enter all this calm consideration before the invasion of a paroxysm of anger, he might calm himself down to a placid mood.  The only cure for anger is the exhaustion of excitability, the collapse, that succeeds it:

'Anger is like
A full-hot horse! who being allowed his way,
Self-mettle tires him.'

    Seneca has truly said, that 'Anger is like rain, which breaks itself upon what it falls.'  Aristotle looked upon this passion as the desire to retaliate any injury we may have received; and again, Seneca defines it as a violent emotion of the soul, which willingly impels us to seek revenge.  There is no doubt that anger produces a fearful sensation of [p. 326] injury, and an ardent desire of revenge.  Hatred is a chronic anger, which fosters a spirit of vengeance, that may be considered the crisis of hate.

    Anger will vary in its symtoms according to our temperaments.  Thus we may observe what is called red anger, and pale anger.  The first is of a violent and explosive nature; it generally affects the sanguineous: the circulation of the blood is accelerated--the breathing is difficult and panting--the features flushed--the swollen veins are visibly enlarged under the integuments--the eyes flash fire: and become injected with blood--the lips, contracted, expose the teeth--the voice becomes hoarse--the hearing difficult--foam will occasionally issue from the mouth; in short, the features assume the character of mania, arising evidently from a congestion of blood on the brain; and under the violence of the paroxysm the angry man will know no restraint, and is indeed, for the time being, a maniac, indiscriminate in his fury, and perfectly uncontrollable.  Such was the case of Charles VI of France, who, being violently incensed against the Duke of Bretagne, and burning with a spirit of malice and revenge, could neither eat, drink, nor sleep, for many days and nights, and at length became furiously mad; as he was riding on horse-back, drawing his sword, and striking promiscuously every one who approached him.

During this paroxysm of anger, the violence of an infuriated man is such that he will break and [p. 327] and destroy every thing about him.  On this subject Dr. Reid and Dugald Stewart have entertained a singular notion, and fancied that in these outrageous acts the angry man thinks that the inanimate objects that he attacks are alive.  The following are his words:--'The disposition which we sometimes feel, when under the influence of instinctive resentment, to wreak our vengeance upon inanimate objects, has suggested to Dr. Reid a very curious query--whether, upon such an occasion, we may have a momentary belief that the object is alive?  for my own part, I confess my inclination to answer this question in the affirmative.'  Now, with all due respect to the opinion of these psychologists, daily experience proves the fallacy of this doctrine; for although such furious persons may break and demolish pots and pans, bottles and glasses, chairs and tables, they rarely expend their fury on bystanders, who would not exactly remain as quiet as crockery or furniture, but have recourse to retaliation with capital and interest.  True, such men may beat their wives and their children, but they are more cautious with strangers; and their outrageous conduct I consider as an indication of a cowardly desire to seek revenge, rather than a resentful spirit to avenge wrongs or insults; and these outbreaks are nothing more than a manifestation of power, that mankind is ever proud of possessing and displaying.  And I truly must again differ in opinion with [p. 328] the philanthropic Dugald Stewart, when he maintains that a man wishes to punish an offender with his own hands, owing to 'a secret wish of convincing our enemey, by the magnanimity of our conduct, how much he had mistaken the object of his hatred.'  I must confess that I should feel much hesitation in exposing myself to this chance of a benevolent display of magnanimity on the part of an infuriated person.

    In these attacks, the brain, the heart, the lungs suffer under congestion, and they will frequently occasion apoplexy, epilepsy, convulsions, paralysis, inflammation of the brain and its membrane; and insanity, hernia, the rupture of a blood-vessel, or aneurism, have often resulted from this fearful paroxysm.

    In pale anger, the liver, the digestive organs are more engaged, and jaundice, inflammation of the liver, bilious dejections are frequently ushered in.  In this anger, the circulation is languid, the pulse small and irregular, the breathing short and oppressed, a cold perspiration oozes from every pore, the teeth are locked or chattering, the eyes fixed and glassy, the features pale and contracted, a general tremour shakes the whole frame, and the individual sufferer--for such he is--appears over-whelmed by the exaltation of his passion; he can articulate a word, s ammers his execrations, and seems to seek for language sufficiently energetic and bitter to express his wrath; his counte- [p. 329] nance is so altered by the violence of his emotions, that he is scarcely recognisable.  Milton has powerfully described this physiognomic change in the unruly fermentation of the mind:

'Thus while he spake, each passion dimm'd his face,
Thrice chang'd with pale ire, envy, and despair;
Which marr'd his borrow'd visage, and betray'd
Him counterfeit.'

    What a description of a of a detected hypocrite!  Thomson has also depicted this condition in vivid colours:

'Senseless and deformed,
Convulsive Anger storms at large, or pale
And silent, settles into fell revenge.'

Pale anger is more frequently excited by offended pride and vanity, when any observation tends to diminish our self-conceit and estimation, or affect our influence in society: such is the irritation of the literary man, if he hears his production disparaged; of the soldier, if any doubt appears to be entertained of his valour. 'When men', to use Bacon's words, 'are ingenious in picking out circumstances of contempt,' all these sentiments urge us to resentment, and to a desire of obtaining revenge.  Our revengeful feelings, or rather their impulsion to revengeful action, may be restrained by reason, but the principle itself is beyond our control; it is an instinctive, a conservative passion, and every animal will seek to destroy an enemy in self-defence, for present, for future security.  Nature [p. 330] has gifted every living creature with defensive and offensive weapons: we do not deliberate on the justice or the injustice of our cause; and even when our resentment is not legitimate, it will endure for a considerable time, for man not only feels hurt buy the injuries he receives from others, but is even angry with himself for having been wrong; and vanity will make him unwilling to acknowledge his error, as it would imply a want of judgment: and our experience betrays more galling vexation in being lowered in our own estimation, which is certain, that in the opinion of others, which our self-sufficiency induces us to question.  As La Rochefoucauldt justly observes, 'Lorsque notre haîne est trop vive, elle nous met au-dessous ce ceux que nous haïssons.'  This is an insupportable moral degradation, since it compels us to admit the superiority of those whom we would wish to degrade in the eyes of the universe.

    When we really have cause to entertain resentment and hatred, it will be more or less a permanent passion, since we more readily forget acts of kindness than injuries; and I much fear, that when we forgive an enemy, our generosity is more to be attributed to the consideration of having sufficiently tiumphed over him, and satisfied our resentment, than to any magnanimous sacrifice on our part.  No doubt, the forgiveness of injuries is a most noble exertion; but pride and vanity will prevent us from following the impulse of a benevolent disposition, and, like the [331] implacable deities, they will not relinquish the victims that are brought to their altars for immolation.

     Hatred is as natural a propensity as love; it is ruled by the laws of attraction and repulsion; it is one of the distinctive attributes of man; it is rarely exhibited in the lower animals of the same species.  Their strife is ephemeral; they entertain no rancorous feelings towards each other, except in some particular cases of marked aversion, and that is to be attributed to jealousy resulting from domestication.  But animals in their natural state seem to forget an injury when the contest that follows it is over; when their wants are satisfied, they cease to entertain any hostile sentiment.  In man, on the contrary, hatred has been transmitted, even amongst uncivilized hordes, from one generation to another; and the family of the savage inherit his bow and arrows, his club, his animosities, and his thirst of revenge.  Indian tribes have been known to travel considerable distances to seek out an enemy; and in Ireland the hatred of what are called 'factions' has existed for centuries.  Revenge, to use Otway's language, appears to be

'Th' attribute of the goods; they stam'd it
With their great image on our natures!*

     When revenge cannot be obtained by honourable
-----
* Otway

[p. 332] and fair means--when the person who has inflicted the injury is placed beyond the reach of ordinary vengeance, and no retribution can be obtained, no legal punishment inflicted--then will this spirit gnaw the very vitals of the injured, and they will consider any means legitimate that can attain their vindictive ends.

'All stratagems are lawful in revenge:
Promise, deceive, betray, or break your trust:--
Who rights his honour, cannot be unjust.'*

The dificulty of obtaining redress, or satisfying our injured feelings, adds to the original injury; and the man who would have been satisfied with a measured satisfaction, becomes implacable, and reflection, instead of calming the irritation, only aggravates the consuming passion.  Anger is attended with intense excitement--a distressing sensation of oppression of suffocation, of convulsive spasms.  Hatred will also occasion much anguish, and an intolerable restlessness of mind and of body: but revenge is the crisis of the malady; it is a gratifying enjoyment, and an injured man feels that he could die satisfied after he has obtained it, exclaiming,

'Tis brave and noble when the falling weight
Of my own ruin crushes those I hate.'**

That these sentiments are reprehensible, in a religious and a moral point of view, there cannot be the least doubt, and happy are those who can withstand their banful influence; but, generally speaking, their invasion is no more under the control of reason or of the mind, that any of our other instinctive appetites.  Time and reflection may convince us both of their evil tendencies, and the necessity of not yielding to their impulse; but such is our nature, that we will more readily forgive an injury inflicted on our affectioons, our fortunes, and even our good name, than any attempt to humble our pride and our vanity, and our self-importance and conceit.  This resentment is what several psychologists have termed 'delibertae resentment,' being more or less prompted by reflection; whereas 'instinctive resentment' arises from the immediate retaliation on an offending party--and in this passion there is less of male-violence than in a calculated system of revenge: at the same time, there can be no doubt that instinctive resentment will become deliberate when the cause that excited it continues to act, or the nature of the injury is more or less permanent, and bears the character of having been intentional.  Howbeit, all these violent passions are ushered in by anger or by indignation,--two principles of action similar in a great degree, although indignation may be a more lofty sentiment, which induces the offended to desise the attacks of a worthless and contemptible enemy; and this apparent magnanimity will often arise from the conviction, that these [p. 334] attacks will not only be harmless, but will very likely prove prejudicial to the offending party.

    The nature of anger has been the subject of much psychological controversy; but of all the definitions given of it by ancient and modern philosophers, the most graphic one is due to Charron.  I transcribe the original, as its quaintness in the old French dialect would not bear translation:--

    'Quel que doit estre, l'estat de l'esprit au dedans, jusqu'il cause un tel désordre au-dehors!  La cholère du premier coup en chasse et bannist loing la raison et le jugement, afin que la place luy demeure toute entière; puis elle remplit tout de feu, de fumée, de ténèbres, et de bruict, semblable à celuy qui mist le maistre hors la maison, puis y mist le feu et se brula vif-dedans; et comme un navire qui n'a ny governement, ny patron, ny voiles, ny avirons, et qui court fortune a la mercy des vagues, vents, et tempestes au milieu de la mer courroucée.

    'Ses effêts sont grands, souvent bien misérables et lamentables.  Premièrement elle nous pousse à l'injustice, car elle se lespite et s'esguise par opposition juste, et par la cognoissance que l'on a de s'estre courracé mal à propos.  Elle s'esguise aussi par le silence et la froideur, par ou l'on pense estre dédaigné et soy et sa cholère, ce qui est propre aux femmes, lesquelles souvent se courroucent, alors que l'on se contre-courrouce et redoublent leurs cholère jusqu'à la rage, quand elles voyent que l'on [p. 335] ne daigne nourrir leur courroux.  Cette passion ressemble proprement aux grandes ruines, qui se rompent sur ce quoy elles tombent.  Elle désire si violemment le mal d'autry, qu'elle ne prend pas garde à éviter le sien.  Elle nous entrasve et nous enlace, nous faict dire et faire des choses indignes, honteuse et messéantes.  Finalement, elle nous emporte si outrement qu'elle nous facict faire des choses scandaleuses et irreparables, meurtres, empoissonnements, trahisons, dont après s'ensuivent de grands repentirs--temoin Alexandre le Grand après avoir tué Clytus, dont disait Pythagoras, qu'à la fin de la cholère estoit le commencement du repentir.'
 

MITCHELL, Barry, "Provoked Violence, Capacity and Criminal Responsibility", (1995) 1(4) Psychology, Crime & Law 291-300; copy at the Solicitor General Canada, Ministry Library and Reference Centre, Ottawa/Solliciteur général Canada, Bibliothèque ministérielle et centre de référence, Ottawa;
 

MITKOVITCH, "Le crime passionnel", (1930) Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie 197-201; titre noté dans ma recherche mais article pas encore consulté; il semble que seulement Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nouvelle-Écosse aurait une copie de ce numéro;
 

MOLOMBY, Tom, “Revisiting Lethal Violence by Men – A Reply”, (1998) 22 Criminal Law Journal 116-118; a reply to Coss, “Revisiting Lethal Violence by Men”, supra; copy at Ottawa University, KTA 0 .C735  Location, FTX Periodicals; see also further reply by Coss;
 

MORGAN, Jenny, 1954-, Critique and Comment, "Provocation Law and Facts: Dead Women Tell No Tales, Tales Are Told About Them", (1997) 21 Melbourne University Law Review 237-276;  "Contents: I Introduction...238; II Telling Tales...240; III Telling Another Story: 'Self-induced' Provocation...250; V Gender Bias?...255; VI More Recent Stories...257; VII Who is the 'Ordinary Man'?...262; VIII Many Different People are Men: The Role of Ethnicity...264; A Whose Experience of Ethnicity?...267; B  The 'Other's' Lack of Self-Control...269; C  Multiculturalism and Cultural Relatovism...271; IX The Future of Provovation...273"; copy at the University of Ottawa, KTA0 .M454,  Location:  FTX Periodicals;

Abstract
"When students are taught the doctrine of provocation as a defence to murder, the cases they are required to read almost invariably involve the killing by a man of his wife or de facto partner, who has left him, sometimes (apparently) for a new partner to 'screw everyone in the street', often (but less apparently) in a context of previous violence by him.  The first part of this article addresses how 'the facts' are constructed in these cases and how those constructions might influence 'the law' on provocation, and considers whether some of the 'leading' cases can be reconstructed.  The second part of the article focuses closely on the objective test in the provocation doctrine.  In particular the role of ethnicity in the reconsideration of that test.  Like the provocation doctrine, the article is value-laden.  It asks the reader to reconsider the valies embodied in the law, and facts, on provocation." (p. 237)

___________Who Kills Whom and Why: Looking Beyond Legal Categories, Melbourne (Victoria, Australia): Victorian Law Reform Commission, 2002, vi, 54 p., ISBN: 0957967861; available at http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/CA256902000FE154/Lookup/Homicide/$file/Occasional_Paper.pdf (accessed on 8 February 2006);

MORRIS, Norval and Colin Howard, Studies in Criminal Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964, xxiv, 270 p., see "III. Provocation" at pp. 79-112; Contents:  " 1. The English Common law...79; (i) There must be a killing...79; (ii) The accused must actually have lost control of himself...82; (iii) But otherwise the test of sufficiency of provocation is the effect on the ordinary or reasonable man...82; (iv) Mere words can probably never amount to provocation...84; (v) Provocation is a question of fact, not law...85;  2. The Direction to the Jury...85; 3. Offences Less than Murder...89; 4. Insanity... 91; 5. Source of the provocation... 92; 6. Native Races... 93; 7. Statutory definitions... 99;
 

MOUSOURAKIS, George, Criminal Responsibility and Partial Excuses, Aldershoot (UK) and Brookfield (Vermont/USA): Ashgate Publishing Company, 1998, vi, 216 p., ISBN: 1855219433; see Table of Contents;
 

___________"Cumulative Provocation and Criminal Liability", (2000) 64 The Criminal Law Journal 332-338; Table of Contents: "Previous Maltreatment of the Accused...332; Reliance on Diminished Responsibility...334; Combined Defence of Provocation and Diminished Responsibility...336; Summary...338";

"Summary
Where there is no evidence suggesting that the accused was sufficiently provoked, or that she acted in the heat of passion as a result, as required for the provocation defence to apply, the accused may still be entitled to a partial defence on different grounds, such as diminished responsibility or a defence of extreme emotional disturbance.  If evidence suggests that the accused suffered from an abnormality of mind and was provoked, provocation and diminished responsibility may be pleaded together.  Such a combined defence may be accepted either on the basis of provocation or on that of diminished responsibility or, possibly, on both.  The latter should be the case where the requirements of both defences appear to be satisfied." (p. 338)

___________"Emotion, Choice and the Rationale of the Provocation Defence", (1999) 30 The Cambrian Law Review 21-30; microfilm copy of this Collection published by Hein at the library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa; however as of 19 June 2002, the library has received up to vol. 29 only;
 

___________"Provocation, loss of self-control and criminal responsibility" (2000) 25(1) Tydskrif Vir Regswetenskap = Journal for Juridical Science 89; not at Ottawa University; title of article noted in my research but not consulted yet; this periodical is only available in Canada at the University of Alberta, Cameron Library; published by Bloemfontein, Fakulteit van Regsgeleerdheid, Universiteit van die Oranje-Vrystaat  ISSN:  0258-252X;

___________"Reason, Passion and Self-Control: Understanding the Moral Basis of the Provocation Defence", (2007)  38 Revue de droit Université de Sherbrooke  215-232; disponible à http://www.usherbrooke.ca/droit/fileadmin/sites/droit/documents/RDUS/volume_38/38-1-mousourakis.pdf (vérifié le 27 août 2009);
 

___________ Shifting grounds of criminal liability: justification and excuse in the theory of provocation, Thesis (Ph.D.), University of Edinburgh, 1991; title noted in my research but thesis not consulted;
 

MOWAH, Ronald Rae, Morbid Jealously and Murder: a psychiatric study of morbidly jealous murderers at Broadmoor, London : Tavistock Publications, 1966, xii, 131 p., (series; International library of criminology, delinquency and  deviant social behaviour; Edward Glover, Hermann Mannheim and Emanuel Miller; editors; number 11); copy at Ottawa University, HV 6515 .M67 1966 MRT; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa, HV 6515 .M67 1966;
 

MULLEN, Paul E., "The crime of passion and the changing cultural construction of jealousy", (1993) 3(1) Criminal Behaviour and Mental Health 1-11; copy at the Solicitor General Canada, Ministry Library and Reference Centre, Ottawa/Solliciteur général Canada, Bibliothèque ministérielle et centre de référence, Ottawa;

"ABSTRACT   Killings motivated by jealousy are, on occasion, glorified by the term 'crime of passion'.  The response to such crimes depends on the prevailing attitudes to jealousy and the legal practices current at the time.  The cultural construction of jealousy has undergone radical changes in emphasis over the history of Western society, and legal systems have altered in response to changing cultural and social contexts.  It is argued that the generosity accorded to the jealous killer has survived these changes.  In our current emotionology jealousy is increasingly regarded as psychopathological and as such ceases to be the responsibility of the jealous individual.  Although pathological jealousies do exist, the vast majority of jealous reactions are not usefully regarded as pathological.  If jealousy is to be translated from a vengeful cry of rage into a disappointed hope, it is essential to recognise that most jealous reactions fall within the scope of normal human experience.  When violence emerges from such jealousy, appeals by mental health professionals to psychopathology to explain and mitigate are misguided." (p. 1)

___________"Jealousy: The Pathology of Passion", (1991) 158 British Journal of Psychiatry 593-601; copy at University of Ottawa, Health Sciences Library/Université d'Ottawa, Bibliothèque des sciences de la santé;
 

{Abstract]
"Emotions may be rooted in biology but the process of cultural construction gives those emotions form and a language for their expression.  The changing construction of jealousy in Western societies has transformed a socially sanctioned response to infidelity into a form of personal pathology which is the mere outward expression of immaturity, possessiveness and insecurity.  This is a history of the stripping away of social, ethical and finally interpresonal meanings from an experience, to leave it as a piece of individual psychopathology.  Fidelity and jealousy are constructed as they are because of the nature of the social and economic realities which drive our culture.  The erosion of the area of human experience which could be identified with normal jealousy leaves the boundary between the pathological jealousy of psychiatry and normal experience increasingly problematic." (p. 593)

___________"Morbid Jealously and the Delusion of Infidelity" in Robert Bluglass and Paul Bowden, eds., with an introduction by Nigel Walker, Principles and Practice of Forensic Psychiatry, Edinburgh and New York: Churchill Livingstone, 1990, xxi, 1405, 10, 84, 53 p., at pp. 823-834, ISBN:  0443035784; copy at CISTI, Canada Institute for Scientific and Technical Information, Ottawa/ICIST, Institut canadien de l'information scientifique et technique, Ottawa, RA1151 P957;
 

___________"A phenomenology of  Jealousy", (1990) 24 Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 17-28; copy at University of Ottawa, Health Sciences Library/Université d'Ottawa, Bibliothèque des sciences de la santé;
 

MURRAY, Michael J., The Criminal Code - A General Review [presented to the Attorney-General of Western Australia], Wembley, Western Australia : Government Printer, 1983, 2 volumes (xvi, 653 p.); see:  sections 245-247, pp. 153-156, vol. 1; section 281,  pp. 175-177, vol. 1; and section 281, pp. 563-564, vol. 2;

"APPENDIX A
DRAFT PROVISIONS
......
Killing under provocation
281. (1) When a person who unlawfully kills another under circumstances which, but for the provisions of this section, would constitute wilful murder or murder, does the act which causes death under provocation, he is guilty of manslaughter only.

(2) 'Provocation' means any wrongful act or insult of such a nature, when done to an ordinary person or in the presence of an ordinary person to another, as to be likely to induce an ordinary person, and which does in fact induce the offender, to do the act which causes the death of the person who offered the provocation, provided that --

(a) the offender acts upon the provocation in the heat of passion before there is time for his passion to cool; and
(b) the nature of the act done by the offender is not disproportionate to the nature of the provocation, and
(c) the provocation was not deliberately induced by any words or conduct of the offender.

(3) Whether the conditions required by subsection (2) of this section are or are not satisfied in the particular case is a question of fact, and whether any matter is or is not capable of constituting provocation is a matter of law.

(4) A lawful act is not capable of constituting provocation.

(5) An unlawful arrest does not necessarily constitute provocation, but may do so if the offender knows, or believes on reasonable grounds, that the arrest was unlawful." (pp. 527 and 563-564, vol. 2)

MUYART DE VOUGLANS, Pierre François, 1713-1791, Les loix criminelles de France dans leur ordre naturel: dédiées au roi, Paris: Mérigot le jeune, 1780, xliii, 883 p.; copie à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, Ottawa, K343.0944 M98 x.fol.;

"CHAPITRE II.
Du Crime commis dans un premier Mouvement.
SOMMAIRES.
I. Qu'entend-on par un Crime commis dans un premier mouvement?
2. Moins graves que les Crimes commis par Dol.
3. Distinction des Crimes commis dans un premier mouvement, quant aux passions qui les font naître.

I.  [I. Qu'entend-on par un crime commis dans un premier mouvement?]
On appelle ainsi, celui qui se commet sans préméditation et dans la chaleur d'une passion violente, comme de la colère, de la douleur, de l'amour, ou de l'ivresse.  Ce qui s'entend, lorsque ces passions sont portées à un tel excès qu'on peut dire qu'elles ne laissent pas une entière liberté d'esprit dans celui qu'elles possèdent, et qu'il y a lieu de présumer qu'il n'aurait point commis le Crime, s'il n'avait été dans cet état.  La Loi en donne pour exemple ceux qui se querellent et se battent dans la chaleur du vin.
    Impetu autem cum per ebrietem ad manus aut ad ferrum venitur. L. 11. ss. 2 ss. de Poenis.
II. [2. Moins graves que les Crimes commis par Dol]
     Aussi les Crimes de cette espèce ne sont point aussi graves que ceux commis par Dol, qui font l'effet des passions plus froides, telles que la haine, la jalousie, et la cupidité.  C'est encore par la même raison, qu'au lieu que ceux-ci ne peuvent jamais s'excuser, et sont déclarés irrémissibles par les Loix du Royaume; les Crimes commis dans un premier mouvement, peuvent donner lieu à la modération, et même à la remise entière de la peine, comme nous le verrons en traitant des Lettres de Grace.
III. [3. Distinction des Crimes commis dans un premier mouvement.]
    Cependant, comme les passions qui excitent ces premiers mouvements ont aussi des caractères et des degrés particuliers de malice qui peuvent les rendre plus ou moins punissables, nous croyons devoir reprendre ici séparément, chacune de ces différentes Causes, pour leur appliquer les principes particuliers qui peuvent les concerner.

§. I. Du Crime commis dans la Colère.
SOMMAIRES.
I. Qu'est-ce que la Colère?
2. Elle rend le crime moins punissable.
3. Quatre choses à considérer en cette matière.

I. [I. Qu'est-ce que la colère?]
La colère est un vif ressentiment de l'injure que l'on prétend avoir reçue, avec un pressant désir de s'en venger.
II. [2. Elle rend le Crime moins punissable, et pourquoi?]
    La Loi met cette passion au nombre des causes qui rendent le Crime moins punissable; parce que ceux qui en sont possédés ne jouissent pas de l'entière liberté de leur esprit, et qu'ils se croient bien fondés dans l'amour de la vengeance qu'elle inspire.
    Quidquid calore iracundiae sit vel dicitur, non prius ratum est, quam si perseverantia apparuerit judicium animi fuisse, ideoque brevi reversa uxor nec divertisse videtur.  L. 49. ss. de reg. jur.
III. [3. Choses à considérer en cette matière.]
    Mais aussi, pour s'assurer si le crime a été véritablement l'efet de cette passion, il y a plusieurs  choses à considérer suivant les Jurisconsultes. I^o. La colère, en elle-même, pour savoir si elle a été extrêmement violente et capable d'aliéner celui qu'elle agitait.  2^o.  Le sujet qui a donné lieu à cette colère, pour savoir si ce sujet était par lui-même assez grave pour exciter un violent courroux; car c'est par le plus ou moins d'importance du sujet, que l'on peut juger du plus ou moins de violence de cette passion; et que l'on peut juger aussi, si elle a été naturelle et létime.  3^o.  Le temps que cette colère a duré, pour savoir s'il ne s'était pas écoulé depuis la rixe un intervalle suffisant pour avoir pu rafraîchir les sens, et calmer les esprits. 4^o.  Enfin, la manière dont le Crime a été commis, pour savoir si la colère dont on était alors agité, a été portée à des excès qui la fassent dégénérer en cruauté et barbarie; comme si l'on a frappé son ennemi dans le temps qu'il fuyait et qu'il était absolument hors d'état de défense; si l'on s'est servi,  pour le blesser, de certaines armes meurtrières et perfides dont il ne pouvait se garantir, telles que couteaux, stilets et autres armes défendues;  mais surtout s'il parassaît , par les circonstances, qu'on se fût ménagé une rencontre, ou bien qu'on se fût servi d'un tiers pour chercher à cette personne la querelle d'où s'est ensuivi le Crime; parce que ces circonstances feraient rentrer nécessairement ce Crime dans la classe de ceux commis par Dol, dont nous venons de parler sur le Chapitre précédent.
    V. JUL. CLAR. Lib. 5. ss. fin. Q. 60. n. 8.... BOER.. Decis. 168.... TIRAQ.  de Poenis temper. Caus. I.

§. II. Du Crime commis dans la Douleur.
SOMMAIRES.
I. Comment l'on doit juger de la douleur en général.
2. Exemples tirés des Loix Romaines.
3. Différence de nos usages sur ce point.

I. [I. Comment l'on doit juger de la douleur en général.]
Pour juger si cette passion a été la véritable cause du Crime, il faut principalement considérer le motif qui a pu l'exciter, et si ce motif était fondé sur des sentiments naturels
II. [2. Exemples tirés des Loix Romaines.]
    La Loi en donne pour exemple, ceux qu'une douleur excessive, causée par la violence du mal, porterait à atténuer sur leur propre vie (I), ou bien l'extrême douleur que ressentiraient un père ou un mari qui surprendraient leur fille, ou femme en adultère.  Nous verrons même, en traitant de ce Crime, qu'elle déclarait l'un et l'autre absolument exempts de peine, ou du moins de celle de mort (2).
    (I) Qui se vulneravit, vel alias mortem sibi conscivit, Imp. Hadrianus rescripsit ut modus ejus rei statutus sit, ut, si impatientia doloris aut taedio vitae, aut morbo, aut furore, aut pudore mori maluit, non animadvertatur in eum, sed ignominia mittatur. L. 6.ss.7...ss. de re militari.
    (2) Ei qui uxorem suam in adulterio deprehensam occidisse se non negat, ultimum supplicium remitti potest... Patri datur jus occidenti adulterum cum filia quam in potestate habet; itaque nemo alius ex parentibus idem jure faciet, sed nec filius pater.  L.20. ss. ad Leg.  Jul. de adult..........Cum sit difficillimum justum dolorem temperare, & quia plus fecerit quam quia vindicare se non debuerit, puniendus sit, sufficit igitur, si sit humilis loci, in opus perpetuum eum tradi, si qui honestior, in insulam relegari.  L. 38. ss. 8, ad Leg. Jul. de adult.
III. [3. Différences de nos usages sur ce point.]
    Mais il n'en est pas de même parmi nous. Ces circonstances peuvent seulement, comme nous le verrons, en traitant des exceptions de l'accusé, servir à faciliter l'obtention des Lettres de Grace.

§. III. Du Crime commis dans la passion de l'Amour.
SOMMAIRES.
I. Ce qu'il faut pour que cette passion rende le Crime moins punissable.
2. Constitution remarquable de Justinien à ce sujet.
3. Affectation extrême des parents et amis.

I. [I. Ce qu'il faut pour que cette passion rende le Crime moins punissable.]
Cette passion est aussi, lorsqu'elle est portée à un certain excès, du nombre des causes qui peuvent donner lieu à la grace du Prince, et qui, dans les Tribunaux ordinaires, peuvent servir à faire modérer la peine.
    V. TIRAQ. de Poenis temper. Caus. 4.  MENOCH. de abitr. Jud. Cas. 328.
II. [2. Constitution remarquable de l'Empereur Justinien à ce sujet.]
    L'on trouve dans le Code une constitution particulière de l'Empereur Justinien, qui veut que l'on use d'indulgence en pareil cas, sur le fondement que l'amour est une espèce de fureur(1).
    (I) Novimus etenim & castitatis sumus amatores, & hoc nostris sancimus subjectis, sed nihil est furore amoris vehementius, quem retinere philosophiae, est perfecte monentis, & infilientem atque inhaerentem concupiscentiam refraenantis. Nov.74.C.4.
III. [3. Affection extrême des parents et des alliés.]
    L'on peut rapporter, à cette passion, l'affection démesurée des parents et des alliés, qui les porte à favoriser l'évasion des criminels et leur rebellion à Justice.
    Datur venia adfectioni parentum vel adfinium. L.4.ss. de re militari." (pp. 13-15; j'ai modernisé le vieux français, et, j'espère, bien transcrit le latin en changeant certains f en s...!)
 

NAROKOBI, Bernard Mullu, "Adaptation of Western Law in Papua New Guinea", (June 1977) 5(1) Melanesian Law Journal 51-69, see "provocation" at pp. 61-62; copy at Ottawa University, KTA 0 .M452  Location: FTX Periodicals; pas à la CSC;
 

NAST, Albert André, 1884-, La répression de l'adultère chez les peuples chrétiens : étude critique...préface de M. Émile Chénon, Paris : A. Rousseau, 1908, iv, viii, 256 p.; note: thèse Université de Paris; copie Bibliothèque USP Library - Collection générale -General collection HQ 808 A3N38R4 1908; ce livre contient plusieurs passages importants dont "L'excuse de meurtre" aux pp. 152-159; je recommande ce livre comme une des bases historiques de fond pour le sujet;

 
[p. 52]
"§ 2. -- Pénalités [dans la législation canonique]

L'adultère pouvait être frappé de deux sortes de peines: criminelles et civiles.

     En aucun temps, l'Église ne frappa le coupable de la peine de mort, comme cela avait lieu chez les peuples anciens et en particulier chez les Hébreux.  Il était conforme à l'esprit chrétien que Dieu seul ait le droit de retirer la vie à ses créatures.  C'est pour cela que les juridictions ecclésiastiques ne s'occupaient point des causes du sang, c'est-à-dire des crimes pouvant entraîner la peine capitale.  Et en conséquence, lorsqu'on portait devant elles de telles affaires, elles les renvoyaient aux juges séculiers.

    Cependant, sans prononcer elle-même la peine de mort, l'Église reconnaissait-elle au mari le droit de tuer son épouse adultère?  L'excusait-elle tout au moins?

    J'ai déjà dit plus haut qu'elle ne procéda point sous ce rapport à une application très logique de ses principes et j'ai essayé d'en donner une explication.  Certes, elle avait horreur du sang et condamnait le meurtre.  Sans doute aussi nous avons des textes, qui nous prouvent qu'au cas d'adultère il n'est nullement permis à l'homme de tuer sa femme.  Saint Augustin le disait peremptoirement (1). Plus
----
    (1)  Cause XXIII, qu. II, c. 9 (Augustinus de adult. conjug.) : ' Si (quod verius dicitur) non licet homini christianio adulteram conjugem occidere, sed tantum, etc... '
 
 

[p. 53]
tard le pape Nicolas écrivait à un archevêque que la Sainte Église n'a jamais été liée par les lois humaines qui permet au mari de tuer son épouse, qu'elle n'a point d'autre glaive que le glaive spirituel, qu'elle ne tue point, mais qu'elle vivifie (1).  Un autre pape, Etienne, n'est pas moins catégorique dans une lettre à Adolphe, roi des Lombards (2).  Mais d'un autre côté certains textes nous autorisent à présumer une certaine indulgence de la part de l'Église.  Ce sont d'abord une lettre du même pape Nicolas à un autre archevêque (3).  Ensuite un autre passage de la lettre
----
(1) Ibid. c. 6  (Nykolaüs papa scribit Albino archiepicopo) : ' Inter haec vestra sanctitas addere studuit, si cujus uxor adulterium perpetravit utrum marito illius liceat secundum mundanam legem eam interficere.  Sed sancta Dei ecclesia nunquam mundanis constringitur legibus; gladium non habet, nisi spiritualem; non occidit, sed vivicat '. Ibid, c. 7 (Item Pius Papa) : ' Quicumque propriam uxirem absque lege, vel sine causa et certa probatione interfecerit, aliamque duxerit uxorem, armis depositis publicam agat penitentiam et, si contumax fuerit, et episcopo suo inobediens extiterit, anathematizetur, quousque consentiat '.  Adde CLARUS, Opera omnia sive practica civilis et criminalis, lib. 5 de Homicidium, n^o30; PETR. LEURENIUS, op., lib., tit.cit., qu. 290, n^o 2 : ' In foro conscientiae et coram Deo nullatenus licet patri aut marito filiam vel uxorem, vel adulterum deprehensos occidere. '

(2) Cause XXXIII, qu II, c. 8 (Stephanus Astulpho) : Nam  si verum (quod absit) fuisset, siut adulter mentitus est, post séptem annos peracta penitentia dimittere eam per approbatam causam poteras, si voluisses; occidere tamen eam nullatenus debuisti.  Non enim vult Deus mortem peccatoris, sed ut convertatur ad penitentiam et vivat. '

(3) Ibid., c. 5, (Nykolaüs papa scribit Rodulpho Bituricensi archiepiscopo) : ' Interfectores suarum sine judicio, cum non addis, adulterarum vel aliquid hujusmodi, quid aliud habendi sunt
 

[p. 54]
d'Etienne mentionnée à l'Instant, qui contredit l'autre passage (1).  Ces contradictions de textes, et en particulier la dernière qui se trouve dans le même document, ne font que corroborer l'explication que j'ai donnée plus haut. Il faut distinguer le droit et le fait : rigidité maintenue dans la définition des principes; accommodement dans leur application par suite de circonstances atténuantes.

    Les peines criminelles, prononcées par le droit canon, variaient suivant que le coupable était clerc ou laïc. [...]
----
quam homicidae, ac per hoc ad penitentiam redigendi? Quibus penitus conjugium denegatur, exceptis adolescentibus, etc... '

(1) Ibid., c. 8 : ' Occidisti uxorem tuam, partem corporis tui legitimo matrimonio tibi sociam, sine causa mortis non tibi resistentem, non insidientem quocumque modo vitae tuae.  Non invenisti eam cum alio vironefariam rem facientem. '
 

.....................................................
 

[p. 73]
"§ 2. -- Pénalités [dans l'Ancien droit]

    Nous avons vu que certaines décisions du droit canon semblent permettre au mari de tuer sa femme surprise en flagrant délit d'adultère, mais qu'elles sont contredites par d'autres, et qu'en tous cas elles sont en contradiction
 
 

[p. 74]
formelle avec l'esprit de l'Evangile.  Que devait décider le droit séculier?

    Strictement le meurtre de la femme et de l'amant surpris en adultère était interdit au mari.  ' En France, il n'est permis au mary de tuer ny l'adultère, ny la femme (1) '. Mais, comme au fond la douleur était fort juste et qu'il était très difficile de la tempérer, le mari meurtrier obtenait aisément grâce du roi qui lui accordait des lettres de rémission et les lettres étaient facilement entérinées par les Cours auxquelles elles étaient adressées (2).  Denisart disait plus catégoriquement encore que le mari ' n'a besoin de grâce que pour la forme(3). '  De même le père meurtrier n'avait point le droit de tuer sa fille coupable ni son complice, mais un tel homicide était excusable (4).  Maynard rapproche de ce cas celui où une mère tua un capitaine qui voulait abuser de ses filles et obtint 'des lettres de rémission et pardon à la Chancellerie (5) '.  Mais la même excuse n'existait pas au profit du fils ou dufrère qui tuait
----
(1) JOUSSE, op. cit., t. III, 4^e part., tit. XXI, de homicid, n. 26.
(2) JOUSSE, loc. cit.; SERPILLON, op. cit., 1^re part, tit. I, art. 11, n. 27; FOURNEL, op. cit., p. 261 et suiv;  LEPESTRE, op. cit., Centur 4, ch. VI, n. 17; LAROCHE-FLAVIN, Arrests du Parlem.  Toulouse, liv. I, tit. VII. ARR. 4; HENRYS, Oeuvres, t. II, liv. IV, ch. VI, qu. 65.
(3) DENISART, op. et verb. cit., n. 5.
(4) JOUSSE, loc. cit., n. 17 et s.; FOURNEL, op. cit., p. 257 et s.; contrà, FARINACIUS, op. cit., qu. 121, n. 1 : ' Regula sit quod pater potest impune occidere filiam in adulterio repertam ac ipsum adulterum ' ; n. 2, 4, 6, 10.
(5) MAYNARD, Not. quest. du Parlem. Toulouse, liv. VI, ch. 86 (Arr., 2 juin 1582).
 
 

[p. 75]
l'amant de sa mère ou de sa soeur ou bien à plus forte raison sa mère ou sa soeur (1).

    Dans certaines contrées de France, il existait une procédure spéciale à la suite de laquelle le mari était en droit de tuer le complice de sa femme.  Cette procédure s'appelait la plainte en sollicitation, qui consistait de la part du mari à faire faire par notaire ou huissier une signification, retérée s'il le fallait, à l'individu qui ' recherchait avec assiduité sa femme ', le prévenant qu'il userait des voies de droit et fait (2).  C'était en réalité une véritable mise en demeure.  Beaumanoir nous apprend que cette coutume existait dans le Beauvoisis. [...]
----
(1) JOUSSE, loc. cit., n. 19; FARINACIUS, op. cit., qu. 121, n. 45 et 47.
(2) FOURNEL, op. cit., p. 391 et s.  -- Cette procédure tirait son origine du droit romain du Bas-Empire : Novelle CXVII, cap. 15, pr.

.....................................................

[p. 159]
"La répression de l'adultère [...] Le code pénal"
[p. 167]
" L'argument le plus sérieux, que l'on donne pour justifier l'inégalité de traitement entre l'homme et la femme, est tiré d'une considération sociale.  Ainsi que je l'ai dit dans le chapitre précédent, les auteurs du Code pénal, approuvés par la plupart des criminalistes, ont distingué nettement deux domaines : le domaine moral et le domaine social.  Au point de vue moral, la moindre infidélité de l'homme est aussi blâmable que celle de la femme : tous veulent bien le reconnaître.  'Si l'on juge des actes, non par les conséquences, mais par les principes, disait Paul Janet; on verra que l'infidélité du mari n'est pas moins coupable que celle de la femme, et que souvent même il est plus difficile de lui trouver des excuses ' (2).  Mais au point de vue social, -- dont le législateur a seulement à tenir compte, __ l'adultère de la femme a des conséquences extrêmement graves et est par suite beaucoup plus répréhensible.  On a vu antérieurement que les anciens criminalistes, Fournel, Muyart de Vouglans l'affirmaient déjà.  C'est ce que disaient aussi en 1810 au Corps législatif le chevalier Faure de Monseignat; c'est ce que
----
(2) PAUL JANET, La famille, p. 70
 
 

[p. 168]
répétait Bedel quelques années plus tard; c'est encore ce que l'on soutient actuellement.  P. Janet s'exprimait en termes très précis : ' Le Code est plus sévère pour la femme que pour le mari, mais par des raisons qui n'ont rien à voir avec la morale : le Code est le défenseur du droit et les fautes de la femme peuvent avoir de graves conséquences pour le droit domestique.  Il n'en est pas de même des fautes de l'homme et quand il n'y a point une injure ouverte, le législateur considère le désordre du mari comme une affaire privée qui ne regarde pas la loi ' (1).  C'est également l'avis de M. Garraud (2).

    Quelles sont donc ces conséquences que redoute tellement le législateur?  Y en a-t-il beaucoup? On le croirait volontiers à lire les auteurs qui mettent toujours ce mot au pluriel; mais en réalité on ne s'attache qu'à une seule : l'introduction dans la famille d'enfants adultérins, dont le mari de la femme infidèle peut être considéré comme le père légal, en vertu de la règle pater is est quem nuptiae demonstrant.  [...]
----
(1) P. JANET, loc. cit.
(2) GARRAUD, loc. cit."
 

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS and Milton M. Stein, "Comment on Homicide: Sections 1601-1609 (Stein; April 9, 1968)" in Working Papers of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, vol. 2, Washington, July 1970 at pp. 823-832, see "Manslaughter Under Excusable 'Emotional Disturbance'" at pp. 827-829;

"Manslaughter Under Excusable 'Emotional Disturbance.' -- The common law and existing Federal law, carve out of murder certain intentional killings resulting from 'sudden quarrel or heat of passion,' affording a lower range of penalties for such cases.  The rationale is that persons who behave homicidally only under serious provocation do not present so great a threat to general security.  Also, it has been argued, if the offender was beside himself with anger or other emotion, it is useless to employ the gravest sanctions against him, as one might hopefully try to deter a coldblooded killer with the threat of capital punishment.  The violently moved killer is beyond such calculations.  Therefore, considerations of  humanity and 'economy in punishment' call for mitigation.

    Existing Federal law is, however, defective in several respects.  The 'sudden quarrel or heat of passion' formula may have been adequate when all murder was punishable by death, but it is too loose in the present day legal context.  One who intentionally and coldbloodedly kills another with whom he is quarreling is a proper candidate for a murder conviction.  'Heat of passion' is an antique phrase misleading to a jury without qualifications about what caused the passion, which the courts have read in the statute.  On the other hand, the judicially created rules need revision too.  They too narrowly circumscribe the admissible provocation as follows:

(a) Words, it is said, cannot constitute sufficient provocation.  Thus racial slurs, sexual taunts, reflections on the chastity of women relatives and the like, are apparently excluded, regardless of the passion they arouse.
(b)  It appears that misdirected, passionate reaction, resulting in the death of somebody other than the provoker, does not mitigate.
(c) It appears that deeply felt affronts such as seduction of a sister, betrayals in friendship, and the like, however violent and blinding the reaction to the affront, do not count.
(d) Powerful but delayed reactions seem to be excluded by a requirement of impulsive and immediate response; thus the man who is put in a passion by 'brooding' over his affront is excluded from mitigation.

    In addition, the traditional rule describes the emotional state necessary for mitigation in psychologically unrealistic terms.  It is said that the offender must be so aroused as to be 'beyond the control of reason' or 'unable to resist the impulse.'   Few psychiatrists could testify honestly and confidently on such an issue.

    In place of these arbitrary limitations, the proposed draft substitutes a more flexible test of extreme emotional disturbance for which there is some excuse.  Note that it is not the homicide that is excusable (it remains, in fact, a grave felony although punishable by lesser penalties) but the emotional disturbance.  The reason for requiring that the disturbance be excusable is to exclude situations where the offender has culpably brought about his own emotional state, for example, by drugs, by sexual aggression, by involving himself in a crime which is itself the cause of his excitement.

    Further, the Model Penal Code formulation for manslaughter -- a homicide 'committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse' -- has been modified in the proposed draft by deleting reference to 'mental' disturbance for which there is reasonable 'explanation.'  We do so precisely in order to eliminate from the class of intentional killers whose culpability may be mitigated those who calculate that some grievance can be redressed by a calmy premeditated killing or by assassination.  We would confine the lesser culpability for manslaughter to those who, when they kill, act under extreme, overwhelming emotion, those who are at the time on the border line of rationality." (pp. 827-829; notes omitted)

NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, Final Report of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws - A Proposed New Federal Criminal Code (Title 18, United States Code), Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971, xxv, 364 p., see "§ 1602. Manslaughter" at pp. 174-175; the proposed code is available on the internet at the Buffalo Criminal Law Center, at "Materials on Federal Criminal Code Reform" which includes also: "Selected Bibliography on Federal Criminal Code Reform", "Special Collection on Federal Criminal Code Reform" and "Conferences on Criminal Code Reform";

"§ 1602. Manslaughter
A person is guilty of manslaughter, a Class B felony, if he:
(a) recklessly causes the death of another human being; or
(b) causes the death of another human being under circumstances which would be murder, except that he causes the death under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable excuse.  The reasonableness of the excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in his situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be.  An emotional disturbance is excusable, within the meaning of this paragraph, if it is occasioned by any provocation, event or situation for which the offender was not culpably responsible." (pp. 174-175)
------
"Comment....
As to 'voluntary manslaughter,' the scope of admissible 'provocation' is broadened to include anything that excusably leads to 'extreme emotional disturbance.'  For example, taunts or seduction of female relatives might suffice.  But extreme emotional disturbance will not reduce murder to manslaughter if the actor has culpably brought about his own mental disturbance, such as by involving himself in a crime, or if the excuse is not reasonable, such as where political events provoke an assassination. Cf. § 3604(2)(f) and A.L.I. Model Penal Code § 210.3(1) for alternative formulations designed to exclude aberrant excuses." (p. 175)

NATIONAL WOMEN'S JUSTICE COALITION INC. (AUSTRALIA), "The Women Who Kill in Self-Defence Campaign. 1998,  Submission to the Model Criminal Code Officer's Committee Fatal Offences Against the Person", available at  http://www.nwjc.org.au/mccode.htm (accessed on 15 February 2003);
 

NEAL, Luke and Dr. Mirko Bagaric, "Provocation: The Ongoing Subservience of principle to Tradition", (2003) 67(3) The Journal of Criminal Law 237-256;

"Abstract  The defence of provocation has been highly critised.  Most commentators argue that the defence is misguided. There does not appear to be any community pressure to preserve the defence.  Despite this, legislatures are reluctant to abolish  provocation as a partial defence to murder. This article examines the underlying rationale for the defence. It concludes that the defence is founded on a flawed assumption about human nature—that people are captive to some of their emotional states. It is also argued that the convoluted and confusing (if not confused) test for provocation is evidence of the unsound nature of the defence—it is simply a case of not being able to develop a feasible (and candid) principle for a doctrine that is devoid of a sound justification." (p. 237; source: http://www.vathek.com/jcl/abstracts67-3.shtml, accessed on 26 August 2003)

 ___________New South Wales,  Crimes Act, 1900,  section 23 Trial for murder provocation:

"CRIMES ACT 1900 - SECT 23
23 Trial for murder provocation

(1) Where, on the trial of a person for murder, it appears that the act or omission causing death was an act done or omitted under provocation and, but for this subsection and the provocation, the jury would have found the accused guilty of murder, the jury shall acquit the accused of murder and find the accused guilty of manslaughter.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), an act or omission causing death is an act done or omitted under provocation where:

   (a)  the act or omission is the result of a loss of self-control on the part of the accused that was induced by any conduct of the deceased (including grossly insulting words or gestures) towards or affecting the accused, and

   (b)  that conduct of the deceased was such as could have induced an ordinary person in the position of the accused to have so far lost self-control as to have formed an intent to kill, or to inflict grievous bodily harm upon, the deceased, whether that conduct of the deceased occurred immediately before the act or omission causing death or at any previous time.

(3) For the purpose of determining whether an act or omission causing death was an act done or omitted under provocation as provided by subsection (2), there is no rule of law that provocation is negatived if:

   (a)  there was not a reasonable proportion between the act or omission causing death and the conduct of the deceased that induced the act or omission,

   (b)  the act or omission causing death was not an act done or omitted suddenly, or

   (c)  the act or omission causing death was an act done or omitted with any intent to take life or inflict grievous bodily harm.

(4) Where, on the trial of a person for murder, there is any evidence that the act causing death was an act done or omitted under provocation as provided by subsection (2), the onus is on the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the act or omission causing death was not an act done or omitted under provocation.

(5) This section does not exclude or limit any defence to a charge of murder."
( http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/ca190082/s23.html )

__________NEW SOUTH WALES, Mervyn Findlay, The Honourable, Review of the Law of Manslaughter in New South Wales -- Report, April 2003; see in particular Schedule 7, "Research Papers: Arguments For and Against the Partial Defences of provocation and Diminished Responsibility"; available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/clrd1.nsf/pages/manslaughter (accessed on 9 October 2003);
 

___________New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Jury Directions, Sydney: New South Wales Law Reform Commission, 2008, xviii, 270 p., ISBN: 978 0  7347 2634 6; available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/lrc/ll_lrc.nsf/vwFiles/cp04.pdf/$file/cp04.pdf (accessed on 25 January 2009); 

___________New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Partial Defences to Murder: Provocation and Infanticide, Sydney (NSW): New South Wales Law Reform Commission, 1997, xii, 146 p. (series; New South Wales Law Reform Commission, ISSN 1030-0244; Report 83), ISBN: 0731310152 (pbk.); available at
http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/4a2565b5001b20d1/9a0e99b46a7710e24a2565f50005f875/3427367fd02a8aa64a2565e0001d118c?OpenDocument
 

___________New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Provocation, diminished responsibility and infanticide, Sydney: New South Wales Law Reform Commission, 1993, x, 145 p. (Series; Discussion paper New South Wales Law Reform Commission; 31), ISBN: 0731011546; availe at  http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lrc.nsf/pages/DP31TOC;
 

___________New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Sentencing,  Sydney : New South Wales Law Reform Commission, 1996, xxiv, 398 p. (series; Report / New South Wales Law Reform Commission, ISSN 1030-0244; number 79), ISBN: 0731000262; copy available at  http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lrc.nsf/pages/R79TOC;
 

NEW ZEALAND, Crimes Act 1961, section 169;
 

___________Crimes Bill 1989, Wellington, New Zealand: Printed under the authority of the New Zealand Government by V.R. Ward, Government Printer, xxvii, 156 p.;

"PART X
CULPABLE HOMICIDE, ENDANGERING, AND SUICIDE
......
128.  Provocation -- The fact that a person kills any other person under provocation shall not be a defence to a charge of culpable homicide, but may be taken into account on the question of penalty." (pp. 47, 50-51)
-------------------------------------
"EXPLANATORY NOTE
......
PART X
CULPABLE HOMICIDE, ENDANGERING, AND SUICIDE
    The provisions of this Part of the Bill owe a great deal to the recommendations of the Criminal Law Reform Committee in its Report on Culpable Homicide, which was presented in July 1976, and attention is drawn to that report.
.....
  Clause 128 replaces section 169 of the present Act.. That section provides for the reduction of murder to manslaughter where the killing is done under provocation.  This clause makes it clear that provocation is not a defence to a charge of culpable homicide, but may be taken into account on the question of penalty." (pp. xv and xvii)

___________ Crimes Consultative Committee, Crimes Bill 1989 : Report of the Crimes Consultative Committee, presented to the Minister of Justice April 1991, [Wellington : s.n., 1991], 123 p.; ISBN: 0477076165 (Chairman: Right Honourable Mr Justice Casey);

"Clause 122 to Clause 132 - Introduction
The provisions in clauses 122-132 of the bill are intended to implement the Report of the Criminal Law Reform Committee on Culpable Homicide, presented to the Minister of Justice in 1976.

They proved to be easily the most contentious parts of the bill and attracted sharp criticism in several of the submissions made to the Select Committee.  In particular, there was major criticism of the term 'culpable homicide' as a replacement for 'murder' notwithstanding the use of the term in existing law and its origin in the draft code proposed by the English Law Commissioners in 1879.

There was also a high degree of support for retention of a crime of manslaughter and great reluctance to see killing not amounting to culpable homicide, and wounding and injuring offences, dealt with by clauses 130-132 relating to endangerment.

As to provocation, there were differing views on whether it should be left to the jury, as now, or should become a matter going to sentence, as is already the case for crimes other murder.

The Committee prefaced its scrutiny of clauses 122-132 of the bill with a wide-ranging discussion of the key issues.  The broad result of its deliberations may conveniently be summarised under several haedings.

1  Penalty

The previous Government indicated that it was one of the main objects of reform to dispense with  mandatory life sentence for murder.  ...
......
The question is clearly one of policy.  However, the Committe's view is that the time has come to make the change.  There is no sound reason why the Court of Appeal cannot be left to establish sentencing guidelines as is already done for other serious crimes, for some of which there is a maximum penalty of life imprisonment.  In making this observation the Committee does not overlook that there will be some intial uncertainty for sentencing Judges and that the sentencing process will in many cases become more protracted. ...
......
2  Terminology

The term 'culpable homicide' in clause 122 attracted more attention than the contents of the clause itself.  There was widespread support for the retention of the term 'murder', especially as clause 122 covers virtually the same ground as the present law of murder.

The Committee sees no reason why the term 'murder' should not be substituted for the term 'culpable homicide' in clause 122.

3  Provocation

Under existing law, a charge of murder is reduced to manslaughter if a defence of provocation succeeds. The test for provocation under section 169 of the Crimes Act 1961 is whether what was said or done was sufficient to deprive a person having the power of self-control of an ordinary person, but otherwise having the characteristics of the offender, of the power of self-control.  Sction 169 attempted to mitigate the injustice that could arise under a purely objective test of provocation, ie provocation that would have deprived an ordinary person of his or her power of self-control.  The provision was soon subject to interpretation by the Court of Appeal in R v McGregor [1962] NZLR 1069 in which the provision was given a more subjective slant.  The offender was deemed to possess the power of self-control of an ordinary person except insofar as that self-control was weakened because of some peculiar characteristic of the offender.  The words or conduct must have been particularly provocative to the offender because of his or her characteristics.

'Characteristics' denote something relatively permanent which mark the offender out somewhat from others. Temporary states such as pain or stress may not be taken into account on a proper application of the current rule.  The law of provocation also contains requirements as to the mode and time of retaliation which do not fit very well with the realities of human behaviour.

In framing the report referred to above, the Criminal Law Reform Committee struggled long and hard with the topic of provocation, which was indeed the point of departure for the report.  That Committee concluded that the defence was so hedged round with difficulty and technicality that useful perpetuation of the defence was something of an historical anomaly once the need to mitigate the rigour of the death sentence for murder had been removed; it would be fairer all round to allow the issue of provocation to be assessed at the time of sentence, as happens already when the issue arises in relation to offences other than murder.

The Committee likewise found the issue difficult to resolve.  While the law on provocation has undoubtedly developed and become more flexible since 1976 the whole subject remains quite difficult and technical especially in relation to a defendant belonging to a minority culture.  It may be open to question how much of the present law can be understood and applied by juries although it must be accepted as their privilege to give merciful consideration to difficult issues of culpability.  Many Judges think that the law on provocation works reasonably well in practice.  There have however been problems in determining in boderline cases whether there is sufficient evidence for the issue to go to the jury, and new trials have sometimes been ordered because of a failure to put it.

If the mandatory life sentence for murder is removed it becomes harder to justify the special place of provocation in murder trials as the only instance where provocation is not dealt with on sentence.

Those who kill under provocation nonetheless have an intent to kill.  Provocation has traditionally been regarded as mitigating the intent but it does not negate it.  The question is not so much whether these offenders should be convicted of murder as whether they should suffer a mandatory life sentence.  Clearly they should not, and that matter would be dealt with by removing the mandatory life sentence for murder.  If this approach is adopted, it would reflect the point already made, that there are significant differences in culpability among those who commit murder.  The argument of stigmatisation then loses force.  There is no particular reason why provoked killers should be convicted of a lesser offence than other groups to whom mitigating factors may apply but who may nevertheless be convicted of murder.

While no-one can be sure, removal of provocation as a jury issue may increase the number of guilty pleas where responsibility for a killing is not disputed.  The change would also remove the possibility of 'sympathy' verdicts where, if justice is to be done, the proper verdict would be murder.

The majority of the Committee is persuaded that the approach taken in clause 128 of the bill has merit.

One member of the Committee, Mr Atkins, dissents from the recommendation that provocation should become a matter to be taken into account on sentence.  He supports the present law on the basis that it avoids the label 'murderer' and that it provides an effective means by which the community (via the jury) can have a merciful input into some murder cases." (pp. 43-46)
 

"5.  In the five years of its existence the Committee has spent more time in discussion and debate on the subject of provocation in the criminal law than on any other topic.  This fact will illustrate two points -- that in our opinion the law requires reform and that a satisfactory solution has not been easy to find.  The solution we now propose will be reagrded by some as a radical approach, but whether radical or not, the recommendation is made as being the best way of removing the criticisms that now surround the law on this subject.

6.  The proposal we favour and recommend is that provocation should no longer be a defence to a charge of murder and should be relevant only on sentence.  We also recommend that there should be created one offence of unlawful killing in which will be combined those cases which now constitute the crime of murder and those instances which would have been murder had they not been reduced to manslaughter by reason of provocation.  We further recommend that the present mandatory life sentence for murder be replaced by a maximum term of imprisonment for life." (p 3).

__________New Zealand Law Commission, Battered defendants : victims of domestic violence who offend : a discusion paper, Wellington, N.Z. : The Commission, 2000, vii, 75 p., see Chapter 6, "Provocation" at pp. 26-33 (series; Preliminary paper; number 41), ISBN: 1877187542 (pbk.); copy available at  http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/documents/publications/Pp41bd.pdf;

__________New Zealand Law Commission, The Partial Defence  of Provocation, Wellington: The Commission, 2007, 107 p. (series; report; 98), ISBN:9781877316371; available at http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/UploadFiles/Publications/Publication_138_366_R98.pdf (accessed on 26 October 2007);
 

___________New Zealand Law Commission, Some Criminal Defences with Particular Reference to Battered Defendants, 2001, xiii, 102 p.,  see "Provocation" at pp. 31-42 (series; report; ISSN: 0113-2334; number 73), ISBN: 1877187739; available at http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/UploadFiles/Publications/Publication_80_194_R73.pdf  (accessed on 17 March 2008);  

"Recommendation...
We recommend abolition of the partial defence of provocation.  Matters of provocation can be taken into account in the exercise of a sentencing discretion for murder." (p. 42)

NG-CHEE-WAN  and Chiu-Hse-Yu, "Provocation in Singapore: The Reasonable Person Test and the Proportionality Requirement", (1995) 16 Singapore Law Review 376-401; title of article noted in my research but article not consulted yet; no copy of this periodical is available in the Ottawa area libraries;
 

NICOLSON, Donald and Rohit Sanghvi, "Battered Women and Provocation: The Implications of R. v Ahluwalia", [1993] Criminal Law Review 728-738;
 

NORRIE, Alan, "The Structure of provocation", (2001) 54 Current Legal problems 307-346;
.

NORTHERN TERRIRORY (AUSTRALIA), Criminal Code of the Northern Territory of Australia, see section 34 at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nt/consol_act/ccotntoa498/s34.html;

"34. Provocation, &c.
(1) A person is excused from criminal responsibility for an act or its event if the act was committed because of provocation upon the person or the property of the person who gave him that provocation provided -
(a) he had not incited the provocation;
(b) he was deprived by the provocation of the power of self-control;
(c) he acted on the sudden and before there was time for his passion to cool;
(d) an ordinary person similarly circumstanced would have acted in the same or a similar way;
(e) the act was not intended and was not such as was likely to cause death or grievous harm; and
(f) the act did not cause death or grievous harm.

(2) When a person who has unlawfully killed another under circumstances that, but for this subsection, would have constituted murder, did the act that caused death because of provocation and to the person who gave him that provocation, he is excused from criminal responsibility for murder and is guilty of manslaughter only provided -
(a) he had not incited the provocation;
(b) he was deprived by the provocation of the power of self-control;
(c) he acted on the sudden and before there was time for his passion to cool; and
(d) an ordinary person similarly circumstanced would have acted in the same or a similar way.

(3) A person is excused from criminal responsibility for the use of such force as was reasonably necessary to prevent the repetition of a wrongful act or insult as to be  provocation for him provided -
(a) he had not incited the wrongful act or insult;
(b) an ordinary person similarly circumstanced would have acted in the same or a similar way;
(c) the force used was not intended and was not such as was likely to cause death or grievous harm; and
(d) the force used did not cause death or grievous harm."
 

NOURSE, V.F., "Reconceptualizing Criminal Law Defenses", (2003) 151(5) University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1691-1746, see "Provocation" at pp. 1716-1720;
 

NOURSE, Victoria, "Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense", (1997) 106 Yale Law Journal 1331-1448; available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/cf/faculty/phrobins/conversations/papers/NoursePassionsProgress.pdf (accessed on 25 March 2008);

"The Article presents findings from the first systematic study of intimate homicide cases that raise the heat of passion or provocation defense. Based on this data, it argues that legal reform has shaped a flawed image of passionate killing, an image that ignores, and thus partially punishes, women's attempts to separate or depart from intimate relationships. After examining the standard theories of self-control supporting reform's approach, the Article argues that the provocation defense, in  practice, protects something more than the defendant's autonomy. It protects norms about relationships. We have not recognized this, the Article argues, because reform has transformed all of the normative questions into questions about reasonable persons, an intellectual strategy that has kept the law standing still in the face of social change and has led feminists and liberals to talk past each other. Finally, this Article tackles one of the oldest and most fundamental questions about the provocation defense why it is that the law protects passion at all and proposes an answer that seeks to free the law of murder from the veil of relationship at the same  time as it acknowledges that there are some passions the law must continue to protect." (source: http://www.yale.edu/yalelj/106/106-5ab1.htm )

O'CONNOR, D. (Desmond) and P.A. (Paul A.) Fairall, Criminal Defences, 3rd ed., Sydney: Butterworths, 1996, xxxii, 328 p., ISBN: 0409308463; see Chapter 11, "Provocation" at pp. 197-225; contents: Introduction...197; The actual loss of self-control...199; Suddenness--the retaliation...200; Suddenness--the provocation...201; Provocation and intentional killing...202; Loss of self-control: the objective element...202; Proportionality...204; Miscellaneous...207; Misdirected retaliation...207; Propinquity...208; Unlawfulness...208; Adultery...2111; Self-induced provocation...211; Words as provocation...213; A triggering incident...215; Provocation and mistake of fact...216; Provocation and diminished responsibility...216; Provocation and constructive murder...217; Provocation nd non-fatal assaults...217; Wounding with intent to murder...218; Provocation and attempted murder...218; Provocation and denial of fault element...219; Provocation under the Codes...220; Northern Territory...221; The Griffith Code...222; Onus of Proof...222; Function of judge and jury...223;
 

ODGERS, F.J., Case and Comment, "Criminal Law - Murder or Manslaughter - Provocation", (1954) Cambridge Law Journal 165-168;
 

ODGERS, Stephen James, "Contemporary Provocation Law -- Is Substantially Impaired Self-Control Enough?"  in Stanley Meng Heong Yeo, ed., Partial Excuses to Murder, Leichhardt (N.S.W., Australia):  The Federation Press, 1991, xvii, 287 p. at pp. 101-111, ISBN: 1862870470;

"Summary
While the partial defence of provocation has developed in a haphazard way, it is the thesis of this essay that the contemporary test for provocation is simply whether the person accused of murder killed in a state of substantially impaired self-control.  The suficiency of the impairment inevitably raises normative issues which are appropriately left to the jury." (p. 101)

O'DOHERTY, Stephen, "Provocation and Diminished Responsibility: Sections 2 and 3 of the Homicide Act 1957", (2001) 165 Justice of the Peace and Local Government Law 776-780; 

O'DONOVAN, Katherine, "Defences fo Battered Women Who Kill", (1991) 18 Journal of Law and Society 219-240, see "Provocation" at pp, 223-229; copy at Ottawa University, HM 34 .B735, Location:  FTX Periodicals;
 

OLIVER, Sarah, "Provocation and Non-Violent Homosexual Advances", (1999) 63 The Journal of Criminal Law 586-592; Contents: "Contrasting approaches to the proportionality requirement...586; Commonwealth...587; England...589; Scotland...589; Contrasting rationales...590; Conclusion 591";

"Conclusion
Arguably the existence of the plea makes the homosexual community more vulnerable to attacks.  This is true in relation to minor homosexual advances although it is upheld as a concession to human frailty, presumably in recognition of the fact that most men would view the advance as sufficiently provocative.  However, in relation to serious advances, the crucial point is to assess the degree of provocation offered, regardless of the gender of the parties involved. ...." (p. 591)

O'MALLEY, Thomas, Sentencing Law and Practice, Dublin: Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, l, 535 p., see "Probvocation" at paragraphs 6-34 to 6-36 at pp. 151-152, ISBN: 189973899;

Sentencing for manslaughter due to provocation is particularly difficult.  The defendant will already have received a substantial concession through the reduced verdict; the judge must then determine how much more clemency is warranted.⁷²"
----
⁷² In Norman (1995) 15 Cr. App. R. (S.), the English Court of Appeal saaid that seven years' imprisonment imposed in that case was at the top of the range of manslaughter due to provocation.  It reduced the sentence to five years." (p. 151)

ORCHARD, Gerald F., "Culpable Homicide - Part I and Part II", [1977] New Zealand Law Journal 411-415 and 447-456; this article deals with the two parts of NEW ZEALAND,  Criminal Law Reform Committee New Zealand, Report on Culpable Homicide, supra; Part I of the report provocation is commented upon at pp. 411-415 and Part II, manslaughter, at pp. 447-456;
 

____________"Homicide" in Neil Cameron and Simon France, eds., Essays on Criminal Law in New Zealand Towards Reform?,  Victoria: Victoria University of Wellington Law Review and Victoria University Press, 1990, 243 p., at pp. 147-158,  and more particularly the "Abolition of the Defence of Provocation" at pp. 148-150 (series; VUW Law Review Monograph; number 3), ISBN: 0864732066;  discusses New Zealand, Criminal Law Reform Committee New Zealand, Report on Culpable Homicide, supra;

"Provocation is an obvious mitigating factor and no one has suggested that the defence could properly be abolished if the mandatory sentence was retained." (p. 148)

___________"Provocation -- Recharacterisation of 'Characteristics'", (1995-97) 6 Canterbury Law Review 202-214; Contents: I. Introduction...202; II. The McGregor Interpretation: 1. The relevance of personal characteristics...204; 2. The scope of "characteristics"...204; 3. The relationship between the provocation and the charracteristic...204; III. Criticisms...204; IV. Characteristics and Dimished Responsibility...206;  V. Characteristics: Meaning...207;  VII. Characteristics and an Accused's Perception...211; VIII. Characteristics and Other "Relevant Factors"...211; IX. Age, Gender and Race...212; X. Intoxication...213; XI. Conclusion...213;  copy at the Supreme Court of Canada Library, Ottawa;
 

___________"Provocation - The Subjective Element", [1977] New Zealand Law Journal 77-80; copy at Ottawa University, KTC 0 .B887  Location, FTX Periodicals;
 

O'REGAN, R.S., "The Definition of Provocation as a Qualified Defence under the Queensland Code" (1989) 13 Criminal Law Journal 165-177;  copy at Ottawa University, KTA 0 .C735  Location,  FTX Periodicals;
 

___________"Indirect Provocation and Misdirected Retaliation", [1968] Criminal Law Review 319-324; copy at the University of Ottawa, KD 7862 .C734,
Location:  FTX Periodicals;
 

___________"Ordinary Men and Provocation in Papua and New Guinea", (1972) 21 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 551-557; copy at the University of Ottawa, K 1701 .I569,  Location:  FTX Periodicals;
 

__________"Provocation and Homicide in Papua New Guinea", (1971-72) 10 University of Western Australia Law Review 1-19; copy at the University of Ottawa, KTA 0 .U46 Location : FTX Periodicals; with the same title in  (1972) 1(3) Melanesian Law Journal 60-74; copy at Ottawa University, KTA 0 .M452  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

ORLAND, Leonard, "Soviet Justice in the Gorbachev Era: The 1988 Draft Fundamental Principles of Criminal Justice", (1989) 4 Connecticut Journal of International Law 513-576,

"ARTICLE 43.  CIRCUMSTANCES EXTENUATING RESPONSIBILITY
1) The following circumstances are deemed to extenuate responsibility:
...
f) commision of the crime under the influence of a strong emotion provoked by violence, serious insult or other unlawful actions by the victim;

g) commission of the crime under the influence of the amoral or imprudent behavior of the victim"
....
4) Extenuating circumstances as provided by law as an element of a crime cannot be consideredagain when sentence is passed." (p. 559)

ORTOLAN,  J.-L.-E. (Joseph-Louis-Elzéar), 1802-1873, Éléments de droit pénal; pénalité, juridictions, procédure, suivant la science rationnelle, la législation  positive et la jurisprudence avec les données de nos statistiques criminelles -- Cinquième édition -- Revue complétée et mise au courant de la législation française et étrangère par Albert Desjardins, 2 tomes, Paris E. Plon, Nourrit,  1886, iii, 660 p. (t. 1) et 668 p. (t. 2); copie à l'Université de Sherbrooke, Québec;

"§2. De la provocation
1^o Suivant la science rationnelle.
    446. Fréquemment il arrive que l'homme lésé dans quelques-uns de ses droits, surtout s'il l'est grièvement, au moment où cette lésion lui est faite, sous le coup de l'irritation qu'elle lui cause, se laisse emporter à son ressentiment et réagit à son tour par quelque acte coupable contre celui ou ceux par qui il vient d'être lésé.  Nous disons alors, en notre langue, qu'il a été provoqué, c'est-à-dire excité, poussé à l'acte qu'il a commis, par la lésion de droit qu'il venait d'essuyer.

    447. Il faut bien se garder de confondre cette situation avec celle de la légitime défense.  L'esprit qui anime l'homme dans la défense légitime est un esprit de fermeté, de justice, dénué de toute passion vindicative, c'est l'exercice d'un droit.  L'esprit qui le pousse dans le cas de provocation est un esprit de passion, de ressentiment, de vengeance : quand le péril est imminent, ce que nous faisons uniquement pour l'éviter est défense; quand le mal vient d'être reçu, ce que nous faisons pour nous en venger est acte coupable provoqué.  Ainsi deux signes distinctifs entre les deux situations, l'un matériel et l'autre moral : le signe matériel, le temps où se place l'acte; le signe moral, l'esprit qui y préside.

    448.  Cependant s'il n'existe aucune confusion possible entre la défense vraiment légitime et l'acte commis en état de provocation, il faut avouer que, lorsqu'il s'agit d'une défense dont les conditions étaient incomplètes ou dont les limites ont été excédées, un certain rapprochement s'opère entre les deux situations, et que la difficulté de les distinguer l'une de l'autre commence.  Cette difficulté augmente si l'on considère que, bien que l'idée de provocation n'arrive naturellement qu'après, tandis que celle de défense n'est jamais possible qu'avant le mal reçu, néanmoins, dans des cas rares, on peut tenir pour réellement provoqué l'homme qui, sur le point de recevoir une lésion grave, par exemple voyant la main résolûment levée sur lui pour le frapper, se sera laissé aller à l'irritation et à l'emportement de la réaction avant même d'avoir reçu le coup, de telle sorte qu'alors le signe distinctif matériel entre la défense et la  provocation disparaît, mais il restera toujours le signe moral, qui ne peut manquer, et, malgré toute possibilité d'analogie en des nuances si fines, celui qui analysera avec pénétration le coeur humain et les éléments moraux des actes qui font l'objet de la pénalité trouvera dans tous les cas, même dans les plus voisins les uns des autres, cette distinction : d'une part, l'homme a agi dans le but de se défendre, d'autre part dans le but de se venger.  Ici esprit de défense, quoique peut-être non-entièrement fondé; là, esprit d'emportement et de vengeance : différences morales qui ne peuvent s'effacer aux yeux de la science rationnelle et dont il est nécessaire de tenir compte : ' Tuendi duntaxat, non etiam ulciscendi causa ' , dit avec une exacte précision, le jurisconsulte Paul, dans le fragment cité ci-dessus (p. 182, note 1).

    449.  La provocation ne fait point disparaître la culpabilité : l'homme a agi avec une intention de nuire, sous l'empire d'une mauvaise passion que la loi ne saurait innocenter.

    450. Si l'on suppose qu'il s'est écoulé un certain temps entre la lésion reçue et l'acte de vengeance qui a eu lieu, le premier mouvement étant passé, la réflexion ayant dû calmer le ressentiment, la vengeance ayant été pour ainsi dire préméditée et exécutée à froid, à peine si l'on pourra, selon les circonstances, trouver dans la provocation antérieure quelque motif d'atténuation, mais eulement de la culpabilité individuelle, suivant les nuances de chaque cause, et non de la culpabilité absolue à prévoir d'avance dans la loi.

    451.  Mais si la réaction a eu lieu spontanément, dans la chaleur de l'irritation et avant que le temps de se refroidir fût arrivé, alors la culpabilité s'en trouvera noblement diminuée, surtout si la lésion éprouvée était grave et irritante de sa nature, ou s'il n'y a pas eu disproportion considérable entre le mal reçu et celui qui a été fait en retour. -- On conçoit même que la loi pénale ait soin de prévoir spécialement ces cas de provocation les plus graves, afin de déterminer l'abaissement de la culpabilité absolue qui en résulte et de décréter en conséquence une atténuation obligatoire de peine.  -- Parmi les provocations les plus irritantes, se trouvent incontestablement les violences ou voies de fait contre la personne et l'offense du mari surprenant sa femme en flagrant délit d'adultère, ou réciproquement.

    452.  Faut-il, comme pour la légitime défense, étendre le cas de provocation aux violences ou lésions de droit éprouvées, non par soi-même, mais par autrui?  Il ne s'agit pas ici de l'exercice d'un droit, d'une assistance légitime donnée, à défaut de la force publique, absente ou inefficace, à celui que l'on voit en un injuste péril.  Cette assistance, nous la devons à tout le monde, et plus la personne secourue nous est étrangère, plus nous sommes louables d'avoir accompli ce devoir.  Il s'agit, dans la provocation, d'une irritation, d'un emportement qui a poussé l'agent à un acte condamnable; il faut donc voir, dans l'hypothèse de violences ou lésions de droit faites à autrui, s'il existait entre l'agent et cette personne lésée quelque lien suffisant pour susciter et rendre excusable cet emportement.  Il n'y a pas à marquer ici de degré de parenté ou d'alliance : une affectation intime, une relation de tutelle, de protection, le simple fait d'avoir une personne, une femme ou un enfant surtout sous sa garde, ne fût-ce que momentanément, peuvent produire cet effet : ce sera une appréciation à faire par le juge de chaque cause." (tome 1, pp. 187-189)