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By / par ©François Lareau, 2003-, Ottawa, Canada
First posted on the internet on: 29 August 2003

Selected Bibliography on
Consent in Comparative Criminal law
-------------------------
Bibliographie choisie sur le
consentement en droit pénal comparé

authors
A-K... see also:  authors/auteurs: L-Z
                                          Consent/consentement: Canadian Law / Droit canadien
 
 

Consent of the victim
Code pénal allemand / German Penal Code / Strafgesetzbuch

[Traduction] Article 226 a  Consentement de la victime omission. Celui qui cause une blessure avec le consentement de la victime agit illicitement que si l'acte, malgré son consentement, est contraire aux bonnes moeurs. (voir GERMANY/ALLEMAGNE, Les nouveaux codes pénaux de langue allemande, infra; cet article est maintenant numéroté 228 depuis la version du 10 mars 1987)

[Translation] § 226 a. Consent of the victim   Whoever commits bodily harm with the consent of the victim acts unlawfully only if his conduct, despite the existence of consent, is contrary to good morals. (see GERMANY/ALLEMAGNE, The Penal code of the Federal Republic of Germany, infra; this article is now numbered as article 228 since the new version of 10 March 1987; available at  http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/Germind.htm, accessed on 6 August 2003);

[Translation] § 228. Consent   Whoever commits bodily injury with the consent of the injured person only acts unlawfully if the act is, despite the consent, contrary to good morals. (see GERMANY/ALLEMAGNE, The German Penal code as amended as of December 19, 2001, infra)

§ 228. Einwilligung des Verletzten.  Wer eine Körperverlezung mit Einwilligung des Verletzten vornimmt, handelt nur dann rechtswidrig, wenn die Tat trotz der Einwilligung gegen die guten Sitten verstößt.

ABDOU, Antoun Fahmy, Le consentement de la victime, Thèse, Paris, 1971; dir. de thèse: Professeur Robert Vouin;
 

__________ Le consentement de la victime. Préf. de Robert Vouin, Paris : Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1971, 622 p. (Collection; Bibliothèque de sciences criminelles; volume 11); copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, KJV 7972.3 .B52 v.11 1971 FTX;
 

ACCAD, Lucien, "Définition des comportements délictueux", dans Encyclopédie juridique de l'Afrique, Tome X, Droit pénal et procédure pénale, sous la direction de Gilbert Mangin, Abidjan/Dakar/Lomé : Les nouvelles éditions africaines, 1982, 352, [66] p., chapitre 1, pp. 19-51; voir sur "Le consentement de la victime", les pp. 39-40, ISBN: 2723608352; copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, FTX, référence;
 

ACHSLOGH, Jacques, "Problèmes de l'expérimentation humaine.  Le point de vue du médecin", dans Licéité en droit positif et références légales aux valeurs:  contribution à l'étude du règlement juridique des conflits de  valeurs en droit pénal public et international / [par] Jean Ladrière ... [et al.] ; avant-propos de Jacques Verhaegen, Bruxelles: Éditions Émile Bruylant, 1982, 706 p., aux pp. 299-314 (Collection; Bibliothèque de la Faculté de droit de l'Université catholique de Louvain; volume 14), ISBN: 2802703013; copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, FTX General, K 7033 .L524 1982;
 

ALEXANDER, Larry, "Introduction to Issues 2 and 3: Symposium on Consent in Sexual Relations", (1996) 2 Legal Theory 87-88; copy at Ottawa University, K 202 .L436  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

___________"The Moral Magic of Consent (II)", (1996) 2 Legal Theory 165-174; copy at Ottawa University, K 202 .L436  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

ALLDRIDGE, Peter, "Consent to the Medical and Surgical Treatment - the Law Commission's Recommendations", (1996) 4 Medical Law Review 129-143; title noted in my research but article not consulted; no copy of this periodical in the Ottawa area libraries according to the AMICUS catalogue (30 July 2003);
 

ALLEMAGNE, Code pénal du royaume de Bavière/ traduit de l'allemand avec des explications tirées du commentaire officiel (exposé des motifs) et un appendice par Ch. Vatel, Paris: A. Durand, 1852, xl, 389 p.; disponible à http://books.google.com/books?id=qW4DAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA1&dq=intitle:p%C3%A9nal&as_brr=1 (site visité le 13 mai 2007);

ALLEN, Michael J., "Consent and Assault",  (1994) 58 Journal of Criminal Law 183-200; copy at Ottawa University, KD 7862 .J653  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

ALT-MAES, Françoise, "L'apport de la loi du 20 décembre 1988 à la théorie du consentement de la victime", (1991) Revue de science criminelle et de droit pénal comparé 244-260; copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, KJJ 0 .R489  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

___________"L'autonomie du droit pénal, mythe ou réalité d'aujourd'hui ou de demain?", (1987) Revue de science criminelle et de droit pénal comparé 347-378, voir "Le consensualisme en droit pénal" aux pp. 351-357; copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, KJJ 0 .R489  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

___________"L'inefficacité du consentement de la victime dans les infractions contre les biens", [1984] Revue de Science criminelle et de Droit pénal comparé 1-17; copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, KJJ 0 .R489  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

___________Notes bibliographiques, "Le consentement en matière pénale, par Xavier Pin, Paris, Paris, LGDJ, Bibliothèque des sciences criminelles, t. 36, 2002, 724 pages", [2002] Revue de science criminelle et de droit pénal comparé 931-933; copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, KJJ 0 .R489  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

AMARASEKARA, Kumar and Mirko Bagaric, Euthanasia, morality and the law, New York : P. Lang, c2002, xvi, 161 p. (series; Teaching texts in law and politics, ISSN 1083-3447; volume19), ISBN: 0820456675; copy at the library of the Supreme Court of Canada, K3611 .E95 A427 2002;
 

AMELUNG, Knut, "Competency to Consent -- A German Approach", (2000) 8(1) European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 1-11; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada;
 

___________"Consent in West German Criminal Law", article presented at the Conference "Reform of the Criminal Law", London, 26-29 July, 1987, 8 p.; important contribution; conference organised by the International Society for the Reform of the Criminal Law, web site at  http://www.isrcl.org/ (accessed on 29 June 2003); copy at home;
 

AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, Model Penal Code and Commentaries, Part I General Provisions §§ 1.01 to 2.13, Philadelphia, The American Law Institute, 1985, xix, 420 p., see "Section 2.11.  Consent" at pp. 393-399;

"§ 2.11.  Consent.

    (1) In General.  The consent of the victim to conduct charged to constitute an offense or to the result thereof is a defense if such consent negatives an element of the offense or precludes the infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense.

    (2) Consent to Bodily Injury.  When conduct is charged to constitute an offense because it causes or threatens bodily injury, consent to such conduct  or to the infliction of such injury is a defense if:

(a) the bodily injury consented to or threatened by the conduct consented to is not serious; or

(b) the conduct and the injury are reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in a lawful athleric contest or competitive sport or other concerted activity not forbidden by law; or

(c) the consent establishes a justification for the conduct under Article 3 [General Principles of Justification] of the Code.

    (3) Ineffective Consent.  Unless otherwise provided by the Code or by the law defining the offense, assent does not constitute consent if:

(a) it is given by a person who is legally incompetent to authorize the conduct charged to constitute the offense; or

(b) it is given by a person who by reason of youth, mental disease or defect or intoxication is manifestly unable or known by the actor to be unable to make a resonable judgment as to the nature or harmfulness of the conduct charged to constitute the offense; or

(c) it is given by a person whose improvident consent is sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense; or

(d) it is induced by force, duress or deception of a kind sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense." (p. 393)
 

___________Model Penal Code: Proposed Official Draft, Philadelphia: The American Law Institute, 1962, xxii, 346 p., see § 2.11, "Consent" at pp. 41-42;
 

___________39th Annual Meeting Proceedings, American Law Institute,  Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1962, see pp. 90-104, on "§ 2.11. Consent"; copy on microfiche at the library of the Supreme Court of Canada (cabinet number 27), Ottawa;
 

ANDENAES, Johannes,  The General Part of the Criminal Law of Norway, translated by Thomas P. Ogle, South Hackensack: Fred B. Rothman and London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1965, xxiii, 346 p., see "Consent" at pp. 173-186  (series; Publications of The Comparative Criminal Law Project, New York University; volume 3);

"The problem...

 From the Roman law comes the maxm volenti non fit injuria -- 'one who consents suffers no wrong.'  Opinion is divided as to whether this maxim expressed a general principle that the consent of the victim precluded punishability.  Accoding to the modern viewpoint, at least, such a rule cannot be accepted.  There are several reasons which may induce society to prohibit an act even though the one who primarily suffers from it consents.  In especially serious crimes a concern for the consenter himself will be likely to cause society to deprive the consent of legal significance; society does not have sufficient confidence in the consenter's ability to make a correct evaluation of his own interests.  In many cases, other people, such as the consenter's relatives, have an important interest in seeing to it that the act is not done.  Purely moral considerations can also come into play , such as in the case of consent to homicide or sexual operations.

No general rule in the Penal Code
    The Penal Code has no general rule on the significance of consent as it does on self-defense or necessity.  The various situations are so different that rules must be made with the individual penal provisions in mind.  It is impossible to establish any general principle." (p. 174)

ANDERSON, Jack, “Citius, Altius, Fortius?  A Study of Criminal Violence in Sport”, (2000) 11 Marquette Sports Law Review 87-106; copy at Ottawa University, KF 3989 .A15 M37  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

ANDERSSON, Ulrika, "The Unbounded Body -- An Analysis of Consent in Swedish Rape Law", (2002/2003) 6(1) Contemporary Issues in Law 64-78; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, periodicals; copy at Ottawa University, KD 7100 .A13 C65  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

APOSTEL, Léo, "L'Euthanasie comme Problème Moral et Philosophique",  (1963-64) 44 Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie 29-48; copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, K 21 .D725  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

ARCHARD, David, "Exploited Consent", (1994) 25 Journal of Social Philosophy 92-101; copy at Ottawa University, H 1 .J565  Location, MRT Periodicals;
 

___________"The Mens Rea of Rape: Reasonableness and Culpable Mistakes",  in Keith Burgess-Jackson, ed., A Most Detestable Crime: New  Essays on Rape, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, xv, 306 p., at pp. 213-229, ISBN: 0195120752 and 0195120760 (pbk.); copy at Ottawa University, K 5197 .M67 1999 MRT;
 

___________" 'A Nod's as Good as a Wink': Consent, Convention, and Reasonable Belief", (1977) 3 Legal Theory 273-290; copy at Ottawa University, K 202 .L436  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

___________Sexual Consent, Boulder (Colorado) and Oxford (England): Westview Press, 1998, x, 189 p., ISBN: 0813330815 and 0813330823 (pb); copy at Ottawa University, HQ 31 .A67 1998 MRT; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa, HQ 32 A73 1998;
 

ARCHER, Frédéric, Le consentement en droit pénal de la vie humaine, thèse de doctorat: droit pénal, Lille 2, 2000, 735 p.; directeur de thèse: Alain Prothais;

"Résumé
La science juridique tend à s'immiscer davantage dans la pratique des interventions médicales sur l'être humain.  La loi autorise de tels actes en les entourant de conditions particulières pour les cantonner dans un périmètre majoritairement sécurisé par le droit pénal.  Notamment le législateur impose le recueil de la volonté du principal intéressé partant du constat selon lequel le 'consentement' n'est pas inconnu du droit pénal qui l'emploie traditionnellement par référence à la volonté de la victime, l'on remarque la présence expresse et de plus en plus fréquente de ce terme dans les textes répressifs protecteurs de la vie humaine.  Il s'est alors avéré nécessaire d'approfondir cette notion ambigüe par l'analyse de ses caractères et de sa nature afin de mieux la cerner et pour comprendre cette irruption dans le système répressif.  Le consentement à un acte médical donné par l'intéressé à un professionnel de santé exerçant à titre libéral est double.  L'un va former le contrat de soins, l'autre est certes une conséquence du premier mais demeure surtout une exigence légale visant à garantir l'exercice de la liberté fondamentale de préserver son intégrité physique.  C'est sous cette dernière acceptation, qu'il y a lieu de comprendre son emploi dans les textes répresssifs.  Pour mettre fin à l'amphibologie du vocable employé, il a été proposé, de lui substituer le termes 'permission' qui évoque d'avantage l'exercice d'une prérogative individuelle dont l'efficacité juridique est dépendante de la loi.  En l'occurence, la volonté individuelle est toujours insuffisante si son expression n'est pas requise par la loi à l'occasion de cette démonstration, nous avons été amené à formuler diverses propositions afin de mieux concrétiser la cohérence du droit pénal de la vie humaine que révèle l'étude de cette notion de consentement. (source: catalogue Abès, à  http://www.sudoc.abes.fr/)

___________[Le ]consentement en droit pénal de la vie humaine, Paris, Budapest : Torino, l'Harmattan, 2003, 618 p., (Collection; Collection Sciences criminelles), ISBN: 2747539512; note: Texte remanié de : Th. Doct. : Droit pénal : Lille II : 2000; copie à la Bibliothèque de la Cour suprême du Canada, Ottawa, KJV5369 A93 2003;
 

ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PÉNAL  (AIDP) (International Association of Penal Law) and Istituto Superiore Internazionale di Scienze Criminali (ISISC) (International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences) and Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law (MPI), Draft Statute
for an International Criminal Court -- Alternative to the ILC-Draft -- (Siracusa-Draft), prepared by a Committee of Experts Siracusa/Freiburg, July 1995, 88 p.; available at  http://www.iuscrim.mpg.de/forsch/straf/referate/sach/hispint/siracusa.pdf (accessed on 10 December 2005);

"Art. 33 m
Consent

With regard to the nature of international crimes defined in this Statute, consent of the victim does not exclude punishment." (p. 53)

ATHANASSOULIS, Nafsika, "The Role of Consent in Sado-masochistic Practices", (2002) 8(2) Res Publica 141-155;

ATTARDO, Marlene A., "Defense of Mistake of Fact as to Victim's Consent in Rape Prosecution", (2002) 102 ALR 5th 447-524; ALR=American Law Reports;
 

AUSTRALIA, Law Reform Commission of the Australian Capital Territory, Report on the Laws Relating to Sexual Assault, Canberra : The Commission, 2001, 137 p., ISBN: 0642601038 (series; report; number 18); available at http://www.jcs.act.gov.au/eLibrary/lrc/lrc18/lrc18_sexual_assault.html (accessed on 9 August 2003);

AUSTRALIA, New South Wales, Criminal Justice Sexual Offences Taskforce, Attorney General's Department of NSW, Responding to sexual assault: the way forward, Sydney: Criminal Law Review Division, Attorney's General Department, NSW, 2006, 192 p., ISBN: 0734728662; available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/clrd/ll_clrd.nsf/vwFiles/CJSOT%20Report.pdf/$file/CJSOT%20Report.pdf (accessed on 30 May 2006);
 

AUSTRALIA, Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, Model Criminal Code Officers Committee, Model Criminal Code. Chapter 5: Sexual offences against the person, Barton (A.C.T.): Attorney-General's Department, 1996, ix, 246 p. (series; Discussion paper), ISBN: 0642208883;
 

___________Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, Model Criminal Code Officers Committee,  Model Criminal Code. Chapter 5: Sexual offences against the person, Barton (A.C.T.): Attorney-General's Department, 2000, xi, 337 p. (series; report), ISBN: 0642209642; copy available at http://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/www/rwpattach.nsf/viewasattachmentPersonal/5E5E1BD0F92F63AECA256BB30003AAC9/$file/modelcode_ch5_sexual_offences_report.pdf (accessed on 14 August 2003);
 

AUSTRALIA, VICTORIA, LAW REFORM COMMISSION, Rape and Allied Offences: Substantive Aspects, Melbourne: Government Printer, 1987, viii, 39 p.  (series; report; number 7); copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa, KF384 ZD7 R466 no. 07;
 

___________Rape and allied offences : substantive aspects, Melbourne : The Commission, [1986],  iv, 55 p., see "Consent" at pp. 9-12 and 22-32, "The Mental Element" at pp. 12-15 and 32-39, "What is to be the Role of Consent" at pp. 47-50, "What should the Mental Element Be?", at pp. 50-53  (series; Discussion paper; number 2)

"What Should The Mental Element Be?
4.20  The Commission believes that the present law is correct and that the Crown should be required to prove beyond reasonable doubt either that the accused was aware that the complainant was not consenting or was aware of the possibility of lack of consent and proceeded regardless.  To impose a requirement that the belief be reasonable would be unacceptable as a matter of principle.  Nor should there be any change in the burden of proof in relation to the mental element.  The Commission is not in favour of a lesser offence of so-called 'negligent rape' to cover situations where the accused has an honest but unreasonable belief in consent.  Such an offence would be wrong in principle and would involve unwarranted complication of the law." (p. 50)

___________Rape and Allied Offences : Victims with Impaired Mental Functioning, Melbourne : The Commission, 1988, 39 p., see "Capacity to consent", "What should the test for capacity be?" and "Does the offender have to be aware of the impairment?" at pp. 10-13 (series; discussion paper; number 9), ISBN:  072414319X;
 

___________Rape: Reform of Law and Procedure, [Melbourne] : The Commission, 1991, viii, 38 p. (series; report; number 43), ISBN: 0730623130; copy at home;
 

___________Rape: Reform of Law and Procedure Appendixes to Interim Report No. 42, [Melbourne] : Law Reform Commission of Victoria, [1991],  vi, 186 p.,  ISBN: 0730623440; copy home;
 

___________Rape: Reform of Law and Procedure Interim Report; [Melbourne] : Law Reform Commission of Victoria, [1991],  vi, 60 p. (series; report; number 42), ISBN: 073062336X; copy at home;
 

___________Sexual Offences against People with Impaired Mental Functioning, [Melbourne] : The Commission, 1988, ii, 52 p., see "Capacity to consent", "What should the test for capacity be?" and "Should it be an offence if the 'offender' is not aware of lack of capacity" at pp. 18-22 (series; report; number 15), ISBN: 0724167153;
 

AUSTRALIA, Victorian Law Reform Commission, Sexual Offences: Interim Report, Melbourne (Victoria): Victorian Law Reform Commission, 2003, xvii, 410 p., ISBN: 0958182965; available at  http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/CA256A25002C7735/OrigDoc/~D4332763FA7768A9CA256D3A001BCF3E?OpenDocument&1=30-Current+projects~&2=20-Sexual+Offences~&3=75-Interim+Report~ (accessed on 15 August 2003);
 

AUTRICHE/AUSTRIA___________ Les nouveaux codes pénaux de langue allemande: Autriche (1974), République démocratique allemande (1968) et République fédérale d'Allemagne (1975), Paris: La  Documentation française avec le concours du Centre français de droit comparé, 1981, 565 p., voir à la p. 55 pour l'article 90 et la p. 64 pour l'article 110, "Consentement de la victime" du Code pénal autrichien (Collection des codes pénaux européens du Comité de législation étrangère et de droit international du Ministère de la Justice, sous la direction de Marc Ancel avec la collaboration de Yvonne Marx; tome 5);  ISBN: 2110006579; la traduction du Code pénal allemand  a été faite par Pierre Franck et Agnès Guerin-Salem, révisée sous la direction d'Yvonne Marx.

"Consentement de la victime

ARTICLE 90. -- (1) Une lésion corporelle ou une mise en péril de l'intégrité physique ne sont pas contraires à la loi si la victime ou la personne mise en péril y donnent leur consentement, et si la lésion ou la mise en péril n'enfreignent pas, en tant que telles, les bonnes moeurs.

(2) La stérilisation pratiquée par un médecin sur une personne avec son consentement n'est pas contraire à la loi, si cette personne a atteint l'âge de vingt-cinq ans accomplis, ou si, pour d'autres motifs, l'atteinte ainsi portée à l'intégrité corporelle n'enfreint pas les bonnes moeurs." (p. 55)

[Note: article amendé en 2001, voir texte allemand ci-dessous]
 

"Traitement médical pratiqué arbitrairement

ARTICLE 110. -- (1) Quiconque  soigne une autre personne sans son consentement, fût-ce d'après les règles de la science médicale, est puni d'une peine privative de liberté de six mois au plus ou d'une peine pécuniaire représentant 360 fois le taux journalier au plus.

(2)   Si l'auteur n'a pas sollicité le consentement de la personne traitée, en estimant que la vie ou la santé de cette personne serait gravement mise en péril par tout retard, il n'e doit être puni en vertu de l'alinéa (1) que si le danger supposé n'a pas existé et s'il aurait pu se rendre compte de ce fait en faisant preuve de l'attention nécessaire (art. 6).  [note: art. 6 sur la négligence]

(3)  L'auteur ne peut être poursuivi qu'à la demande de la personne arbitrairement traitée." (p. 64)
 

"§ 90 Einwilligung des Verletzten

 (1) Eine Körperverletzung oder Gefährdung der körperlichen Sicherheit ist nicht rechtswidrig, wenn der Verletzte oder Gefährdete in sie einwilligt und die Verletzung oder Gefährdung als solche nicht gegen die guten Sitten verstößt.

 (2) Die von einem Arzt an einer Person mit deren Einwilligung vorgenommene Sterilisation ist nicht rechtswidrig, wenn entweder die Person bereits das fünfundzwanzigste Lebensjahr vollendet hat oder der Eingriff aus anderen Gründen nicht gegen die guten Sitten verstößt.

 (3) In eine Verstümmelung oder sonstige Verletzung der Genitalien, die geeignet ist, eine nachhaltige Beeinträchtigung des sexuellen Empfindens herbeizuführen, kann nicht eingewilligt werden.

 (Abs 3 eingefügt durch BGBl 2001 I /130)"
 

§ 110 Eigenmächtige Heilbehandlung

 (1) Wer einen anderen ohne dessen Einwilligung, wenn auch nach den Regeln der medizinischen Wissenschaft, behandelt, ist mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu sechs Monaten oder mit Geldstrafe bis zu 360 Tagessätzen zu bestrafen.

 (2) Hat der Täter die Einwilligung des Behandelten in der Annahme nicht eingeholt, daß durch den Aufschub der Behandlung das Leben oder die Gesundheit des Behandelten ernstlich gefährdet wäre, so ist er nach Abs. 1 nur zu bestrafen, wenn die vermeintliche Gefahr nicht bestanden hat und er sich dessen bei Aufwendung der  nötigen Sorgfalt (§ 6) hätte bewußt sein können.

 (3) Der Täter ist nur auf Verlangen des eigenmächtig Behandelten zu verfolgen."

AZÉMA, Jean, La responsabilité en matière de sports, Lyon: impr. Bosc frères, M. et L. Riou; Paris, Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1934, 164 p.; thèse Montpellier, Faculté de droit, 1934; il se peut que ne traite que du droit civil; titre noté dans mes recherches mais livre non consulté; aucune copie de ce livre  dans la région d'Ottawa, selon ma vérification du catalogue AMICUS (24 août 2005); copie à l'Université de Sherbrooke, Bibliothèque de droit, 18.992/JJ.5/.A94r/1934;
 

BACHMANN, Gregor, "Review Essay - Volenti non fit iniuria - How to make a principle work", 4 German Law Journal No. 10 (1 October 2003) - Private Law; available at: http://www.germanlawjournal.com/ (accessed on 16 July 2004);

"Consent as 'negative element'
...German criminal law scholarship sharply distinguishes between elements of  an offence ("Tatbestand") and reasons for justification ("Rechtfertigungsgründe"). Occasionally the victim's consent is seen as a "negative" element of an offence, thus belonging to the first category (labelled "Einverständnis"); sometimes it is viewed a reason for justification (labelled "Einwilligung"). Whether this distinction is necessary is a controversial issue, yet most scholars at least accept the               general scheme as a helpful systematization."

BADAR, Mohamed Elewa and Nora Karsten, "Current Developments at the International Criminal Tribunals", (2007) 7 International Criminal Law Review 163-186, and see "Rape--Absence of Consent as an Element of the Crime or as an Affirmative Defence?", at pp. 167-168;

BADR, Mohammed Abdel Aziz, L'influence du consentement de la victime sur la responsabilité pénale: étude comparée, Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1928, xvi, 304, 8 p.; thèse,  Paris, 1928; note: préface de Donnedieu de Vabres; titre noté dans mes recherches; livre non consulté; aucune copie de ce livre au Canada, selon le catalogue AMICUS;

BAKER, DEnnis J., "The Moral Limits of Consent as a Defense in the Criminal Law", (Winter 2009) 12(1) New Criminal Law Review 93-121; see synopsis at http://caliber.ucpress.net/doi/abs/10.1525/nclr.2009.12.1.93 (accessed on 29 August 2009);
 

BAKER, J.H., ed., The Reports of Sir John Spelman, London: Selden Society, 1978, vol. 2, see Chapter 10, "Pleas of the Crown", at pp. 299-346, and see pp. 312-314; copy at Ottawa University, FTX General, KD 270 1502. S64; note: Sir John Spelman, c. 1480-1546;
 

BALLERAT, Pascale, La médicalisation du droit pénal, thèse de doctorat, droit pénal, Tours, 1999, 2 volumes, 1050 p., 78 ref.; dir de thèse: Georges Vermelle;

"Résumé:

C'est au XX^e siècle, que la médicalisation du droit pénal a pris son essor.  La médecine a conquis de nombreux pans du domaine répressif, par des interventions de nature très différente, allant d'un simple prêt de vocabulaire, jusqu'à une prise de pouvoir, comme en matière d'interruption de grossesse, non sans laisser une forte empreinte sur le droit pénal et l'imprégner de son esprit.  Elle a permis d'améliorer la cohérence et l'efficacité des textes répressifs et d'en faciliter l'application, à un tel point, qu'à bien des égards, elle est, aujourd'hui, devenue indispensable.  Cette union est perfectible; le sens que donne le droit pénal aux notions médicales n'est pas toujours conforme à leur véritable définition, ce qui détermine, alors, de manière discutable  l'application des infractions qui les contiennent.  En outre, des freins existent à son extension.  Il faut compter avec l'évolution de la science, les réticences du législateur, lorsqu'ils s'agit de faire participer les médecins à l'élaboration des textes, qu'ils vont pourtant avoir à appliquer, les attentes de l'opinion publique et de la victime.  Malgré tout, tout porte à croire que la tendance qui s'est affirmée, depuis le début du siècle, est amenée à s'accentuer au prochain millénaire, grâce, notamment, aux progrès de la médecine; la génétique pourrait même permettre de traiter la cause de certaines délinquances.  C'est pourquoi, il était important de souligner la diversité de l'intervention médicale, d'aider, lorsque c'est nécessaire, le législateur, à en faire un usage meilleur, mais aussi de raprocher, par un sujet fédérateur, en les impliquant de surcroît, les forces de l'ordre, les médecins et l'institution judiciaire, qui parfois, se comprennent mal, pour les préparer et les encourager à entretenir, dès aujourd'hui, des rapports plus fructueux encore, pour le bénéfice du droit pénal de la société."  (Source: catalogue Abès, France)
 
 

BARON, Marcia W., "I thought she consented",  in Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, eds., Social, political, and legal philosophy,  Boston, MA : Blackwell Publishers, 2001, 557 p. (series; Philosophical issues, ISSN 0029-4624; volume 11), ISBN: 0631230270 and 0631230262 (pbk.); no copy of this book in the Ottawa area libraries;  article not consulted;

BARRY, Matthe P., Richard L. Fox, and Clark Jones, "Judicial Opinion on the Criminality of Sports Violence in the United States", (2005) 15(1) Seton Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainement Law 1-25; 
 

BEALE, J.H. (Joseph-Henry), 1861-1943,  "Consent in the Criminal Law", (1894-95) 8 Harvard Law Review 317-327; copy at Ottawa University, KFM 2469 .H457  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

BERGELSON, V., "The Right to Be Hurt: Testing the Boundaries of Consent", (2007) 75(2) The George Washington Law Review 165-236; with the same title as a Rutgers University (Newmark) Legal Working Paper Series, 92 p.,   at  http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/fp/art37/  (accessed on 30 August 2007);

BENTHAM, Jeremy, 1748-1832, Theory of Legislation, by Jeremy Bentham; translated from the French of Etienne Dumont by R. Hildreth, London : Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner, 1900, xv, 472 p.;

"CHAPTER XIV.
Grounds of Justification.

I proceed to speak of some circumstances which, in connection with an offence, operate to take away its injurious quality.  We may give to these circumstances the common name of means of justification, or, for shortness, justifications.

    General justifications, which apply tpo nearly all offences, may be reduced to the following heads: --

1st.   Consent.
2nd.  Repulsion of a greater evil.
3rd   Medical practice.
4th.   Self-defence.
5th    Political power.
6th    Domestic power.

    How do these circumstances furnish justifications?  We shall see that sometimes they import proof of the absence of evil; and sometimes they evince that the evil has been compensated -- that is, that a good more equivalent has resulted from it.  The question here relates to the evil of the first order; for in all these cases there is no evil of the second order.  I confine myself to some general observations.

    1st.  Consent.  Meaning the consent of the person who suffers the evil, if there is an evil.  What more natural than to presume that there is in fact no evil, or that it is perfectly compensated, where there is such a consent?  We therefore admit the general rule of the lawyers, that he who consents suffers no injury.  This rule is founded upon two very simple propositions: one, that every person is the best judge of his own interest; the other, that no man will consent to what he thinks hurtful to himself.

    This rule admits many exceptions of which the reason is palpable; -- such as coercion, fraud, concealment, a consent out of date or revoked, madness, drunkenness, childhood.

......

    3rd.  Medical Practice. -- This ground of justification is only a subdivision of the preceding.  An individual is made to suffer for his own good.  A man is seized with an apoplexy.  Shall we wait for his consent to bleed him?  There cannot be a doubt as to the propriety of using the lancet, because it is very certain that it is not the patient's wish to die.

    The case is very different if a man, master of his faculties, and able to consent, thinks proper to refuse it.  Shall we give his friends or physicians the right to force an operation which he declines?  This would be to substitute a certain evil for a danger almost imaginary.  Distrust and terror would watch by the sick man's bed.  If a physician, through humanity, goes beyond his right, and the experiment turns out unfavourably, he ought to be exposed to the rigour of the laws, and his intention, at most, should only serve as an extenuation of his offence." (pp. 266-269)
 

- HAREL, Alon, "Victims and Perpetrators: The Case against a Unified Theory of Comparative Liability in Criminal Law", at pp. 489-502;
- HURD, Heidi M., "Blaming the Victim: A Response to the Proposal That Criminal Law Recognize a General Defense of Contributory Responsibility", at pp. 503-522;
- HUSAK, Douglas, "Comparative Fault in Criminal Law: Conceptual and Normative  Perplexities", at pp. 523-540;
- SIMONS, Kenneth W., "The Relevance of Victim Conduct in Tort and Criminal Law", at pp. 541-565;
- BERGELSON, Vera, "Conditional Rights and Comparative Wrongs: More on the Theory and Application of Comparative Criminal Liability", at pp. 567-597;

BERGER, Vivian, "Review Essay / Defending Sexual Autonomy Stephen J. Schulhofer, Unwanted Sex: The Culture of Intimidation and the Failure of Law ...", (2001) 20(1) Criminal Justice Ethics 45-52; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada;
 

BERLINER, Dana, "Rethinking the Reasonable Belief Defense to Rape", (1991) 100 Yale Law Journal 2687-2706; copy at Ottawa University, KFC 3669 .Y34  Location: FTX Periodicals;

BEYLEVELD, Deryck and Roger Brownsword, Consent in the law, Oxford : Hart, 2007, xvii, 388 p., ISBN: 9781841136790 and 1841136790; limited preview at http://books.google.com/books?id=rPg9d8D4F_kC&printsec=titlepage&dq=%22criminal+code+%22+date:2006-2009&lr=&as_brr=3&source=gbs_toc_s&cad=1 and http://books.google.com/books?id=rPg9d8D4F_kC&dq=%22criminal+code+%22+date:2006-2009&lr=&as_brr=3&source=gbs_summary_s&cad=0 (accessed on 25 May 2008);

BIBBINGS, Lois and Peter Alldridge, "Sexual Expression, Body Alteration, and the Defence of Consent", (1993) 20(3) Journal of Law and Society 356-370; copy at Ottawa University, HM 34 .B735  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

BIENEN, Leigh, "Mistakes", (1977-78) 7 Philosophy anf Public Affairs 224-245; copy at Ottawa University, H 1 .P54  Location: MRT Periodicals;
 

BINDER, Richard L., Comment, "The Consent Defense: Sports, Violence and the Criminal Law", (1975-76) 13 The American Criminal Law Review 235-248; copy at Ottawa University, KF 9202 .A425  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

Bioéthique, available at  http://www.coe.int/T/F/Affaires_juridiques/Coop%E9ration_juridique/Bio%E9thique/
Clonage, available at  http://www.coe.int/T/F/affaires_juridiques/coop%E9ration_juridique/Bio%E9thique/Activit%E9s/Clonage/default.asp
 

BIX, B., Notes, "Assault, sado-masochism and consent", (1993) 109 Law Quarterly Review 540-544; deals with the House of Lords decision of Brown; copy at Ottawa University, KD 322 .L37  Location: FTX Periodicals;

BOHLANDER, Michael, "Mistaken consent to sex, political correctness and correct policy", (October 2007) 71(5) The Journal of Criminal Law 412-426;
 

BONILLA, Margaret D., "Cultural Assault -- What Feminists Are Doing to Rape Ought to Be a Crime", (1993) 66 Policy Review magazine 22-29; available at  http://www.ukpoliticsmisc.org.uk/usenet_evidence/rape_culture.htm (accessed on 18 August 2003);
 

BOWEN, John Bellmore, An ethical analysis of rules and violence in sport, MA, California State University, Long Beach, 2000, 93 p.; title noted in my research but thesis not consulted; no copy in Canada according to the AMICUS catalogue (verification of 6 August 2003);
 

BRANTS, Chrisje, "The State and the Nation's Bedrooms: The Fundamental Right of Sexual Autonomy",  in Peter Alldridge and Chrisje Brants, eds., Personal Autonomy, The Private Sphere and Criminal Law: A Comparative Strudy,  Portland (Oregon): Hart Publishing, 2001, xxv, 274 p., Essay 5 at pp. 117-138, ISBN: 1901362825; copy at the Supreme Court of Canada Library, Ottawa, KJC 1646 P47 22001;
 

BRODY, Baruch A.,  The ethics of biomedical research : an international perspective, New York : Oxford University Press, 1998, xiii, 386 p., ISBN: 0195090071; copy at Ottawa University, RGN General: R 852 .B76 1998;
 

BRODY, Susan L., "Rape of the Mentally Deficient: Satisfaction of the Nonconsent Element", (1982) 15 John Marshall Law Review 115-129;
 

BRONITT, Simon H., "Spreading Disease and the Criminal Law", [1994] Criminal Law Review 21-34;  copy at Ottawa University, KD 7862 .C734  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

___________"Rape and Lack of Consent", (1992) 16 Criminal Law Journal 289-310; copy at Ottawa University, KTA 0 .C735  Location: FTX Periodicals;

BROOKE, Henry, Consent in the Criminal Law, The Stationery Office Books, 1995, 302 p., ISBN: 0117302244; title noted in my research but book not found in Canadian libraries according to my verification of the AMICUS catalogue (10 August 2003);

"This report invites views on the approach that the law should adopt when criminalizing activities in which mature people agree to take part. Evidence and submissions were taken on topics such as sports and  martial arts, casual fighting and rough horseplay, and cosmetic piercing and sado-masochism." (source:  http://www.NetStoreUSA.com/ljbooks/011/0117302244.shtml, accessed on 10 August 2003)

BROUWER, Anne-Marie, L.M. de, 1975-, Supranational criminal prosecution of sexual violence:the ICC and the practice of the ICTY and the ICTR, Antwerpen:
Intersentia, c2005, xiv, 570 p., "The issue of whether or not consent should be an element of the crime of rape in international (criminal) law is
dealt with in Chapter 2, paragraph 4.1. on ‘rape’, pages 103-137. But see also for instance Chapter 4, paragraph 6.2.2" (communication from the author, 3 February 2007)
(series; School of Human Rights Research series; v. 20), ISBN: 9050955339 (pbk.); NOTES: "This volume is an adapted version of a dissertation
defended at Tilburg University on 2 November 2005"; copy at the Université de Montréal, KZ 1168.5 B76 2005; see the
Table of Contents of the book at http://www.intersentia.be/zoekdetail.asp?pid=1250# (accessed on 3 February 2007); book not consulted yet; 

BRYANT, J.A., Annotation, "Consent as defense in prosecution for sodomy", (1974) 58 ALR 3d 636-655; ALR=American Law Reports;
 

BRYDEN, David P., "Redefining Rape", (2000) 3 Buffalo Criminal Law Review 317-479; availbale at  http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/bclrarticles/3(2)/bryden.pdf (accessed on 11 July 2003);
 

BURGESS-JACKSON, Keith, Rape: A Philosophical Investigation, Aldershot, Hant, England ; Brookfield, USA : Dartmouth, c1996, xi, 244 p., see chapter 6, "Consent, Force, and Coercion", at pp. 91-106, and chapter 8, "Mens Rea" at pp. 137-161, ISBN: 1855214857; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, K5197 B87 1996;
 

BUTLER, William Elliott, 1939-, Criminal code of the Russian Federation, Transl. by William E. Butler. Introd. by William E. Butler and Maryann E. Gashi-Butler, 3rd ed., London: Simmonds & Hill; The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer International, 1999, xxvi, 224 p., ISBN: 1898029407 (Simmonds and Hill) and 9041195025 (Kluwer Law International); 4th ed., London : Wildy, Simmonds & Hill Pub. Ltd., 2004,  xxxix, 303 p., ISBN: 1898029660;

"Article 131. Rape

1. Rape, that is, sexual intercourse with the application or threat of the application of force against the victim or other persons or by taking advantage of the helpless state of the victim --
shall be punished by deprivation of freedom for a term of from three to six years." (p. 69)

CALVERY HANSON, Linda S. and Craig Dennis, "Revisiting Excessive Violence in the Professional Sports Arena: Changes in the Past Twenty Years?", (1996) 6 Seton Hall Journal of Sport and Entertainement Law 127-166;

CARR, Craig L., "Tacit Consent", (1990) 4 Public Affairs Quarterly 335-345; copy at Carleton University, Ottawa, SER H97.A1P74;

CARROLL, Mary, "It's Not How You Play the Game, It's Whether You Win Or Lose: The Need For Criminal Sanctions To Curb Violence In Professional Sports", (1989) 12 Hamline Law Review 71-90;
 

CAVALLARO, Rosanna, "A Big Mistake: Eroding the Defense of Mistake of Fact About Consent in Rape", (1996) 86 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 815-860;
 

CHAMALLAS, Martha, "Consent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct", (1987-88) 61 Southern California Law Review 777-862;

CHAN, Phil C. W., "The Gay Age of Consent in Hong Kong", (September 2004) 15(3) Criminal Law Forum 273-299;
 

CHAND, Hukm, Principles of the law of consent: with special reference to criminal law, including the doctrines of mistake, duress, and waiver: Bombay, Bombay education society's press, 1897, xviii, 581 p.; copy at Laval University, KPN/C454/1897; also available at other places in Canada;  available at http://www.archive.org/details/principlesoflawo00chaniala (accessed on 20 August 2007);

CHARLES, Raymond, "Le sport et le droit pénal", (1952-53) 33 Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie 825-869; article non consulté; aucune copie de ce périodique, pour cette année-là, dans les bibliothèques de la région d'Ottawa;
 

CHILDS, Mary, Review Article, "Sexual Autonomy and Law -- Stephen Schulhofer, Unwanted Sex: The Culture of Intimidation and the Failure of Law, Cambridge, Mass and London: Harvard University Press, 1998, xii, 318 pp, hb...", (2001) 64 The Modern Law Review 309-323;
 
 
CLARKE, C. Antoinette, "Law and Order on the Courts: The Application of Criminal Liability for Intentional Fouls During Sporting Events", (2000) 32 Arizona State Law Journal 1149-1193;

CLEMENS, Margaret A., Notes, "Elimination of the Resistance Requirement and other Rape Law Reforms: The New York Experience", (1982-83) 47 Albany Law Review 871-907; copy at Ottawa University, KFN 5069 .A42  Location, FTX Periodicals;
 

COLOMBANI, Isabelle, La place du consensualisme dans le droit pénal français, thèse de doctorat en droit, Aix-Marseilles 3, 1991, 558 feuilles; dir. de thèse: Fernand Boulan;

"Résumé
 La place du consensualisme dans le droit pénal français.  Cette étude a pour objet d'envisager les différents aspects de l'introduction du consensualisme dans le droit pénal français, après l'examen de ce phénomène en droit étranger et dans les autres branches du droit français.  Apparu tout d'abord dans les transactions pénales et dans certaines sanctions relatives à des délits spécifiques (vagabondage, alcoolisme, toxicomanie...), le consensualisme s'est peu à peu intégré dans les grands principes de la répression pénale.  Médiation et conciliation en sont les exemples les plus frappants.  Ces deux techniques extra-judiciaires de règlement des conflits font actuellement l'objet de nombreuses expériences au sein des juridictions françaises.  Elles symbolisent le mouvement de déjudiciarisation que connaissent au XX^eme siècle la plupart des législations.  Le développment du consensualisme se fait actuellement dans le respect des grands principes du droit pénal et de procédure, et il a pour objectif de réduire le contentieux pénal afin de désencombrer les tribunaux.  En cela, il vise à améliorer le système de justice à favoriser la paix sociale."

.........

[Summary]

"The purpose of this study is to envisage the different aspects of the introduction of consensualism in French penal law, after the examination of this phenomenon in foreign law and in the other branches of French law.  First apparent in penal transaction and in certain sanctions related to specific crimes (vagrancy, alcoholism, drug abuse...).   Little by little, consensualism has been integrated into the main principles of penal represssion.  Mediation and conciliation are the most striking examples of this.  These two extra-judiciary methods are the objects of numerous experiments in the heart of French jurisdiction.  They symbolize the diversion of the juridiction apparent in most of the XXth century legislations.  At the moment, consensualism is developing with regards to the main principles of penal law and the legal procedure, and, its purpose is to reduce matters of penal dispute in order to reduce the work in the tribunals.  Therefore its purpose is to improve the judicial system and help promote peace." (source: Catalogue Abes; visionné le 8 juillet 2003)
 

CONNELLY, A.M., "Problems of Interpretation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights", (1986) 35 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 567-593; copy at Ottawa University, K 1701 .I569  Location: FTX Periodicals;

COOK, Kate, "Rape Law.Consent Free Agreement.CO.UK: An Assessment of the Legal Definition of Consent, in the Light of the Current Review of Sexual Offences Law", (2002/2003) 6(1) Contemporary Issues in Law 7-22; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, periodicals;

COOPER, Simon and Alan Reed, "Informed Consent and the Transmission of Sexual Disease: Dadson Revivified", (October 2007) 71(5) The Journal of Criminal Law 461-474;
 

CORNELIS, Ludo and Pierre Van Ommeslaghe, "Les 'faits justificatifs' dans le droit belge de la responsabilité aquilienne", in Journées d'études sur le droit de la responsabilité (1984: Gand, Belgique), Limpens, Jean, 1910-1979, Centre interuniversitaire de droit comparé, In  memoriam Jean Limpens : Studiedagen aansprakelijkheidsrecht, Gent, 23-24 maart 1984 = In memoriam Jean Limpens : Journées d'études sur le droit de la responsabilité, Gent, 23-24 mars 1984 = In memoriam Jean Limpens : Symposium on Civil Liability, Gent, 23-24 March 1984, Antwerpen : Kluwer rechtswetenschappen, 1987, xxvii, 311 p., aux pp. 265-287, et voir "Le consentement de la victime", aux pp. 282-284 (series; Interuniversitair Centrum voor Rechtsvergelijking; 12), (Collection; Centre interuniversitaire de droit comparé; 12), ISBN: 9063212879; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, K923 Z9 I56 1987; droit civil mais un article utile pour les chercheurs et chercheuses;
 

COSENTINI, Francesco, 1870-, Code pénal international en 1314 articles : dressé sur la base comparative des projets et textes récents de codes pénaux, La Cibourg, Berne : Institut américain de droit & de législation comparée, 1937, xxviii, 258 p. (Collection; Études et documents. Série française; no 8); copie de ce  livre très rare au Canada à la Bibliothèque du Parlement, Ottawa;

"[Article] 117.  Consentement de l'intéressé. -- N'est pas punissable celui qui lèse ou compromet un droit, avec le consentement de la personne qui peut valablement en disposer.  It. 50 -- U. 37 -- Contra Br. 26 c." (p. 18)

COUNCIL OF EUROPE, Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine Oviedo, 4.IV.1997; available at  http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/html/164.htm (accessed on 5 June 2005);

"Article 8 – Emergency situation

     When because of an emergency situation the appropriate consent cannot be obtained, any medically necessary intervention may be carried out immediately for the benefit of the health of the individual concerned."

COURDENT, Hélène, Le consentement dans la recherche médicale, Mémoire D.E.S.S. : droit de la santé : Bordeaux 4 : 2000, 95 feuilles, annexes non paginées;  titre noté dans mes recherches; mémoire non consulté; aucune copie de ce livre au Canada, selon le catalogue AMICUS;
 

COWART, Monica R., "Understanding Acts of Consent: Using Speech Act Theory to Help Resolve Moral Dilemmas and Legal Disputes", (2004) 23 Law and Philosophy 495-525;
 

COWLING, Mark, Date rape and consent, Aldershot ; Brookfield, Vt. : Ashgate, 1998, viii, 154 p., ISBN : 1859725090; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, HQ32 C69 1998; copy at the University of Ottawa, HQ 32 .C69 1998 MRT;
 

___________"Should Communicative Sexuality be Written into English Law on Rape", (2002/2003) 6(1) Contemporary Issues in Law 47-63; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, periodicals;
 

CUNLIFFE, Ian, "Consent and Sexual Offences Law Reform in New South Wales", (1984) 8 Criminal Law Journal 271-295; copy at Ottawa University, KTA 0 .C735  Location: FTX Periodicals;

"Summary

Just when it seemed the battle fought by Wolfenden and others to get the law enforcement out of the bedroom of consenting adults was won, the movement towards liberalism was swamped by other forces.  Under the influence of the women's movement, consent was abandoned as the touchstone for sexual offences at the most serious end of the spectrum.  In New South Wales it seems to be 'rape';

- if a wife infects her husband with herpes, even if he had intercourse knowing she had herpes,
- to break a consenting woman's hymen to have intercourse,
- to engage in sado-masochistic practices as a prelude intercourse,
- for two men to fight for the sexual attentions of a willing woman,
- for husband and wife to bruise or abrase an interloper, in evicting him so that they can retire to bed for sex,
- for a man to delay withdrawal too long when coitus interruptus was the agreed objective

The thesis of this article is that, however sexual offences are defined, consensual behaviour between consenting adults in private must fall outside their scope.  The article has a secondary theme: that it is time that as much energy was devoted to delineating precisely the intended scope of sexual offences -- old and new -- as has recently been devoted to other aspects of sexual law reform.  That need is especially urgent with the extension of sexual offences law into the marital bedroom.  Sexual offences are now seriously over-inclusive, out of a concern that objectionable sexual behaviour can slip through the net.  But as a number of authors have noted, sex is an area of behaviour which is normally pleasurable and only sometimes deserves prohibition.  The present state of the law fails to draw a proper dividing line." (p. 271)

CURLEY, E.M., "Excusing Rape", (1975-76) 5 Philosophy and Public Affairs 325-360; copy at Ottawa University, H 1 .P54  Location: MRT Periodicals;
 

CZACHORSKI, Witold, "Causes de justification -- Note pour les pays socialistes, in Journées d'études sur le droit de la responsabilité (1984: Gand, Belgique), Limpens, Jean, 1910-1979, Centre interuniversitaire de droit comparé, In  memoriam Jean Limpens : Studiedagen aansprakelijkheidsrecht, Gent, 23-24 maart 1984 = In memoriam Jean Limpens : Journées d'études sur le droit de la responsabilité, Gent, 23-24 mars 1984 = In memoriam Jean Limpens : Symposium on Civil Liability, Gent, 23-24 March 1984, Antwerpen : Kluwer rechtswetenschappen, 1987, xxvii, 311 p., at pp. 251-264, et voir "Le consentement de la victime", aux pp. 259-262 (series; Interuniversitair Centrum voor Rechtsvergelijking; 12), (Collection; Centre interuniversitaire de droit comparé; 12), ISBN: 9063212879; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, K923 Z9 I56 1987; droit civil mais un article utile pour les chercheurs et chercheuses;
 

DALCQ, R.O. (Roger O.), "À propos du consentement du malade", dans Licéité en droit positif et références légales aux valeurs:  contribution à l'étude du règlement juridique des conflits de  valeurs en droit pénal public et international / [par] Jean Ladrière ... [et al.] ; avant-propos de Jacques Verhaegen, Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1982, 706 p., aux pp. 289-297 (Collection; Bibliothèque de la Faculté de droit de l'Université catholique de Louvain; volume numéro 14), ISBN: 2802703013; copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, FTX General, K 7033 .L524 1982;
 

DAVIES, Chris, "Criminal law and assaults in sport: An Australian and Canadian perspective", June 2006) 30(3) Criminal Law Journal 151-158;

DAVIES, Mitchell C., "Consenting to Battery Under a Misapprehension: Mistake as to Quality in the Court of Appeal", (2002) 31(3) Common Law World Review 236-253;
 

DAVIS, Amanda O., Comments "Clarifying the Issue of Consent: The Evolution of Post-Penetration Rape Law", (2005) 34 Stetson Law Review 729-766; available at http://www.law.stetson.edu/lawrev/abstracts/PDF/34-3Davis.pdf  (accessed on 24 April 2006);

DAWKINS, Kevin and Margaret Briggs, Criminal Law", [2007] Part 1 New Zealand Law Review 131-177, and see "Consent", at pp. 131-135; deals with  R. v Lee [2006] 3 NZLR 42 (CA);

DENMARK, The Danish criminal code : English version, by Gitte Høyer, Martin Spencer & Vagn Greve, Copenhagen : DJØF Pub., 1999, 201 p.,  ISBN:
8757401373;

"§ 248.
For legemsangreb under slagsmâl, eller nâr deb angrebne har ovet gengaeld modangriberen, kan straffen under saelig formildende omstaenigheder bortfalde.

"§ 248.
Where blows have been inflicted in a brawl or where the person assaulted has returned such assault, the penalty may under particularly mitigating circumstances be remitted." (p. 167)

DEVEREUX, John,  "Consent as a Defence to Assaults Occasioning Harm - The Queensland Dilemma", (1987) 14 University of Queensland Law Journal 151-159; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada;
 

__________ "The More Things Change, the More they stay the same: Consent to Serious Assaults in Queensland", (1991) 16 University of Queensland Law Journal 282-289; copy at Ottawa University, KTA 0 .U537  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

DEVLIN, Patrick, 1905-, The Enforcement of Morals, London: Oxford University Press, 1965, 139 p., see the lecture "Morals and the Criminal Law" at pp. 1-25; copy at Ottawa University, FTX General,  KD 664 .D4 1965;
 

DINE, Janet and Bob Watt, "The transmission of disease during consensual sexual activity and the concept of associative autonomy",  available at  http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/1998/issue4/watt4.html (accessed on 31 May 2003);
 

DINGWALL, Gavin, "Addressing the Boundaries of Consent in Rape", (2002) 13(1) King’s College Law Journal 31-52; copy at Ottawa University, KD 460 .K5532  Location, FTX Periodicals;
 

DINICOLA, Ronald A. and Scott Mendeloff, "Controlling Violence in Professional  Sports: Rule Reform and the Federal Professional Sports Violence Commission", (1982-83) 21 Duquesne Law Review 843-916; copy at Ottawa University, KFP 69 .D87  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

DONNEDIEU DE VABRES, Henri (1880-1954), Traité de droit criminel et de législation pénale comparée, Paris : Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1947, xvii, 1059 p., voir "Le consentement de la victime" aux pp. 241-248;

"Le consentement de la victime est-il un fait justificatif?. -- Au premier abord, il semble étrange que cette question puisse se poser.  Les termes n'en sont-ils pas contradictoires?" (p. 241)

......

"C'est au Digeste, livre XLVII, titre 10, De Injuriis, loi I, § 5, que se trouve l'adage Volenti non fit injuria.  Ce texte n'est pas décisif, car la règle qu'il énonce s'applique à une catégorie spéciale d'infractions à la loi pénale: à l'injure.  Sans doute ce mot d'injure avait, en droit romain, un sens plus large que dans notre droit actuel; il ne désignait cependant qu'une catégorie spéciale d'infractions." (p. 242)

......

"Pourquoi le consentement de la victime n'est pas, en règle générale, un fait justificatif. -- D'un point de vue rationnel, l'idée que le consentement de la victime abolit la responsabilité pénale serait vraie si la répresssion n'intervenait que pour la défense d'intérêts privés.  Mais il n'en est rien.  L'intervention répressive a pour but essentiel d'assurer le maintien de l'ordre public, non de donner satisfaction à des particuliers.

    La vérité générale est donc que le consentement de la victime laisse subsister la responsabilité pénale." (p. 242, une note omise)

......

"Le duel. --  Dans l'ancien droit, la répression du duel était très dure.  Elle était assurée par les édits de 1602, 1609, 1626 et l'ordonnance criminelle de 1670.  Le duel était puni en vertu d'une incrimination spéciale, comme constituant un crime de lèse-majesté.

    Devant le silence du législateur révolutionnaire et des rédacteurs du Code pénal, la question fut posée de savoir si on devait punir le duelliste comme auteur d'un meurtre.  Dans le cas où le duel n'aurait pas entraîné la mort, on s'est demandé si les combattants pouvaient être poursuivis sous l'inculpation de coups et blessures.

    Il s'est produit, à cet égard, des revirements de jurisprudence, déterminés par les opinions différentes des procureurs généraux près la Cour de cassation.  C'est ainsi que de 1818 à 1829, sous l'impulsion du procureur général Merlin, on se prononçait pour l'impunité du duel.  Mais à partir de 1837, la Cour de cassation se décida en sens contraire, sous l'influence du procureur général Dupin (Cass. Chambres réunies, 15 décembre 1837, S., 1838, I, 5)." (p. 244, une note omise)

......

"Les blessures occasionnées par les sports. -- [...] La seule raison qui explique l'impunité du boxeur et de tous ceux qui, au cours d'exercices sportifs, ont déterminé une blessure, c'est qu'il existe, en leur faveur, une autorisation de la loi." (p. 245)

......

"Des cas exceptionnels où le consentement de la victime fait disparaître l'infraction. -- Nous avons dit qu"il existe, d'autre part, des infractions dont le défaut de consentement, chez la victime, est un élément essentiel.  Le délit consiste dans une atteinte portée à sa volonté.  Si cette volonté est consentante, le délit n'existe plus et l'agent est justifié.

    Ceci se vérifie à l'égard des délits contre la propriété, contre la liberté, et contre les moeurs." (p. 247)

DOUBLIER, Roger, "Le consentement de la victime", dans, sous la direction de G. Stefani,  Quelques aspects de l'autonomie du droit pénal : Études de Droit criminel, Paris : Librairie Dalloz, 1956, xii, 423 p., deuxième partie, chapitre II,  pp. 188-225  (Collections; Publications de l'Institut de criminologie de la Faculté de droit de l'Université de Paris);
 

DRIPPS, Donald A., "Beyond Rape: Am Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of Force and the Absence of Consent", (1992) 92 Columbia Law Review 1780-1809;
 

___________"For a Negative, Normative Model of Consent, with a Comment on Preference-Skepticism", (1996) 2 Legal Theory 113-120; copy at Ottawa University, K 202 .L436  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

DUBBER, Markus Dirk, "Consent", available at  http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/web/cali2/June1ConsentCRIM32/index.html  (accessed on 15 December 2002);
 

___________"Recht and Rechtsgut: The Objective of German Criminal Law", draft, working Paper, 23 September 2002, 10 p., see on consent, pp. 9-10; available in word format at the author's web site, http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/web/publications.htm (accessed on 17 November 2002), 10 p; note de recherche: article sur la notion de bien juridique; important contribution;
 

DUNN, J., "Consent in the Political Theory of John Locke" in Gordon J. Schochet, 1937-, ed., Life, Liberty & Property, Belmont (California): Wadsworth, 1971, 182 p., at p. 136, ISBN: 0534000134; title of article noted in my research but not consulted; no copy of this book in the Ottawa area libraries according to my verification of the AMICUS catalogue (10 August 2003);
 

DWORKIN, Gerald, "The Law Relating to Organ Transplatation in England", (1970) 33 The Modern Law Review 353-377; copy at Ottawa University, KD 322 .M62  Location, FTX Periodicals;
 

DWORKIN, Ronald, "Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals", (1965-66) 75 Yale Law Journal 986-1005; copy at Ottawa University, KFC 3669 .Y34  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

EAST, Edward Hyde, 1764-1847, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, 2 vols., London: Butterworth, 1803, lxiv, 1126  p.;

"[Mayhem]

The statutes of H. 4. H. 8. and Car. 2. are evidently directed to the maiming of others: but a person who even maims himself, or procures another to maim him, that he may have more colour to beg; or disables himself to prevent being pressed for a soldier; is subject to fine and imprisonment at common law; and so is the party to whom it was effected at the other's desire." (vol. 1, p. 396) 

EDWARDS, Susan, "No Defence for a Sado-Masochistic Libido" (19 March 1993) 143 New Law Journal 406-407; issue number 6592; deals with the House of Lords' decision of Brown; copy at Ottawa University, KD 322 .N49  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

EHRLICH, Susan, "The Discursive Reconstruction of Sexual Consent", (1998) 9(2) Discourse and Society 149-171; title noted in my research but article not consulted yet; no copy of this periodical in the Ottawa area libraries;
 

EKEU, Jean-Paul, Consensualisme et poursuite en droit pénal comparé,  Paris : Éditions Cujas, 1993, 463 p. (Collection; Travaux de l'Institut de sciences criminelles de Poitiers; volume 12), ISBN:  2254934155; copie à l'Université Laval, K 5425 E36 1993; titre noté dans mes recherches mais livre non consulté; aucune copie de cette publication dans les bibliothèques de la région d'Ottawa;
 

___________Consensualisme et poursuite en droit pénal comparé (les aspects législatifs et les usages juridiqes), thèse de doctorat (nouveau doctorat): science criminelles, Poitiers, 1990; dir. de thèse: Jean Pardel; titre noté dans mes recherches; thèse non consultée; aucune copie au Canada selon le catalogue AMICUS;

"Résumé

Depuis une décennie, on voit se développer des usages consensualistes comme la diversion, la médiation.  Ces usages sont en train de transformer le mécanisme traditionnel de la pousuite pénale.  Par exemple, le consensualisme peut être utilisé comme facteur d'extinction de l'action pénale ou comme facteur de retrait des poursuites.  La montée du phénomène de la négociation s'explique par les nombreux avantages du consensualisme: il comporte des avantages économiques pour les parties, il permet de désengorger les institutions judiciaires, enfin il restaure à la communauté son pouvoir de traiter elle-même un certain nombre de conflits.  Cependant, l'importance du phénomène consensuel invite à se demander si ces usages vont s'intégrer au système pénal ou s'ils s'imposeront comme un système parallèle de justice."

.........

"[Summary]

The last decade has seen the development of 'consensualist' techniques such as diversion and mediation.  These techniques are now transforming the traditional justice process. The rise of these techniques has been inspired by varied motives to give the victimes or offenders better outcomes, to relieve the pressures on the courts, to restore justice to the community outside the criminal justice system.  The importance of the phenomenon makes us wonder whether the negotiation must remain part of the penal system or whether it is going to become a separate system of justice." (source: Catalogue Abes; visionné le 8 juillet 2003)

ELIAS, O.A. and C.L. (Chin L.) Lim, The paradox of consensualism in international law, The Hague/London/ Boston: Kluwer law international, 1998, xix, 322 p. (series; Developments in international law; volume 31), ISBN: 041105166; copy at Ottawa University, KZ 1255 .D49 v.31 1998 FTX;
 

ELLIOTT, Catherine, "A Comparative Analysis of Defences in English and French Criminal Law", (2000) 8(4) European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 319-326, see "Defences with no equivalent in French law" at pp. 325-326;
 

ESER, Albin, "'Defences' in War Crime Trials", (1994) 24 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 201-222, see "Consent of the Victim" at pp. 215-216; copy at Ottawa University, KPD 0 .I852  Location: FTX Periodicals;

"Consent of the Victim

Consent of the victim, which in the scope of 'normal criminality' is quite a common defence, is hardly discussed in the literature of war crimes (again, with the rare exception of Jescheck), despite the fact that the Nuremberg judges were frequently faced with the invocation of this defence.

Briefly, their position was as follows: ... ." (p. 215)

___________"Justification and Excuse", (1976) 24 The American Journal of Comparative Law 621-637; copy at Ottawa University, K 521 .A424  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

___________"Justification and Excuse: A Key Issue in the Concept of Crime" in Albin Eser, George P. Fletcher, Karin Cornils, Barbara Huber, Ewa Weigend and Thomas Weigend, eds., Justification and Excuse: Comparative Perspectives, volume 1, Dobbs  Ferry (New York): Transnational Juris Publications, 1987, ISBN: 0929179226, pp. 17-65;

"IV.  HOW TO STRUCTURE AND RATIONALIZE GROUNDS OF JUSTIFICATION
...

2.  'Monistic' and 'Pluralistic' Theories of Justification

Yet, what might be the reason for such permission?  Could it be based in each case on the same common principle?  By these questions aimed at the substantive rationale of justification, we are touching problems which are still quite controversial in German criminal theory.  In general, however, one can observe a clear trend away from 'monistic' toward 'pluralistic' theories of justification.

The 'monistic' theories try to explain all grounds of justification by one general principle: mostly by way of the so-called 'Zwecktheorie' (purpose theory) by justifying an act if it was 'an appropriate means of achieving a legally-recognized purpose'.  But while this theory can explain self-defense, perhaps also necessity, it is hardly applicable to consent by the victim.  The same goes for similar theories, such as the principle of 'more benefit than loss' or the 'balancing of interests' -- explanations which are certaintly appropriate for some but not all grounds of justification if the explanatory principle is to retain any predictive sense.

Therefore 'pluralistic' explanations are gaining ground, in particular the 'dualistic' approach based on the premise that all grounds of justification can be traced to two basic situations: a) cases in which an interest was invaded because it conflicted with other important interests and was therefore preempted (e.g. self-defense, necessity or conflict of duties with regard to a superior interest; and b) where the person whose interest was at stake has renounced its protection (as by consent).  It was EDMUND MEZGER who placed these situations into the dualistic formula of justification by reason of superior or absent interest.  Unquestionably these principles are still too abstract to be applied in concrete cases.  But if we treat the rationale of superior or absent interest as a general rule of justification, we have at least an important starting point for applying recognized grounds of justification or for developing new ones.

3.  Types of Justification -- 'Utility of the Legal Order'

To get an idea of the broad range of justifications, we should point out some of the more important recognized by German law.  In doing so, we should keep in mind that the permitting rules by which an act realizing the paradigm of an offence may be justified are found not only in criminal law.  For according to the principle of 'unity of the legal order', any permitting norms regardless of where they may be found -- in criminal, administrative or even private law -- have to be taken into consideration.  If we classify the grounds of justification with respect to their source or purpose, we can distinguish four main groups:

(1) Consent (express or implied) of the injured person, indicating that he waives protection of his interest.  In this case the rationale of justification is an 'absent interest'. ... (pp. 46-49; footnotes omitted)
 

"Summary

There are some areas of activity in which the problem of justification or excuse occurs not sporadically, but rather so often as to be characteristic of that conduct.  Medicine is one of those fields.  So long as every invasion of the patient's bodily integrity constitutes a prima facie case of battery (as is true under German case law), medical treatment requires a particular justification which regularly consists in the informed consent of the patient.

After some introductory remarks about the legitimation of medical treatment in general (I), I will discuss the protective and justificatory aspects of ordinary medical treatment, in particular with regard to the question whether the decision to provide treatment should depend on the projected welfare of the patient or on his expressed will (II).  A further question for examination would be the extent to which principles of ordinary treatment apply as well to research, both therapeutic and non-therapeutic (III).  In coping with these questions, there has been too little discussion of the relationship between the consent of the patient and cost/benefit considerations: One question is whether consent is a sufficient justification, rendering cost/benefit consideration irrelevant.  Another question is whether consent is necessary in every case or whether an argument of social benefit would provide an adequate substitute.

Other problems of justification and excuse arise in the field of euthanasia and in various forms of aid in dying (IV).  A number of important distinctions have to be drawn, e.g., such as that between killing oneself and assisting in the death of another, whether in the latter case the assistance occurs on the basis of the other's request or on the physician's own decision, and whether the death is a consequence of active intervention or of passive omission.

In the case of pre- und perinatal intervention the field today includes not only the traditional issue of justifying abortion, but also the contemporary problems connected with modern reproductive medicine (V).

Traditional legal principles require development in order to meet the innovations of modern medicine.  Thus it is imperative to subject the problems of modern medicine, both in issues of the patient's protection and the physician's justification, to a comprehensive critique that transcends national boundaries.  These are questions that affect all of humanity." (p. 1444)

ESKRIDGE, William N., “The Many Faces of Sexual Consent”, (1995) 37 William & Mary Law Review 47-67; copy at Ottawa University, KFV 2469 .W55  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

ESTRICH, Susan, "Rape", (1985-86) 95 Yale Law Journal 1087-1184;
 

EUROPEAN COMMISSION AND COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, Laskey, Jaggard and Brown v. U.K., (1997) 24 European Human Rights Reports 39; available at  http://www.clea.org.uk/cases/ftext/Laskey.htm (accessed on 2 July 2003); available at  http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/Hudoc2doc\HEJUD\sift\607.txt (accessed on 2 July 2003); disponible en français à http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/Hudoc2doc\HFJUD\sift\608.txt (visionné le 2 juillet 2003);

"For the Government, the State was entitled to punish acts of violence, such as those for which the applicants were convicted, that could not be considered of a trifling or transient nature, irrespective of the consent of the victim. In fact, in the present case, some of these acts could well be compared to "genital torture" and a Contracting State could not be said to have an obligation to tolerate acts of torture because they are committed in the context of a consenting sexual relationship. The State was moreover entitled to prohibit activities because of their potential danger.

The Government further contended that the criminal law should seek to deter certain forms of behaviour on public health grounds but also for broader moral reasons. In this respect, acts of torture - such as those at issue in the present case - may be banned also on the ground that they undermine the respect which human beings should confer upon each other. In any event, the whole issue of the role of consent in the criminal law is of great complexity and the Contracting States should enjoy a wide margin of appreciation to consider all the public policy options." (Paragraph 40 of the judgment).

FAFINSKI, Stefan, "Consent and the Rules of the Game: The Interplay of Civil and Criminal Liability for Sporting Injuries", (October 2005) 69(5) The Journal of Criminal Law 414-426;

FAGET, J., "Le cadre juridique et éthique de la médiation pénale" dans Robert Cario, sous la direction de, La médiation pénale entre répression et réparation, Paris: l'Harmattant, 1997, 239 p., à la p. 36, (Collection; Collection Logiques juridiques), ISBN:  2738461735; title noted in my research but document not consulted; no copy of this book in the Ottawa area libraries according to the AMICUS catalogue (10 August 2003); copie à l'Université Laval, K 5404 M489 1997; copie à l'Université de Montréal;
 

FALK, Patricia J., "Rape by Fraud and Rape by Coercion", (1998) 64 Brooklyn Law Review 39-180;
 

FARRUGIA, Paul J., "The Consent Defence: Sports Violence, Sadomasochism and the Criminal Law", (1996-97) 8 Auckland University Law Review 472-502;
 

FEINBERG, Joel, 1926-, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, vol. 3, Harm to Self, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986, xxiii, 420 p., ISBN: 0195037464 and 0195059239 (pbk.);
 

FELDMAN, Debra L., Note, "Pandora's Box Is Open: Criminal Prosecution is Implemented; Violent Play in the National Hockey League Eliminated", (2002-2003) 2 Virginia Sports and Entertainement Law Journal 310-327;

FINCH, Emily, and Vanessa E. Munro, "Intoxicated Consent and Boundaries of Drug-assisted Rape", [2003] The Criminal Law Review 773-787;

"Summary: Drug-assisted rape has attracted a significant amount of media attention in recent years.  It has been portrayed as the use of particular drugs that lead the victim to become unconscious during which time sexual violation occurs.  This article challenges the accracy of this construction and suggests that the issue common to all scenarios involving drugs or alcohol and sexual activity is the validity of intoxicated consent to intercourse.  An exploration of the ways in which intoxicants are misused in a sexual context informs a discussion of the parameters of drug-assisted rape and an evaluation of the efficacy of the current law to address the proble.  The article concludes with a suggestion regarding the validity of intozxicated consent that would ameliorate some of the complexities inherent in this area of law." (p. 773)

"No idea testifies more powerfully to individuals as a source of value than the principle of consent.  When individuals consent to undergo medical operations, to engage in sexual intercourse, to open their homes to police searches, or to testify against themselves in court, they convert what otherwise would be an invasion of their person or their rights into a harmless or justified activity.  The existence of a doctrine of consent testifies, therefore, to the existence of personal rights.  Individuals possess (one might say 'own') rights to their bodily integrity, to their physical privacy, to their property, and to their freedom from state intrusion.  They can waive these rights and sometimes transfer them to others, as in the case of property rights.  Waiver and transfer are specific instances of consent." (p. 109)

___________"Justification: Theory", in Joshua Dressler, editor in chief, Encyclopedia of crime & justice, 2nd ed., New York : Macmillan Reference USA, c2002,  4 v. (xxxvi, 1780 p.), in vol. 2, at pp. 883-889, ISBN : 002865319X (for set of 4 volumes) and 0028653211 (vol. 2);
 

___________"Justification: 1. Theory", in Sanford H. Kadish, ed., Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice, 1st ed., vol. 3, New York: Free Press, 1983, pp. 941-946, on consent, see p. 943, ISBN:  0029181110;

"Whether one takes nonconsent to be an element of the prohibition or consent to be a justification depends finally, on how one perceives the interest protected by the legal system.  Is there a general interest in not permitting forcible, nontherapeutic bodily contact?  Is this interest violated even in cases of consent?  If so, then consent functions at most as a justification for violating the norm protecting this legal interest.  Unfortunately, the positive law supplies no answer to this basic question.  The way in which the interests underlying the criminal law are perceived depends on a collective judgment of the values basic to society.  However society expresses those judgments, its claims of value are open to disagreement and dispute.  The classification of consent does not lend itself to clear resolution." (p. 943)

___________Rethinking Criminal Law, Boston: Little, Brown, 1978, xxviii, 898 p.; reprint in: Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, ISBN:  0195136950;
 

FLEURY, René, Du consentement de la  victime  dans les infractions, Lille: C. Robbe, 1911, 118 p.; note: Thèse de doctorat en sciences juridiques, Université de Lille: 1911-1912; titre noté dans mes recherches mais thèse non consultée; aucune copie au Canada selon le catalogue AMICUS (13 juillet 2003);

FOLEY, Brian, "Boxing, the Common Law and the Non-Fatal Offences against the person Act 1997", (2002) 12(3) Irish Criminal Law Journal 15-20; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada; also published at http://www.brianfoley.ie/Boxing.pdf (accessed on 26 February 2008);
 

FRANCE, Code pénal also in  English;

"Des agressions sexuelles
Article 222-22 [...]
Constitue une agression sexuelle toute atteinte sexuelle commise avec violence, contrainte, menace ou surprise. [...]"
-----------
"Sexual Aggressions ...
Article 222-22...
Sexual aggression is any sexual assault committed with violence, constraint, threat or surprise. ..."

FRANCE, Sénat, L'euthanasie, Service des affaires européennes, janvier 1999; couvre la France, l'Angleterre, l'Australie, le Dannemark, la Suisse, les Pays-Bas, l'Allemagne, les Pays-Bas, les É-U.); disponible à  http://www.senat.fr/lc/lc49/lc49.html (accessed on 17 August 2003);
 

FRECKELTON, I., "Masochism, Self-Mutilation and the Limits of Consent", (1994) 2 Journal of Law and Medicine 48; title noted in my research; no Ottawa area library with this periodical according to the AMICUS catalogue; article not read;
 

FREYHOFER, Horst H., 1938-, The Nuremberg medical trial, New York : P. Lang, 2003 (series; Studies in modern European history, ISSN 0893-6897; vol. 53), ISBN: 0820467979; no location in Canada according to my verification of the AMICUS catalogue (done on 6 August 2003);
 

FRITZ, Kevin A., "Going to the Bullpen: Using Uncle Sam to Strike Out Professional Sports Violence", (2002) 20 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L. J. 189-229; copy at Ottawa University, KF 4290 .C37  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

GARDINER, James, M., "Touchlines and Guidelines: The Lord Advocate's Response to Sportsfield Violence", [1997] Criminal Law Review 41-54; copy at Ottawa University, KD 7862 .C734  Location: FTX Periodicals;

GARDNER, John, "Justification under Authority",  February 18, 2009), Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 5/2009, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1345763; available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1345763 (accessed on 4 March 2009), now published in (January 2010) 23(1) The Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 71-98 and see "Consent" at pp. 75-83;

GARDINER, Simon, "The Law and Sports Field", [1994] Criminal Law Review 513-515;  copy at Ottawa University, KD 7862 .C734  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

__________Sports Law, 2nd ed., London: Cavendish Publishing, 2001, 852 p.,  ISBN: 1859416845; title noted in my research but book not consulted; no copy in Canada according to AMICUS catalog;
 

GARRAUD, P., "Les sports et le droit pénal", (1924) Revue internationale de droit pénal 212-250;  disponible à http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/CadresFenetre?O=NUMM-115272&M=chemindefer (vérifié le 3 avril 2008);
 

GAUTHIER, Jean, Cours de droit pénal suisse, 2e partie, L'infraction, Lausanne: Université de Lausanne (polycopies), 1991, 158 p., voir le "consentement de la victime" aux pp. 57-60;

"L'adage 'volenti non fit injuria' qui est tiré d'un passage du Digeste (47, 10, 1, 5: '...quia nulla injuria est, quae in volentem fiat'), signifie qu'une lésion des droits d'autrui n'est pas considérée comme un acte illicite, si la victime y consent. Mais il n'exprime pas une règle générale.  Le consentement de la victime ne supprime le caractère illicite de l'acte que si la victime avait le pouvoir de disposer librement du bien lésé par l'infraction.  Or, la loi pénale ne protège pas seulement les intérêts des particuliers, mais aussi l'ordre social.  Le consentement du lésé ne met pas fin au trouble que l'infraction a causé à l'ordre social.

[...]

Le consentement de la victime ne peut justifier que des infractions commises au préjudice de particuliers ou de communautés déterminées (horie, société anonyme).  Et ce consentement n'est opérant que si l'infraction porte atteinte à un intérêt à la protection duquel le lésé peut renoncer, sans que l'intérêt public en souffre.  Tel n'est pas le cas de la vie, ni de l'intégrité corporelle, du moins lorsque l'infraction lui porte une atteinte grave."  (pp. 57-58)

GAUTHIER, Jeffrey A., "Consent, Coercion, and Sexual Autonomy", in Keith Burgess-Jackson, ed., A most detestable crime: new philosophical essays on rape, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, xv, 306 p., at pp. 71 to 91, ISBN: 0195120752 and 0195120760 (pbk.); copy at Ottawa University, K 5197 .M67 1999 MRT;

GENDALL, David, "The Sport of Boxing: Freedom Versus Social Constraint", (1997) 5 Waikato Law Review; available at http://www.nzlii.org/nz/journals/WkoLRev/1997/5.html (accessed on 10 August 2006);
 

GERMANY/ALLEMAGNE, Alternative Draft of a Penal Code for the Federal Republic of  Germany, Translated and with an Introduction by Joseph J. Darby - Commentary by Jürgen  Baumann, Hackensack (N.J.)/London: Fred B. Rothman/Sweet & Maxwell, 1977, xvi, 160 p., ISBN: 0837700418  (Series; The American Series of Foreign Penal Codes, vol. 21); copy at the Supreme Court of Canada Library, Ottawa, K 5001 A63 no. 21; note: the offence of battery is covered at § 109 and the offence of aggravated battery at § 110;

"§ 112  Consent

(1) A battery is not illegal if the victim had given his consent.

(2) A sterilization is not illegal if carried out by a doctor in accordance with medical standards, the person sterilized had himself consented and

1. the sterilization served to prevent the procreation of offspring possessing serious mental or physical disabilities, or

2. the person sterilized is over 25 years of age and had visited a Counselling Centre prior to the operation.

(3) Destruction of the gonads is not illegal if done by a doctor in accordance with medical standards, and the person operated on was at least 25 years of age, had given his consent and had visited a Counselling Center prior to the operation.

(4) A doctor performing an operation described in subparagraph 2 or 3 on a person over 25 years of age without first availing himself of the prescribed services of the Counselling Center shall be punished by a fine of up to three months." (p. 96)
 

"Title Three
CRIMES AGAINST PHYSICAL INVIOLABILITY ...

§ 152  Consent.

    If the victim consents to the physical harm, the act shall be unlawful only if, notwithstanding the consent, it is blameworthy under the circumstances, particularly with reference to the motives and the objects of the perpetrator and victim, as well as of the means used and of the foreseeable scope of injury." (p. 94)

---------------------------

"Title Four
SURGICAL OPERATIONS AND MEDICAL TREATMENT...

§ 161  Medical Treatment.

    Operations and other treatments which according to medical knowledge and experience and according to the principles of a scrupulous physician are necessary and are performed in order to prevent, diagnose, cure or alleviate illness, suffering, body damage, physical complaints and psychic disturbance are not punishable as physical harm.
 

§ 162  Unconsented Medical Treatment.

    (1) Anybody who performs upon another an operation or any other treatment to prevent, diagnose, cure or alleviate illness, suffering, body damage, physical complaints or psychic disturbance, without his consent, shall be punished with jailing up to three years, penal custody or a fine.

    (2) The act is not punishable under paragraph 1 if the consent could be obtained only by a postponent of the treatment which might put the person in danger of death or serious injury to the body or health (§ 147, paragraph 2), and circumstances do not compel the conclusion that he would refuse such consent.

    (3)  The act is also not punishable under paragraph 1 if a physician performs medical treatment (§ 161) upon another without the latter having consented within the meaning of paragraph 1 for the reason that he was not previously informed of the circumstances necessary for consent, but

1. the person in question has at least consented to treatment in general, and if an operation should have to be performed, to the performing of an operation in general,

2. the treatment is, according to medical knowledge and experience, necessary to avert danger of death or serious injury to body or health (§ 147, paragraph 2),

3. a full elucidation would mentally burden the person so severely that the success of the treatment would forseseeably be seriously prejudiced, and

4. circumstances do not compel the conclusion that he would refuse the consent had he been fully informed.

    (4) If the perpetrator acts in the erroneous assumption that the requirements of paragraphs 2 or 3 are satisfied and if he is to be blamed for the error, he shall be punished with jailing up to two years, penal custody or a fine.

    (5) The act shall be prosecuted only upon complaint.  If the victim dies, the right to complain shall pass to his relatives under § 121, paragraph 2." (pp. 98-99)
 

___________The German Penal code: as amended as of December 19, 2001 / translated by Stephen Thaman; with an  introduction by Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, Buffalo, NY : William S. Hein, 2002, lxxi, 275 p. (series; The American series of foreign penal codes; volume 32), ISBN: 083770054X; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, K 5001 A63 no. 32 c. 01;
 

___________ Les nouveaux codes pénaux de langue allemande: Autriche (1974), République démocratique allemande (1968) et République fédérale d'Allemagne (1975), Paris: La  Documentation française avec le concours du Centre français de droit comparé, 1981, 565 p., voir à la p. 483 pour l'article 226a, "consentement de la victime" (reproduit au début de ce document) du Code pénal allemand (Collection des codes pénaux européens du Comité de législation étrangère et de droit international du Ministère de la Justice, sous la direction de Marc Ancel avec la collaboration de Yvonne Marx; tome 5);  ISBN: 2110006579; la traduction du Code pénal allemand  a été faite par Pierre Franck et Agnès Guerin-Salem, révisée sous la direction d'Yvonne Marx.
 

___________The Penal code of the Federal Republic of Germany [of 1975], Translated  by Joseph J. Darby With an Introduction by Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, Littleton (Colorado):  F.B. Rothman and London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1987, xxvi, 257 p., at p. 53 (series; The American Series of Foreign Penal Codes; vol. 28), ISBN: 0837700485; Research Note/Note de recherche: available on the internet /disponible sur l'internet Buffalo Criminal Law Center (and click on "Criminal Law Resources on the Internet");
 

GHENT, Jeffrey F., Annotation, "Comment Note.  -- Impossibility of Consummation of Substantive Crimes as Defense in Criminal Prosecution for Conspiracy or Attempt to Commit Crime", (1971) 37 ALR3d 375-413 with ALR3d Supplement, June 2006, at pp. 32-35;

GIBSON, Don Eugene-Nolan, "Violence in Professional Sports: A Proposal for Self-Regulation", (1980-81) 3 COMM/ENT Law Journal 425-453; note: [Hastings] Communications and Entertainement Law Journal;

GILES,  Marianne,  "R. v. Brown: Consensual Harm and the Public Interest", (1994) 57 The Modern Law Review 101-111; copy at Ottawa University, KD 322 .M62  Location, FTX Periodicals;
 

GOLDING, Martin P., 1930-, Philosophy of Law, Englewoods Cliffs (NJ), Prentice-Hall, 1975, x, 133 p., see chapter 3, "The Limits of Law" at pp. 52-68 (series; Prentice-Hall foundations of philosophy series), ISBN: 0136641369; copy at Ottawa University, MRT General: K 230 .G625 1975;
 

GORDON, Gerald H., "Consent in Assault.  Further Thoughts", (1976) The Journal of the Law Society of Scotland 168-170; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa;
 

GOURDON, Alexandra, "Criminal Law: Rape. Consent to Rape: A Comparative Analysis Between Ireland and France", (1994) 4 The Irish Student Law Review; see reference at  http://www.islr.ie/Reviews/1994/review94Contents.html (accessed on 2 November 2002); title noted in my research but article not consulted; no copy of this periodical in the Ottawa area libraries; copy at York University, Law Library;
 

GRAUPNER,  H., "Sexual consent: the criminal law in Europe and overseas", (2000) 29(5) Archives of  Sexual  Behaviour 415-461; copy at Ottawa University, MRT Periodicals, HQ 1 .A7;

[Abstract]
"What role can the criminal law play in the battle against child sexual abuse? Should sexual relations of and with, persons under a certain age be criminalized regardless of the circumstances, even if they are consensual ("age of consent," "minimum age")? Where should such a minimum age-limit be fixed? Should there be a special, higher age-limit for particular conditions (e.g., "seduction," "corruption")?   Should sexual contacts with minors within a relationship of authority be criminalized generally, or just if authority is abused? Should criminal proceedings be instituted ex officio or upon complaint only? Should authorities be provided with a power of discretion or should they be obliged to prosecute and sentence in each case? In answering these questions, it is highly beneficial to have a look across the borders to the solutions other countries have reached. This study presents an overview on the criminal law governing the sexual behavior of, and with, children and adolescents in all European jurisdictions and in selected jurisdictions outside of Europe. It shows which categories of offences exist and from which age onward young people can effectively consent to various kinds of sexual behavior and relations in the different countries. All states in Europe and all of the studied jurisdictions overseas have minimum age limits for sexual relations, and punish sexual relations with persons under a certain age. Nowhere is this age set lower than 12 years. In Europe, in one-half of the jurisdictions, consensual sexual relations with 14-year-old adolescents are legal; in three-quarters, with 15-year olds; in a majority, this is also the case when the older partner has started the relation (and also when the initiative contains an offer of remuneration). In nearly all jurisdictions, such relations are legal from age 16 onward. Most states apply a higher age limit for contacts in relationships of authority. If the authority is not misused, the age limit in most jurisdictions is set between 14 and 16; if it is misused, between 16 and 18. Most states make no difference between heterosexual and homosexual relations." (source: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov:80/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=10983249&dopt=Abstract, accessed on 11 August 2003)

___________"Sexual Consent - The Criminal Law in Europe and Overseas", Keynote-Lecture at the 7th International Conference of the International Association for the Treatment of Sexual Offenders (IATSO) "Sexual Abuse and Sexual Violence - From Understanding to Protection and Prevention” (Vienna, September11th-14th 2002), Friday, 13th September 2002), available at  http://members.aon.at/graupner/documents/Graupner-paper-kn-oFN.pdf (accessed on 14 August 2003);
 

GRAVEN, Jean, 1899-, "Faut-il punir l'euthanasie?", [1950] Revue internationale de criminologie et de police technique 27; titre noté dans mes recherches mais article non consulté;
 

___________"Le procès de l'euthanasie, les données et la solution d'un problème 'insoluble'", (1964) Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Strafrecht/ Revue pénale suisse 121; titre noté dans mes recherches mais article pas encore consulté; aucune copie de ce périodique dans la région d'Ottawa;
 

GRAVEN, Philippe, L'infraction pénale punissable, Berne : Éditions Staempfli, 1993, xv, 346 p., voir "Le consentement de l'ayant droit", aux pp. 145-152 (Collection; Précis de droit Staempfli), ISBN: 372720978X; contribution importante; il y a maintenant une deuxième édition soit une mise à jour par Bernhard Sträuli, 1995, 376 p.,  ISBN: 3727209836;

"Aussi n'est-il pas surprenant que la doctrine, unanime à reconnaître la justification de certaines infractions par le consentement, diverge sur les fondements mêmes de celle-ci.

    Pour certains, le consentement est un acte juridique conférant à son bénéficiaire le droit d'attenter aux intérêts du consentant; pour d'autres, ce dernier abdique son 'droit au droit' et cesse d'être protégé par la loi dont il décline librement le secours; pour d'autres encore, un intérêt dont le titulaire autorise la lésion perd sa qualité de bien juridiquement protégé et ne peut plus faire l'objet d'une atteinte antijuridique.  Reste néanmoins à expliquer pourquoi un particulier peut valablement consentir à la violation d'une norme édictée dans l'intérêt général, renoncer à une protection institutuée dans l'intérêt général ou dépouiller un bien du caractère de bien pénalement protégé que la volonté générale lui attribue.  L'explication ne peut être que politique, et non juridique: un Etat libéral doit reconnaître, parallèlement à l'intérêt public au respect des biens individuels pénalement protégés, un intérêt public à l'exercice de la liberté individuelle; sauf disposition contraire, les citoyens peuvent donc consentir au sacrifice de leurs biens, dans la mesure où l'intérêt général à la libre disposition de ceux-ci prime l'intérêt général à leur intangibilité." (p. 146, édition de 1993)

GRAYSON, Edward, "Crime in Sport", ", (4 June 2005) 169(23) Justice of the Peace 436-437;
 

GREAT BRITAIN, Advisory Group on the Law of Rape, Report of the Advisory Group on the Law of Rape / presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by command of Her Majesty, London: H.M.S.O., 1975, vi, 41 p. (series; command; 6352), ISBN: 0101635206; copy at Ottawa University, KD 7976 .R3 A3 1975 FTX;
 

GREAT BRITAIN, Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, London: H.M.S.O., 1957, 155 p. (series; Command; number 247), (President: Wolfenden); copy at Carleton University, in storage, talk to staff at Stacks Desk (near entrance), Flr 2 DDS, UK1 XP C56 CMND.247;
 

GREAT BRITAIN, The Criminal Bar Association, "CBA response to the Government White Paper", February 2003; available at  http://www.criminalbar.co.uk/reports/feb03a.cfm (accessed on 2 July 2003);
 

___________ The Criminal Bar Association, "Position Paper of Criminal Bar Association ("CBA") in Respect of Sexual Offences Bill", March 2003; available at  http://www.criminalbar.co.uk/reports/mar03.cfm (accessed on 2 July 2003);
 

GREAT BRITAIN, Criminal Bill Commission, Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Consider the Law Relating to Indictable Offences: With an Appendix Containing a Draft Code Embodying the Suggestions of the Commissioners, Command 2345 in Sessional Papers (1878-79), vol. 20, pp. 169-378 (President : C.B. Blackburn); also published in Royal Commission Select Committee and Other Reports on the Criminal Law with Proceedings Minutes of Evidence Appendix and Index 1847-1879, Shannon : Irish University Press, 1971 (series; Irish University Press Series of British Parliamentary Papers; Legal Administration Criminal Law; vol. 6) at pp. 369-579;

"SECTION 67
SURGICAL OPERATIONS
    Every one is protected from criminal responsibility for performing with reasonable care and skill any surgical operation upon any person for his benefit: Provided that performing the operation was reasonable, having regard to the patient's state at the time, and to all the circumstances of the case.

...

SECTION 69
CONSENT TO DEATH
    No one has a right to consent to the infliction of death upon himself; and if such consent is given, it shall have no effect upon the criminal responsibility of any person by whom such death may be caused." (pp. 350-351 of Sessional papers; pp. 75-76 of Command 2345)
 

___________The Criminal Law Revision Committee, Sexual Offences: fifteenth report, London: HMSO, 1984, ix, 105 (series; report; number 15) (series; command 9213), ISBN: 0101921306; title noted in my research but document not consulted; copy at the Department of Justice Canada;
 

___________The Criminal Law Revision Committee, Working Paper on Sexual Offences, London: HMSO, 1980, iv, 63 p.(series; working paper); copy at Ottawa University, location: FTX, KD 7876 .A255 1980;
 

GREAT BRITAIN, Home Office, Explanatory Notes  to the "Sexual Offences Bill", introduced in the House of Lords as Bill C-23, on 28 January 2003; available at  http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200203/ldbills/026/en/03026x--.htm (accessed on 5 July 2003);
 

GREAT BRITAIN, Home Office, Protecting the Public: Strengthening protection against sex offenders and reforming the law on sexual offences, white Paper of the Government, setting out what will be proposed in the Sexual Offences Bill, London: Home Office, November 2002 (series; Command number 5668); available at  http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/justice/sentencing/sexualoffencesbill/whitepaper.html (accessed on 5 July 2003);
 

GREAT BRITAIN, Law Commission, Consent in sex offences : a report to the Home Office Sex Offences Review, London : Law Commission, 2000, iv, 74p; copy at the  Law Commission web site /  http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/library/lcspecial-1/consent.pdf
 

___________Consent in the criminal law : a consultation paper, London : H.M.S.O., 1995, xii, 290 p.(series; Consultation paper; no. 139) , ISBN: 0117302244; available at  http://alternate.com/downloads/LawCommConsultationPaper139.pdf (accessed on 2 July 2003); copy at Ottawa University, copy at Ottawa University, FTX General, KD 7896 .Z9 C65 1995;
 

___________Consents to Prosecution: A Consultation Paper, London: The Stationary Office, 1997, viii, 114 p. (series; consultation paper; number 149), ISBN: 0117302341; copy at Ottawa University,  FTX General  KD 8329 .C65 1997;  available at  http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/files/lc255.pdf (accessed on 1 July 2003);
 

___________Consents to prosecution : item 11 on the sixth programme of law reform : criminal law, London : H.M.S.O., 1998, xii, 115 p., (series; number 115), ISBN: 0105529265; copy at Ottawa University, FTX General: KD 654 .A25 v.255 1998; available at  http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/files/lc255.pdf (accessed on 25 August 2003);
 

___________Criminal law : consent and offences against the person: a consultation paper, London : H.M.S.O., 1994, iv, 71 p. (series; Consultation paper; no. 134),  ISBN: 011730218X;
 

___________Thirty-Sixth Annual Report 2001: A Year of Achievement, London: H.M.S.O., 2002, see "Consent as a defence" at paragraph 5.16;

"Consent as a defence

5.16   In February 2000 we produced a special report on Consent in Sex Offences, which was later published as an appendix to the report of the Home Office's Sex Offences Review.²²  Our report did not deal with another of the main issues discussed in our two consultations papers on consent as a defence²³ -- namely the circumstances, if any, in which it ought to be a defence to an offence of inflicting personal injury that the injured person consented to what was done.  Bearing in mind the amount of work that would be required to reach conclusions on the very difficult and sensitive issues involved, and the improbability of any consensus being reached, we have now decided that it would not be worthwhile for us to produce any further report on this topic.  It therefore does not appear in our Eighth Programme of Law Reform.
-------------------
²² Setting the Boundaries: Reforming the law on sex offences (2000).
²³ Consent and Offences Against the Person (1994) Consultation Paper No 134; Consent in the Criminal Law (1995) Consultation Paper No 139." (paragraph 5.16)

GREAT BRITAIN, Home Office, Policy Advisory Committee on Sexual Offences, Working party [paper?] on the age of consent in relation to sexual offences June 1979, London : H.M.S.O., 1979,  v, 30 p., ISBN: 011340204X; copy at the Department of Justice Canada, Ottawa, KE/94/.S5/G7988; title noted in my research but document not consulted yet;
 

___________Home Office, Policy Advisory Committee on Sexual Offences, Report on the age of consent in relation to sexual offences, London : H.M.S.O., 1981, v, [33] p. (series; Great Britain. Parliament. Papers by command. Cmnd. 8216) (series; Pamphlet series ; no. 1002), ISBN:  0101821603; title noted in my research; document not consulted; no copy in the Ottawa area libraries according to AMICUS catalogue;
 

___________Home Office, Setting the Boundaries: Reforming the Law on Sexual Offences, London, Home Office Communication Directorate, 2000, 2 volumes;  vol. 1, Summary, Report and Recommendations, available at  http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs/vol1main.pdf (accessed on 25 August 2003);  vol. 2, Supporting Evidence;  available at  http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs/volmain2.html (accessed on 25 August 2003);
 

GREAT BRITAIN, Parliament, The Sexual Offence (Amendment) Bill: "Age of consent"  and abuse of a position of trust [Bill 55 of 1999-2000] , at  http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2000/rp00-015.pdf research paper 00/15, 7 Feb 2000;
 

GREAT BRITAIN, Parliament, House of Commons,  Bill 178, Criminal Code (Indictable Offences) Bill, 1878 in  Sessional Papers [British Parliamentary Papers] (1878), vol. 2, pp. 5-249; Research Note: Bill 178 was drafted by Sir James Fitzjames Stephen;

"SECTION 122.
'CONSENT' AND 'MAIM' DEFINED.

    The word 'consent' in sections 123, 124, and 125 means a consent given by a sober and rational person able to form a rational judgment on the matter to which he consents and not procured by force, fraud, or threats of whatever nature.

    A 'maim' is bodily harm, whereby a man is deprived of any member of his body or permanently deprived of the use of it or of any sense or faculty.
 

SECTION 123.
INJURIES BY CONSENT.

    The act of inflicting on any person by his own consent bodily injury not amounting to a maim is not an offence, unless it is so inflicted as to amount to a breach of the peace, as in a prize fight or any similar exhibition.
 

SECTION 124.
SURGICAL OPERATIONS.

    No one commits an offence by inflicting on another any bodily injury in the nature of a surgical operation performed either by the patient's own consent, or if he is incapable of consenting, then by the consent of any person who has a lawful right to consent thereto, or if no such person's consent can be had, then if it is inflicted in good faith for the benefit of the patient, provided that this section shall be subject to the provisions herein-after contained as to culpable negligence, and to the provisions of Section 159.
 
 

SECTION 125.
NO RIGHT TO CONSENT TO DEATH.

    If any person inflicts death upon  another person by his consent he commits the same offence as if such consent had not been given.
 

......

SECTION 159.
MAIMING ONESELF OR ANOTHER BY CONSENT.

    Every one shall be guilty of an indictable offence, and shall be liable upon conviction thereof to two years imprisonment and hard labour, who, for any purpose injurious to the public, maims himself, or maims any other person by his consent." (pp. 80-81 and p. 86)

GREAT BRITAIN, Parliament, House of Lords, "Sexual Offences Bill", 28 January 2003, Bill 26; available at  http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/ld200203/ldbills/026/2003026.htm (accessed on 5 July 2003); see in particular sections, sections 7, 8, 78, 79 and 80;
 

GREECE, Greek Penal Code, translated by Nicholas B. Lolis,  introduction by Giorgios Mangakis, South Hackensack, N.J. : Rothman, 1973, xii, 206 p., see ssection 308, at p. 150 (series; The American Series of Foreign Penal Codes; 18),  ISBN: 0837700388; copy at the library of the Supreme Court of Canada,  K5001 A63 no. 18;

"CHAPTER 16
Bodily Injury
Article 308
Simple Bodily Injury

    1.  One who  intentionally causes another to suffer bodily ill-treatment or injures his health shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than three years.  However, if the ill-treatment caused or injury to health is very slight, he shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than six months or by pecuniary penalty.  'If such results are insignificant, he shall be punished by jailing or fine.'*

    2. Bodily injury under paragraph 1 shall be justified if caused with the consent of the victim and it is not contra bonos mores.

    3. A person guilty of an offense under paragraph 1 may be released from any punishment if he was driven to the offense by reasonable indignation due to an immediate provocation of a characteristically cruel or rude nature act on the part of the victim, committed against him or in his presence.
----
*The punishments within ' ' has been added by Article 6, L.D. 2493/1953." (p. 150; emphasis in bold added in subsection 2)

GREEN, Leslie, "Law and Obligations" in Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, x, 1050 p., at pp. 514-547, and see "Consent" at pp. 525-528, ISBN: 0198298242; copy at the Library of the supreme Court of Canada, K 235 0932 2002 c,. 01;

"Consent

A distinctive theme of Western political thought is the idea that political obligation is justified only by the consent of the governed.  In Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Kant we find many variations on the claim that our duties to law are determined by some form of individual agreement, whether express or tacit.  Promises, contracts, oaths, and vows all fall into this general area.  In its core meaning, consent of these sorts is not only voluntary, it is performative: it is given with the intention of changing the rights, duties, powers, or liabilities of another, and it succeeds in part because it is known to be done with that intention." (p. 525; notes omitted)

GREEN, Richard, "(Serious) Sadomasochism: A Protected Right of Privacy?", (2001) 30(5) Archives of Sexual Behavior 543-550;  copy at Ottawa University, MRT Periodicals, HQ 1 .A7;

GREEN, Stuart P., "Consent and the Grammar of Theft Law", (2007) 28 Cardozo Law Review 2505-2522;
 

GRIFFITHS, Gareth, "Euthanasia: An Update", New South Wales Parliamentary Library Research Service, 2001 (series; briefing paper; 3/2001), available at  http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/web/PHWebContent.nsf/PHPages/ResearchBf032001?OpenDocument (accessed on 20 September 2003);
 

GROSS, Hyman, A Theory of Criminal Justice, New York: Oxford University Press, 1979, xviii, 519 p., ISBN: 0195023498 and 0195023501 (pbk.);

"There are two major restrictions.  If in the eyes of the law a person is not competent to judge and to protect his interests, his consent is for that reason of no consequence. ...

    The other restriction relates to the nature of the harm.  If the harm in question is serious, and if the risk-laden conduct producing it is not privileged by social acceptance, consent is ineffective to relieve from criminal liability.  While it is true that the injury we suffer might be only our business, the conduct producing it is a social concern.  In spite of the consent of the victim, such conduct may exceed the bounds of decency....

    In some cases of serious and unprivileged harm-doing there is another reason for dissalowing consent as a defence to criminal charges.  Sometimes the harm done extends beyond the victim to those who depend on him and to those upon whom he must depend.  ..." (pp. 18

GUNN, Michael and David Ormerod, “The Legality of Boxing”, (1995) 15 Legal Studies 181-203; copy at Ottawa University, K 12 .E357  Location,  FTX Periodicals;
 

HALL, Jonathan, ‘Can children consent to indecent assault?’,  [1996] Criminal Law Review 184-188;  copy at Ottawa University, KD 7862 .C734  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

HALL, Ruth and Lisa Longstaff, "Defining Consent", (6 June 1997) 147 New Law Journal 840; issue number 6795; copy at Ottawa University, KD 322 .N49  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

HALLEUX, "Le consentement de la victime justifie-t-il les coups?", (1933) Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie 182; titre noté dans mes recherches mais article non consulté; aucune copie de ce périodique pour cette année-là dans les bibliothèques d'Ottawa;
 

HALLOWELL, L. and R.I. Meshbesher, "Sports Violence and the Criminal Law", (1977) 13 Trial 27; title noted in my research but article not read; no copy of this number in the Ottawa libraries;
 

HANNA, Cheryl, “Sex is not a Sport: Consent and Violence in Criminal Law”, (2001) 42(2) Boston College Law Review 239-290; copy at Ottawa University, KFM 2469 .B66  Location: FTX Periodicals; available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1276834 (accessed on 4 October 2008);
 

HARARY, C., "Aggressive Play or Criminal Assault?  An In Depth Look at Sports Violence and Criminal Liability", (2002) 25(2/3) Columbia Journal of Law and the Arts 197-217; title noted in my research but article not consulted; no copy of this periodical in the Ottawa area according to my verification of the AMICUS catalogue on 13 August 2003;
 

HARMAN, John D., "Consent, Harm and Marital Rape", (1983-84) 22 Journal of Family Law 423-443; copy at Ottawa University, KFK 94 .J653  Location: FTX: Periodicals;
 

HARRIS, Lucy Reed, "Towards a Consent Standard in the Law of Rape", (1975-76) 43 The University of Chicago Law Review 613-645; copy at Ottawa University, KF 175 .U55  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

HART, H.L.A., Law, Liberty and Morality, Stanford (California): Stanford University Press, 1963, 88 p., see "Paternalism and the Enforcement of Morality" at  pp. 30-34; note: The Harry Camp Lectures;

[p. 30]

"PATERNALISM AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALITY
     I shall start with an example stressed by Lord Devlin.  He points out⁷ that, subject to certain exceptions such as rape, the criminal law has never admitted the consent of the victim as a defence.  It is not a defence to a charge of murder or a deliberate assault, and this is why euthanasia or mercy killing terminating a man's life at his own request is still murder.  This is a rule of criminal law which many now would wish to retain, though they would also wish to object to the legal punishment of offences against positive morality which harm no one.  Lord Devlin thinks that these attitudes are inconsistent, for he asserts of the rule  under discussion.  'There is only one explanation,' and that is that 'there are certain standards of behaviour or moral principles which society requires to be observed.'⁸  Among these are the sanctity of human life and presumably (since the rule applies to assaults) the physical integrity of the person.  So in the case of this rule and a number of others Lord Devlin claims that the 'function' of the crimi-
------
⁷ The Enforcement of Morals, p. 8
⁸ Ibid.
 
 

[p. 31]
nal law is to 'enforce a moral principle and nothing else.'⁹

    But this argument is not really cogent, for Lord Devlin's statement that 'there is only one explanation' is simply not true.  The rules excluding the victim's consent as a defence to charges of murder or assault may perfectly well be explained as a piece of paternalism, designed to protect individuals against themselves.  Mill no doubt might have protested against a paternalistic policy of using the law to protect even a consenting victim from bodily harm nearly as much as he protested against laws used merely to enforce positive morality; but this does not mean that these two policies are identical.  Indeed, Mill himself was very well aware of the difference between them: for in condemning interference with individual liberty except to prevent harm to others separate types of inadequate ground which have been proffered for the use of compulsion.  He distinguishes 'because it will be better for him' and 'because it will make him happier' from 'because in the opinion of others it would be right.'¹⁰

    Lord Devlin says of the attitude of criminal law to the victim's consent that if the law existed for the protection of the individual there would be no reason why he should avail himself of it he did not want it.¹¹  But paternalism -- the protection of people against themselves -- is a per-
------
⁹ Ibid., p. 9
¹⁰ On Liberty, Chapter 1.
¹¹ The Enforcement of Morals, p. 8.
 
 

[p. 32]
fectly coherent policy.  Indeed, it seems very strange in mid-twentieth century to insist upon this, for the wane of laissez-faire since Mill's day is one of the commonplaces of social history, and instances of paternalism now abound in our law, criminal and civil. The supply of drugs or nrcotics, even to adults, except under medical prescription is punishable by the criminal law, and it would seem very dogmatic to say of the law creating this offence that 'there is only one explanation,' namely, that the law was concerned not with the protection of the would-be purchasers against themselves, but only with the punishment of the seller for his immorality.  If, as seems obvious, paternalism is a possible explanation of such laws, it is also possible in the case of the rule excluding the consent of the victim as a defence to a charge of assault.  In neither case are we forced to conclude with Lord Devlin that the law's 'function' is to 'enforce a moral principle and nothing else.'¹²

    In Chapter 5 of his essay Mill carried his protests against paternalism to lengths that may now appear to us fantastic.  He cites the example of restrictions of the sale of drugs, and criticises them as interferences with the liberty of the would-be purchaser rather than with that of the seller.  No doubt if we no longer sympathise with this criticism this is due, in part, to a general decline in the belief that individuals know their own interests best, and to an
------
¹²  See, for other possible explanations of these rules, Hughes, 'Morals and the Criminal Law", p. 670.
 
 

[p. 33]
increased awareness of a great range of factors which diminish the significance to be attached to an apparently free choice or to consent.  Choices may be made or consent given without adequate reflection or appreciation of the consequences; or in pursuit of merely transitory desires; or in various predicaments when the judgment is likely to be clouded; or under inner psychological compulsion; or under pressure by others of a kind too subtle to be susceptible of proof in a law court.  Underlying Mill's extreme fear of paternalism there perhaps is a conception of what a normal human being is like which now seems not to correspond to the facts.  Mill, in fact, endows him with too much of the psychology of a middle-aged man whose desires are relatively fixed, not liable to be artificially stimulated by external influences; who knows what he wants and what gives him satisfaction or happiness; and who pursues these things when he can.

    Certainly a modification in Mill's principles is required, if they are to accomodate the rule of criminal law under discussion or other instances of paternalism.  But the modified principles would not abandon the objection to the use of the criminal law merely to enforce positive morality.  They would only have to provide that harming others is something we may still seek to prevent by use of the criminal law, even when the victims consent to or assist in the acts which are harmful to them.  The neglect of the distinction between paternalism and what I have termed legal
 

[p. 34]
moralism is important as a form of a more general error.  It is too often assumed that if a law is not designed to protect one man from another its only rationale can be that it is designed to punish moral wickedness or, in Lord Devlin's words, 'to enforce a moral principle.'  Thus it is often urged that statutes punishing cruelty to animals can onl;y be explained in that way.  But it is certainly intelligible, both as an account of the original motives inspiring such legislation and as the specification of an aim widely held to be worth pursuing, to say that the law is here concerned with the suffering, albeit only of animals, rather than with the immorality of torturing them.¹³ Certainly no one who supports this use of the criminal law is thereby bound in consistency to admit that the law may punish forms of immorality which involve no suffereing to any sentient being." (pp. 30-34)

 
[p. 499]
"§ IV. Du consentement de la partie lésée. Règle générale.
    648.  Le consentement de la personne envers laquelle l'infraction a été commise, ne fait point disparaître celle-ci, et l'agent invoquerait en vain, pour se justifier, la maxime volenti non fit injuria.  L'État n'exerce pas le droit de punir dans l'intérêt seul des particuliers qu'il protége; il réprime les attentats contre les personnes et les propriétés, parce qu'ils portent en même temps atteinte aux droits du corps social; et nul ne peut accorder à un autre l'autorisation d'enfeindre les lois qui intéressent l'ordre public et les bonnes moeurs.  Si le consentement de la partie lésée ne détruit pas la criminalité de l'action, il ne peut non plus effacer la culpabilité de l'agent; car celle-ci consiste dans la volonté de commettre une action dont on connaît la criminalité.  L'agent est même civilement responsable de son fait.  Sans doute, l'action en dommages-intérêts intentée par la partie lésée avec son consentement, par exemple, par la personne blessée dans un duel, serait repoussée par l'exception de dol.  Mais l'auteur du fait qui aurait causé du dommage à des tiers, serait obligé de le réparer.  Ainsi, les enfants, les parents, la veuve d'un homme tué en duel,
 
 

[p. 500]
seraient en droit de réclamer les dommages-intérêts devant les tribunaux civils ou correctionnels ⁽¹⁷⁾.

    649.  Conformément au principe énoncé, le fait d'avoir volontairement donné la mort à une personne, même sur son ordre ou avec son consentement, constitue un meurtre ou un assassinat, et non pas un acte de participation à un suicide.  L'homme tué, bien qu'il ait sollicité la mort, n'a joué dans ce drame qu'un rôle passif; l'auteur de l'action, l'agent principal est celui qui a donné la mort ⁽¹⁸⁾.  Pareillement, la mutilation d'un individu, quoique celui-ci ait demandé ou consenti à la subir, est un crime ou un délit; et si c'est un milicien qui s'est laissé mutiler pour se faire exempter du service, il est puni lui-même ⁽¹⁹⁾.  La mort donnée et les blessures faites dans un duel régulier, constituent des infractions sui generis ⁽²⁰⁾.  Celui qui fait avorter une femme avec son consentement, commet un crime ou un délit, ainsi que la femme qui y consent ⁽²¹⁾.  Quelquefois le consentement de la personne lésée a pour effet de changer le caractère délictueux du fait, qui constituerait une autre infraction, si cette personne n'y avait point consenti.  Le délit de prostitution ou de corruption de la jeunesse suppose le consentement des mineurs: car autrement il y aurait
------
(17) L. 1 § 5 D. de injur. (47, 10).  Lorsque, dit Ulpien, quelqu'un a vendu un fils de famille, le père a contre le vendeur l'action injuriarum, quand même le fils aurait consenti à la vente; mais l'action du fils serait non recevable, quia nulla injuria est, quaue in volentem fiat.

(18) Cass. Fr. 2 août 1816; 16 novembre 1827; 23 juin 1857; 21 août 1851.

(19) Aux termes de l'art. 95 n^o 2 de la loi du 3 juin 1870, sur la milice, sont punis d'un emprisonnement de huit jours à deux ans, ceux qui, appelés par leur numéro à faire partie d'un contingent de leur classe, ont employé des moyens propres à faire naître ou à developper des maladies ou des infirmités pour se faire exempter du service, ou qui sont mutilés ou laissé mutiler dans ce but, soit que leur exemption ait été admise, soit quelle ait été rejetée.

(20) Art. 427, 428, 429, 430 C. p..

(21) Art. 350, 351 et 353 C. p.
 
 

[p. 501]
viol ou attentat violent à la pudeur, et ceux qui auraient favorisé ou facilité la perpétration  de ce crime ou de ce délit, en seraient les complices ⁽²²⁾.

§ V. Exceptions à la règle.
    650.  Le principe que nous venons d'établir, n'est pas absolu.  Certaines infractions supposent que le fait est commis contre la volonté de la personne à laquelle il porte préjudice; de sorte que le consentement de celle-ci enlève à l'action tout caractère criminel.  Tels sont, d'abord, les délits conre les propriétés.  On ne peut concevoir ni vol, ni abus de confiance, ni escroquerie ou tromperie, si le propriétaire a voulu se laisser dépouiller de la chose ou de la somme par celui qui l'a frauduleusement soustraite ou obtenue, ignorant, au moment du fait, l'intention du propriétaire ⁽²⁵⁾.  Pareillement, la loi ne punit les destructions ou dégradations des objets appartenant à autrui, que lorsqu'elles ont eu lieu malgré le propriétaire; à moins que le fait, tel que l'incendie, ne mette en péril les personnes mêmes ou des choses qui n'appartiennent pas à ce dernier ⁽²⁴⁾.  Dans la même catégorie rentrent aussi certains attentats contre les personnes.  Il est évident qu'il n'y a pas d'infraction, si la personne détenue a consenti à la séquestration.  L'enlèvement des mineurs n'est puni, que lorsqu'il a été exécuté à l'aide de violences, de ruses ou de menaces.  Le ravisseur ne se rend donc coupable d'aucun délit, si la personne prétendûment enlevée a consenti à son enlèvement ou suivi volontairement le ravisseur.  Le viol et l'attentat violent à la pudeur ne peuvent se concevoir, lorsque la personne, objet du prétendu attentat, y a consenti.

    651.  Pour que, dans les cas indiqués, le consentement de
------
(22) Art.379.  Voir d'autres exemples dans les art. 370, 372, 493 et 494 C. p.

(23) L. 46 § 8, L. 48 § 2 D. de furtis (47, 2).

(24) Art. 521, 523, 528, 530, etc. Art. 510 et suiv. C. p.
 
 

[p. 502]
la personne lésée exclue l'infraction, il faut, d'abord, que cette personne soit capable de consentir.  Celui qui enlève ou fait enlever soit un enfant âgé de moins de sept ans accomplis, soit une fille âgée de moins de seize ans accomplis et non émancipée, commet un crime ou un délit, quand même l'un ou l'autre consentirait à son enlèvement ou suivrait volontairement le ravisseur.  Le consentement de l'enfant au-dessous de quatorze ans accomplis, qui a été l'objet d'un attentat à la pudeur, n'exclut point le crime ou le délit ⁽²⁵⁾.  Il faut, ensuite, que le consentement soit libre.  S'il était surpris ou extorqué, il y aurait délit d'escroquerie ou de tromperie, ou crime d'extorsion ⁽²⁶⁾. Il faut, de plus, que le consentement ne soit pas le résultat d'un abus de confiance.  La loi punit quiconque abuse des besoins, des faiblesses ou des passions d'un mineur, pour lui faire souscrire, à son préjudice, des obligations, quittances, etc.; elle frappe même, quoique moins sévèrement, celui qui fournit habituellement des valeurs, à un taux excédant l'intérêt légal, en abusant des faiblesses ou des passions de l'emprunteur ⁽²⁷⁾. Il faut, enfin, que le consentement ait été précédé ou accompagné le fait.  Le consentement donné après la perpétration du délit peut constituer une circonstance atténuante, mais n'efface point la criminalité de l'action.  Si celui à qui l'on a soustrait ou escroqué une somme d'argent, informé de la misère du coupable, veut bien lui laisser cette somme, ou si la personne enlevée par ruse ou par violence consent à demeurer avec le ravisseur, le fait n'en constitue pas moins un délit.
------
(25) Art. 364, 370 et 372 C. p.  L'attentat prévu par ce dernier article suppose le consentement de la victime; autrement il constituerait un attentat violent à la pudeur ou un viol.  Art. 373 et suiv.  Voir le n^o 649 in fine.

(26) Art. 470, 496 et suiv. C. p.

(27) Art. 493, 494 C. p. " (pp. 499-502)

HAWKES,  Emma, "'She Was Ravished against Her Will, What So Ever She Say': Female Consent in Rape and Ravishment in Late-Medieval England", (1995) 1 Limina: A Journal of History and Cultural Studies 47-54; not at Ottawa University; published by the Dept. of History, University of  Western Australia; title noted in my research but article not consulted yet; no copy of this periodical in Canada according to my verification of the AMICUS catalogue (24 July 2003);
 

HEDLEY, Steve, "Sado-Masochism, Human Rights and the House of Lords", (1993) 52(2) Cambridge Law Journal 194-196; copy at Ottawa University, KD 322 .C329  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

HÉMARD, J., "Le consentement de la victime dans le délit de coups et blessures", (1939) Revue critique de législation et de jurisprudence 293-319; titre noté dans mes recherches mais article non consulté; aucune copie de ce périodique dans la région d'Ottawa, selon ma vérification du catalogue AMICUS (24 juillet 2003);
 

HENNAU-HUBLET, C., L'activité médicale et le droit pénal.  Les délits d'atteinte à la vie, l'intégrité physique et la santé des personnes, Bruxelles et Paris, Bruylant et LGDG, 1987, 475 p., ISBN: 2802703706; copie à l'Université d'Ottawa,  FTX General: K 3601 .H45 1987;
 

HENNING, Terese, Consent and mistaken belief in consent in Tasmaninan sexual offences trials, Hobart : University of Tasmania Law Press, c2000, 152 p. (series; University of Tasmania Law School / Occasional paper; no. 6); title noted in my research but book not consulted; no copy in Canada according to the AMICUS catalogue (verification of 6 August 2003)

"Occassional Paper No. 6: Consent and Mistaken Belief in Consent in the Tasmanian Sexual Offences Trials

This report is the second in a series of reports monitoring the operation of the 1987 reforms to the Criminal Code 1924 (Tas) and the Evidence Act 1910 (Tas). The purpose of the present study was to examine, in the context of sexual offences trials, the operation of the reforms to the definition of ‘consent’ in the Tasmanian Criminal Code 1924. It also examined the operation of the defence of mistaken belief in consent in these trials.

The Background to the reform and the defence of mistaken belief in consent under s 14 of the Code is discussed in Chapter 1; the research methodology and basic quantitative findings with respect to the sexual offences tried and the lines of defence encountered are dealt with in Chapter 2; Chapter 3 discusses the research findings with regard to the Crown construction of consent and key themes used by the defence to refute the Crown allegations of non-consent, to construct sexual contact as consensual and to lay a foundation for the defence of mistaken belief in consent. Chapter 4 discusses findings concerning trial judges’ summations and Chapter 5 presents the study’s conclusions and recommendations."

HERRING, Jonathan, "Mistaken Sex", [July 2005] The Criminal Law Review 511-524;
 

HINCHLIFFE, Sara, "Morgan Reviewed: In Defence of Freedom of Will", (2002/2003) 6(1) Contemporary Issues in Law 37-46; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, periodicals; important contribution;

"[Abstract]

DPP v Morgan provides legal precedent in England and Wales for a defence to rape of 'honest but mistaken belief in consent', no matter how unreasonable the grounds for arriving at such a belief.  This principle has been the subject of much feminist criticism.  Many feminists claim that the Morgan defence privileges the experience of men over that of women -- in that even if a jury believes that the complainant did not consent to sex they must acquit a defendant so long as he did not intend to commit rape.  This article argues that Morgan must be retained if we are to defend civil liberties, uphold the principle of criminal responsibility, and argue that women are not passive victims of male sexuality.  Important protections of civil liberties fought for for hundreds of years are at risk if the Morgan principle is sacrificed." (source: table of contents at the beginning of  issue 1, volume 6)

HORDER, Jeremy, "Consent, Threats and Deception in Criminal Law", (1999) 10(1) King's College Law Journal 104-108;  copy at Ottawa University, KD 460 .K5532  Location, FTX Periodicals;
 

___________"How Culpability Can, and Cannot, be Denied in Under-age Sex Crimes", [January 2001] Criminal Law Review 15-30; copy at Ottawa University, KD 7862 .C734  Location: FTX Periodicals;

"Summary: Focussing on under-age sex crimes, and on the indecency with Children Act 1960 in particular, I argue that the prosecution should not be obliged to show, as an integral part of proving mens rea, that a defendant realised the victim was under-age (although when the age in question is 16, special considerations apply).  Whatever V's age it should, however, be a defence -- for the defence to raise a doubt as to whether he or she was aware that his or her conduct was outside the bounds of what humane and decent people regard as tolerable, in society as it is today." (p. 15)

HORROW, Richard B., "Violence in professional sports: is it part of the game?", (1982) 9 Journal of Legislation 1-15; copy at Ottawa University, KF 262 .N672  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

HUGHES, Graham, "Consent in Sexual Offences", (1962) 25 The Modern Law Review 672-686; copy at Ottawa University, KD 322 .M62  Location, FTX Periodicals;
 

__________ "Two Views on Consent in the Criminal Law", (1963) 26 The Modern Law Review 233-248; copy at Ottawa University, KD 322 .M62  Location, FTX Periodicals;
 

___________Notes and Comments, "Morals and the Criminal Law", (1961-62) 71 Yale Law Journal 662-683; copy at Ottawa University, KFC 3669 .Y34  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

HURD, Heidi M., "The Moral Magic of Consent", (1996) 2 Legal Theory 121-146; copy at Ottawa University, K 202 .L436  Location: FTX Periodicals;

___________Book Review, "Was the Frog Prince Sexually Molested?: A Review of Peter Westen's The Logic of Consent.  THE LOGIC OF CONSENT: THE DIVERSITY AND DECEPTIVENESS OF CONSENT AS A DEFENSE TO CRIMINAL CONDUCT.  By Peter Westen.  Burlington: Ashgate Publishing Co. 2004.  Pp. vii, 383. $104.95" , (2004-2005) 103 Michigan Law Review 1329-1346;
 

HURTADO POZO, José, Droit pénal -- Partie générale II, Zurich: Schulthness Schulthness Médias Juridiques, 2002, xli, 396 p., voir le "Consentement" aux pp. 83-94,  et "Consentement présumé" aux pp. 140-142, ISBN: 3725544700; importante contribution au sujet; sans aucun doute, un des meilleurs livres de thérorie pénale en français; José Hurtado Pozo est professeur à l'Université de Fribourg, en Suisse;

"Consentement et accord

La doctrine distingue généralement l'accord (Einverständnis) du consentement (Einwilligung), ce qui permet de préciser l'aspect de l'infraction concerné par l'acceptation de l'ayant droit.  Selon le critère majoritaire, l'accord exclut la typicité: l'énoncé de fait légal prévoit que l'acte incriminé doit être réalisé contre la volonté de la victime ou, du moins, sans son accord.  Par exemple, le vol (art. 139) suppose une rupture de la possession, c'est-à-dire la soustraction d'une chose contre la volonté de son propriétaire; si celui-ci donne la chose à un tiers ou autorise celui-ci à se l'approprirer, il n'y a pas d'infraction.  Pour une violation de domicile (art. 186), l'auteur doit pénétrer ou demeurer dans la maison de l'ayant droit sans son autorisation; l'infraction n'est pas réalisée si celui-ci accepte la présence du tiers.  Ces comportements ne tombent pas sous le coup des dispositions citées; le bien juridique n'a pas été atteint, car l'auteur a agi en conformité avec la volonté de l'ayant droit.  Cet assentiment change la nature de ces actes, qui deviennent des procédés normaux entre individus dans le cadre de l'ordre social.

Le consentement, par contre, concerne les situations où le fait d'agir contre la volonté de l'ayant droit ou sans son accord ne constitue pas un élément de l'énoncé de fait légal.  Dès lors, le comportement exécuté (blesser la victime, endommager son patrimoine, etc.) remplit les conditions de l'énoncé de fait légal concerné (art. 122 et 123, lésions corporelles; art. 144, dommages à la propriété).  Le consentement n'aurait d'autre effet que de justifier ce comportement typique: le caractère illicite du comportement typique étant neutralisé par le consentement.  Le fait d'agir conformément à la volonté de l'ayant droit ne constitue pas un procédé ordinaire de la vie sociale (atypique) puisqu'il inclut un danger significatif.  Cependant, la personne concernée, par l'exercice de sa liberté de décision, est prête à supporter le préjudice." (pp. 86-87; notes omises)

------

"Autres faits justificatifs [...]

F. Consentement présumé

Si le consentement, circonstance qui exclut la typicité, implique une réelle manifestation de volonté de l'ayant droit, celle-ci fait défaut en cas du consentement présumé du fait d'une situation particulière (p. ex. état d'inconscience ou absence de la personne concernée).  Sous certaines conditions, l'ordre juridique tolère qu'une intervention préjudiciable puisse avoir lieu en présumant l'accord de l'ayant droit.  Il s'agit d'une appréciation normative de la manière dont la personne concernée aurait exercé sa liberté d'accepter ou de refuser le préjudice.  Le consentement présumé constitue un consentement hypothétique, car la personne qui subit le dommage est dans l'impossibilité d'autoriser l'exécution du comportement préjudiciable.  Un exemple typique est celui de l'accidenté en état d'inconscience qui doitêtre soumis à une intervention chururgicale (lésions corporelles, art. 122), ou de celui qui pénètre dans la maison de son voisin en voyage (violation de domicile, art. 186) pour éviter que l'immeuvle ne subisse de dégâts à cause d'une fuite d'eau.

a. Etat de nécessité et gestion d'affaires sans mandat [...]

b. Présomption de la volonté" (pp. 131 et 140-141; une note omise)
 
 

"L'application du consentement du lésé en tant que fait justificatif soulève toutefois quelques questions. En principe, la liberté individuelle permet à tout particulier de disposer de biens juridiques aussi personnels que ceux qui sont protégés par les art. 122 ss.  Cependant, en tenant compte de l'importance des biens concernés, le droit de disposer de son intégrité corporelle et de sa santé est parfois limité, et ce en vertu de l'intérêt prépondérant de l'ayant-droit.  L'effet justificatif du consentement est admis de façon générale lorsque l'on est en présence de lésions simples; il l'est également lorsque les lésions sont graves, mais uniquement dans les cas où ces lésions sont effectuées dans l'intérêt prépondérant de la 'victime'.  L'auteur d'une lésion grave infligée en vue d'obtenir une assurance sera réprimé, malgré le consentement clairement manifesté de la victime, pour participation à une escroquerie et lésions corporelles; si la même situation se présente, mais que la lésion est simple, seule sera applicable la disposition punissant l'escroquerie.

    Dans deux domaines particuliers, le consentement de la victime mérite une analyse plus approfondie: on pense aux traitements médicaux et aux activités sportives.  [...] " (p. 111, par. 254; notes omises)

___________"Rapes without rapists",  in Ernest Sosa and Enrique Villanueva, eds., Social, political, and legal philosophy,  Boston, MA : Blackwell Publishers, 2001, 557 p., at pp. 86-117 (series; Philosophical issues, ISSN 0029-4624; volume 11), ISBN: 0631230270 and 0631230262 (pbk.); no copy of this book in the Ottawa area libraries according to my verification of the AMICUS catalogue on 6 August 2003; article not read;
 

HUSAK, Douglas N., "Consent"  in Christopher Berry Gray, ed., The Philosophy of Law: An Encyclopedia, New York Garland Publishing, 1999, 2 volumes (xxxviii, 950 p.), in vol. 1, at pp. 148-150 (series; Garland reference library of the humanities ; vol. 1743), ISBN: 0815313446;

___________Review Article, "The Complete Guide to Consent: Alan Wertheimer's Consent to Sexual Relations", (2006) 25 Law and Philosophy 267-287;
 

INDIA, Indian Penal Code 1860,  see sections 87-92; available at  http://www.vakilno1.com/bareacts/indianpenalcode/indianpenalcode.htm  (accessed on 15 July 2003);
 

INDIA, Indian Law Commissioners,  A Penal Code prepared by the Indian Law Commissioners, and  published by Command of the Governor General of India in Council -- Reprinted from the Calcutta Edition,  London: Pelham Richardson, 1838, viii, 138 p., reprint in  Birmingham (Ala.):  Legal Classics Library, c1987; and in Union (New Jersey): The Lawbook Exchange Ltd., 2002, ISBN: 158477018X; the Indian Law Commissioners were: Lord Thomas Babington Macaulay, 1800-1859, J.M. MacLeod, G.W. Anderson and F. Millett; also available as  command number 673,  in British Sessional [Parliamentary] Papers (1837-1838) XLI, 463-587; the British Parliamentary Papers have been reproduced on microcard; copy at Carleton University, Ottawa; research note: the "Notes [on the Indian Penal Code by the Indian Law Commissioners]" are also found in  Miscellaneous Works of Lord Macaulay edited by his sister Lady Trevelyan, in Five Volumes, vol. IV, New York: Harper, 1880, 669 p., pp. 177-327;

    "31.  The words 'intelligent consent' denote a consent given by a person who is not, from youth, mental imbecility, derangement, intoxication, or passion, unable to understand the nature and consequences of that to which he gives his consent.

......

CHAPTER III. *
GENERAL EXCEPTIONS. ...
----
* See Note B.

    69.  Nothing which is not intended to cause death, and which is not known by the doer to be likely to cause death, is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause, or be known by the doer to be likely to cause any person above twelve years of age who has given a free and intelligent consent, whether express or implied, to suffer that harm, or to take the risk of that harm, such consent not having been obtained by wilful misrepresentation on the part of the person who does the thing.

    Illustrations.

    (a) A, a dentist, offers Z, a person of ripe age and sound mind, a price for Z's teeth, and without any wilful misrepresentation, obtains Z's consent to the drawing of Z's teeth.  A draws Z's teeth.  Here, though A's act falls under the definition of the offence of voluntarily causing hurt, A has committed no offence.

    (b) A converts Z, a person of ripe age and sound mind, to the Mahomedan religion, and, without any wilful misrepresentation, obtains Z's consent to be circumcised.  A cicumcises Z.  A has committed no offence.

    (c) A and Z agree to fence with each other for amusement.  If this agreement implies the consent of each to suffer any harm which, in the course of such fencing, may be caused without any foul play, then if A, while playing fairly, hurts Z, A has committed no offence.

    (d) A, a friend of Z, calls at Z's house, in Z's absence, and writes and seals several letters there with Z's paper and wax, without asking any person's permission.  Here, if the acquitance between A and Z be such that, according to the usages of society, the consent of Z to such use of his property must be implied thence, A has committed no offence.
 

    70.  Nothing which is not intended to cause death is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause, or be intended by the doer to cause, or be known by the doer to be likely to cause to any person for whose benefit it is done, in good faith, and who has given a free and intelligent consent, whether express or implied, to suffer that harm, or to take the risk of that harm, such consent not having been obtained by wilful misrepresentation on the part of the person who does the thing.

    Illustration.

    A, a surgeon, knowing that a particular operation is likely to cause death of Z, who suffers under a painful complaint, but not intending to cause Z's death, and intending in good faith Z's benefit, performs that operation on Z, by Z's free and intelligent consent, not having obtained that consent by misrepresentation.  A has committed no offence.
 

    71.  Nothing which is done in good faith for the benefit of a person who is under twlve years of age, or of unsound mind, by that person's lawful guardian or guardians, or by the authority of such lawful guardian or guardians, is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause to that person:
    Provided,
    First, That this exception shall not extend to the intentional causing of death, or to the attempting to cause death;
    Secondly, That this exception shall not extend to the doing of any thing which the person doing it knows to be likely to cause death, for any purpose other than the preventing of death or grievous hurt;
    Thirdly, That this exception shall not extend to the voluntary causing of grievous hurt, or to the attempting to cause grievous hurt, unless it be for the purpose of preventing death or grievous hurt, or in the performance of the rite of circumcision;
    Fourthly, That this exception shall not extend to rape, or to the gratification of unnatural lust, or to the attempting to commit rape or to gratify unnatural lust;
    Fifthly, That this exception shall not extend to the abetment, either previous or subsequent, of any offence, to the committing of which offence it would not extend.

    Illustrations.

    (a) A, a parent, whips his child moderately, for the child's benefit.  A has committed no offence.

    (b) A confines his child, for the child's benefit.  A has committed no offence.

    (c) A, in good faith, for his daughter's benefit, intentionally kills her to prevent her from falling into the hands of Pindarries.  A is not within the exception.

    (d) A, in good faith, for his child's benefit, without his child's consent, has his child cut for the stone, knowing it to be likely that the operation will cause the child's death, but not intending to cause the child's death.  A has committed no offence, inasmuch as his object was the preventing of death or grievous hurt to the child.

    (e) A, in good faith, for his child's pecuniary benefit, emasculates his child.  Here, inasmuchas as A has caused grievous hurt to the child for a purpose other than the preventing of death or grievous hurt to the child, A is not within the exception.

    (f) A, intending in good faith the pecuniary benefit of Z, his daughter, a child under twelve years of age, abets a rape committed by B on Z.  Neither A nor B is within the exception.
 

72.   Nothing is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause to a person for whose benefit it is done in good faith, even without that person's consent, if the circumstances are such that it is impossible for that person to signify consent, or if that person is in such a state of mind as to be incapable of intelligent consent,* and has no legal guardian to whom it is possible to apply for authority:
    Provided,
    First, That this exception shall not extend to the intentional causing of death, or to the attempting to cause death;
    Secondly, That this exception shall not extend to the doing of any thing which the person doing it knows to be likely to cause death, for any purpose other than the preventing of death or grievous hurt;
    Thirdly, That this exception shall not extend to the voluntary causing of hurt, or to the attempting to cause hurt for any purpose other than the preventing of death or hurt;
    Fourthly, That this exception shall not extend to rape, or to the gratification of unnatural lust, or to the attempting to commit rape or to gratify unnatural lust;
    Fifthly, That this exception shall not extend to the abetment, either previous or subsequent, of any offence, to the committing of which offence it would not extend.

    Illustrations.

    (a) Z is thrown from his horse, and is insensible.  A, a surgeon, finds that Z requires to be trepanned.  A, not intending Z's death, but in good faith, for Z's benefit, performs the trepan before Z recovers his power of judging for himself.  A has committed no offence.

    (b) Z is carried off by a tiger.  A fires at the tiger, knowing it to be likely that the shot may kill Z, but not intending to kill Z, and in good faith intending Z's benefit.  The tiger drops Z.  It appears that A's ball has given Z a mortal wound.  Nevertheless, A has committed no offence.

    (c)  A, a surgeon, sees a child suffer an accident, which is likely to prove fatal unless an operation be immediately performed.  There is not time to apply to the child's legal guardians.  A performs the operation, in spite of the entreaties of the child, intending in good faith the child's benefit.  A has committed no offence.

    (d) A is in a house which is on fire, with Z, a child.  People below hold out a blanket.  A drops the child from the house-top, knowing it to be likely that the fall may kill the child, but not intending to kill the child, and intending in good faith the child's benefit.  Here, even if the child is killed by the fall, A has committed no offence. ...
----
* For the definition of intelligent consent see Clause 31" (pp. 4-9)
 

"NOTE B.
ON THE CHAPTER OF GENERAL EXCEPTIONS [Clauses 62 to 84].

    This chapter [III] has been framed in order to obviate the necessity of repeating in every penal clause a considerable number of limitations.

    Some limitations relate only to a single provision, or to a very small class of provisions.  Thus the exception in favor of true imputations on character (Clause 470) is an exception which belongs wholly to the law of defamation, and does not affect any other part of the code.  The exception in favor of the conjugal rights of the husband (Clause 359) is an exception which belongs wholly to the law of rape, and does not affect any other part of the code.  Every such exception evidently ought to be appended to the rule which it is intended to modify.

    But there are other exceptions which are common to all penal clauses of the code, or to a great variety of clauses dispersed over many chapters.  Such are the exceptions in favor of infants, lunatics, idiots, persons under the influence of delirium; the exceptions in favor of acts done by the direction of the law, of acts done in the exercise of the right of self-defence, of acts done by the consent of the party harmed by them.  It would obviously be inconvenient to repeat these exceptions several times in every page.  We have, therefore, placed them in a separate chapter, and we have provided that every definition of an offence, every penal provision, and every illustration of a definition or penal provision, shall be construed subject to the provisions contained in that chapter.  Most of these explanations appear to us to require no explanation or defence.  But the meaning and the ground of the rules laid down in Clause 69 and in the three following clauses may not be obvious at first sight.  On these, therefore, we wish to make few observations.

    We conceive the general rule to be, that nothing ought to be an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause to a person of ripe age who, undeceived, has given a free and intelligent consent to suffer that harm or to take the risk of that harm.  The restrictions by which the rule is limited affect only cases where human life is concerned.  Both the general rule and the restrictions may, we think, be easily vindicated.

     If Z, a grown man, in possession of all his faculties, directs that his valuable furniture shall be burned, that his pictures shall be cut to rags, that his fine house shall be pulled down, that the best horses in his stable shall be shot, that his plate shall be thrown into the sea, those who obey his orders, however capricious these orders may be, however deeply Z may afterwards regret that he gave them, ought not, as it seems to us, to be punished for injuring his property.  Again, if Z chooses to sell his teeth to a dentist, and permits the dentist to pull them out, the dentist ought not be punished for injuring Z's person.  So if Z embraces the Mahometan religion, and consents to undergo the painful rite which is the initiation into that religion, those who perform the rite ought not to be punished for injuring Z's person.

    The reason on which the general rule which we have mentioned rests is this, that it is impossible to restrain men of mature age and sound understanding from destroying their own property, their own health, their own comfort, without restraining them from an infinite number of salutary or innocent actions.  It is by no means true that men always judge rightly of their own interest.  But is is true, in the vast majority of cases, they judge better of their own interest than any law-giver, or any tribunal, which must necessarily proceed on general principles, and which cannot have within its contemplatation the circumstances of particular cases and the tempers of particular individuals, can judge them.  It is difficult to conceive any law which should be effectual to prevent men from wasting their substance on the most chimerical speculations, and yet which should not prevent the construction of such works as the Duke of Bridgewater's canals.  It is difficult to conceive any law which should prevent a man from capriciously destroying his property, and yet which should not prevent a philosopher, in a course of chemicals experiments, from dissolving a diamond, or an artist from taking ancient pictures to pieces, as Sir Joshua Reynolds did, in order to learn the secret of the coloring.  It is difficult to conceive any law which should prevent a man from capriciously injuring his own health, and yet should not prevent an artisan from employing himself in callings which are useful and, indeed, necessary to society, but which tend to impair the constitutions of those who follow them, or a public-spirited physician from inoculating himself with the virus of a dangerous disease.  It is chiefly, we conceive, for this reason that almost all governments have thought it sufficient to restrain men from harming others, and have left them at liberty to harm themselves.

    But though in general we would not punish an act on account of any harm which it might cause to a person who had consented to suffer that harm, we think that there are exceptions to this rule, and that the case in which death is intentionally inflicted is an exception.

    It appears to us that the reasons which render it highly inexpedient to inflict punishment in ordinary cases of harm done by consent of the person harmed do not exist here.  The thing prohibited is not, like the destruction of property, or like the mutilation of the person, a thing which is sometimes pernicious, sometimes innocent, sometimes highly useful.  It is always, and under all circumstances, a thing which a wise law-giver would desire to prevent, if it were only for the purpose of making human life more sacred to the multitude.  We cannot prohibit men from destroying the most valuable effects, or from disfiguring the person of one who has given his unextorted and intelligent consent to such destruction or such disfiguration, without prohibiting at the same time gainful speculations, innocent luxuries, mainly exercises, healing operations.  But by prohibiting a man from intentionally causing the death of another, we prohibit nothing which we think it desirable to tolerate.

    It seems to us clear, therefore, that no consent ought to be a justification of the intentional causing of death.  Whether such intentional causing of death ought or ought not be punished as murder is a distinct question, and will be considered elsewhere.

    The next point which we have here to consider is how far consent ought to be a justification of the causing of death, when that causing of death is, in our nomenclature, voluntary, yet not intentional; that is to say, when the person who caused the death did not mean to cause it, but knew that he was likely to cause it.

    In general we have made no distinction between cases in which a man causes an effect designedly, and cases in which he causes it with knowledge that he is likely to cause it.  If, for example, he sets fire to a house in a town at night, with no other object than that of facilitating theft, but being perfectly aware that he is likely to cause people to be burned in their beds, and thus causes the loss of life, we punish him as a murderer.  But there is, as it appears to us, a class of cases in which it is absolutely necessary to make a distinction.  It is often the wisest thing that a man can do to expose his life to great hazard.  It is often the greatest service that can be rendered to him to do what may very probably cause his death.  He may labor under a cruel and wasting malady which is certain to shorten his life, and which renders his life, while it lasts, useless to others, and a tourment to himself.  Suppose that under these circumstances he, undeceived, gives his free and intelligent consent to take the risk of an operation which in a large proportion of cases has proved fatal, but which is the only method by which his disease can possibly be cured, and which, if it succeeds, will restore him to health and vigor.  We do not conceive that it would be expedient to punish the surgeon who should perform the operation, though by performing it he might cause death, not intending to cause death, but knowing himself to be likely to cause it.  Again; if a person attacked by a wild beast should call out to his friends to fire, though with imminent hazard to himself, and they were to obey the call, we do not conceive that it would be expedient to punish them, though they might by firing cause his death, and though when they fired they knew themselves to be likely to cause his death.

    We propose, therefore, that it shall be no offence to do even what the doer knows to be likely to cause death if the sufferer, being of ripe age has, undeceived, given a free and intelligent consent to stand the risk, and if the doer did not intend to cause death, but, on the contrary, intended in good faith the benefit of the sufferer.

    We have now explained the provisions contained in Clauses 69 and 70.  The cases to which the two next clauses relate bear a close affinity to those which we have just considered.

    A lunatic may be in a state which it makes it proper that he should be put into a strait-waistcoat.  A child may meet with an accident which may render the amputation of a limb necessary.  But to put a strait-waistcoat on a man without his consent is, under our definition, to commit an assault.  To amputate a limb is, by our definition, voluntarily to cause grievous hurt, and, as sharp instruments are used, is a very highly penal offence.  We have therefore provided, by clause 71, that the consent of the guardian of a sufferer who is an infant, or who is of unsound mind, shall, to a great extent, have the effect which the consent of the sufferer himself would have if the sufferer were of ripe age and sound mind.

    That there should be some provision of this sort is evidently necessary.  On the other hand, we feel that there is a considerable danger in allowing people to assume the office of judging for others in such cases.  Every man always intends which the law invests every person who is present when a great crime is committed, or when the public peace is concerned.  To acts done in the exercise of this temporary guardianship, we extend by Clause 72 a protection very similar to that which we have given to the acts of regular guardians." (pp.79-81)
.........

    295.  Volontary culpable homicide is 'murder' unless it be of one of the three mitigated descriptions hereinafter enumerated; That is to say,

    First, Manslaughter;
    Secondly, Voluntary culpable homicide by consent;
    Thirdly, Voluntary culpable homicide in defence." (p. 39; emphasis in bold added)
 

"NOTE M.
ON OFFENCES AGAINST THE BODY. ...
 

    "The second mitigated form of voluntary culpable homicide is that to which we have given the name of voluntary culpable homicide by consent.  It appears to us that this description of homicide ought to be punished, but that it ought not to be punished so severely as murder.  We have elsewhere given our reasons for thinking that this description of homicide ought to be punished*.

    Our reasons for not punishing it so severely as murder are these: In the first place, the motives which prompt men to the commission of this offence are generally far more respectable than those which prompt men to the commission of murder.  Sometimes it is the effect of a strong sense of religious duty, sometimes of a strong sense of honor, not unfrequently of humanity.  The soldier, who, at the entreaty of a wonded comrade, puts that camrade out of pain; the friend who supplies laudanum to a person suffering the tourment of a lingering disease; the freedman who in ancient times held out the sword that his master might fall on it; the high-born native of India who stabs the females of his family at their own entreaty in order to save them from the licentiousss of a band of marauders, would, except in Christian societies, scarcely be thought culpable, and even in Christian societies would not be regarded by the public, and ought not to be treated by the law, as assassins.

    Again, this crime is by no means productive of so much evil to the community as murder.  One evil ingredient of the utmost importance is altogether wanting to the offence of voluntary culpable homicide by consent.  It does not produce general insecurity. It does not spread terror through society. When we punish murder with such signal severity, we have two ends in view.  One end is, that people may not be murdered.  Another end is, that people may not live in constant dread of being murdered.  This second end is, perhaps, the more important of the two.  For if assassination were left unpunished, the number of persons assassinated would probably bear a very small proportion to the whole population; but the life of every human being would be passed in constant anxiety and alarm.  This property of the offence of murder is not found in the offence of voluntary culpable homicide by consent.  Every man who has not given his consent to be put to death is perfectly certain that this latter offence cannot at present be committed on him, and that it never will be committed unless he shall first be convinced that it is his interest to consent to it.  We know that two or three midnight assassinations are sufficient to keep a city of a million of inhabitants in a state of consternation during several weeks, and to cause every private family to lay in arms and watchmen's rattles.  No number of suicides, or of homicides committed with the unexorted consent of the person killed, could possibly produce such alarm among the survivors.

    The distinction between murder and voluntary culpable homicide by consent has never, as far as we are aware, been recognized by any code in the distinct manner in which we propose to recognize it; but it may be traced in the laws of many countries, and often, when neglected by those who have framed the laws, it has had a great effect on the decisions of the tribunals, and particularly on the decisions of tribunals popularly composed.  It may be proper to observe that the burning of a Hindoo widow by her own consent, though it is now, as it ought to be, an offence by the regulations of every Presidency, is in no Presidency punished as murder.
----
*see Note B. (p. 109)  

INGRAM, John Dwight, "Date Rape: It's Time for 'No' to Really Mean 'No'", (1993) 21 American Journal of Criminal Law 3-36; copy at Ottawa University, KF 9202 .A427  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

IRAQ, Penal Code, available at available at http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/Iraqi_Penal_Code_1969.pdf (accessed on 18 July 2006);

ITALY, Penal Code  / ITALIE, Code pénal:

"Art. 50 - Consenso dell'avente diritto
   Non è punibile chi lede o pone in pericolo un diritto, col consenso della persona che può validamente disporne."


- The Italian Penal Code [of 1930]  translated by Edward M. Wise, in collaboration with Allen Maitlin ; introd. by Edward M. Wise, Littleton (Colorado):  F. B. Rothman, 1978, xlvi, 249 p., see art. 50 at p.17 (Series; The American series of foreign penal codes; 23),  ISBN: 0837700434; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa, K5001 A63 no. 23;

"Article 50.  Lawful Consent.
     Anyone who impairs or endangers a right with the consent of a person who can validly relinquish it shall not be punishable." (p. 17)

JESCHECK, Hans-Heinrich, "Droit pénal - Procédure pénale", traduction et adaptation par A. Rieg, dans, sous la direction de, Michel Fromont et André Rieg,  Introduction au droit allemand (République fédérale), t. 2, Droit public - Droit pénal, Paris: Cujas, 1984, 428 p., ISBN: 2254840308;

"Dans la section sur les blessures corporelles se trouve enfin l'importante disposition sur le consentement de la victime (Einwilligung).  D'après le § 226a [maintenant numéroté 228], celui qui cause une blessure corporelle avec le consentement de la victime n'agit pas en principe de manière illicite, puisque le corps appartient aux biens dont le titulaire peut disposer.  L'acte devient néanmoins illicite, quand, malgré le consentement, il est contraire aux bonnes moeurs.  On peut songer, par exemple, à des agissements sadiques, à des expérimentations humaines sans utilité, ou à des interventions en vue de la préparation d'une escroquerie à l'assurance." (p. 298)

JOLIDON, Pierre, "La responsabilité pénale et civile des participants à des activités sportives", (1989) 108 Revue pénale suisse 17-47; titre noté dans mes recherches; article non-consulté; aucune copie de ce numéro de ce périodique dans les bibliothèques canadiennes selon le catalogue AMICUS;
 

JOLOWICZ, J.A., "Grounds of Justification -- English  Law", in Journées d'études sur le droit de la responsabilité (1984: Gand, Belgique), Limpens, Jean, 1910-1979, Centre interuniversitaire de droit comparé, In  memoriam Jean Limpens : Studiedagen aansprakelijkheidsrecht, Gent, 23-24 maart 1984 = In memoriam Jean Limpens : Journées d'études sur le droit de la responsabilité, Gent, 23-24 mars 1984 = In memoriam Jean Limpens : Symposium on Civil Liability, Gent, 23-24 March 1984, Antwerpen : Kluwer rechtswetenschappen, 1987, xxvii, 311 p., at pp. 223-248, and see "Volenti non fit injuria", at pp. 235-240 (series; Interuniversitair Centrum voor Rechtsvergelijking; 12), (Collection; Centre interuniversitaire de droit comparé; 12), ISBN: 9063212879; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, K923 Z9 I56 1987; civil law but useful for researchers;
 

JONES, Helen, "Rape, Consent and Communication: Re-Setting the Boundaries", (2002/2003) 6(1) Contemporary Issues in Law 23-36; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, periodicals;
 

JONES, J.C.H., and Kenneth G. Stuart, "Hit Somebody: Hockey Violence, Economics, the Law, and the Twist and McSorley Decisions", (2002) 12 Seton Hall Journal  of Sport Law 165-198;
 

JUNG, Heinke, "L'expérimentation sur les êtres humains, Réflexions d'un juriste allemand", (1991) Revue de science criminelle et de droit pénal comparé 33-48; copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, KJJ 0 .R489  Location: FTX Periodicals; contribution importante au sujet;
 

___________"Introduction au droit médical allemand", (1996) Revue de science criminelle et de droit pénal comparé 39-47; copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, KJJ 0 .R489  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

JUSTICE, "Sexual Offences Bill: Second Reading, House of Lords", London: Justice, February 2003, 8 p., available at  http://www.justice.org.uk/images/pdfs/sexual%20offence.pdf (accessed on 5 July 2003);
 

KABBAJ, Nezma, Le consentement de la victime, thèse de doctorat, droit pénal, Université de Montpellier 1, 1981; dir. de thèse: J. Marie Aussel; titre noté dans mes recherches mais thèse non consultée; aucune copie dans les bibliothèques de la région d'Ottawa;
 

KALOSIEH, Adrienne, Note, "Consent to Genocide?  The ICTY's Improper Use of the Consent Paradigm to Prosecute Genocidal Rape in Foca", (2002-2003) 24 Women's Rights Law Report 121-135;

KANNAI, Ruth, "Consent in the Criminal Law", an extract from an article published in Mishpatim, vol.  29(2); available for download at  mishpatim.mscc.huji.ac.il/~review/english/ main/publications/past/292e/292_3e.doc (accessed on 12 August 2003); available on html format at  http://www.google.ca/search?q=cache:z7UDnDKkeo4J:mishpatim.mscc.huji.ac.il/~review/english/main/publications/past/292e/292_3e.doc+KANNAI,+Ruth,+%22Consent+in+the+Criminal+Law%22&hl=fr&ie=UTF-8 (accessed on 12 August 2003);
 

KARON, Daniel R., "Winning Isn't Everything, It's the Only Thing. Violence in Professional Sports: The Need for Federal  Regulation and Criminal Sanctions", (1991-92) 25 Indiana Law Review 147-163;

KASUBHAI,  Mustafa T., "Destabilizing Power in Rape: Why Consent Theory in Rape Is Turned on its Head", (1996) 11 Wisconsin Women's Law Journal  37-74; copy at Ottawa University, KF 477 .A15 W57 Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

KELK, Constantijn, "Consent in Dutch Criminal Law" in Peter Alldridge and Chrisje Brants, eds., Personal Autonomy, the Private Sphere and the Criminal Law: A Comparative Strudy,  Portland (Oregon): Hart Publishing, 2001, xxv, 274 p., Essay 9 at pp. 205-222, ISBN: 1-901362825; copy at the Supreme Court of Canada Library, Ottawa; KJC 1646 P47;

"2. FIELDS OF CRIMINAL LAW WHERE CONSENT IS RELEVANT

There are different concepts of consent in relation to the question of whether an act constitutes a criminal offence: it may be explicitly required, it may be deemed to have been given if the person concerned did not explicitly withhold it, or it may be implicit in the circumstances of the act.  Under Dutch criminal law, consent is relevant especially in the following areas: offences where prosecution is dependent on an official complaint to the public prosecutor; pornography and matters of public decency; sexual acts under duress or involving violence; voluntary submission to violence in general; conduct of the medical profession in general; euthanasia (including asisted suicide) in particular.

    In all of these fields, consent by the person who would otherwise be regarded as the victim, may mean that the act is either not a criminal offence, or that the perpetrator cannot or will not be subjected to prosecution.  However, it will be clear from the following observations that it is certainly not unrestrictedly true in Dutch criminal law that volenti non fit injuria.  All depends on the circumstances and, when seen from a long-term perspective, on changing social definitions of harm and public interest." (pp. 207-208)

KELL, David, "Consent to Harmful  Assaults Under the Queensland Criminal Code: Time for a Reappraisal?", (1994) 68 Australian Law Journal 363-378;

Abstract
"This article examines, with particular reference to the position under the Queensland Criminal Code, the extent to which a person's consent to the infliction of harm ought to prvent criminal liability atttaching to a person charged, under criminal assault provisions, with inflicting that harm.  Both common law and code authority are considered, as is the recent work of the Queensland Criminal Code Review Committee.  Four alternative models, to the prevailing Code interpretation are evaluated and a new approach, to some extent drawing upon common law doctrine, is advanced as a more persuasive guide for judicial decision making." (p. 363)

___________"Social Disutility and the Law of Consent", (1994) 14(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 121-135; copy at Ottawa University, KD 418 .O93  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

KELMAN, Mark, "Interpretative Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law", (1980-81) 33 Stanford Law Review 591-673, see "Consent" at pp. 614-616;
 

KENNEDY, Ian, "The Legal Effect of Requests by the Terminally Ill and Aged not to receive further treatment from doctors", [1976] Criminal Law Review 217-232;  copy at Ottawa University, KD 7862 .C734  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

KILLIAS, Martin en collaboration avec Bernard A. Dénéréaz, Précis de droit pénal général, Berne: Staempfli, 1998, xlv, 300 p., voir sur le consentement, les pp. 108-110 (collection; Précis de droit Staempfli),  ISBN:  3727209895; aussi une 2e édition, Berne, 2001;
 

KLEINIG, John, "Consent As a Defense in Criminal Law", (1979) 65 Archiv fur Rechts - und Sozialphilosophie (Berlin) / Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy 329-346; copy at Carleton University, STO (storage in basement; accessible by the public), SER K1.R3;

"Summary

In a number of criminal offences, particularly those which involve serious bodily harm, the legal maxim volenti non fit injuria can be invoked as a defence.  The paper explores and rejects several recognised rationales for this position.  An alternative account is offered.  It is argued that the consent of the victim does not serve to transfer responsibility for his acts from the offender.  Where this is threatening to a person's status as a responsible agent, the act consented to fall within the scope of justifiable legal regulation." (p. 345)

KNOOPS, Geert-Jan, Defenses in contemporary international criminal law, Ardsley (NY): Transnational Publications, 2001, xxxviii, 297 p., see "The defense of consent to sexual assault and mistake of fact" at pp. 104-108 (series; International and comparative criminal law series),  ISBN: 1571051511;
 

KOH, K.L., "Consent and Responsibility in Sexual Offenses", [1968] Criminal Law Review 81-97 and 150-162;  copy at Ottawa University, KD 7862 .C734  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

___________"Doctrine of Consent in Criminal Law", (1967) 9 Malaya Law Review 181-201;

KUHLMANN,  Walter,  "Violence in Professional Sports", [1975] Wisconsin Law Review 771-790;

KUHN, André, Laurent Moreillon L., et Aline Willi-Jayet, sous la direction de, Aspects pénaux du droit du sport, Berne: Stämpfli, 2002, 298 p. (Collection; Collection CIES 6), ISBN: 3727251050; titre noté dans mes recherches mais livre non consulté; aucune copie de ce volume dans les bibliothèques comprises dans le catalogue AMICUS de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada (vérification du 4 mars 2006);

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