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updated on / mise à jour au: 8 November 2011

by / par  ©François Lareau, Ottawa, 2007
First posted on the internet on  9 October 2007

Selected Bibliography on
Mistake or Ignorance of Fact

                  - - - - - - - - - - -
Bibliographie choisie sur
l'erreur ou l'ignorance  de fait


Note:

Mistake of fact is also dealt in other bibliographies such as on attempt, intent, consent, mistake of law, selft-defence, and Justification, Excuse and the Tripartite Theory of the Criminal Offence, see http://www.lareau-law.ca/droitpenal_.htm,

L'erreur de fait est déjà illustré dans d'autres bibliographies, par exemple: l'intention, le consentement, l'erreur de droit, la légitime défense, la tentative, et la justification, l'excuse et la théorie tripartite de l'infraction pénale, voir les diverses bibliographies à  http://www.lareau-law.ca/droitpenal_.htm


I-  Canadian Law / Droit canadien


ACORN, Annalise, "The Defence of Mistake of Fact and the Proposed Recodification of the General Part of the Criminal Code: A Feminist Critique and Proposals for Reform",  Alberta Women and Seniors' Secretariat, 1994, 33 p;  also available in French under the title "La défense d'erreur de fait et la recodification proposée de la Partie générale du Code -- Une critique féministe et des propositions de réforme";

A.D.G. (Allan D. GOLD), "Notes and Comments: Strict Liability: Reasonable Mistake of Fact", (1977-78) 20 The Criminal Law Quarterly 300-306;
 

BACHER, Jean-Luc, "La politique criminelle de la Cour suprême du Canada en matière de fraude", (avril-juin 2005) 58 Revue internationale de criminologie et de police technique et scientifique 215-228, et voir "erreur de fait" aux pp. 221-222;

BOURQUE, Sophie (Mme la juge), "Les moyens de défense", dans Barreau du Québec, École, Droit pénal: Infractions, moyens de défense et peine, Cowansville: Éditions Yvon Blais, 2007, aux pp. 175-207, et voir les  "L'erreur de fait", les pp. 185-187  (Collection; Collection de droit 2007-2008; vol. 12), ISBN: 9782896350322; copie à la Bibliothèque de la Cour suprême du Canada, KF 385 ZB5 C681 v. 12 1007-08; note: voir aussi la contribution de LAPOINTE, infra, dans le même livre;
 

BRAITHWAITE, W.J., "Developments in Criminal Law and Procedure: The 1978-79 Term", (1980) 1 Supreme Court Law Review 187-248 [see "I. Mens Rea: Strict Liability, Mistake of Fact and Law, Motive", pp. 188-213];
 

___________"Developments in Criminal Law and Procedure: The 1979-80 Term", (1981) 2 Supreme Court Law Review 177-234 [see "Mistake and Mens Rea" at pp. 176-188];


BURBIDGE, George Wheelock, 1847-1908, A Digest of the Criminal Law of Canada (Crimes and Punishments) Founded By Permission on Sir James Fitzjames Stephen's Digest of the Criminal Law, Toronto: Carswell, 1890, lxiii, 588 p.; pdf completed on 4 September 2006; also available at http://www.archive.org/details/cihm_00331 (accessed on 21 September 2008);
PDF
- Table of Contents and Index
- i-lxiii and 1-41 (Cover page; Table of cases cited; Table of statutes cited (U.K. and Canada); List of Abbreviations; Contents; articles 1-34);
- 42-140 (articles 35-184);
- 141-239 (articles 185-308);
- 240-340 (articles 309-434);
- 341-448 (articles 435-561);
- 449-537 (articles 562-629 and Appendix of Notes);
- 539-588 (Index; p. 538 is blank)


BRYANT, A.W., "The Issue of Consent in the Crime of Sexual Assault", (1989) 68 Canadian Bar Review 94-154;


CAIRNS WAY, Rosemary, 1956-, "Bill C-49 and the Politics of Constitutionalized Fault", (1993) 42 University of New Brunswick Law Journal 325-334 [deals with An Act to amend the Criminal Code (sexual assault) (Bill C- 49) and is part of the Forum "Sexual Assault Legislation"];

CAMPBELL, Kenneth L., "Intoxicated Mistakes", (1989-90) 32 The Criminal Law Quarterly 110-134;


CANADA, Department of Justice Canada, Reforming the General Part of the Criminal Code: A Consultation Paper, [Ottawa]; [Department of Justice Canada], [November 1994], v, 35 p., and see "Defences and "Awareness of the circumstances", at pp. 11 and 12; see also p. 35; put on the Internet on 12 January 2007; also published in French/aussi publié en français: Ministère de la Justice Canada, Projet de réforme de la Partie générale du Code criminel: Document de consultation, [Ottawa], [Ministère de la Justice Canada], [Novembre 1994], v, 39 p., et voir "Moyens de défense" et "La perception des circonstances", aux pp. 13-15; voir aussi la p. 39, placé sur l'internet, le 12 janvier 2007;
PDF  ENGLISH VERSION
"Source: Reforming the General Part of the Criminal Code, Consultation Paper, 1994.
              Department of  Justice Canada.
              Reproduced with the permission of the Minister of Public
              Works and Government Services Canada, 2007."
- Table of Contents;
i-v and 1-35;

PDFVERSION FRANÇAISE
"Source: Projet de réforme de la Partie générale du Code criminel, Document de consultation, 1994.
              Ministère de la Justice Canada.
              Reproduit avec la permission du ministre des Travaux publics
              et Services gouvernementaux Canada, 2007."
- Table des matières;
- i-v et 1-39;

"APPENDIX
What this consultation paper does not deal with

This consultation does not cover every possible General Part issue.  For example, it does not deal with the defence of mistake of fact, because the major problems with that defence were addressed in a 1992 law, Bill C-49.  Mistake of fact had often been raised by an accused person in sexual assault cases.  The accused would argue that he or she did not have the degree of fault required for a conviction, having made a mistake about the complainant's consent to the sexual activity -- "I thought there was consent.'  The law now prohibits the mistake of fact defence where the accused did not take reasonable steps to make sure that the complainant did indeed consent.  And mistake is not a defence if the mistake came about because of the accused's person intoxication, recklessness or wilful blindness to the truth." (p. 35)

-----

"ANNEXE
Quelles questions le présent document de consultation n'aborde-t-il pas?

Le présent document n'aborde pas toutes les questions concernant la Partie générale.  Par exemple, il ne traite pas du moyen de défense fondé sur l'erreur de fait parce que les principaux problèmes soulevés par ce moyen de défense ont été réglés par le projet de loi C-49 en 1992.  L'erreur de fait était souvent invoquée dans des affaires d'agression sexuelle où l'accusé faisait valoir qu'il ne possédait pas l'élément moral requis par l'infraction  parce qu'il croyait  que la victime avait conmsenti  à l'activité sexuelle.  La loi interdit maintenant à l'accusé d'invoquer en défense l'erreur de fait s'il n'a pas pris les mesures raisonnables pour s'assurer du consentement réel de la victime et si cette erreur provient de l'affaiblissement  de ses facultés, de son insouciance ou d'un aveuglment volontaire." (p. 39)


CANADA, Department of Justice Canada and James W. O'Reilly, Toward a New General Part of the Criminal Code of Canada -- Details on Reform Options --, [Ottawa]: [Department of Justice Canada], [December 1994], ii, 50 p., put on the Internet on 12 January 2007; information on the French version/informations sur la version française: Ministère de la Justice Canada et James W. O'Reilly, Pour une nouvelle codification de la Partie générale du Code criminel du Canada -- Options de réforme --, [Ottawa]: [Ministère de la Justice Canada], [décembre 1994], ii, 51 p., placé sur l'internet, le 12 janvier 2007;
PDF  ENGLISH VERSION
"Source: Reforming the General Part of the Criminal Code, Consultation Paper, 1994.
              Department of  Justice Canada.
              Reproduced with the permission of the Minister of Public
              Works and Government Services Canada, 2007."
Table of Contents;
- i-ii and 1-50;

PDF VERSION FRANÇAISE
"Source: Pour une nouvelle codification de la Partie générale du Code criminel, Options de réforme, 1994.
              Department of  Justice Canada.
              Reproduced with the permission of the Minister of Public
              Works and Government Services Canada, 2007."
--------
"Source: Pour une nouvelle codification de la Partie générale du Code criminel, Options de réforme, 1994.
              Ministère de la Justice Canada.
              Reproduit avec la permission du ministre des Travaux publics
              et Services gouvernementaux Canada, 2007."
- Table des matières;
- i-ii et 1-51;



CANADA, Department of Justice Canada, Brian Jarvis and Darren Littlejohn,  Reforming the General Part of the Criminal Code: A Summary and Analysis of the Responses to the Consultation Paper, [Ottawa]: Department of  Justice Canada, Communications and Consultation Branch, 1995, 123 p., and see "Question 5 -- Awareness of the circumstances [for defences]", at pp. 43-48; document obtained by François Lareau with letter from Department of Justice Canada, Access to Information and Privacy Office, dated 22 February 1999, Request file A98-00147, released pages 000731-000853; this document is available at my Digital Library on Canadian criminal law at, http://www.lareau-law.ca/DigitalLibrary.html; there are also two shorter versions of that document also available at my Digital Library: Reforming the General Part of the Criminal Code: Analysis of the Responses to the Consultation Paper, 51 p., and Analysis of Responses to the Consultation Paper on Reforming the General Part of the Criminal Code -- Executive Summary, 15 p; on these three documents,  see Background Document;


CANADA, The Minister of Justice of Canada,  Proposals to Amend the Criminal Code (general principles), [Ottawa], [Department of Justice Canada], 28 June 1993, 17 p.; note:these proposals do not deal with mistake of fact for the reason given in CANADA, Department of Justice Canada, Reforming the General Part of the Criminal Code: A Consultation Paper, supra, at p. 35; put on the Internet on 12 January 2007 / information on the French version /informations sur la version française:  CANADA, Ministre de la Justice du Canada, Proposition de modification du Code criminel (principes généraux), [Ottawa], [Ministère de la Justice Canada], 28 ¸juin 1993, 17 p.; cette proposition ne traite pas de l'erreur de fait pour la raison donnée dans CANADA, Department of Justice Canada, Reforming the General Part of the Criminal Code: A Consultation Paper / Ministère de la Justice Canada, Projet de réforme de la Partie générale du Code criminel: Document de consultation, supra, à la p. 39; mis sur l'internet, le 12 janvier 2007;
ENGLISH VERSION (Bilingual text) & VERSION FRANÇAISE (texte bilingue)
PDF 
"Source: Proposals to amend the Criminal Code (general principles), 1993.
              Department of  Justice Canada.
              Reproduced with the permission of the Minister of Public
              Works and Government Services Canada, 2007."
- Text / Texte;


CANADA, Officials of the Department of Justice Canada, and  Members and Consultants of the Law Reform Commission of Canada, Toward a New General Part for the Criminal Code of Canada: A Framework Document on the Proposed New General Part of the Criminal Code for the Consideration of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General, [Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, December 1990], 137 p., see "Failure of proof defences" and "Mistake of Fact" at pp. 55-57 and "Excuses" and "Mistaken belief as to defence", at pp. 99-100; pdf completed on 16 December 2006; information on the French version/informations sur la version française, CANADA, Fonctionnaires du ministère de la Justice Canada et des membres de la Commission de réforme du droit du Canada et des conseillers auprès de celle-ci, Pour une nouvelle codification de la Partie générale du Code criminel du Canada.  Document cadre sur la nouvelle Partie générale proposée du Code criminel présenté pour examen au Comité permanent de la Justice et du Solliciteur général, [Ottawa: Ministère de la Justice Canada, décembre 1990], 144 p.;
ENGLISH VERSION
PDF 
"Source: Toward a New General Part for the Criminal Code of Canada, 1990.
              Department of  Justice Canada.
              Reproduced with the permission of the Minister of Public
              Works and Government Services Canada, 2006."
- Table of Contents;
- 1-137;


___________Parliament, House of Commons,  Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Sub-Committee on the Recodification of the General Part of the Criminal Code of the Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General, [Ottawa]: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1992-1993,  11 Issues; note that the 11th issue consists of the report:  First Principles: Recodifying the General Part of the Criminal Code of Canada: Report of the Sub-Committee on the Recodification of the General part of the Criminal Code of the Standing Committee on Justice and the Sollicitor General, and see "Mistake of Fact" at p. 70 and "Mistaken Belief as to Defence" at p. 74; also published in French/aussi publié en français: Parlement, Chambre des Communes, Procès-verbaux et témoignages du Sous-comité sur la Recodification de la Partie générale du Code criminel du Comité permanent de la justice et du Solliciteur général,  [Ottawa]: I'Imprimeur de la Reine pour le Canada, 1992-1993, 11 fasicules;  noter que le 11e fasicule contient le rapport : Principes de base: recodification de la Partie générale du Code criminel du Canada.  Rapport du Sous-comité sur la recodification de la Partie générale du Code criminel du Canada du Comité permanent de la justice et du Solliciteur général et voir "L'erreur de fait" aux pp. 74-75 et "L'erreur quant à l'existence d'un moyen de défense" à la p. 79;

"Mistake of Fact

    The CBA Task Force proposed that the defence of mistake of fact should apply where the accused made a mistake as to circonstances under which he or she was acting. However, where appropriate, the accused could be convicted of an included offence.  The trial court should consider all of the circumstances of the case, including any reasonable grounds for the accused belief, in determining whether the accused really had a mistaken belief.187

    The Law Reform Commission also recommended codification of the defence, but instead of providing for liability only for included offences, the Commission stated that the accused could be convicted of an included or an attempt to commit another offence.  Further, instead of a clause directing courts to consider the presence of reasonable grounds for the accused's belief, the Commission states that the defence of mistake of fact should not be available for crimes of recklessness or negligence where the mistake is due to the accused's recklessness or negligence.

    While the Sub-Committee is aware that there may be situations where a conviction for an attempt to commit an offence other than the offence may have thought he or she was committing would be appropriate,188  the Sub-Committee does not agree with the Law Reform Commission that an accused, in raising the defence of mistake of fact, should be open to conviction for an attempt to commit any offence.  It would be unfair to convict an accused of an offebce with which he or she was charged.

     The Sub-Committee agrees with the CBA Task Force that courts should consider all the circumstances in determining whether the accused was indeed mistaken.  It is unnecessary, in the Sub-Committee's view, to include an express provision as suggested by the Law Reform Commission dealing with the defence of mistake of fact to crimes of negligence or recklessness.  In these cases, a reckless or negligent mistake would be consistent with liability and would not, therefore, provide an excuse. ...
------
187  Issue 5A: 56
188 Such as in the situations arising in R. v. Ladue, [1965] 4 C.C.C. 264 (Y.T.C.A.) or R. v. Kundeus, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 272 (see especially the judgment of Laskin, C.J.C.)." (p. 70)

-----

"Mistaken Belief as to Defense

    The Law Reform Commission suggested that no one be liable if he or she would have had a defence on the facts as he or she believed them to be.213  This is the means the Commission chose to use to introduce a subjective element into various defences.  As mentionned in relation to self-defence, the Sub-Committee would prefer to see the subjective elements set out in each relevant provision, rather than in a general provision.  This, it belives, would make clearer the subjective aspect of each defence.
------
213 Ibid. [Report 31], Recommendation 3(17), at 41." (p. 74)


CANADA/PROVINCES, Report of the Working Group on Chapter 3 of the Law Reform Commission of Canada Report 30, Vol. 1,  "Recodifying Criminal Law", [Ottawa]: [Department of Justice Canada], December 1987, vii, 80 p., and see "Clause 3(2) Lack of Knowledge" at pp. 8-15 and  "Clause 3(16) Mistaken Belief as to Defence" at pp. 24-27;  Research Notethis report is cited in the Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1988-1989 - 18th Annual Report, Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1989 at p. 37, ISBN: 0662573013 and in CANADA, Officials of the Department of Justice Canada and Members of the Law Reform Commission of Canada,  Toward a New General Part forthe Criminal Code of Canada: A Framework Document on the Proposed New General Part of the Criminal Code for the Consideration of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General, supra.   This report of the working group was submitted to the Federal-Provincial Coordination Committee of Senior Justice Officials. Members of the Working Group were from: the Department of Justice Canada, and from the following provincial Attorney General departments or Ministries/Departments of Justice: Ontario, Québec, New Brunswick, Saskatchewan, Alberta, Manitoba and  British Columbia. This report is available from the Department of Justice Canada.  It was obtained by François Lareau in 1998 under Access to Information Request number A98-00185; also available in French / aussi disponible en français: CANADA/PROVINCES, Rapport du Groupe de travail chargé de l'étude du chapitre 3 du Rapport no 30 de la Commission de réforme du droit du Canada "Pour une nouvelle codification du droit pénal" (Volume I), [Ottawa]: [Ministère de la Justice Canada],  décembre 1987, vii, 88 p.; Notes de recherche :  ce rapport est mentionné dans Commission de réforme du droit du Canada, 1988-1989, Dix-huitième Rapport annuel,  Ottawa : Commission de réforme du droit du Canada, 1989,  à la p. 40, ISBN: 0662573013 et dans CANADA, Fonctionnaires du Ministère de la Justice Canada et des membres de la Commission de réforme du droit du Canada, Pour une nouvelle codification de la Partie générale du Code criminel du Canada : document cadre sur la nouvelle partie générale proposée du Code criminel présenté pour examen au comité permanent de la justice et du solliciteur général, supra.   Ce rapport du groupe de travail a été soumis au Comité fédéral-provincial de coordination composé de fonctionnaires de niveau supérieur de la justice.  Les membres du groupe de travail proviennent du Ministère de la Justice Canada et des ministères des procuereurs généraux /ministères provinciaux de la justice de: l'Ontario, Québec, Nouvelle-Écosse, Saskatchewan, Alberta et Columbie-Britannique.  Ce rapport est disponible au Ministère de la Justice Canada.  Il a été obtenu par François Lareau en 1998 suite à une demande d'accès à l'information numéro A-98-00185;

"Clause 3(2) [of the Law Reform Commission Report 30] Lack of Knowledge
...
3. Comments on Proposals
   
a.  Position and Points in Issue


    The members do not agree with clause 3(2) as drafted: it leaves certain policy issues unresolved, and more fundamentally, it may be better to deal with the matter of clause 3(2) in the context of the mens rea provisions.  Where a mistake of fact relates to an element of an offence, the offence simply is not made out and a separate provision is not necessary.

    Generally, therefore, mistake can be regarded as merely a corollary of mens rea: it represents an assertion of innocent intention rather than a defence.  If it is possible to draft a satisfactory statement of the normative concept of criminal blameworthiness, it may be redundant to make a special provision for mistake.

    The members feel clause 3(2) is more properly a liability-creating provision than a defence; its only virtue would be to create exceptions, where appropriate as a matter of policy, to the general principle that liability requires the specific mens rea inherent in the offence charged.  However, the members feel the LRC has not accomplished this in its draft of clause 3(2).

    There are a number of unresolved issues which are of sufficient importance to warrant treatment in a separate rule if they do not follow as a matter of inference from the basic mens rea principle.


    Transferred Mens Rea

    In particular, if the LRC draft includes the provision in s. 5 of Appendix A

  5. A person commits a crime only by engaging in the relevant conduct with the state of mind specified in the definition of the crime or section 8.

then the draft must also contain a provision to deal with persons charged with committing one crime where they thought they were committing a different crime.

    The members feel that such a provision would be better included as a subsection of s. 5 of the draft, rather than in the part on defences.

    In any case the members are not satisfied that the Commission's solution (essentially, the minority position in Kundeus) is the correct one.  Members considered other possible solutions: the majority position in Kundeus; or convicting the person of the offence charged but substituting the penalty range for the offence the accused thought he was committing.  Most members agree with the sentiment expressed by Laskin, C.J.C., dissenting in Kundeus, that it is inconsistent with our legal tradition to convict anyone on the basis of a mens rea for an offence different from the offence charged.  Moreover, since Vaillancourt, it is probably not possible to do so.

    The members agreed that this is an important problem of policy which the LRC has not solved.


    Reasonableness of Mistake

    Under the present law, a mistake must be honest, but it is not required to be reasonable.  The members are not all satisfied that this position is correct; some feel strongly that as a matter of policy, a mistake should be reasonable, and that acting unreasonably, particularly where bodily harm results, represents a degree of fault sufficient to found criminal responsibility.

    Other members feel that honesty is the more appropriate test, since it can take into account particular characteristics of the accused; and this aspect should not be abandoned, wherever the accused has those characteristics through no fault of his own.

    The members are unable to take a definitive position on this issue but all members agree it is an important policy area requiring further study.  The LRC did not address this issue.


    Mistake of Fact Resulting from Voluntary Intoxication

    Mistake caused by intoxication is another issue not directly addressed by the LRC.  All members agree with the general principle that, if a mistake of  fact is due to voluntary intoxication, then the mistake of fact defence should not apply.  Members feel the law should not protect anyone who, through his own conduct, prevents himself from being in a position to know facts which, had he known them, would preclude him from committing an offence.  Further work on this issue is required:  members did not reach conclusions concerning the level of intoxication required or the penalty structure which should be associated with the scheme.

    Resolution of this issue also requires discussion of whether the law should continue to distinguish between offences of specific intent and general intent.  That issue arises in Chapter 2 but has not been addressed.  The discussion in Chapter 2 addressed two levels of culpability: intention (which by  definition would include recklessness) and negligence.


    Wilful Blindness, Recklessness, and Negligence

    The LRC  failed to address the issue of mistake arising from wilful blindness on the part of the accused.  It is not clear whether this could be covered by the concept of recklessness outlined in clause 3(2)(b).  The members agree that wilful blindness and recklessness should be addressed as an aspect of a general statement of definition of mens rea in chapter 2; as such, the provision would be included in s. 8 of the draft in Appendix A of the LRC Report.  Some members feel that as recklessness imports knowledge, in the sense of conciousness of risk, it is inconsistent to treat it as part of a defence of "lack of knowledge" under clause 3(2).

    In any case the members feel there should be more study of the issues of recklessness and negligence.  Clause 3(2)(b) would impose liability only in respect of offences which can be committed by recklessness or negligence.

    Some mebers feel that recklessness or negligence should simply vitiate the defence, and liability would therefore be imposed in respect of any type of offence.

    The members of the Working Group studying Chapter 2, which contains the provisions on mens rea, were unable, in the time available for this study, to devise a statement or definition  of mens rea which they find satisfactory.

    The members agreed unanimously that more study is needed, both on developing a statement or definition of mens rea and on resolving outstanding issues, including mistake of fact caused by intoxication; wilful blindness and recklessness; negligence; transferred intent (Kundeus-type cases); and the question of honest as opposed to reasonable belief.

    b. Codification

    The members are generally agreed that codification of the principle in clause 3(2) is unnecessary, but until the mens rea problem is resolved no definitive conclusion can be reached.

    c. Recommendations

1.  If possible, clause 3(2) should not be codified separate from the treatment of mens rea in the draft code.  Further work should be done on mens rea to arrive at a statement or definition of mens rea which will comprise the general principle in clause 3(2) (unanimous).

2.   If a mistake of fact is due to voluntary intoxication, then the mistake of fact defence should not apply (unanimous).

3.   Further work should be done on outstanding issues, including:

  (i) mistake of fact resulting from intoxication;
  (ii) wilful blindness and recklessness;
  (iii) negligence;
  (iv) transferred intent;
  (v) honest vs. reasonable belief.
 
  (unanimous)" (pp. 12-15)

--------

"Clause 3(16) [of the Law Reform Commission Report 30]  Mistaken Belief as to Defence
...
3. Comments on Proposals
   
a.  Position and Points in Issue


    The members agree clause 3(16) is insufficient as drafted, although they accept the general principle that there should be a defence of mistake as to facts grounding a defence.

    Some members feel the issue of mistaken belief as to defence should be resolved in the context of a general statement or definition of mens rea.  Other members feel that there are enough significant policy issues involved to warrant treatment in a separate rule; moreover, mistake as to the facts grounding a defence is dictinct from mistake as to an element of the offence because the former, unlike the latter, is not resolved as a mere consequence of the principles of mens rea.  In mistaken belief as to defence, the definition of the offence is committed by a person who does the act intentionally, i.e. with the requisite mens rea.  If the facts were as he believed them, then the act would be justified in the circumstances or its author would be excused.  However, where the facts are not as believed, there is in fact no justification and the author is not excused as he believed he was; and the mens rea remains intact.  It is at the level of blameworthiness or fault of the author that the defence, if any, must operate.

    Nevertheless, it may be possible to accomodate mistaken belief as to defence into a statement of mens rea, depending on the scope of the definition.

    Mens rea has two distinct aspects, descriptive and normative.  Descriptive mens rea refers to various states of mind -- intentionally, recklessly, knowingly, negligently -- which the definition of an offence may require to exist in the author before he can be convicted of the offence.  It is the descriptive mens rea which is negated by mistake of fact as to an element of an offence (LRC clause 3(2)).

    Normative mens rea consists of blameworthiness, the fault necessary to sustain a conviction.  It is the expression which stands for the principle that there can be no criminal responsibility without fault.  This is the level of excuses and it is at this level that LRC clause 3(16) must operate.

    The members of the Working Group for Chapter 2 have not agreed on any general statement of mens rea.  If the statement ultimately developped deals with both descriptive and normative mens rea, then conceivably it could accomodate both 3(2) and 3(16).  If the statement is confined to descriptive mens rea, 3(16) must be dealt with separately.

    It is not known what statement for mens rea the members of the working group for Chapter 2 will devise; some members of that Working Group feel it is not possible to devise a general statement.  Some of the members of the Chapter 3 Working Group feel there are enough independent issues in clause 3(16) to warrant treatment in a separate rule in any case.

    Those independent issues include wilful blindness; the effect of intoxication on mistake of facts grounding a defence; and whether the applicable test for mistake should be objective [reasonable belief] or subjective [actual belief].  In general, the same issues arise here as in respect of the defence of mistake in clause 3(2), above, and are discussed in that part of this report.  Members feel that final resolution of these issues will require more intensive study of the policy implications and theoretical problems than was possible in the context of the present exercise.

    b.  Codification

    Three members feel the number of areas in clause 3(16) requiring policy decisions dictates that a provision addressing the issue should be codified.  Two members feel that it should be possible to devise a statement of mens rea which will accomodate all these concerns, and there should not be a codified defence of mistaken belief in a defence.

    c. Recommendations

1.  Reject clause 3(16) as drafted (unanimous).

2.  More work should be done towards the development of a general statement of mens rea, to allow a determination of whether the substance of clause 3(16) should be codified directly or dealt with as an aspect of mens rea (unanimous).

3.  The present law, which requires that in order for mistake to be a defence, the mistake has to be honestly held (as tested by reasonableness) is not adequate and a purely objective test of reasonableness should be substituted, to the effect that no one is criminally liable for reasonable conduct, including due care for the safety and security of innocent persons, under a reasonable belief that the conduct is lawful (the numbers were split on this point: 2 for, 3 against)." (pp. 25-27)


THE CANADIAN ASSOCIATION OF POLICE CHIEFS, An Evaluation of Volume I of  Report 30 Published by the Law Reform Commission Canada and Titled "Recodifying Criminal Law" for The Hon. Ray HNATYSHYN Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, [Ottawa?]: The Canadian Association of Police Chiefs, 1987, 112 p., see "Section 25: Mistaken Belief as to Defence", at p. 40;
"Would it not be more appropriate if the mistaken belief referred to in section 25(1) [Law Reform Commission Report 30, section 25, at Appendix A, p.103, see infra] was reasonably based?   In its present draft it is submitted that the belief required to invoke this defence be subjective only and therefore it is largely beyond the ability of the Crown to refute.  It is further submitted that such a mischief is inconsistent with the ordinary burdens justifiably and traditionally recognized by the criminal law." (p. 40)


CANADIAN BAR ASSOCIATION,  CRIMINAL RECODIFICATION TASK FORCE, Principles of Criminal Liability: Proposals for a New General Part of the Criminal Code - Report of the Criminal Recodification Task Force,  Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, [1992],  x, 190 p., and see "Mistake of Fact" at pp. 50-58, ISBN: 0920742335; Research Note: This book is also published in CANADA, House of Commons, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Sub-Committee on the Recodification of the General Part of the Criminal Code of the Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor Generalsupra, Issue 5 of 2 and 18 November 1992 at pp. 5A:1-5A:194; also published in French / aussi publié en français: ASSOCIATION  DU BARREAU CANADIEN, GROUPE DE TRAVAIL SUR LA NOUVELLE CODIFICATION DU DROIT PÉNAL, Principes de responsabilité pénale: proposition de nouvelles dispositions générales du Code criminel du Canada: Rapport du Groupe de travail sur la nouvelle codification du droit pénal, Ottawa : Association du Barreau canadien, [1992], xiii, 206 p., ISBN: 0920742351; Note de recherche : aussi publié dans CANADA, Chambre des Communes,  Procès-verbaux et témoignages du Sous-comité sur la Recodification de la Partie générale du Code criminel du Comité permanent de la justice et du Solliciteur général, supra, fasicule 5 du  2 et 18 novembre 1992 aux pp. 5A:224-5A:434;

"Mistaken belief in facts

9.  No person is liable for an offence committed through lack of knowledge which is due to mistake or ignorance as to the relevant circumstances; but where on the facts as the person believed them he or she would have committed an included offence, the person shall be liable for committing that included offence.

Caution respecting belief

10.  A court or jury, in determining whether a person had a particular belief in a set of facts, shall have regard to all the evidence including, where appropriate, the presence or absence of reasonable grounds for having that belief." (p. 50)

------

"Codified defences

The Task Force believes that clause 3(17) of the Law Reform Commission's recommendation [Report 31] is unnecessary.  No other surveyed jurisdiction has such duplication or detailed codification." (p. 58)


CANADIAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Submission to the Minister of Justice on the Proposals to Amend the Criminal Code (General Principles), [Ottawa]: [The Canadian Bar Association], January 1994, 12 p. (series; Legislative and Law Reform Submissions); infomation on the French version/informations sur la version française: L'Association du Barreau canadien, Mémoire au Ministre de la justice sur la proposition de modification du Code criminel (Principes généraux), [Ottawa]: [L'Association du Barreau canadien], janvier 1994, 12 p. (Collection; Mémoires - Législation et réforme du droit);

"3. OMISSIONS

A third overall objective of recodification is comprehensiveness.  The fact that the drafters have grafted new provisions onto an old structure results in significant omissions.  The following general principles are not addressed:

(a) provocation

(b) mistake of fact
(c) double jeopardy
(d) de minimus" (p. 10)

----------
 "3. OMISSIONS
Le troisième but général visé par la nouvelle codification est d'obtenir un énoncé exhaustif des principes généraux applicables.  En greffant de nouvelles dispositions sur une structure dépassée, les rédacteurs ont été coupables d'omissions importantes.  Ainsi les principes généraux suivants ne sont pas énoncés :

(a) la provocation
(b) l'erreur de fait
(c) l'autorité de la chose jugée
(d) la règle de minimis" (p. 10)

COLVIN, Eric, 1945 and Sanjeev Anand, Principles of Criminal Law, 3rd ed., Toronto: Thomson/Carswell, 2007, li, 599 p., ISBN: 978 0779813247;
 

COMMISSION OF INQUIRY CONCERNING CERTAIN ACTIVITIES OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE, Freedom and Security under the Law, Second Report -- Volume 1, [Ottawa]: The Commission, 1981, xxii, 664 p., and see "Mistake of fact", at PDF pp. 365-367, ISBN: 0660109514 and 0660109506 (vol. 1 and 2) (Chairman: Mr. Justice D.C. McDonald); also published in French/aussi publié en français: COMMISSION D'ENQUÊTE SUR CERTAINES ACTIVITÉS DE LA GENDARMERIE ROYALE DU CANADA, Liberté et la sécurité devant la loi: deuxième rapport -- volume 1, [Ottawa]: La Commission, 1981, ISBN: 0660907682 (vol.1 et 2) (Président: D.C. McDonald);


CONNELLY, Peter J., "Drunkenness and Mistake of Fact: Pappajohn v. The Queen; Swietlinski v. The Queen", (1981-82) 24 The Criminal Law Quarterly 49-65;


CÔTÉ-HARPER, Gisèle, 1942-, Pierre Rainville, 1964-, et  Jean Turgeon, 1951-, Traité de droit  pénal canadien, 4e édition refondue et augmentée, Cowansville: Éditions Yvon Blais, 1998, lv, 1458 p., voir en particulier les pp. 1031-1100, ISBN: 2894512589;

COUGHLAN, Stephen G., "Annotation: R. v. Ewanchuk, (1999) 22 C.R. (5th) 1 (Ont. C.A.)", (1999) 22 C.R. (5th)  6;

COTLER, Irwin, "War Crime and the Finta Case", (1995) 6 Supreme Court Law Review (2d) 577-646, and see in particular "Did the Court Err in its Characterization of the 'Obedience to Superior Orders' and 'Mistake of Fact' Defences?", at pp. 632-635;


Criminal Code / Code criminel, available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/  (accessed on 5 October 2007) et disponible à http://laws.justice.gc.ca/fr/home (visité le 5 octobre 2007);


Criminal Code -- Annotated used by practioners/ Code criminel annoté utilisé par les practiciens

    in English (published every year) /en anglais:


  GOLD, Allan D., The Practioner's Criminal Code, Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Canada, 2008;


GREENSPAN, Edward L. and Marc Rosenberg, annotations by, Martin's Annual Criminal Code 2008, Aurora: Canada Law Book Inc.;

WATT, David and Michelle Fuerst, annotations by, The 2008 Annotated Tremeear's Criminal Code, Toronto: Carswell, A Thomson Company;
 
in French/en français (publié chaque année):
COURNOYER, Guy et Gilles Ouimet, Code criminel annoté 2008, Cowansville: Éditions Yvon Blais, une société Thomson;

DUBOIS, Alain et Philip Schneider, Code criminel et lois connexes annotés 2008, Brossard: Publications CCH Ltée;

DELISLE, R.J., “Annotation: R. v. Park, (1995) 39 C.R. (4th)  287”, (1995) 39 Criminal Reports (4th) 287 [deals with mistake of fact as to consent for sexual offences];


Droste v. The Queen, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 208;

"The literature on transferred intent distinguishes between two kinds of situations in which the 'wrong victim' suffers harm at the hands of the accused.  The first, sometimes called error in objecto involves a mistake by the perpetrator as to the identity of the victim.  A gunman aims at and shoots a pedestrian on the street; the assailant thought the pedestrian was X, but in fact he is Y.  There is little controversy that this sort of mistake as to the identity in no way affacts the fact that the perpetrator has committed an intentional crime.  It is the second 'wrong victim' situation, sometimes called aberratio ictus, or more poetically, 'a mistake of the bullet' that has led to the controversy surrounding the doctrine of transferred intent.  In this second situation the perpetrator aims at X but by chance or lack of skill hits Y.  The appropriateness of assessing criminal liability as though the bullet had found its intended mark depends heavily upon one's evaluation of the importance of the identity of the victim as an element of the offence in question." (Dickson, J., p. 216)


DUBBER, Markus Dirk,  "Commentary" in Don Stuart, 1943-,  R.J. Delisle and Allan Manson, eds., Towards a Clear and Just Criminal Law: A Criminal Reports Forum, Scarborough (Ontario): Carswell, Thomson Professional Publishing, 1999, v, 574 p., at pp. 156-182, see "Mistake of Fact" at pp. 175-176, ISBN: 045927077X;  Research Note: commentary on Stuart, Don's proposals on the General Part in his article "A Case for a General Part", infra;

EWASCHUK, E.G. (Eugene G.), Criminal pleadings and practice in Canada, 2nd ed.,Aurora (Ont.) : Canada Law Book, 1987-, 4 v. (loose-leaf), and see vol. 2, Part "21: 6000  Mistake of Fact";  ISBN: 088804013X;

FEDERAL/PROVINCIAL WORKING GROUP ON HOMICIDE, Final Report of the Federal/Provincial Working Group on Homicide, [Ottawa], [Department of Justice Canada], June 1990, updated April 1991, xii, 170 p., and see "Recommendation 17  Mistake of Fact" at pp. 81-82 (Co-Chairmen: Howard F. Morton,  Ministry of the Attorney General, Province of Ontario and Jean-François Dionne, Quebec Department of Justice); copy of this report was obtained by François Lareau under an Access to Information Act request response dated November 9, 1998, file A-98-00183 from the Department of Justice Canada; also available in French / aussi disponible en français : Groupe de travail fédéral-provincial sur l'homicide, Rapport final du groupe de travail fédéral-provincial sur l'homicide, [Ottawa], [Ministère de la Justice Canada], juin 1990, révisé avril 1991, xii, 172 p. et voir "Recommandation 17 Erreur de fait", aux pp. 84-85 (Co-Présidents:  Howard F. Morton, Ministère du Procureur général de l'Ontario et Jean-François Dionne, Ministère de la Justice du Québec); copie de ce rapport a été obtenu par François Lareau dans la réponse en date du 9 novembre 1998 de sa demande à la Loi sur l'accès à l'information, au Ministère de la Justice Canada, dossier A-98-00183;

"Recommendation 17  Mistake of Fact

(1) For the purpose of this part, an honest but mistaken belief, in facts which, if true, would not constitute the offence charged, is a defence to that charge.

(2) In determining whether or not a mistaken belief referred to subsection (1), was honest, the trier of fact may take into account the presence or absence of reasonable grounds for such a belief.

(3) In determining whether or not a mistaken belief referred to in subsection (1) was honest, the trier of fact may take into account the failure of the person charged to make prudent inquiries as to relevant facts where, under the circumstances, the person charged had reason to suspecty that his belief about such fact was mistaken.

(4) Subsection (1) does not apply as a defence to homicide crimes that are committed by recklessness or negligence where the mistake is due to the accused's recklessness as negligence as the case may be.

(5) The common law with respect to mistake of fact is abolished." (p. 81)

-----------

"Recommandation 17   Erreur de fait

(1) Aux fins de la présente partie, la perception de bonne foi, quoique erronée, au moment pertinent, de faits importants qui, s'ils étaient réels, n'auraient pas constitué l'infraction reprochée est un moyen de défense contre cette inculpation.

(2) Afin de déterminer si la perception erronée visée au paragraphe (1) était ou non de bonne foi, le juge des faits peut prendre en considération la présence ou l'absence de motifs raisonnables à l'appui de cette perception.

(3) Afin de déterminer si la perception erronée visée au paragraphe (1) était ou non de bonne foi, le juge des faits peut prendre en considération le défaut de l'accusé de vérifier les faits pertinents à proposes desquels, eu égard aux circonstances, il aurait dû soupçonner son erreur.

(4) Le paragraphe (1) ne constitue pas un moyen de défense contre une inculpation d'homicide commis par insouciance ou par imprudence si l'erreur est attribuable, selon le cas, à l'insouciance ou à l'imprudence de l'accusé.

(5) La common law relative à l'erreur de fait est abrogée." (p. 84)

FERGUSON, Gerry, "Recent Developments in Canadian Criminal Law", (2000) 24(4) Criminal Law Journal 248-263, see "Consent,  mistaken belief in consent and sexual assault" at  pp. 257-259;
 

FERGUSON, Gerry  A. and John C. Bouck, Canadian Criminal Jury Instructions (CRIMJI), 3rd edition, vol. 2, Vancouver (British Columbia) : Continuing Legal Education Society of British  Columbia, 1994-,  ISBN: 0865047715, see "CRIMJI  Mistake of Fact - Honest Belief” at 8.44;

R. v. Finta, 1994 CanLII 129 (S.C.C.), Cory, J.; available at  http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1994/1994canlii129/1994canlii129.html  (accessed on 29 September 2007);

The common law defence of mistake of fact is based on the concept that to have a guilty state of mind, the accused must have knowledge of the factual elements of the crime he is committing. In other words, although an accused may commit a prohibited act, he is generally not guilty of a criminal offence where he is ignorant of or mistaken as to a factual element of the offence. (See for example R. v. Prue, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 547.) An accused is deemed to have acted under the state of facts he or she honestly believed to exist when he or she did the act alleged to be a criminal offence. (See Beaver v. The Queen, [1957] S.C.R. 531, and Pappajohn v.The Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 120.) The trial judge also instructed the jury that this defence was available to the respondent;


FORBES, Brian N., "Mistake of Fact with Regard to Defences in Tort Law", (1970) 4 Ottawa Law Review 306-311; 


FORTIN, Isabelle et Valérie Lessard, "Le critère de vraisemblance en matière d'erreur sur le consentement dans les cas d'agression sexuelle", (1996) 10 Revue juridique des étudiants et étudiantes de l'Université Laval ( R.J.E.U.L) 177 (1 p. seulement); il s'agit du sommaire d'un travail de recherche de 35 pages, numéro 96-15 que l'on peut commander;
 

FORTIN, Jacques et Louise Viau, "La réforme de la responsabilité pénale par la Cour suprême du Canada", (1979) 39 Revue du Barreau 526-558, voir "Erreur de fait" aux pp. 543-550 et 556;


___________Traité de droit pénal général, Montréal: Éditions Thémis, 1982, xi, 457 p.;


FRIEDLAND, M.L. (Martin Lawrence), 1932-,  and Kent Roach, 1961-, Criminal Law and Procedure : Cases and Materials, 8th ed., Toronto: Emond Montgomery Publications, 1997,  xxvii, 1020 p., ISBN: 0920722962, see on mistake of fact, pp. 601-634; note: there is also a 9th ed., published by Kent Roach, Patrick Healy and Gary T. Trotter, Criminal law and procedure : cases and materials, 9th ed., Toronto : Emond Montgomery Publications, 2004, xxiv, 1068 p., ISBN:1552391183, and see table of contents at http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/g4/0/1552391183_4647in.pdf  (accessed on 30 September 2007);


FUERST, Michelle K., Defending Sexual Offences, 2nd ed., Carswell, 2000, ix, 162  p., see Chapter 8, "The Defences of Consent and Mistaken Belief in Consent", at pp. 71-78 (series; Carswell practice guides), ISBN: 0459260839; copy at the Supreme Court of Canada, KF9325 F84 2000;


GALLOWAY, Donald, “Annotation: R. v. Moreau (1986), 51 C.R. (3d)  209 (Ont.C.A.)”, (1986) 51 C.R. (3d) 210-211;


GALLOWAY, Donald, “Annotation: R. v. Sansregret (1983), 37 C.R. (3d) 45 (Man. C.A.)”, (1984) 37 C.R. (3d) 45-46;


GANS, Jeremy, "When Should the Jury be Directed on the Mental Element of Rape", (1996) 20 Criminal Law Journal 247-266; important part dealing with Canadian law; defence of mistake of fact; important Canadian content;

HORWITZ, Stephen, Research paper on cases  and materials on ignorance of law and mistake of fact prepared by Stephen Horowitz for the Law Reform Commission of Canada,  [Ottawa] : Law Reform Commission, 1977, ii, 29 p.; copy at the National Library, Ottawa; cited in Law Reform Commision of Canada, Fourteenth Annual Report 1984-1985, Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1985, 52, [3], p. at p. 36 (under the title: Cases  and Materials on Ignorance of Law and mistake of Fact , ISBN: 0662539575;


INSTITUTE OF LAW RESEARCH AND REFORM, Defences to Provincial Charges, Edmonton: The Institute of Law Research and Reform, March 1984, ii, 123 p., see "Mistake of Fact" at pp. 60-63 (series; Report No. 39);

KAMEL-TOUEG, Nabil, Précis de droit pénal général - Droit pénal I, 2e édition, Mont-Royal (Province of Québec) : Modulo Édiiteur, 1994, ix, 242 p.,  ISBN: 2891135024;


LAPOINTE, Pierre, "Les infractions criminelles", dans Barreau du Québec, École, Droit pénal: Infractions, moyens de défense et peine, Cowansville: Éditions Yvon Blais, 2007, aux pp. 54-121 et  voir les "défenses d'erreur" pour les crimes sexuels aux pp. 90-92 (erreur sur l'âge et le consentement) (Collection; Collection de droit 2007-2008; vol. 12), ISBN: 9782896350322; copie à la Bibliothèque de la Cour suprême du Canada, KF 385 ZB5 C681 v. 12 1007-08; note: voir aussi la contribution de BOURQUE, supra, dans le même livre;
 

LAREAU, François, "The Difference Between Negligent Homicide and Reckless Homicide when Both of them Involve Consciousness of the Risk", article presented at the Society for the Reform of Criminal Law Conference "Reform of the Criminal Law", 26-29 July 1987, London, England, 21 p. and  1 page errata; paper mentioned in "[Conference Report]: Reform of the Criminal Law - The Inns of Court, London, England, July 26-29, 1987", (1989) 1 Criminal Law Forum 91-98 at 95; see a revised version : The Distinction between Conscious Negligence and Recklessness;


"III- Some Thoughts on Recklessness (or Dolus Eventualis) and Conscious Negligence

We have already alluded to the first difference between the two concepts.  While both recklessness and conscious negligence involve foresight, the former amounts to voluntary conduct (towards the objective)  and the latter to involuntary conduct.
 
Secondly, for recklessness, the result is less important in value than the object of the agent's conduct while for conscious negligence, it is the contrary. 20   For example, in a situation of negligent homicide, had the accused realized his mistake by thinking seriously, reasonably and sufficiently about the matter, he would have refrained from acting.  Professor Fletcher writes that conscious negligence involves an affirmative aversion to the harmful "side-effect".21   Professor Fletcher explains: 
The best way to state the distinction is to employ a contrafactual conditional.  If the actor knew the side effect was going to occur, would he act in the same way?  If yes, then the actor is reconciled to the side-effect. 22
A possible third difference (which I have found brilliant) is that foresight at the precise instant of acting may have disappeared in cases of conscious negligence.  If the actor no longer takes into consideration the risk, having concluded that it will not result, is he or she not then unconscious of the risk?  This opinion would mean that at the time of the action (or omission), the conscious negligence has turned itself into unconscious negligence. 23
 
The theory of mistake may be helpful in resolving or confirming the distinction between recklessness and conscious negligence.  Mistake of fact, if honest and unreasonable, does negate recklessness but not negligence.  With conscious negligence, the actor makes a mistake by concluding that the unlawful result will not occur.  A mistake in cases of negligence does not eliminate the offence, since the essence of negligence in these cases is having made that unreasonable mistake.  As Professor Williams has stated: "Where the crime requires gross negligence the mistake to justify conviction must be grossly unreasonable".24
......
----------
20.  Ibid. [Paul Logoz, Commentaire sur le Code pénal suisse, Neuchâtel: Delachaux & Niestlé, 1976, 569 p., at p. 97, ISBN: 2603000578] at pp. 92-94.  Professor Logoz states at pp. 92-93:
 
[dolus eventualis / translation by me] Given the choice between two unpleasant solutions (either give up the desired act, or carry out that act but risk bringing about some harmful result), the actor chose the second.  For him, the harmful consequence of his act is simply the least of two evils.  So in the end one can say that in the case of dolus eventualis, the actor made up his mind out of selfishness to go ahead with the act anyway. ....
[conscious negligence / translation by me].   ...[the] individual acted not out of selfishness but out of rashness; he did not give the matter sufficient thought.

See also Hermann Mannheim,  "Mens Rea in German and English Criminal Law  [Part I, II and III]", (1935) 17 Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law (3rd series) 82-101 at pp. 92-93; 236-250; and (1936) vol. 18, pp. 78- 93;

21. Fletcher, supra, note 1 [Rethinking Criminal Law, Boston: Little, Brown, 1978,], at p. 446. 

22. Ibid.

23.  See the authorities mentioned in Gillis Erenius, Criminal Negligence and Individuality, Stockholm: P.A. Norstedt & Söners Förlag, 1976, 282 p. at p. 78 (series; Institutet för Rättsvetenskaplig Forskning (IFRF); vol. 85), ISBN: 9117670713.  See also Morkel, supra, note 9, at pp. 330-331.

24. Glanville Williams, Criminal Law: The General Part, 2nd ed., London: Stevens & Sons, 1961, liv, 929 p. at p. 202."


____________ Légitime défense et théorie, thèse LL.M., Université d'Ottawa, 1992, xii, 335 p., et voir les pp. 127-198 sur la légitime défense putative (directeur: André Jodouin);
PDF
- Jury, sommaire (1 p.) et résumé (4 p.);
-
English Synopsis
- pp.
i-xii et 1-126;
- pp.
127-221;
- pp.
222-335;


LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, The General Part -- Liability and Defences, Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1982, [ix], 204 p., and see "Mistake or Ignorance of Fact", at pp. 71-76 (series; Working Paper; 29), ISBN: 0662514297; available at my Digital Library http://www.lareau-law.ca/DigitalLibrary.html; information on the French version/informations sur la version française, COMMISSION DE RÉFORME DU DROIT DU CANADA, Partie générale -- responsabilité et moyens de défense, Ottawa: Commission de réforme du droit du Canada, 1982, [x], 239 p., (Collection; Document de travail; 29); ISBN: 0662514297;


___________Recodifying Criminal Law: Volume I, Ottawa:  Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1986, [xiii],117 p., (series; Report; 30), ISBN: 0662547322; available at my Digital Library http://www.lareau-law.ca/DigitalLibrary.html; information on the French version/informations sur la version française, COMMISSION DE RÉFORME DU DROIT DU CANADA, Pour une nouvelle codification du droit pénal: Volume I, Ottawa: Commission de réforme du droit du Canada, 1986, [12], 131 p. (Collection; rapport; 30), ISBN: 0662547322;

_____________ Recodifying Criminal Law (Revised and Enlarged Edition of Report 30), Ottawa:  Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1987, [16], 213 p., see "Lack of Knowledge", "Mistake of Fact"and "Exception", at p. 30;  "Mistaken Belief as to Defence" at pp. 41-42; "Different Crime from That Furthered", at p. 47; and "Alternative Convictions", at pp. 47-48 (series; Report; 31), ISBN: 0662547578; available at my Digital Library http://www.lareau-law.ca/DigitalLibrary.html; information on the French version/informations sur la version française, COMMISSION DE RÉFORME DU DROIT DU CANADA, Pour une nouvelle codification du droit pénal (Édition révisée et augmentée du rapport no 30) , Ottawa: Commission de réforme du droit du Canada, 1987, [16], 233 p. (Collection; rapport; 31), ISBN: 0662547578;
 

LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF SASKATCHEWAN, Proposals for Defences to Provincial Offences: Report to the Minister of Justice,  Saskatoon : Law Reform Commission of Saskatchewan, December 1986, 18 p., see "Common Law Defences";

LIBMAN, Rick,  1956-, Libman on regulatory offences in Canada, Saltspring Island, BC : Earlscourt Legal Press, c2002-, 1 v. (loose-leaf), see in partuclar Chapter 4, "Public Welfare Offences Involving Mens Rea"; Chapter 5, "Absolute Liability Offences"; Chapter 6, "Strict Liability Offences", Chapter 7, "The Defence of Due Diligence"; and Chapter 8, "Other Defences" (8.7,  Mistake of Fact; 8.8, Lack of Mens Rea), ISBN: 0968233864; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa, KF 1292 A6 L53 2002;

LUCAS, David, The Rule of Law and Defences of Justification and Excuse: Some Problems Areas, LL.M. thesis, University of Montreal, Faculty of Law, July 1981, vi, 262 p., see "self-defence, justification or excuse" at pp. 123-141 and "Mistake and its effect on a claim of self-defence", pp. 141-182;


MacDONALD, Donald, 1952-, Rape and Consent -- The Defense of Mistake of Fact,  prepared for the Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Ottawa, Library of Parliament, 1982, 12 leaves; copy at the Library of Parliament, J 103 H7 1980/83 L4 226; deals with the Supreme Court of Canada decision of R. v. Papajohn, [1980] 2 Supreme Court Reports 120 and Bill C-53 amending the Criminal Code for sexual offences;

MARCOTTE, Alain,  "Les moyens de défense en matière pénale dans le contexte de l'obligation de protection du travailleur, victime potentielle",  dans Développements récents en droit de la santé et sécurité au travail, 2001, Cowansville (Québec): Éditions Yvon Blais, 2001, xii, 308 p. aux pp. 171-204 (Collection; Service de la formation permanente Barreau du Québec; vol. 148), ISBN: 2895414700; voir "L'erreur de fait raisonable" aux pp. 194-196; droit pénal provincial;


MARIN, André, "When is an 'Honest but Mistaken Belief in Consent'  NOT an 'Honest but Mistaken Belief in Consent' ", (1995) 37 The Criminal Law Quarterly 451-460 [Table of Contents: "Introduction.  The Impact of Seaboyer.  Section 276 and the Claimed 'Honest but Mistaken Belief in Consent'. Conclusion"];


McCALLA, W., "Transferred Intent in Murder", (1981) 18 C.R. (3d) 66-74; discusses also aberratio ictus;

McKINNON, G.D. (Gil D.), "Mistake of Fact", May 15, 1991, 26 p., (series; Working Paper, Canadian Bar Association, National Criminal Justice Sextion, Committee on on Criminal Code Reform; number 3);  paper prepared for the The Canadian Bar Association Task Force, mentioned in The Canadian Bar Association Task Force, The Canadian Bar Association Task Force Report: Principles of Criminal Liability - Proposals for a New General Part of the Criminal Code, Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association,  [1992], x, 190 p., at p. 189;  ISBN: 0920742335; available from the Canadian Bar Association in Ottawa; copy at the University of Montreal, Library of the Faculty of Law, call number: HAAD W926 v. o3 1991;

MEWETT, Alan W., 1930-, "The Reckless Rape", (1975-76) 18 The Criminal Law Quarterly 418-420;

"Thus, whether the mistake is 'reasonable' or 'unreasonable' is not the right way of putting the problem; nor whether rape is an offence of general or specific intent.  What the jury should be instructed is to convict the accused if they find that he knew the woman was not consenting or if they find that he was reckless as to whether she consented or not and, in the latter question, all the circumstances, such as the consumption of alcohol, the conduct of the woman, or the time and place of the episode, must be considered." (p. 420)

MEWETT, Allan W., 1930-,  and Morris Manning, Mewett & Manning on Criminal Law (previously published under title: Criminal Law), 3rd ed, Toronto: Butterworths, 1994, lxiv, 959 p., ISBN: 0409903752 (bound) and 0433396458 (pbk.); “Table of Contents...Chapter 11: Mistake...363 to 401; I. Mistake and Mens Rea; II. Reasonableness and Mistake; III. The Innocence of the Mistake: Transferred Intent; IV. Mistake of Law; V. Statutory Regulations”;

OLIVER, V.L., "Ignorance or Mistake of Fact as a Defence in Military Law", (January 1957) The JAG Journal 13-16;

OSCAPELLA, Eugene, "Criminal Law: Charge of Trafficking in LSD: Accused Selling LSD Believing It to be Mescaline: Effect of Mistake on Conviction: The Queen v. Kundeus 5 N.R. 471", (1976) 8 Ottawa Law Review 91;

Pappajohn v. The Queen, 1980 CanLII 13 (S.C.C.); available in English /disponible en français à  http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1980/1980canlii13/1980canlii13.html


PARKER, Graham, E., 1933-, "Annotation: Mistake of Fact versus Transferred Intent" (1976) 32 C.R.N.S. 150-162;

PARENT, Hugues, 1970-, "La négligence criminelle en droit pénal canadien: analyse descriptive et critique d'un concept en pleine évolution", (May/mai 2006) 10(3) Canadian Criminal law Review / Revue canadienne de droit pénal 259-298, et voir "L'erreur" aux pp. 271-277;


___________ Traité de droit criminel, Tome 1. L'acte volontaire et les  moyens de défense, Montréal : Éditions Thémis, 2003, xxviii, 587 p., voir "L'erreur de fait" aux pp. 283-327, ISBN: 2894001703;


___________Traité de droit criminel, Tome Premier:  L'imputabilité, 2e édition, Montréal : Éditions Thémis, 2005, xxxii, 1023 p., voir "L'erreur de fait", aux pp. 365-438, ISBN: 2894001703; copie à la Bibliothèque de la Cour suprême du Canada, KF 9220 ZA2 P39 2005, t. 1, c. 01;

PICKARD, Toni, "Culpable Mistakes and Rape: Harsh Words on Pappajohn", (1980) 30 University of Toronto Law Journal  415-420;


____________"Culpable Mistakes and Rape: Relating Mens Rea to the Crime", (1980) 30 University of Toronto Law Journal  75-98;

POPPLE, A.E., “Annotation: Mistake as a defence”, (1955) 20 C.R. 297-300;

“Practice Note: Defence of honest belief”, (1964) 43 C.R. 228;


“Practice Note: Honest belief as a defence”, (1963) 40 C.R. 145;

QUIGLEY, Tim, "Annotation: R. v. Slater, (2005) 31 C.R. (6th) 112 (Saskatchewan Court of Appeal)", (2005) 31 Criminal Reports (6th) 113; charge of obtaining sexual services and mistake as to age defence;

okR. c. Trottier, 2002 CanLII 41589 (QC C.Q.), disponible à http://www.canlii.org/fr/qc/qccq/doc/2002/2002canlii41589/2002canlii41589.html (vérifié le 19 octobre 2007);

"DÉCISION

[25]           La poursuite a prouvé les éléments essentiels de l'infraction: le défendeur a utilisé de façon intentionnelle la force sur le bénéficiaire, sans son consentement.

[26]           Il s'agit maintenant de décider si le défendeur était justifié, pour des motifs raisonnables, de recourir à la force. De plus, il faut déterminer si le geste présente un caractère excessif.

[27]           Le Tribunal doit en premier lieu examiner si le défendeur était autorisé par la loi à utiliser la force en raison de ses fonctions. Autrement dit, l'article 25 du Code criminel est-il applicable?

[28]            Outres les dispositions du Code criminel, les procureurs ne réfèrent le Tribunal à aucune source législative, jurisprudentielle ou doctrinale à l'appui de leur thèse respective.

[29]           La défense s'appuie essentiellement sur la description de tâches du préposé aux bénéficiaires, prévoyant notamment ce qui suit: «Intervenir physiquement lorsque nécessaire. Assurer la sécurité sur le département».

[30]           Le Tribunal n'est pas convaincu que cette description correspond à une autorisation prévue par la loi. Après tout, une description de tâches est un document négocié entre des parties, assimilable à un contrat. Comme l'écrit la juge Bergeron dans Procureur général du Québec c. D.B., un protocole d'intervention, prévoyant le recours à la force, n'est pas une loi et ne peut autoriser ce qui est légalement proscrit[3].

[31]           L'autorisation, au sens de l'article 25, doit nécessairement trouver une assise dans la loi.

[32]           Le Tribunal trouve un premier élément de réponse dans l'admission des parties: le bénéficiaire est hospitalisé légalement pour suivre des traitements psychiatriques.

[33]           Or, l'article 118.1 de la Loi sur les services de santé et les services sociaux[4], permet le recours à la force comme mesure de contrôle d'une personne dans un établissement. Ce recours n'est cependant possible «…que pour l'empêcher de s'infliger ou d'infliger à autrui des lésions. L'utilisation d'une telle force doit être minimale et exceptionnelle et doit tenir compte de l'état physique et mental de la personne.»

[34]           De plus, le Tribunal tient compte de la Loi sur la protection des personnes dont l'état mental présente un danger pour elles-mêmes ou pour autrui[5] et des articles 26 à 31 du Code civil du Québec. La doctrine enseigne que le cadre d'intervention prévu par ces dispositions «…peut entraîner la privation de liberté pour un individu et sa détention contre son gré, pour une durée indéterminée, dans un hôpital.»[6]

[35]           Si un bénéficiaire, en vertu de la loi, peut être privé de sa liberté, des mesures doivent nécessairement être prises pour rencontrer cet objectif.

[36]           De telles mesures peuvent entraîner l'utilisation d'une force raisonnable, lorsque les circonstances le commandent, pour la sécurité du bénéficiaire et des autres patients. Le Tribunal interprète dans ce sens le mot «lésions» de l'article 118.1.

[37]           Selon cette logique, le Tribunal conclut que le défendeur est une personne autorisée par la loi à utiliser la force nécessaire, en raison de ses fonctions, selon l'article 25 du Code criminel.

[38]           Cette interprétation de la loi colle d'ailleurs à la description de tâches et aux témoignages entendus. Guy Privé, préposé aux bénéficiaires, Lise Caron, infirmière auxiliaire, Roger Tremblay, assistant infirmier chef, et le défendeur, ont déclaré au Tribunal qu'il arrive au personnel, en certaines circonstances, pour des raisons de sécurité, d'intervenir physiquement à l'endroit des bénéficiaires.

[39]           Vu cette conclusion concernant l'application de l'article 25 du Code criminel, il ne sera pas nécessaire de décider si le bénéficiaire est un intrus au sens de l'article 41. [...]¸"


RANDALL, Melanie, "Sexual Assault in Spousal Relationships, 'Continuous Consent', and the Law: Honest But Mistaken Judicial Beliefs", (2008) 32(2) Manitoba Law Journal 144-181;


ROACH, Kent, 1961-, Criminal Law, 3rd ed., Toronto : Irwin Law, 2004, xx, 421 p. (series; Essentials of Canadian Law), ISBN: 155221091X;


ROSENBERG, Marc, "Mistake of Fact and Law" in National Criminal Law Program Substantive Criminal Law, vol. 3, St. John's Newfoundland, 1986, pp. A1-A39; Research Note: this program of substantive criminal Law  is given every two or three years by the Federation of Law Societies of Canada so there is a more recent version but not necessarily by the same author;

ROY, Simon, 1959-, L'erreur de fait attribuable à l'intoxication comme moyen de "défense" en droit criminel canadien, thèse LL.M., Université Laval, 2001, viii, 166 feuilles; bibliographie aux pp. 156-166;  monsieur Roy est professeur de droit à l'Université de Sherbrooke;


RUTHERFORD, Douglas, "But honestly, I didn't know ...", in National criminal law program (2001 : Charlottetown, P.E.I.), ed., National criminal law program / The Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Charlottetown : Federation of Law Societies, 2001, in vol. 2 of 2; copy at Department of Justice Canada, Prairies Region, Edmonton Office, Law Library, call number: KF 9655 N36 2001; title noted but not consulted yet;


SCHABAS, William A., Les infractions d'ordre sexuel, Éditions Yvon Blais, 1995, 400 p., ISBN: 2890739791;


SHADLEY, Richard, "Mistake" in National Criminal Law Program: Substantive Criminal Law, Winnipeg, Man.: The Federation of Law Societies of Canada, 1996, vol. 2 of 2, section 16.1, 13 p;  Notes: "University of Manitoba, Winnipeg, Manitoba, July 15 to 19, 1996"; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada; does it deal with mistake of fact also?---------------
 

SHEELY, E., “The Defence of Mistake...”, on reserve at the desk of Fauteux Library, University of Ottawa # ZZ Q 0446 (as of Oct. 1997); note: I did not get full title but the title also mention the proposal of codification;--------------------------

SHEEHY, Elizabeth, and Christine Boyle, "Justice L'Heureux-Dubé and Canadian Sexual Assault Law: Resisting the Privaitization of Rape", in Elizabeth Sheehy, ed., Adding Feminism to Law: The
Contributions of Justice Claire L'Heureux-Dubé
, Toronto: Irwin Law, 2004, viii, 390 p., at pp. 247-283, ISBN: 1552210855; copy at the Library of Parliament, Br.B KE 8248 L44 A73;

 
SIMMONS, Anne Marie, "Mistake", in National Criminal Law Program (2004 : Halifax, N.S.), Dalhousie University, Faculty of Law, and Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Substantive criminal law : 2004 National Criminal Law Program, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, July 12 to 16, 2004 / presented by the Federation of Law Societies of Canada in conjunction with the Faculty of Law, Dalhousie University, [s.l. : s.n.], 2004, 3 v., in volume 2, Tab 13.1, 15 p.; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada KF9220 ZA2 N38 2004; 
 

SMART, W.B., "Mistake" in National Criminal Law Program: Substantive Criminal Law (1993: Montreal), [ed.],  National Criminal Law Program, The Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Montreal (PQ): Federation of Law Societies, 1993, 2 volumes; information from  http://gate.library.ualberta.ca/ (The GATE:  NEOS Libraries' Catalogue) as seen on 11 November 2000; document not consulted;


SNIVELY, Pamela, "Mistake of Fact" brief presented to CANADA, Chambre des Communes/House of Commons,Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Sub-Committee on the recodification of the General Part of the Criminal Code of the Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General/ Procès-verbaux et témoignages du Sous-comité sur la Recodification de la Partie générale du Code criminel du Comité permanent de la justice et du Solliciteur général, Issue/Fasicule 2: June 15, 1992, at pp. 2A:26 to 2A:33;  the French version/ la version française "L'erreur de fait" se trouve aux pp. 2A:140 à 2A:151;
 

STUART, Don, 1943-, Canadian Criminal Law: A Treatise, 5th ed., Toronto: Thomson/Carswell, 2007, xix, 815 p., ISBN: 978 0779812950;


__________ "A Case for A General Part" in Don Stuart, 1943-,  R.J. Delisle and Allan Manson, eds., Towards a Clear and Just Criminal Law: A Criminal Reports Forum, Scarborough (Ontario): Carswell, Thomson Professional Publishing, 1999, v, 574 p., at pp. 95-145, see "Mistake of Fact" at pp. 118-119,  ISBN: 045927077X; 

"TEXT OF SUGGESTED GENERAL PART
...
Mistake of Fact
15. (1) Where the fault requirement is intent or recklessness, to excuse a mistaken belief need not be reasonable although resonableness is relevant to determining whether the belief existed.

(2) Where the fault requirement is criminal negligence, to excuse a mistaken belief must be reasonable.

(3) Where the accused has a mistaken belief within the meaning of subsections (1) or (2), he or she may nevertheless be convicted of an included or attempted offence where the belief constitutes the requisite fault for that offence." (see pp. 139 and 142)


___________“Annotation: R. v. Bulmer (1987) 58 C.R. (3d) 48 (S.C.C.)”, (1987) 58 C.R. (3d) 49-50;
 

___________"Annotation: R. v. Cornejo, (2004) 18 C.R. (6th) 124 (Ont. C.A.)", (2004 18 Criminal Reports (6th) 126-127; mistaken belief in consent, s. 273.2(b) of the Criminal Code;


___________"Annotation: R. v. Ewanchuk, (1998) 13 C.R. (5th) 324 (Alta. C.A.), (1998) 13 C.R. (5th) 330-331; deals with consent for a sexual offence;


___________"Annotation: R. v. Livermore, (1994) 31 C.R. (4th) 374 (Ont. C.A.)", (1994) 31 Criminal Reports  (4th) 375-376; "mistaken belief defence to sexual assault; air of reality test not necessary to be supported by source other than the accused"];
 

__________"Annotation: R. v. Livermore, (1996) 43 C.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.)", (1996) 43 Criminal Reports (4th) 5-6;


___________"Annotation R. v. O. (M.), (2001) 36 C.R. (5th) 258 (S.C.C.)", (2001) 36 C.R. (5th) 259;


___________“Annotation: R. v. Osolin (1994) 26 C.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.)”, (1994) 26 C.R. (4th) 7-9;


___________“Annotation: R. v. Roche, (1984) 40 C.R. (3d) 138 (Ont. County Ct.)”, (1984) 40 C.R. (3d) 138-139;


___________"Annotation: R. v. Roche, (1985) 46 C.R. (3d) 160  (Ont. C.A.)", (1985) 46 C.R. (3d) 161; on interpretation of s. 246.1 of the Criminal Code and the defence of mistake of fact as to consent;
 

___________"Annotation: R. v. Went, (2005) 25 C.R. (6th) 350 (British Columbia Supreme Court) 350", (2005) 25 Criminal Reports (6th) 352-353;
 

___________"Ewanchuk: Asserting 'No Means No' at the Expense of Fault and proportionality Principles", (1999) 22 Criminal Reports (5th series) 39-49;


____________"Sexual Assault: Substantive Issues Before And After Bill C-49", (1993) 35 The Criminal Law Quarterly 241-263;

____________"Pappajohn: Safeguarding Fundamental Principles", (1980-81) 26 McGill Law Journal 348-361;


___________"White Paper Proposals on Subjective and Objective Standards of Fault and Defences, Mistake of Fact and Transferred Intent", [Ottawa] : Law Reform Division, Department . of Justice Canada, 1994, 21 p., available at my Digital Library; information on the French version - translation /informations sur la version française - Traduction : "Les normes subjectives et objectives applicables - la faute, les moyens de défense, l'erreur de fait le transfert d'intention : la proposition du livre blanc,  [Ottawa] : Division de la réforme du droit, Ministère de la justice du Canada, 1994, 25 p.; disponible à  http://web.archive.org/web/20020117052514/http://129.128.19.162/docs/whpafdoj.html et  Bibliothèque numérique (visionnés le 5 juillet 2008);

"1.  Mistake of Fact
...
Recommendation 6.  There should be a provision that a mistake of fact need merely be honest in the case of awareness of risk crimes but must also be reasonable in the case of negligence offences."  (pp. 18-19)


"2.  Transferred Intent
...
Recommendation 7.  There should be a provision that where an accused has a mistaken belief she can be convicted on the facts as she believed them to be of an included offence, which might be an attempt to commit the offence intended." (p. 19)
.

SUGUNASIRI, Shalin M., Integrating equality into the criminal constitutional context sexual assault, mistake of fact and minimum mens rea, LL.M. thesis, Dalhousie University 2002, vii, 168 leaves; copy at Dalhousie University, Law Library, Sir James Dunn Library; title of thesis noted in my research but thesis not consulted (22 February 2003);


TANOVICH, David M., Annual Review of Criminal Law 1999-2000, Scarborough (Ontario): Carswell, Thomson Professional Publishing, 2000, xxv, 247 p., see "Consent" at pp. 98-102, ISBN: 0459276913; comments on R. v. Ewanchuk,


TANOVICH, David M. and Gerry Ferguson, Annual Review of Criminal Law 2001, Carswell, a Thomson Company, 2002, xxvii, 200 p., ISBN: 0459271148; see  "Consent and Exercise of Authority" at p. 38 (less than one page) and "Mistaken Belief in Consent: Sexual Assault" at pp. 42-46;


TUR, Richard H.S., "Rape: Reasonableness and Time", (1981) 1 Oxford Journal of legal Studies 432-441, and see "Papajohn: When is honest mistake operative?" at pp. 432-438; copy at Ottawa University, KD 418 .O93  Location: FTX Periodicals;

VANDERVORT, Lucinda,  "The Defence of Belief in Consent: Guidelines and Jury Instructions for Application of Criminal Code Section 265(4)", (2005) 50 The Criminal Law Quarterly 441-452;
 

___________"Honest Beliefs, Credible Lies, and Culpable Awareness: Rhetoric, Inequality, and Mens Rea in Sexual Assault", (Spring 2004) 42(4) Osgoode Hall Law Journal 625-660;  available at  http://www.ohlj.ca/archive/articles/42_4_vandervort.pdf  (accessed on 30 September 2007);
 

__________"Sexual Assault: Availability of the Defence of Belief in Consent", (2005) 84 The Canadian Bar Review 89-105;
 

__________"To Codify or Not Codify the Principles of Criminal Responsibility: A Question of Fundamental Justice and Equality" in Don Stuart, 1943-,  R.J. Delisle and Allan Manson, eds., Towards a Clear and Just Criminal Law: A Criminal Reports Forum, Scarborough (Ontario): Carswell, Thomson Professional Publishing, 1999, v, 574 p., pp. 231-242, see p. 239, "(e) Section 15 - Mistake of Fact", ISBN: 045927077X; note: comments on Professor Don Stuart's draft General Part found at  pp. 95-145;


VERDUN-JONES, Simon N. (Simon Nicholas), 1947-,  Criminal Law in Canada: Cases, Questions & The Code, 4th ed., Thomson/Nelson, 2006,  xvi, 332 p., see Chapter 9, "Mistake of Fact, Consent, and Mistake of Law as Defences to a Criminal Charge" at pp. 212-242, ISBN: 0176407170; copy at the Library of Parliament, Br.B  KE 8809 V47 2007;
 

WATT,  David, 1948-, Ontario Specimen Jury Instructions (Criminal), Toronto: Thomson/Carswell,  [2003], xiii, 1101 p., see "Final 73, Mistake", at p. 1045, ISBN: 0459254928; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa, KF 9682 W38 2003 c. 01;


__________ "The Relationship between Mistake of Fact, Wilful Blindness and Recklessness - John Henry Sansregret v. The Queen, unreported, May 9, 1985 (S.C.C.) in Criminal Law Audio Series, Toronto: Criminal Law Audio Series, 1985, tape 6, side 1, # 1, 20 minutes on audio cassette;


___________"The Submissions of Defences to the Jury: General principles and Mistake of Fact Cases.  Daniel Robert Laybourn, Edwin Hanson Bulmer and Richard Ray Illingworth v. Her Majesty the Queen, unreported, June 4, 1987 (S.C.C.).  Her Majesty the Queen and James Douglas Robertson, unreported June 4, 1987 (S.C.C.)"   in Criminal Law Audio Series,  Toronto: Legal Audio Services of Canada Ltd, 1987, audio cassette, 1987, tape five, side one and two, 60 minutes;


WEILER, Joseph M., “Regina v. Kundeus:  The Saga of Two Ships Passing in the Night”, (1976) 14 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 457-480;


WEILER, Paul,"The Supreme Court of Canada and the Doctrines of Mens Rea", (1971) 49 The Canadian Bar Review 280-363, see "The Reach of Fault: Herein of Mistake of Fact and of Law" at pp. 316-323;

WILLIAMS, John M., "Mistake of Fact: the Legacy of Pappajohn v. The Queen, (1985) 63 The Canadian Bar Review 597-628;
 

WILLIAMS, John M., "Transferred Intent/Transferred Mistake", 7 p. in Keith R. Hamilton, "Defence of the Person",  March 1991, 13, [9] p., discussion paper mentioned in The Canadian Bar Association Task Force Report, Principles of Criminal Liability: Proposals for a New General Part of the Criminal Code, Ottawa: Canadain Bar Association, [1992], x, 190 p. at p. 189, ISBN: 0920742335; available from the Canadian Bar Association, Ottawa; copy at the Library of the Faculty of Law, University of Montreal; the paper is part of the  following series: (series; Working Paper, Canadian Bar Association, National Criminal Justice Section, Committee on Criminal Code Reform; number 1);


II-  Comparative Law / Droit comparé
 

ALEXANDER, Dolly F., "Twenty Years of Morgan: A Criticism of the Subjective View of Mens Rea and Rape in Great Britain", (1995) Pace International Law Review 207-246;


ALEXANDER, Larry, "Mistake", in Joshua Dressler, ed., Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice, 2nd ed., New York: Macmillan Reference USA, Gale Group/Thomson Learning, 2002, at pp. 1014-1019, ISBN: 002865322X (vol. 3) and 002865319X (set of 4 volumes); article available in a different format at http://law.jrank.org/pages/1600/Mistake.html  (accessed on 6 October 2007);

"The new approach to exculpatory mistakes has also been extended beyond mistakes regarding elements of crimes to mistakes that bear on defense." (p. 1016)


THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, Model Penal Code and Commentaries (Official Draft and Revised Comments), Part I - General Provisions §§1.01 to 2.13, Philadelphia: The American Law Institute, 1985, liii, 420 p., see "Section 2.04.  Ignorance or Mistake", at pp. 267-280;
 

___________Model Penal Code: Proposed Official Draft, Philadelphia: The American Law Institute, 1962, xxii, 346 p., see "Subsection 1.13(10) and section 2.04;

"Section 1.13 General Definitions.

In this Code, unless a different meaning plainly is required:
.

(10) "material element of an offense" means an element that does not relate exclusively to the statute of limitations, jurisdiction, venue or to any other matter similarly unconnected with (i) the harm or evil, incident to conduct, sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense, or (ii) the existence of a justification or excuse for such conduct;" (pp. 22-23)

"Section 2.04 Ignorance or Mistake.

(1) Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law is a defense if:

(a) the ignorance or mistake negatives the purpose, knowledge, belief, recklessness or negligence required to establish a material element of the offense; or

(b) the law provides that the state of mind established by such ignorance or mistake constitutes a defense.

(2) Although ignorance or mistake would otherwise afford a defense to the offense charged, the defense is not available if the defendant would be guilty of another offense had the situation been as he supposed. In such case, however, the ignorance or mistake of the defendant shall reduce the grade and degree of the offense of which he may be convicted to those of the offense of which he would be guilty had the situation been as he supposed.

(3) A belief that conduct does not legally constitute an offense is a defense to a prosecution for that offense based upon such conduct when:

(a) the statute or other enactment defining the offense is not known to the actor and has not been published or otherwise reasonably made available prior to the conduct alleged; or

(b) he acts in reasonable reliance upon an official statement of the law, afterward determined to be invalid or erroneous, contained in (i) a statute or other enactment; (ii) a judicial decision, opinion or judgment; (iii) an administrative order or grant of permission; or (iv) an official interpretation of the public officer or body charged by law with responsibility for the interpretation, administration or enforcement of the law defining the offense.

(4) The defendant must prove a defense arising under Subsection (3) of this Section by a preponderance of evidence." (pp. 30-31)

 

___________ Model Penal Code: Tentative Draft No. 4, Philadelphia: The American Law Institute, 1955, xv, 302 p., see "Section 2.04.  Ignorance or mistake as a defence" at  pp.135-139;

AMIRTHALINGAM, Kumaralingam, "Mistake and Strict Liability", in Wing-Cheong Chan, Barry Wright, and Stanley Yeo, eds., Codification, Macaulay and the Indian Penal Code : the legacies and modern challenges of criminal law reform, Farnham, Surrey, England ; Burlington, VT, USA : Ashgate, c2011, xiii, 379 p., at pp.109 to approx. 128; ISBN: 9781409424420 (hardback); title noted in my research but article not consulted yet (7 November 2011); 


ARCHARD, David, "The Mens Rea of Rape: Reasonableness and Culpable Mistakes" in Keith Burgess-Jackson, ed., A most detestable crime: new philosophical essays on rape, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, xv, 306 p., at pp. 213 to 229 (approx), ISBN: 0195120752 and 0195120760 (pbk.); no copy in the libraries of the Ottawa area;

ARISTOTE, Éthique de Nicomaque, traduction, préface et notes par J. Voilquin, Paris: Garnier Flammarion, 1965, 310, [3] p.; voir le Livre III, Chapitre 1; acessible à  http://www.darmaisin.com/96%20Textes%20classiques/Aristote_volonte.htm  (consulté le 29 septembre 2007);

"1. Puisque la vertu a rapport aux passions et aux actions, qu'on loue et blâme ce qui émane de notre volonté, tandis qu'on ne refuse pas son pardon et parfois même sa pitié à ce qui est accompli sans volonté de choix, peut-être est-il nécessaire de déterminer, puisque notre examen porte sur la vertu, ce qui est volontaire et ce qui est involontaire.

2. Du reste, cette étude ne manquera pas d'être utile aussi aux législateurs chargés de fixer les récompenses et les peines.

3. A ce qu'il semble, sont involontaires les actes accomplis par contrainte ou s'accompagnant d'ignorance [...]

13. Quant aux actes que nous commettons par ignorance, tous sont sans doute dépourvus de volonté; l'acte exécuté contre notre gré est affligeant et suivi de regret. Car quiconque agit par ignorance et ne retire pas de désagrément de ses actes, n'agit pas de son plein gré, puisqu'il était ignorant; et d'autre part, il n'agit pas contre son gré, puisqu'il n'éprouve aucune tristesse. Ainsi donc, pour ce qui a rapport à cette ignorance, on peut dire de l'un, celui qui regrette son acte, qu'il a agi contre son gré; quant à l'autre, qui n'éprouve aucun regret, disons, puisqu'il diffère du premier, qu'il n'a pas agi de son plein gré. Puisque la situation est différente, mieux vaut lui donner un nom particulier.

14. Il semble donc qu'il faille distinguer ce qu'on fait par ignorance de ce qu'on exécute sans savoir ce qu'on fait. En effet, l'homme qui s'enivre ou qui se met en colère ne paraît pas agir par ignorance, mais pour une des raisons que nous avons indiquées, et non pas sans savoir, mais inconscient de son acte. Ainsi donc tout homme pervers, quel qu'il soit, ignore ce qu'il faut faire et ce dont il faut s'abstenir. Faute qui rend injustes et franchement mauvais tous les hommes de cette sorte.

15. Il faut donc définir l'acte involontaire, non pas celui qui comporte l'ignorance de notre intérêt — car cette ignorance volontaire dans la détermination est la cause, non pas du caractère involontaire de l'acte, mais de sa perversité —, ce n'est pas non plus l'ignorance générale qui est en cause, puisque celle-là du moins encourt le blâme; mais c'est l'ignorance des circonstances particulières dans lesquelles et au sujet desquelles l'action a lieu. C'est dans les cas de ce genre que trouvent à s'exercer la pitié et le pardon, car celui-là agit involontairement qui, par ignorance, agit mal sans le savoir.

16. Peut-être ne sera-t-il pas mauvais d'indiquer quels sont, pour ce genre d'actions, la nature, le nombre, l'agent, l'action elle-même, les circonstances, les conditions, quelquefois même les moyens — par exemple, tel instrument —, les motifs — par exemple s'il s'agit de son salut —, enfin la manière— si c'est avec douceur, avec violence.

17. Toutes ces circonstances, personne ne saurait, à moins d'être fou, les ignorer; et il est clair que l'agent ne saurait lui non plus les méconnaître — qui voudrait, en effet, s'ignorer lui-même?   Mais il peut arriver que l'agent ignore ce qu'il fait, comme on dit qu'en parlant des mots vous ont échappé; ou qu'on révèle, comme Eschyle, les mystères sans savoir que c'est interdit; ou bien, en voulant montrer l'appareil, on fait partir la catapulte. Il peut arriver qu'on fasse comme Mérope, qui prend son fils pour son plus mortel ennemi; qu'on croie moucheté un fer de lance acéré; qu'on prenne un caillou pour une pierre ponce; ou qu'en faisant boire quelqu'un pour le sauver on le fasse périr; ou bien encore qu'en voulant montrer comment on s'y prend dans la lutte à main plate, on assène à quelqu'un un mauvais coup.

18. En raison de l'ignorance où l'on est de toutes les conditions de l'action, l'homme qui en méconnaît quelques-unes semble agir contre son gré, surtout dans le cas des plus importantes. Or les plus importantes sont celles dans lesquelles et en vue desquelles s'exécute l'action.

19. Cet acte qu'on appellera involontaire à cause d'une telle ignorance, encore faut-il qu'il s'accompagne de chagrin et de regret.

20. Si donc l'action involontaire est celle qui résulte de la violence ou de l'ignorance, ce qui est volontaire semble être ce dont le principe se trouve dans l'agent qui connaît toutes les circonstances particulières de l'action.

21. On a peut-être tort, en effet, de classer parmi les actes involontaires ceux qui émanent de la colère ou d'un vif désir.

22. Car tout d'abord, dans ce cas, aucun des autres êtres vivants n'agira de son plein gré, — non pas même les enfants. Ensuite, est-il vrai que nous ne faisons de notre plein gré aucun des actes que nous exécutons par désir ou par emportement ? Ou bien les belles actions les faisons-nous de notre plein gré, les actions honteuses contre notre gré ? Une telle affirmation n'est-elle pas risible, étant donné que la cause du moins est la même ? Il serait absurde aussi de prétendre que sont accomplies contre notre gré les actions vers lesquelles on est tenu de se porter. C'est qu'il convient même de se mettre en colère dans certains cas et de désirer vivement certains biens, comme la santé et l'instruction.

23. D'autre part, à ce qu'il semble, les actes involontaires causent de la peine, ceux qui sont accomplis par désir du plaisir.

24. Posons encore cette question : quelle différence y a-t-il dans les actes involontaires, dont l'erreur provient d'un faux raisonnement ou d'un mouvement de la sensibilité ?

25. Tous deux sont à éviter. Les fautes contre la raison procèdent tout autant que les autres de la nature humaine, si bien que les actes de l'homme proviennent de la colère et du désir. Il est donc absurde de les considérer comme ne provenant pas de notre volonté." (pp. 65 et 67-69)

ARISTOTLE, Nichomachean Ethics, with an English translation by H. Rackham, Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press and London: William Heinemann, 1934,  Book III, Chapter 1; available http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/cgi-bin/ptext?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0054&query=head%3D%233  (accessed on 29 September 2007);

1. Virtue however is concerned with emotions and actions, and it is only voluntary feelings and actions for which praise and blame are given; those that are involuntary are condoned, and sometimes even pitied. Hence it seems to be necessary for the student of ethics to define the difference between the Voluntary and the Involuntary; and this will also be of service to the legislator in assigning rewards and punishments.

2.  It is then generally held that actions are involuntary when done (a) under compulsion or (b) through ignorance...

13.  (b) An act done through ignorance is in every case not voluntary, but it is involuntary only when it causes the agent pain and regret: since a man who has actedthrough ignorance and feels no compunction at all for what he has done, cannot indeed be said to have acted voluntarily, as he was not aware of his action, yet cannot be said to have acted involuntarily, as he is not sorry for it. Acts done through ignorance therefore fall into two classes: if the agent regrets the act, we think that he has acted involuntarily; if he does not regret it, to mark the distinction we may call him a ‘non-voluntary’ agent--for as the case is different it is better to give it a special name.

14. Acting through ignorance however seems to be different from acting in ignorance; for when a man is drunk or in a rage, his actions are not thought to be done through ignorance but owing to one or other of the conditions mentioned, though he does act without knowing, and in ignorance. Now it is true that all wicked men are ignorant of what they ought to do and refrain from doing, and that this error is the cause of injustice and of vice in general.

15.  But the term ‘involuntary’ does not really apply to an action when the agent is ignorant of his true interests. The ignorance that makes an act blameworthy is not ignorance displayed in moral choice (that sort of ignorance constitutes vice)--that is to say, they result not from general ignorance (because that is held to be blameworthy), but from particular ignorance, ignorance of the circumstances of the act and of the things affected by it; for in this case the act is pitied and forgiven, because he who acts in ignorance of any of these circumstances is an involuntary agent.

16.  Perhaps then it will be as well to specify the nature and number of these circumstances. They are (1) the agent, (2) the act, (3) the thing that is affected by or is the sphere of the act; and sometimes also (4) the instrument, for instance, a tool with which the act is done, (5) the effect, for instance, saving a man's life, and (6) the manner, for instance, gently or violently.

17.  Now no one, unless mad, could be ignorant of all these circumstances together; nor yet, obviously, of (l) the agent--for a man must know who he is himself. But a man may be ignorant of (2) what he is doing, as for instance when people say ‘it slipped out while they were speaking,’ or ‘they were not aware that the matter was a secret,’ as Aeschylus said of the Mysteries; or that ‘they let it off when they only meant to show how it worked’ as the prisoner pleaded in the catapult case. Again (3) a person might mistake his son for an enemy, as Merope does; or (4) mistake a sharp spear for one with a button on it, or a heavy stone for a pumice-stone; or (5) one might kill a man by giving him medicine with the intention of saving his life; or (6) in loose wrestling hit him a blow when meaning only to grip his hand.

18.  Ignorance therefore being possible in respect of all these circumstances of the act, one who has acted in ignorance of any of them is held to have acted involuntarily, and especially so if ignorant of the most important of them; and the most important of the circumstances seem to be the nature of the act itself and the effect it will produce.

19.  Such then is the nature of the ignorance that justifies our speaking of an act as involuntary,given the further condition that the agent feels sorrow and regret for having committed it.

20.  An involuntary action being one done under compulsion or through ignorance, a voluntary act would seem to be an act of which the origin lies in the agent, who knows the particular circumstances in which he is acting.

21.  For it is probably a mistake to say that acts caused by anger or by desire are involuntary.

22.   In the first place, (1) if we do so, we can no longer say that any of the lower animals act voluntarily, or children either.

23.  Then (2) are none of our actions that are caused by desire or anger voluntary, or are the noble ones voluntary and the base involuntary? Surely this is an absurd distinction when one person is the author of both.

24.  Yet perhaps it is strange to speak of acts aiming at things which it is right to aim at as involuntary; and it is right to feel anger at some things, and also to feel desire for some things, for instance health, knowledge.

25.  Also (3) we think that involuntary actions are painful and actions that gratify desire pleasant.

26.  And again (4) what difference is there in respect of their involuntary character between wrong acts committed deliberately and wrong acts done in anger?

27.  Both are to be avoided;  and also we think that the irrational feelings are just as much a part of human nature as the reason, so that the actions done from anger or desire also belong to the human being who does them. It is therefore strange to class these actions as involuntary."  (pp. 117, 123, 125, 127, and 129)

ARMAGOST, Stephanie, "An Innocent Mistake or Criminal Conduct: Children Dying of Hyperthermia in Hot Vehicules", (2001-2002) 23 Hamline Journal of  Public Law and Policy 109-144; copy at Ottawa University;

ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PÉNAL (AIDP) (International Association of Penal Law) and Istituto Superiore Internazionale di Scienze Criminali (ISISC) (International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences) and Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law (MPI), Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court -- Alternative to the ILC-Draft -- (Siracusa-Draft), prepared by a Committee of Experts Siracusa/Freiburg, July 1995, 88 p.; available at  http://web.archive.org/web/20050904120837/http://www.iuscrim.mpg.de/forsch/straf/referate/sach/hispint/siracusa.pdf at  (accessed on 10 December  2005 and 2 October 2007 for web.archive)

"Art. 33 n
Mistake of Fact or Law

1. If the person would not be held guilty of the crime if the circumstances were as he reasonably believed, he is not punishable.

2. The person who commits a crime in the mistaken belief that he is acting lawfully is not punishable, provided that he has done everything under the circumstances which could reasonably be demanded of him to inform himself about the applicable law. If he could have avoided his mistake of law, the punishment may be reduced." (p. 53)

....

Art. 33 o
Superior Order

1. A person acting pursuant to an order of a government or a superior is not relieved of punishability, unless such order results in coercion or duress, mistake of fact or law.

2. A superior order may be considered in mitigation of punishment if justice so requires."

ATTARDO, Marlene A., "Defense of Mistake of Fact as to Victim's Consent in Rape Prosecution", (2002) 102 ALR 5th 447-524; ALR=American Law Reports;


AUSTRALIA, Australian Capital Territory, Criminal Code 2002, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/act/consol_act/cc200294/  (accessed on 5 October 2007);

Section 35
Mistake or ignorance of fact—fault elements other than negligence

(1) A person is not criminally responsible for an offence that has a physical element for which there is a fault element other than negligence if—

(a)  when carrying out the conduct making up the physical element, the person is under a mistaken belief about, or is ignorant of, facts; and

(b) the existence of the mistaken belief or ignorance negates a fault element applying to the physical element.

(2)     In deciding whether a person was under a mistaken belief about facts, or was ignorant of facts, the trier of fact may consider whether the mistaken belief or ignorance was reasonable in the circumstances.


Section 36
Mistake of fact—strict liability

(1)  A person is not criminally responsible for an offence that has a physical element for which there is no fault element if—

        (a)   when carrying out the conduct making up the physical element, the person considered whether or not facts existed, and was under a mistaken but reasonable belief about the facts; and

        (b)  had the facts existed, the conduct would not have been an offence.

(2)     A person may be taken to have considered whether or not facts existed when carrying out conduct if—

(a)   the person had considered, on a previous occasion, whether the facts existed in the circumstances surrounding that occasion; and

(b)   the person honestly and reasonably believed that the circumstances surrounding the present occasion were the same, or substantially the same, as the circumstances surrounding the previous occasion.

Note     Section 24 (Absolute liability) prevents this section applying to offences of absolute liability.



___________Australian Law Reform Commission, The Recognition of Aboriginal Customary Laws, Canberra : Australian Govt. Pub. Service, 1986, vol. 1, ISBN: 0644013451 (series; report; 31; vol. 1);

"[vol. 1, ]
18. Aborinal Customary Laws and Substantive Criminal Liability
Criminal Law Defences and Aboriginal Customary Laws
Other Defences
...
432. Mistaken Belief. The relevance of mistaken belief to criminal responsibility differs depending on the kind of mistake, and on the offence. A mistake of law is, with certain exceptions, irrelevant: this rule, and the exceptions to it, are discussed below.[89] A mistake of fact as to a particular element of an offence may be relevant in several different ways. It may negative the intent necessary for the offence: for example, if the defendant mistakenly but honestly believed that the victim was consenting to sexual intercourse, the defendant cannot be guilty of rape. There is no requirement in such cases that the defendant’s belief be reasonable, provided it is shown to be genuine.[90] In other cases, there may be no requirement that the defendant believed in the existence (or was reckless as to the non-existence) of particular facts. However at common law it is a defence to most criminal charges that the defendant actually believed on reasonable grounds in the existence of facts which, if true, would have exonerated him from liability.[91] This defence applies especially to regulatory or statutory offences, many aspects of which are (apart from the defence) subject to a regime of strict liability. For present purposes, these offences are however of little or no relevance.

433. Mistake and Aboriginal Customary Laws. Mistaken or ‘unreasonable’ belief can be produced by adherence to a world-view based on traditional or customary beliefs or patterns of behaviour. Adherence to tradition or to customary laws is not to be equated with superstition, but the two may be associated, and when they are legal problems of considerable difficulty arise. For example an American Indian was convicted of manslaughter when he shot what he believed was a Wendigo, an evil spirit in human form.[92] Similar problems have arisen in Papua New Guinea with sorcery, although the courts have refused to entertain defences based, for example, on mistake of fact.[93] Equivalent problems do not seem to have been raised in Australian cases, at least not in the last fifteen years. There are certainly Aboriginal practices of ‘magic’ or ‘sorcery’,[94] but they do not seem to have had much impact in criminal cases. Eggleston suggests that a defence based on mistake may have been available to the defendants in the Skinny Jack case, but it was not in fact raised there.[95] It is unlikely that the defence of honest and reasonable mistake of fact would be directly relevant in cases involving customary law issues. What is more likely is that mistaken assumptions or beliefs based on tradition may affect the defendant’s intent (in cases where mens rea is required), or his belief as to an appropriate response in cases of self-defence or provocation. Given the qualified nature of the ‘objective’ requirement for both defences, appropriate account could probably be taken of customary laws and traditional’ practices in such cases, under the existing law.[96]...
------

[89] para 434.

[90] See para 416-18.

[91] Thomas v R (1937) 59 CLR 279; Proudman v Dayman (1941) 67 CLR 536; R v Reynhoudt (1962) 107 CLR 381; Howard 363-377. The position is substantially the same in the Code States: Qld, s 24; WA, s 24; Tas, s 14; NT, s 32.

[92] R v Machekequonabe (1894) 28 Ont 309. See Glanville Williams, ‘Homicide and the Supernatural’ (1949) 65 Law Q Rev 491; Howard, 41, 106.

[93] See RS O’Regan, ‘Sorcery and Homicide in Papua New Guinea’ (1974) 48 ALJ 76; Weisbrot (1982) 79-82; and see also the works by RB Seidman, ‘Mens Rea and the Reasonable African: The Pre-Scientific World-View and Mistake of Fact’ (1966) 15 ICLQ 1135, and ‘Witch Murder and Mens Rea: A Problem of Society under Radical Social Change’ (1965) 28 Mod L Rev 46.

[94] cf RM Berndt & CH Berndt, The World of the First Australians, 4th rev edn, Rigby, Adelaide, 1985, 319-335. The only instance is which ‘sorcery’ was mentioned in the cases collected in ACL RP6A was Case No 1, where D was said to feel himself ‘in danger from spirits who would take [his] kidney fat while asleep’: id, 4-5. This was taken into account by Justice Forster in sentencing, but on any view D’s act of manslaughter was wrongful in that case. On this question from a socio-medical viewpoint see J Reid, Sorcerers and Healing Spirits Continuity and Change in an Aboriginal Medical System, ANU Press, Canberra, 1983, esp 92-118; 1H Jones, ‘stereotyped aggression in a group of Australian Western Desert Aborigines’ (1971) 44 Br J Med Psychol 259; 1H Jones & DJ Home, ‘Psychiatric Disorders among Aborigines of the Australian Western Desert’ (1973) 7 Soc Sci & Med 219; JE Lemaire, The Application of Some Aspects of European Law to Aboriginal Natives of Central Australia, LLM thesis, University of Sydney, Sydney, 1971, 118-126; J Cawte, Medicine is the Law, University Press of Hawaii, Honolulu, 1974, esp ch 6. See also LR Hiatt, Kinship and Conflict, ANU Press, Canberra, 1965 119-21 ; WL Warner, A Black Civilisation, Harper & Bros, London, 1937, ch 7, 8; B Spencer and FJ Gillen, The Native Tribes of Central Australia, McMillan, London, 1899, ch 16; DB Rose, ‘Dingo Makes us Human: Being and Purpose Australian Aboriginal Culture’. Phd Thesis, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn Mawr, March 1981, 372-3.

[95] Eggleston, 298.

[96] But the Papua New Guinea Supreme Court refused to treat sorcery as giving rise to a defence of provocation: Weisbrot (1982) 79. The Sorcery Act 1971 s 20 expressly allows sorcery to count as provocation, provided the ordinary villager in similar circumstances would have reacted in a similar fashion." (source: http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/31/Ch_18.html#fn89, accessed on 24 September 2007)

AUSTRALIA, Commonwealth Attorney's General in association with the Australian Institute of Judicial Administration,  The Commonwealth Criminal Code: A Guide for Practitioners, March 2002, 369 p., on mistake of fact, see pp. 170-190; see also, pp. 220-221; ISBN: 0642210349; available at  http://www.ag.gov.au/www/criminaljusticeHome.nsf/AllDocs/RWP1E51ED9C5B665D5FCA256BDB00227895?OpenDocument (accessed on 16 August 2003);


AUSTRALIA, Queensland, Criminal Code Act 1899, available at http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/LEGISLTN/CURRENT/C/CriminCode.pdf (accessed on 5 October 2007);

"24 Mistake of fact

(1) A person who does or omits to do an act under an honest and reasonable, but mistaken, belief in the existence of any state of things is not criminally responsible for the act or omission to any greater extent than if the real state of things had been such as the person believed to exist.

(2) The operation of this rule may be excluded by the express or implied provisions of the law relating to the subject."


BACIGALUPO, Enrique, "Responsabilité criminelle", in Peter J. Cullen, ed., Enlarging the fight against fraud in the European Union : penal and administrative sanctions, settlement, whistleblowing and corpus juris in the candidate countries / [ERA, Europäische Rechtsakademie], Köln : Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft, c2004, c2003, 447 p., aux pp. 75-89, et voir "Système de l'erreur", aux pp. 84-86 (series; Schriftenreihe der Europäischen Rechtsakademie Trier ; Bd. 36 = Serie de publications de l'Academie de Droit Europeen de Treves; Bd.36 = Series of publications by the Academy of European Law Trier; Bd. 36), ISBN: 3898173658; copy at the University of Ottawa, FTX General, KJE 8643 .E55 2004; note: touche aux droits de la Bulgarie, Estonie, Hongrie, Lituanie, Pologne, Roumanie, Slovaquie, Slovénie et de la République tchèque;  texte important aussi pour l'erreur sur les moyens de défense;

 

BADAR, Mohamed Elewa, "Mens Rea -- Mistake of Law & Mistake of Fact in German Criminal Law: A Survey for International Criminal Tribunals", (2005) 5 International Criminal Law Review 203-246; available at http://bura.brunel.ac.uk/bitstream/2438/1195/3/1MensReainGermanLawICLR2004%5B1%5DRevised.pdf  (accessed on 28 September 2007);
 

BANTEKAS, Ilias, "Defences in International Criminal Law", in Dominic McGoldrick, Peter Rowe, and Eric Donnelly, eds., The Permanent International Criminal Court: Legal and Policy Issues, Oxford (England)/Portland (Oregon): Hart Publishing, xviii, 498 p., at pp. 263-284, and see "Mistake of Fact or Mistake of Law", at pp. 281-282 (series; Studies in International Law; volume 5), ISBN: 1841132810; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, KZ 6310 P47 2004;


BIENEN, Leigh, "Mistakes", (1977-78) 7 Philosophy anf Public Affairs 224-245; copy at Ottawa University, H 1 .P54  Location: MRT Periodicals;


BURCHELL, E.M., "Unreasonable Mistake of Fact as a Defence in Criminal Law", (1963) 80 South African Law Journal 46-52;


BURCHELL, Jonathan, "Mistake or Ignorance to the Causal Sequence - A New Aspect of Intention" (1990) 107 South African Law Journal 168-175;
 

BYRD, B. Sharon, "Putative Self-Defense and Rules of Imputation. In Defense of the Battered Woman" (1994) 2 Annual Review of Law and Ethics 283-306; abstract available at http://www.str2.jura.uni-erlangen.de/hruschka/JRE/vol02/a2-byrd.htm (accessed on 24 September 2007); are also published in Leo Katz, Michael S. Moore and Stephen J. Morse, eds., Foundations of Criminal Law, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, ix, 352 p. at pp. 260-271 followed by "Notes and Questions" at pp. 271-272 (series; Interdisciplinary Readers in Law), ISBN: 0195094956 (cloth) and 0195094964 (paper);


CAMPBELL, Colin, "Annotation: Mistake or Lack of Information as to Victim's Age as Defense to Statutory Rape", (1997) 46 A.L.R. (5th) 499-522; A.L.R. = American Law Reports;
 

CANALS, Jose M. and Henry Dahl, translated by, "Standard Penal Code for Latin America", (1990) 17 American Journal of Criminal Law 263-288; available at  http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/Latspc.htm; see articles 27-29; note de recherche: pour une traduction française du Code pénal type latino-américain, voir RAMIREZ, infra;

"Article 27
No act is punishable when a person who commits a criminal act is convinced that it lacks some element required under the corresponding statutory definition.

However, if the person is recklessly or negligently mistaken, the act is punishable only when the law contemplates the reckless or negligent commission of the criminal act.

The same rules apply to those who wrongfully assume the existence of justifying circumstances.


Article 28
No act is punishable when a person who commits a criminal act is convinced that it lacks some element required under the corresponding statutory definition.

However, if the person is recklessly or negligently mistaken, the act is punishable only when the law contemplates the reckless or negligent commission of the criminal act.

The same rules apply to those who wrongfully assume the existence of justifying circumstances.


Article 29
If by mistake the act committed was different from the one the person intended, the punishment corresponding to the less serious act will apply." (p. 269)

CASSESE, Antonio, International criminal law, Oxford; New York : Oxford University Press, 2003, lvi, 472 p., see "Mistake of fact" at pp. 251-255 (includes "Mistake of  fact and Superior Order" at pp. 253-255), ISBN: 0199261288 and  0199259119 (pbk); copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, K5000 C37 2003 c. 01; copy at Carleton University, floor 4, K5000 .C37 2003;
 

CAVALLARO, Rosanna, "A Big Mistake: Eroding the Defense of Mistake of Fact About Consent in Rape", (1996) 86 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 815-860;


CHAND, Hukm, Principles of the law of consent: with special reference to criminal law, including the doctrines of mistake, duress, and waiver: Bombay, Bombay education society's press, 1897, xviii, 581 p.; copy at Laval University, KPN/C454/1897; also available at other places in Canada;  available at http://www.archive.org/details/principlesoflawo00chaniala (accessed on 20 August 2007);

CHRISTOPHER, Russell L., "Mistake & Ignorance" in Christopher Berry Gray, ed., The Philosophy of Law: An Encyclopedia, New York Garland Publishing, 1999, 2 volumes ( xxxviii, 950 p.), in vol.2, pp. 537-539 (series; Garland reference library of the humanities ; vol. 1743), ISBN: 0815313446;


___________"Mistake of Fact in the Objective Theory of Justification: Do Two Rights Make Two Wrongs Make Two Rights...?", (1994) 85 Journal of  Criminal Law and Criminology 295-332;
 

Code de droit canonique, Texte officiel et traduction française par La société internationale de droit canonique et de législations religieuses comparées avec le concours des Faculté de droit canonique de l'Université Saint-Paul d'Ottawa, Faculté de droit canonique de l'Institut catholique de Paris, Ottawa:  Service des Éditions de la Conférence des Évêques catholiques du Canada (C.E.C.C.), 1984, xxxii, 363 p., ISBN: 0889970971; note de recherche: voir les canons 1323, nn. 4, 5 et 6, 1324, § 1, n. 8 et 1325 aux pp. 229-230; ces dispositions sont aussi disponibles à  http://ledroitcriminel.free.fr/la_science_criminelle/les_sciences_juridiques/la_loi_penale/imputation/droit_canon_imputation.htm  (consulté le 27 septembre 2007);

"Can. 1323 -- N'est punissable d'aucune peine la personne qui, lorsqu'elle a violé une loi ou un précepte:
...
4° a agi forcée par une crainte grave, même si elle ne l’était que relativement, ou bien poussée par la nécessité ou pour éviter un grave inconvénient, à moins cependant que l’acte ne soit intrinsèquement mauvais ou qu’il ne porte préjudice aux âmes;

5° a agi en état de légitime défense contre un agresseur qui l’attaquait injustement, elle-même ou un autre, tout en gardant la modération requise;
[...]
7° a cru, sans faute de sa part, que se présentait une des circonstances prévues aux numéros 4 ou 5.


Can. 1324 --
§ 1.  L’auteur d’une violation n’est pas exempt de peine, mais la peine prévue par la loi ou le précepte doit être tempérée, ou encore une pénitence doit lui être substituée, si le délit a été accompli :
[...]
8° par qui, par une erreur dont il est coupable, a cru que se présentait une des circonstances dont il s’agit au Canon 1323, numéros. 4 et 5;


Can. 1325 --
L’ignorance crasse ou supine ou affectée ne peut jamais être prise en considération dans l’application des dispositions des canons 1323 et 1324 ; il en est de même pour l’ébriété ou les autres troubles mentaux, s’ils ont été recherchés volontairement pour accomplir le délit ou l’excuser, ou pour la passion qui aurait été volontairement excitée ou nourrie."


The Code of Canon Law in English translation Prepared by The Canon Law Society of Great Britain and Ireland in association with The Canon Law Society of Australia and New Zealand and The Canadian Canon Law Society, London (England): Collins, 1983, xv, 319 p.,  ISBN: 000599750X (cased) and 0005997577 (limp); see canons 1323, nn. 4, 5 and 6, 1324 § 1, n. 8 and 1325 at pp. 234-235; these provions are also available at http://www.stjamescatholic.org/ebooks/code_of_canon_law_1983.pdf  (accessed on 27 September 2007);

"Can. 1323  No one is liable to a penalty who, when violating a law or precept:
...
4° acted under the compulsion of grave fear, even if only relative, or by reason of necessity or grave inconvenience, unless, however, the act is intrinsically evil or tends to be harmful to souls;
5° acted, within the limits of due moderation, in lawful self-defense or defense of another against an unjust aggressor;
...
7° thought, through no personal fault, that some one of the circumstances existed which are mentioned in nn. 4 or 5.


Can. 1324 
§1 The perpetrator of a violation is not exempted from penalty, but the penalty prescribed in the law or precept must be diminished, or a penance substituted in its place, if the offence was committed by:
...
8° one who erroneously, but culpably, thought that some one of the circumstances existed which are mentioned in Canon 1323, nn. 4 or 5;


Can. 1325 -- Ignorance which is crass or supine or affected can never be taken into account when  pplying the provisions of Canon 1323 and 1324. Likewise, drunkenness or other mental disturbances cannot be taken into account if these have been deliberately sought so as to commit the offence or to excuse it; nor can passion which has been deliberately stimulated or nourished."

Corpus juris 2000 (version de Florence);

"Article 10 – Erreur (ancien article 11)

L’erreur sur les éléments constituant l’infraction exclut l’intention.  L’erreur sur la prohibition exclut la responsabilité au cas d’une erreur inévitable par un homme prudent et raisonnable. Si l’erreur était évitable, la sanction peut être diminuée, et le juge pourra donc ne pas prononcer la peine maximale encourue (voir article 14)." (disponible à  http://www2.law.uu.nl/wiarda/corpus/art-frans.pdf, visionné le 3 mai 2004; voir aussi le site principal à http://www2.law.uu.nl/wiarda/corpus/index1.htm)


Corpus juris 2000 (draft agreed in Florence);

"Article 10 – Error (previously Article 11)

Mistake as to the constituent elements of the offence excludes intention. Mistake as to the legal prohibition excludes liability if it would have inevitably been committed by a careful, sensible person. If the mistake was avoidable, the penalty may be reduced, and the judge may not impose the maximum penalty (see Article14)." (available at  http://www2.law.uu.nl/wiarda/corpus/art-eng.pdf, accessed on 3 May 2004; see also main site at  http://www2.law.uu.nl/wiarda/corpus/index1.htm)

CLIVE, Eric (from CBE, Edinburgh), Pamela Ferguson (from Dundee), Christopher Gane and Alexander McCall Smith presented A Draft Criminal Code for Scotland with commentary to the Minister of Justice in August 2003; ix, 205 p., and see "Error" at pp. 73-74, available at  http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/downloads/cp_criminal_code.pdf  (accessed on 24 September 2007);
 

COWLEY, D., "The Retreat from Morgan", [1982] Criminal Law Review 198;
 

CROATIA, Criminal Code in English, available at http://www.vsrh.hr/CustomPages/Static/HRV/Files/Legislation__Criminal-Code.doc, (accessed on 26 September 2007);

"Mistake of Fact
Article 47
(1) A perpetrator does not act intentionally if at the time of the perpetration of a criminal offense he is not aware of one of its material elements.
(2) If the perpetrator’s mistake regarding  the material elements of the criminal offense is due to his negligence, he shall be culpable insofar as the statute prescribes punishment for such an offense also when committed by negligence.
(3) The perpetrator shall not be punished for intent if at the time of the perpetration of a criminal offense he mistakenly assumed that the circumstances existed, which, had they actually existed, would have rendered his conduct lawful.
(4) If the perpetrator is mistaken as to the claim of legal justification out of negligence, he shall be punished for the perpetration of a criminal offense, provided that the statute prescribes punishment for such an offense also when committed by negligence."

CROSS, R., "Century Reflections on Prince's Case", (1975) 81 The Law Quarterly Review 205-222;   
 

CURLEY, E.M., "Excusing Rape", (Summer 1976) 5 Philosophy and Public Affairs 325-360;


DAMASKA, Mirjan, "Comment  by Dr. Mirjan Damaska Comparing Study Draft of Proposed new Federal Criminal Code to European Penal Codes", in Working Papers of the National Commission on Reform of Fedderal Criminal Laws, vol. III, Miscellaneous Memoranda and Guidelines for Conforming Title 18, Parts II-V, and other titles of the United States Code to the Proposals for a New Federal Criminal Code, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,  1971, at pp. 1477-1505, and see PDF pp. 1488-1491; for the sections referred to in those pages, see NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, infra;

DAUBE, D., "Error and Accident in the Bible", (1949) 2 Revue internationale des droits de l'antiquité 189-213;


DELTMAR, Victoria J., "Culpable Mistakes in Rape: Eliminating the Defence of unreasonable mistake of fact as to victim consent", (1984-85) 89 Dickinson Law Review 473-499;
 

DINGWALL, Gavin, "Intoxicated Mistakes about the Need for Self-Defence", (January 2007) 70(1) The Modern Law Review 127-138;

 

DINSTEIN, Yoram, "Defences", in Gabrielle Kirk McDonald and Olivia Swaak-Goldman, eds., Substantive and Procedural Aspects of International Criminal Law.  The Experience of International and National Courts", vol. I, Commentary, The Hague-London-Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2000, xvi,705 p., at pp. 367-388; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, K5000 S83 2000, v. 1;388;

DRESSLER, Joshua, Understanding Criminal Law, 2nd ed., New York : Matthew Bender/Irwin, 1995, xli, 556 p., and see "Chapter 12 Mistakes of Fact", at pp. 133-145  (series; legal text series), ISBN: 0256193193; there is now a 4th ed.: Newark(NJ): LexisNexis, c2006, xxxiv, 649, [32] p. (series; the understanding series), ISBN: 082057001X;

DUTILE, Fernand N. and Harold F. Moore, "Mistake and Impossibility:Arranging a Marriage Between Two Difficult Partners", (1979) 74 Northwestern University Law Review 166-201;


ÉCHAPPÉ, Olivier,  "L'imputabilité de l'acte délictueux : du droit romain au droit canonique", (1987) 30 L'année canonique115-132;
"L'erreur de fait a été également admise en droit romain comme cause d'excuse (96) et parfois, si elle portait sur un élément secondaire du délit, comme cause d'atténuation (97).  Le droit canonique l'a reprise en lui équiparant l'ignorance et l'inadvertence. […]
-----
(96) D. 3, 2, 11, 4.
(97) Cf. Arnaldo BISCARDI, op. cit. [L'imputabilita dell'atto delittuoso in diritto romano, in Appolinaris, L. I (1970), pp. 162-163]."



ENGLAND AND WALES, The Law Commission, A Criminal Code for England and Wales, vol. 1: Report and Draft Criminal Code Bill and vol. 2: Commentary on Draft Criminal Code Bill, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, [1989], v, 278 p. (series; Law Com. No. 177), ISBN: 0102299897;

"Belief in circumstances affording a defence.
    41. -- (1) Unless otherwise provided, a person who acts in the belief that a circumstance exists has nay defence that he would have if the circumstances existed.

Non-application to pre-Code offences.
    (2)  Subsction (1) does not apply in respect of a defence specially provided for a pre-Code offence as defined in section in section 6 (to which section 2(3) applies).

Proof or disproof of belief.
    (3) Any requirement as to proof or disproof of a defence applies to proof or disproof of a belief mentioned in subsection (1)." (vol. 1, p. 60)

----

Clause 41: Belief in circumstances affording a defence

    12.6  A statutory presumption.  If knowledge of a particular circumstance is an element of an offence, a belief that that circumstance does not exist means that the offence is not committed.9  Subsection (1) provides a presumption in favour of a corresponding rule for defences, namely, that a person who acts in the belief that a circumstance exists has any defence that he would have if it existed.10  The Code thus gives general effect to the prima facie principle that a person is to be judged, for purposes of criminal liability, on the facts as he believed them to be.  This is the tendency, though not the universal effect,11 of recent judicial developments in the field of defences.  It is desirable that the Code should provide consistently for offences and defences, leaving it to Parliament in particular contexts, if it thinks fit, to exclude the application of this subsection or to limit a defence of belief in the existence of an 'exempting circumstance'12 to a case of a belief based on reasonable grounds. Whether a defendant relies on this subsection, the absence of reasonable grounds for the belief  he claims to have held is, of course, relevant in determining whether he did hold it.13
...
------
9 This truism is discussed in n. 48 to para. 8.32 above.

10 See Appendix B, Example 41.  Compare clause 6 of the draft Criminal Liability (Mental Element) Bill appended to our Report on the Mental Element in Crime (1978).  Law Com. No. 89.  That clause (and the Code team's clause 44) proposed to specify the ways in which the presumption might be displaced.  For our reason for not now adopting this proposal, see para. 8.27 above, relating to the presumption of a requirement of fault established by clause 20(1); that paragraph, appropriately modified, applies here.

11See, e.g., para. 12.15 below.

12 Defined in clause 6 as 'any circumstance amounting to a defence or any element of a defence'.

13 See clause 14."  (vol. 2, p. 228)


___________The Law Commission, Intoxication and Criminal Liability, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 2009, vii, 132 p., (series; The Law Commission; Report;  No. 314), available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/lc314.pdf (accessed on 25 January 2009);


ESER, Albin,  "Mental Elements -- Mistakes of Fact and Law", ",  in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta and John R.W.D. Jones, eds., The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary, volume I, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, cxl, 1048 p., Chapter 23, at pp. 889-948, mistake of fact and law are dealt with at pp. 934-948; copy at Ottawa University, FTX General: KZ 6310 .R64 2002 v. 1; copy at External Affairs Library, Ottawa; available at http://www.freidok.uni-freiburg.de/volltexte/3909/pdf/Eser_Individual_criminal_responsibility.pdf (accessed on 26 January 2008); 


ESTONIA, Penal Code, available at http://www.legislationline.org/upload/legislations/07/6a/4d16963509db70c09d23e52cb8df.htm (accessed on 23 September 2007);

§ 17. Ignorance of circumstances which constitute necessary element of offence

(1) A person who at the time of commission of an act is unaware that a circumstance which constitutes a necessary element of an offence is not deemed to have committed the act intentionally. In such case the person shall be held liable for an offence committed through negligence in the cases provided by law.

(2) A person who at the time of commission of an act erroneously assumes circumstances which would constitute the necessary elements of an offence for which a more lenient punishment is prescribed, shall be liable for an intentional offence the commission of which the person intended.

(3) Ignorance of law shall not preclude intent or negligence.

§ 31. Error concerning circumstance which precludes unlawfulness

(1) An intentional act is not unlawful if at the time of commission of the act the person erroneously assumes circumstances which would preclude the unlawfulness of the act. In such case, the person shall be punished for an offence committed through negligence in the cases provided by law.

(2) A person who at the time of commission of an act is unaware of the circumstances which objectively preclude the unlawfulness of the act shall be held liable for an attempt. In such case, the court may apply the provisions of § 60 of this Code.


ETHIOPIA, The Criminal Code of the Federal Democratic Republic of  Ethiopia,  2004, available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/70993/75092/F1429731028/ETH70993.pdf (accessed on 30 September 2007);

"Article 80.- Mistake of Fact.

(1) Whoever commits a crime under an erroneous appreciation of the true facts of the situation shall be tried according to such appreciation. Where there is no criminal Intention the doer shall not be punishable. Where he could have avoided the mistake by taking such precautions as were commanded by his personal position and the circumstances of the case (Art. 59), he shall be punishable for negligence in cases where such negligence is penalized by law.

(2) Mistake as to a fact which constitutes a specified crime shall not exclude the punishment of the doer for another crime constituted by the act he performed.

(3) The crime is committed where there is a mistake as to the identity of the victim or the object of the crime."

FINGARETTE, Herbert,  "Alcoholism: Can Honest Mistake About One's Capacity for Self-Control Be an Excuse?", (1990) 13 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 77 (Part of the Special Issue: "Intoxication and Criminal Responsibility", vol. 13, numbers 1/2, 1990);


FINKEL, Norman J. and Jennifer L. Groscup, "When Mistakes Happen - Commonsense Rules of Culpability", (1997), 3(1) Public Policy & Law 65-125; no copy in Canadian libraries; 


FINKEL, Norman  J., Stephen .T. Maloney, Monique Z. Valbuena and  Jennifer .L. Groscup "Lay perspectives on legal conundrums: Impossible and mistaken act cases" (1995) 19(6) Law and Human Behavior 593-608;

FINKEL, Norman J. and Gerrod Parrott, Emotions and culpability: how the law is at odds with psychology, jurors, and itself, Washington: American Psychological Association, c2006, xv, 312 p. and see chapter 10, "Where Self-Defense's Justification Blurs into Excuse: A Defensible Theory, with Fitting Verdicts, for Mistaken Self-defense, (series; The law and public policy), ISBN: 1591474167; title noted in my research but book not consulted yet (6 December 2006);


FLETCHER, George P.,  Basic Concepts of Criminal Law, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, xi, 223 p., ISBN: 0195121708 and 0195121716 (pbk.); for table of contents, see: Biddle Law catalogue, University of Pennsylvania; important contribution to the subject;

"Contents...
9. Relevant versus Irrelevant Mistakes, 148
Irrelevant Mistakes, 149
Mistakes about Factual Elements of the Definition (Type One), 156
Mistakes about  Legal Aspects of the Definition (Type Two), 156
Mistakes about Factual Elements of Justification (Type Three), 158
Putative Justification Negates the Required Intent, 159
Strict Liability: The Mistake Is Deemed Irrelevant, 160
Putative Justification Is Itself Justification, 161
Reasonable Mistake as an Excuse, 162
Mistakes about the Norms of Justification (Type Four), 163
Mistakes about the Factual Elements of Excuses (Type Five), 163
Mistakes about Excusing Norms (Type Six), 165
Summary of Mistakes: Relevant and Irrelevant, 166" (p. ix and x)

--------

"The drafters [of the Model Penal Code] totally overlooked the significance of the kind of element to which the mistake relates.  As we shall see, it makes an extraordinary difference whether a mistake pertains to an element of the defnition, an element of a justification, or an element of an excusing condition." (p. 155)


___________"Mistake in the Model Penal Code: A False False Problem", (1988) 19 Rutgers Law Journal 649-670; important contribution to the subject;


____________Rethinking Criminal Law, Boston : Little, Brown, c1978, xxviii, 898 p., and see Chapter 9, "The Theory of Mistake", at pp. 683-758 (also deals with mistake of law);

FRYLING, Tina, "Mistake of Fact as a Criminal Defense to Criminal Liability",  in Richard A. Wright and J. Mitchell Miller, eds., Encyclopedia of Criminology,  Scarborough : Routledge/Taylor & Francis, 2004, vol. 2, at pp. 1002-1003; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, HV 61017 E53 2005 REF;
 

GARRETT, Elisabeth, "Mistaken Mistakes", [October 1989]  New Zealand Law Journal 355-357;
 

GARVEY, Stephen P., "Two kinds of criminal wrongs",  (2003) 5(3)  Punishment and Society 279-294;

"Crimes of negligence are also based on mistakes of fact. According to the Model Penal Code, negligence is the failure to perceive a substantial and unjustifiable risk that you should have perceived. The problem is not (as in the prior example) that you see a risk where none exists. Just the opposite: you fail to see a risk where one does exist. If A’s child is in fact suffering from a life-threatening illness, but A sees no risk to the child’s life, then A has made a mistake of fact. Moreover, if a reasonable or virtuous person, who knew what A knew, would have seen the risk, then A’s mistake is unreasonable; and if the child dies as a proximate result of A’s mistake, then A is guilty of negligent homicide." (p. 289)

GILES, Marianne, "Self-Defence and Mistake: A Way Forward", (1990) 53 Modern Law Review 187-200;

GREAT BRITAIN, House of Commons, Bill 178, Criminal Code (Indictable Offences), 1878,  xviii, 218 p.; British Parliamentary Papers,  (1878), vol. 2, pp. 5-245; notes:  Bill drafted by Sir James Fitzjames Stephen; first reading in the House of Commons on 14 May 1878 (introduced by the Attorney General Sir John Holker);

"Section 25.
IGNORANCE OF FACT.

    An alledged offender shall in general be in the same position as he would have been in if he had acted as he did under that state of facts which he in good faith and on reasonable grounds believed to exist when he did the act alleged to be an offence, provided that if an act in itself immoral is punishable by law only when certain facts exist independent of its immoral character, or if an act in itself punishable by law is punishable with additional severity only if certain facts exist indepently of its illegality, every person liable to punishment or to increased punishment, as the case may be, by reason of the existence of such facts shall be liable to such punishment or to such increased punishment, although he was not aware of the existence of such facts, and although he believed in good faith and on reasonable grounds that they did not exist, unless a contrary intention is expressed in the definition of the offence." (available at  http://www.lareau-law.ca/StephenBill178ONE.pdf)


___________ CRIMINAL CODE BILL COMMISSION, Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Consider the Law Relating to Indictable Offences: With an Appendix Containing a Draft Code Embodying the Suggestions of the Commissioners, London: HMSO, 1879, 209 p.. (series; C.(Command); 2345), (President: C.B. Blackburn); also published  in British Parliamentary Papers, (1878-79), vol. 20, pp. 169- 378; see at pp. 18-19 of the command number paper, the comments of the Commissioners on section 25, ignorance of fact, in Stephen's Bill (Bill 178);

"The Bill [Stephen's Bill, Bill 178] also contained a provision as to the effect of mistakes of fact upon the criminality of acts done in consequence of such mistakes, which if some qualifications had been made in it would have included under one general principle a considerable number of enactments contained in Part III [Justification and Excuse for Acts which would Be Otherwise Offences] of the Draft Code.  The difficulty presented on the one hand by our rules of construction to expressing matters of such intricacy in general language, and the danger apparent on the other hand of losing the certainty essential for a Code, have induced us (at some sacrifice perhaps of brevity) to adopt a mode of dealing with these subjects which reduces to an intelligible and systematic form a great body of law on which precise rules are very desirable, and which is at present in an extremely obscure and fragmentary state." (available at Report: pp. 1-48)

GROSS, Hyman, "Mistake"  in Sanford H. Kadish, ed.,  Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice, vol. 3 of 4, New York: Free Press, 1983, pp. 1066-1073, ISBN: 0029181110 (set of 4 volumes);

__________A Theory of Criminal Justice, New York: Oxford University Press, 1979, xviii, 521 p., ISBN: 0195023498 and 0195023501 (pbk.),


GRUNSVEN, Paul R. Van, "Medical Malpractice or Criminal Mistake? -- An Analysis of Past and Current Criminal Prosecutions for Clinical Mistakes and Fatal Errors", (1997-99) 2 DePaul Journal of Health Care Law 1-54;


GÜNGÖR,  Dragana, "Mental Elements and  Mistake of Fact and  Law in Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court", (18 July 2005) 1(1) Free Law Journal 21-30; available at http://www.fwpublishing.net/Files/Free_Law_Journal-Volume1Number1-18July2005.pdf (accessed on 10 December 2006);
 

HALL, Jerome, General Principles of Criminal Law, 2nd ed., Indianapolis : Bobbs-Merrill, c1960, xii, 642 p., and see Chapter 11, Ignorance and Mistake", at pp. 360-414;


____________"Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law", (1956-57) 33 Indiana Law Journal 1-44;
 

HARBOE, Nicolai, 1876-1943, Les conditions subjectives de la culpabilité, 3 tomes, Oslo: I. Kommisjon Hos Jacob Dybwad, 1930-34 (series; Skrifter Utgitt Av Det Norske Videnskaps-akademi i Oslo. Historisk-filosofisk klasse; 1930: no.4, 1931: no.1, and 1934: no.1), voir dans l'article de 1934 (tome 3), "Le crime par erreur" et  "Le crime par ignorance", et respectivement aux pp. 77-83 et  84-93; livre rare au Canada; copie à l'Université Queens, Kingston, Ontario;
 

HENNAU, Christiane et Jacques Verhaegen, "La faute non intentionnelle et sa réglementation dans les codes pénaux modernes", (1994) 74 Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie 568-580, voir en particulier la "Section IV: L'erreur fautive de fait et ses effets" aux pp. 574-576;

HENNING, Terese, Consent and mistaken belief in consent in Tasmaninan sexual offences trials, Hobart : University of Tasmania Law Press, c2000, 152 p. (series; University of Tasmania Law School / Occasional paper; no. 6); title noted in my research but book not consulted; no copy in Canada according to the AMICUS catalogue (verification of 6 August 2003)

"Occassional Paper No. 6: Consent and Mistaken Belief in Consent in the Tasmanian Sexual Offences Trials

This report is the second in a series of reports monitoring the operation of the 1987 reforms to the Criminal Code 1924 (Tas) and the Evidence Act 1910 (Tas). The purpose of the present study was to examine, in the context of sexual offences trials, the operation of the reforms to the definition of ‘consent’ in the Tasmanian Criminal Code 1924. It also examined the operation of the defence of mistaken belief in consent in these trials.

The Background to the reform and the defence of mistaken belief in consent under s 14 of the Code is discussed in Chapter 1; the research methodology and basic quantitative findings with respect to the sexual offences tried and the lines of defence encountered are dealt with in Chapter 2; Chapter 3 discusses the research findings with regard to the Crown construction of consent and key themes used by the defence to refute the Crown allegations of non-consent, to construct sexual contact as consensual and to lay a foundation for the defence of mistaken belief in consent. Chapter 4 discusses findings concerning trial judges’ summations and Chapter 5 presents the study’s conclusions and recommendations."

HERRING, Jonathan, "Mistaken Sex", [July 2005] The Criminal Law Review 511-524;
 

HIGGINS, Vanessa and A.J.A., "Self-defence  Murder -- self-induced intoxication -- mistaken belief as to threat -- mistake caused by intoxication -- reasonableness of belief -- whether defendant raising issue of self-defence to charge of murder entitled to be judged on basis of what he mistakenly believed to be the situation where mistaken belief brought about by self-induced intoxication R v Hatton Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)…", [April 2006] Criminal Law Review 353-356; the case is reported by Vanessa at pp. 353-355 and the commentary by A.J.A. is at pp. 355-356;


HINCHLIFFE, Sara, "Morgan Reviewed: In Defence of Freedom of Will", (2002/2003) 6(1) Contemporary Issues in Law 37-46; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, periodicals; important contribution;

"[Abstract]

DPP v Morgan provides legal precedent in England and Wales for a defence to rape of 'honest but mistaken belief in consent', no matter how unreasonable the grounds for arriving at such a belief.  This principle has been the subject of much feminist criticism.  Many feminists claim that the Morgan defence privileges the experience of men over that of women -- in that even if a jury believes that the complainant did not consent to sex they must acquit a defendant so long as he did not intend to commit rape.  This article argues that Morgan must be retained if we are to defend civil liberties, uphold the principle of criminal responsibility, and argue that women are not passive victims of male sexuality.  Important protections of civil liberties fought for for hundreds of years are at risk if the Morgan principle is sacrificed." (source: table of contents at the beginning of  issue 1, volume 6)


MORISHITA, T. (Tadashi),  "Règlementation juridique dde l'erreur en droit pénal japonais, (mars 1979) Hiroshima Law Journal 1; article cité par Pradel, infra, p. 300;
 

HOLLEY, Dannye, "The Influence of the Model Penal Code's Culpability Provisions on State Legislatures: A Study of Lost Opportunities, Including Abolishing the Mistake of Fact Doctrine", (1997-98) 27 Southwestern University Law Review 229-263;
 

HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE.  EMPEROR (1765-1790 : Joseph II),  The Emperor’s new code of criminal laws. Published at Vienna, the 15th of January, 1787. Translated from the German, by an officer, London : printed for G. G. J. and J. Robinson, 1787, [3], vi-viii,110 p.; notes: Translation of Allgemeines Gesetz über Verbrechen 1787; available in the Eighteenth Century Collections Online, ESTC number T100992; 18th century microfilm reel # 677; source: British Library;

"5.  The want of free-will absolves the offender from any criminal accusation, in the following cases: ...

f. When the action has been committed through error, in which case no crime can be imputed to the offender, since, had he possessed proper information, he migh have conducted himself, as the laws and good principles directed him." (pp. 2-4)  


HOWARD, Colin, "The Reasonableness of Mistake in the Criminal Law", (1961-64) 4 University Queensland Law Jourmnal 45-56;
 

ISRAEL, Penal Law of Israel (626/1996) -Unofficial English Translation--"Penal Law--Draft Proposal and New Code," 30 Israel Law Review 5-27 (1996)

"34R. (a) A person who does any act imagining a state of things which does not exist shall bear no criminal liability save to the extent as he would bear it if the state of things were in fact as he imagined it to be.

(b) Subsection (a) shall apply also to offences of negligence provided that the mistake is reasonable and, subject to the provisions of section 22(b), to strict-liability offences.


34S. For the purposes of criminal liability, it is immaterial whether a person, owing to a mistake as to the existence or meaning of a penal enactment, imagines that his act is not prohibited, unless the mistake could not reasonably have been avoided."

 

The Italian Penal Code Translated by Edward M. Wise in collaboration with Allen Maitlin.  Introduction by Edward M. Wise, Lttleton (Colorado): Fred B. Rothman and London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1978, xli, 249 p., see article 47 (series; American series of foreign penal codes; vol. 23), ISBN: 08377700434;

"Article 47.  Error of Fact.
    Error of fact as to the act which constitutes the offense shall preclude the actor's being punishable.  However, punishability shall not be precluded with respect to an error induced by negligence when the act is designated by law as a crime of negligence.

    Error of fact as to the act which constitutes a particular offense shall not preclude punishability for a different offense.

    Error as to a law other than the penal law shall preclude punishability when it causes an error of fact as to the act which constitutes the offense." (p. 16)

------

"Art. 47 - Errore di fatto
   L'errore sul fatto che costituisce il reato esclude la punibilità dell'agente. Nondimeno, se si tratta di errore determinato da colpa, 
la punibilità non è esclusa, quando il fatto è preveduto dalla legge come delitto colposo.

L'errore sul fatto che costituisce un determinato reato non esclude la punibilità per un reato diverso.

L'errore su una legge diversa dalla legge penale esclude la punibilità, quando ha cagionato un errore sul fatto che costituisce reato.

(http://www.usl4.toscana.it/dp/isll/lex/cp_l1.htm#L1t3c1, accessed on 3 August 2006)

------

"ART. 47 -- Erreur de fait. --
    L'erreur sur le fait qui constitue l'infraction, exclut la possibilité de punir l'agent.  Néanmoins, s'il s'agit d'une erreur dérivant d'une faute, la possibilité de le punir n'est pas exclue, lorsque le fait est prévu par la loi comme délit non intentionel.

    L'erreur sur le fait qui constitue une infraction déterminée, n'exclut pas la possibilité de punir l'agent pour une infraction différente.

    L'erreur portant sur une loi distincte de la loi pénale exclut la possibilité de punir l'agent, quand elle a causé une erreur sur le fait qui constitue l'infraction." (Code pénal italien  de 1930, traduction de P. de Casabianca avec mise à jour par V. de Toma,  avec une notice spéciale sur ce code par Marc Ancel avec la collaboration de Yvonne Marx, dans Les Codes pénaux européens, Tome II, Paris: Centre français de droit comparé, 1956, pp. 871-1014, à la p. 881 (Nouvelle Collection du Comité de législation étrangère et de droit international));

JESCHECK, Hans-Heinrich, "The General Principles of International Criminal Law Set Out in Nuremberg, as Mirrored in the ICC Statute", (2004) 2(1) Journal of International Criminal Justice 38-55, and see "Mistake of Fact, Mistake of Law", at pp. 46-47;

KAHAN, Dan M., "Is Ignorance of Fact an Excuse Only for the Virtuous?", (June 1998) 96(7) Michigan Law Review 2123-2128;

KEEDY, Edwin R., "Ignorance and Mistake in the Criminal Law", (1908-09) 22 Harvard Law Review 75-96, see "Ignorance and Mistake of Fact" at pp. 81-88;
 

KELT, Maria and Herman von Hebel, "General Principles of Criminal Law and Elements of Crime", in Roy S. Lee, ed., ans Hakan Friman, Silvia A. Fernandez de Gurmendi, Herman von Hebel, and Darryl Robinson, associate editors, The International Criminal Court: Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Ardsley (NY): Transnational Publishers, 2001, lxvi, 857 p., at pp. 19-40, and see "MISTAKE OF FACT AND MISTAKE OF LAW", at pp. 36-37, ISBN: 1571052097; copy at Ottawa University, FTX General KZ 6310 .I579 2001;
 

KNOOPS, Geert-Jan, Defenses in contemporary international criminal law, Ardsley (NY): Transnational Publications, 2001, xxxviii, 297 p., see "The defense of consent to sexual assault and mistake of fact" at pp. 104-108 (series; International and comparative criminal law series),  ISBN: 1571051511;

KOONTZ, Paul A., "Mistake of Fact as a defense to common law crimes", (1937) 41 Dickinson Law Review 115-120;
 
 
KOPPE, J. Melvin, "Criminal Law - Attempts - Mistake of Fact", (1936) 16 Boston University Law Review 199-204;


LAINGUI, André, La responsabilté pénale dans l'ancien droit: XVIe-XVIIIe siècle, Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1970, xii, 367 p., voir sur l'erreur de fait, les pp. 81-82 et 94-100 (Collection; Bibliothèque d'histoire du droit et droit romain, t. 17);


LAPPI-SEPPÄLÄ, Tapio, "The Doctrine of Criminal Liability and the Draft Criminal Code for Finland" in Raimo Lahti and Kimmo Nuotio, eds., Criminal Law Theory in Transition: Finnish and Comparative Perspectives/Strafrechtstheorie Im Umbruch Finnische und vergleichendePerspektiven, Helsinki:  Finish Lawyers' Publishing Company, 1992, xiv, 604 p., at pp. 214-246, see "Mistake as to a Circumstance Affording a Defence" at pp. 234-236, ISBN: 9516405940;


LASSERRE, M. Emmanuel, Étude sur les cas de non-culpabilité et les excuses en matière pénale suivant la science rationnelle, la législation positive et la jurisprudence, Toulouse: Imprimerie de Bonnal et Gibrac, 1877, 375 p.; pdf et Internet complétés le 2 juin 2007;
PDF
- Table des matières;
- 1-186;
- 187-375;


Laws of the New Sudan -- Penal Code, 2003, available at http://www.unsudanig.org/docs/The%20Penal%20Code%20Act,%202003.pdf (accessed on 29 September 2007);

"Section 44-- Act done by Person Bound or Justified by Law: No act is an offence which is done by a person who is legally bound to do it or justified by law in doing it, or who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake of law in good faith believes himself to be bound by law to do it or justified by law in doing it.

Illustration –
(a) (“A”) an officer of a Court being ordered by that Court to arrest (“Y”) and after due enquiry believing (“Z”) to be (“Y”) arrests (“Z”). (“A”) has committed no offence.

(b) (“A”) sees (“Z”) commit what appears to (“A”) to be a murder. (“A”) in the exercise to the best of his judgment exerted in good faith of the power which the law gives to all persons of arresting murderers in the act seizes (“Z”) in order to bring (“Z”) before the proper authorities. (“A”) has committed no offence, though it may turn out that (“Z”) was acting in self-defense."

LEVERICK, Fiona, Killing in Self-Defence, Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2006, xxviii, 217 p., ISBN: 9780199283460, 019928346X (pbk.); title noted in my research but book not consulted yet (2 July 2007);

"Contents: The classification of defences -- The justification of self-defence -- Retreat -- Imminence of harm -- Self-generated self-defence -- Killing to protect property -- Killing to prevent rape -- Mistake -- The impact of the European Convention on Human Rights" (source: Hollis catalogue, Harvard University)

___________ "Mistake in Self-Defence after Drury", [2002], Part 1, The Juridical Review 35-48; copy at Ottawa University, KD 322 .J854  Location: FTX Periodicals;  


LOW, Peter W., "The Model Penal Code, the Common Law, and Mistakes of Fact: Recklessness, Negligence or Strict Liability?", (1987-88) Rutgers Law Journal 539-567; copy at the University of Ottawa, FTX Periodicals, KFN 1869 .R87;


MacDONALD, Elizabeth, "Intoxication, Mistake and Self-Defence", (2 October 1987) 137 New Law Journal 914-915; issue 6325; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada; number missing at the University of Ottawa;

MACEDONIA, Criminal Code, available at http://www.legislationline.org/legislation.php?tid=1&lid=6272 (accessed on 24 September 2007);

"[Translation]
Real mistake
Article 16

(1) The offender is not criminally responsible, when at the time the crime was committed, he had no knowledge of some of its characteristics, determined by law; or if he wrongly considered that there are circumstances according to which, if they had existed, this would have been permissible.

(2) If the offender was under mistaken notion out of negligence, he is criminally responsible for the crime committed out of negligence, if the law determines a criminal responsibility for such an act."

MENSA-BONSU, Henrietta, J.A.N., "The Defence of Mistake of Fact and Claim of Right Matters Arising from Republic V. Kwando II", (1996-1999) 20 University of Ghana Law Journal 125-136;


MILGATE, H.P., "Intoxication, Mistake and the Public Interest", [1987] Cambridge Law Journal 381-384; R. v. O'Grady [1987] 3 W.L.R. 321 (C.A.); about mistake due to intoxication in self-defence;   

MILTON, J.R.L., "Reasonable Mistake of Fact as a Defence in Statutory Offences" (1971) 88 South African Law Journal 70-83; copy at the University of Ottawa, Law Library, FTX Periodicals, KR 0 .S69;

___________"Recent Cases, "A Stab in the Dark: A Case of Aberratio Ictus, (1968) 85 South African Law Journal 115-122;
 

MINKOWICH, Meyer, Mistake of Fact and Ignorance as a Defense in Criminal Law of the Talmud and English Common Law", PH.D. thesis., The Dropsie College, 1961, source: ADD X1961;  notes: in 1986, the Dropsie College  became the Annenberg Research Institute.  In 1993,  the Annenberg Research Institute merged into the University of Pennsylvania becoming the institutions Center for Advanced Judaic Studies; could be in hebrew, Ta`ut ka-`uvdah ve-i-yedi`ah ke-haganah be-mishpat pelili; Franklin Pennylvania Library;


MORGAN, Neil, "Mistake", (1991) 15 Criminal Law Journal 128-138, and see "Mistake of Fact, at pp. 136-138;

"One final feature which is welcome is the clear recognition that mistake may be either a complete or a partial  excuse, following the Queensland and Western Australian Model.68...
------
68 Criminal Codes, s. 24" (p. 138)

MOSTAFA, Mahmoud M., Principes de droit pénal des pays arabes, Préface de Marc Ancel, Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1972,  iii, 190 p. et voir "L'erreur dans la justification" aux pp. 49-50 (collection; Les grands systemes de droit pénal contemporains; vol. 5); copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, FTX General;

"Toutefois nous aurions préféré qu'il soit prévu par un texte général relatif à l'erreur dans la justification, à l'instar de l'article 28 du projet de Code pénal de la République arabe unie (projet de 1966) qui dispose que: 'L'intention est écartée si l'acte constitutif de l'infraction est accompli sur la base d'une erreur ... dans des circonstances telles que, si elles se réalisaient, l'acte serait justifié.  Pourtant ceci n'empêche pas la poursuite de l'auteur pour toute infraction involontaire ou toute autre infraction découlant de son acte.'." (p. 50)


MOUSOURAKIS, George, Criminal Responsibility and Partial Excuses, Aldershoot (UK) and Brookfield (Vermont/USA): Ashgate Publishing Company, 1998, vi, 216 p., ISBN: 1855219433; see Table of Contents; see chapter 6 "Self-defence, Provocation and Mistake of Fact", at pp. 177-195;


MYERS, Larry W., "Reasonable Mistake of Age: A Needed Defense to Statutory Rape", (1965) 64 Michigan Law Review 105-136;


NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, THE, Study Draft of a New Federal Criminal Code  (Title 18.  United States Code), Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., for sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970, lxiv, 344p.; notes: "Consists of materials under consideration by the Commission preparatory to its final report to the President and Congress in November of 1970." (source: Hollis catalogue, Harvard University); excerpts are to be read with part of the article of DAMASKA, reproduced supra;

"§ 302 Requirements of Culpability
....
(3) Factors to Which Requirement of Culpability Applies.
...
(d) Except as otherwise expressly provided, no culpability is required with respect to facts which establish that a defense does not exist, if the defense is defined in part A of this Code or Chapter 10; otherwise the least kind of culpability required for the offense is required with respect to such facts." (pp. 24-25)

-------

"§ 303.  Mistake of Fact in Affirmative Defenses.

Except as otherwise expressly provided, a mistaken belief that the facts which constitute an affirmative defense exist is not a defense." (p. 27)

------

"§ 304.  Ignorance or Mistake Negating Culpability

A person does not commit an offense if when he engages in conduct he is ignorant or mistaken about a matter of fact or law and the ignorance or mistake negates the kind of culpability required for commission of the offense." (p. 27)

------

""§ 609.  Excuse

(1)  Mistake.  A person's conduct is excused if he believes that the factual situation is such that his conduct is necessary and appropriate for any of the purposes which would establish a justification under this Chapter, even though his belief is mistaken, except that, if his belief is negligently or recklessly held, it is not an excuse in a prosecution for an offense for which negligence or recklessness, as the case may be, suffices to establish culpability.  Excuse under this subsection is a defence or affirmative defense according to which type of defense would be established had the facts been as the person believed them to be." (p. 46)

------

"§ 1306  Escape.
....
(4) Defenses.  Irregularity in bringing about or maintaining dtention, or lack of jurisdiction of the committing or detaining authority shall not be a defense to a prosecution under this section if the escape is from prison or other facility used for official detention or from detention pursuant to commitment by an official proceeding.  In the case of other detention, irregularity or lack of jurisdiction shall be an affirmative defense if (a) the escape involved no substantial risk of harm to the person or property of anyone other than the detainee, or (b) the detaining authority did not act in good faith under color of law." (p. 101)


Les nouveaux codes pénaux de langue allemande: Autriche (1974), République démocratique allemande (1968) et République fédérale d'Allemagne (1975), Paris: La  Documentation française avec le concours du Centre français de droit comparé, 1981, 565 p., (Collection des codes pénaux européens du Comité de législation étrangère et de droit international du Ministère de la Justice, sous la direction de Marc Ancel avec la collaboration de Yvonne Marx, tome 5),  ISBN: 2110006579;

[Code pénal allemand]
"ARTICLE 16
Erreur sur les circonstances de l'acte
(1) Si, au moment de la commission de l'acte l'auteur ignorait une circonstance qui constitue un des éléments constitutifs du délit, il n'agit pas intentionnellement.  Le caractère punissable de l'acte commis par imprudence n'en est pas affecté.

(2)  Celui qui, lors de la commission de l'acte, prévoit, par erreur, des circonstances qui constitueraient un des éléments constitutifs du délit par une disposition légale plus douce, ne peut être puni pour acte intentionnel qu'en application de cette loi plus douce." (p. 332)


"ARTICLE 35
Etat de nécessité en tant que cause d'excuse
(1) Agit sans culpabilité celui qui, en présence d'un danger pour la vie, la personne ou la liberté, danger qui ne peut être évité par aucun autre moyen, commet un acte illicite en vue de détourner le danger de lui-même, d'un parent ou d'un autre de ses proches.  La présente distinction n'est pas applicable s'il pouvait, selon les circonstances, être exigé de l'auteur qu'il accepte le danger notamment parce qu'il avait lui-même provoqué le danger ou parce qu'il se trouvait dans une situation juridique particulière; toutefois, la peine peut être atténuée en application de l'article 49, alinéa 1, lorsque l'auteur, eu égard à des rapports juridiques particuliers, ne devait pas accepter le danger.

(2) Si, lors de la commission de l'acte, l'auteur suppose, par erreur, l'existence de circonstances qui l'auraient excusé, en application de l'alinéa 1, il n'est puni que s'il ne pouvait pas éviter cette erreur.  La peine doit être atténuée conformément à l'article 49, alinéa 1." (p. 339)

------------

[Code pénal autrichien]

"Supposition erronée de l'existence d'un état de choses justificatif
ARTICLE  8 -- Quiconque suppose par erreur un état de choses, qui exclurait l'illicéité de l'acte, ne peut être puni pour avoir commis cet acte intentionnellement.  Il doit être puni pour commission (de l'acte) par négligence, si l'erreur tient à la négligence et si ladite commission par négligence est passible d'une peine." (p. 15)

"Excuse créée par l'état de nécessité
ARTICLE 10. -- (1) Quiconque commet un acte passible d'une peine pour écarter de lui-même ou d'un tiers un dommage grave le menaçant directement bénéficie d'une excuse, si la gravité du dommage dont l'acte en cause fait peser la menace n'est pas hors de proportion avec celle du dommage que ledit acte vise à écarter, et si l'on ne pouvait s'attendre, dans la situation de l'auteur, à un comportement différent de la part d'un homme attaché aux valeurs placées sous la protection du droit.

(2)  L'auteur ne bénéficie pas d'une excuse, s'il s'est exposé au danger délibérément, en l'absence d'un motif reconnu par le droit en vigueur.  L'auteur doit être puni pour avoir agi par négligence, si c'est par une erreur reposant sur sa négligence qu'il a supposé réunies les conditions qui auraient fait bénéficier son acte d'une excuse, et si une peine est prévue pour l'acte commis par négligence." (p. 16)
 

NORWAY, Penal Code, available at http://www.legislationline.org/upload/legislations/51/ec/c428fe3723f10dcbcf983ed59145.htm (accessed on 30 September 2007)

"§ 42. If any person has committed an act in a state of ignorance concerning circumstances that determine criminal liability or increase the penalty for the said act, such circumstances shall not be attributable to him.

If the ignorance can be ascribed to negligence, in cases in which negligence is punishable the penalty prescribed for such negligence shall be applicable.

Error regarding the value of an object or the amount at which damages must be assessed shall only be taken into account when criminal liability is conditional thereon."


O'CONNOR, Vivienne and Colette Rausch, eds., with Hans Joerg Albrecht and Goran Klemencic, Model codes for post-conflict criminal justice, Washington, D.C. : United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007-,  and see "Mistake of Fact and Mistake of Law" at pp. 85-86, ISBN: 9781601270115 (pbk.: alk. paper); 1601270119 (pbk. : alk. paper); 9781601270122 (hardcover : alk. paper);  1601270127 (hardcover : alk. paper); available at http://books.google.com/books?id=FL3nJkyxDBkC&pg=PR23&dq=%22comparative++criminal+law%22&lr=&as_brr=3&ei=XSDxSPaCIoO6yAT4-aziAw&sig=ACfU3U0jIcI2f4BPr_OTvi5RqgnWG9DcMg#PPA78,M1 (accessed on 11 October 2008);
 


OKO, Okechukwu, "Unveiling the Cloak of Deception: Determining When Ignorance or Mistake Should Excuse Criminal Responsibility in Louisiana", (1995-96) 23 Southern University Law Review 213-255;
 

O'REGAN, Robin S, Essays on the Australian Criminal Codes, Sydney: The Law Book, 1979, xix, 152 p., see Essay III, "Unreasonable Mistake of Fact", at pp. 40-51, ISBN: 0455199558;

_____________ "Sorcery and Homicide in Papua New Guinea" (1974) 48 Australian Law Journal 76-82;


PAIZES, Andrew, "Mistake as to the Causal Sequence and Mistake as to the Causal Act Exploring the Relation between Mens Rea and the Causal Element of the Actus Reus", (1993) 110 South African Law Journal  493-529;


PERKINS, Rollins M., "Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law",  (1939-40) 88 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 35-70;
 

___________"Ignorance or Mistake of Law Revisited",  (1980) Utah Law Review 473-491;

POLAND, Penal Code; available at http://www.era.int/domains/corpus-juris/public_pdf/polish_penal_code1.pdf  (accessed on 24 September 2007);

"Article 28. § 1. Whoever commits an act while being in error as to a circumstance constituting a feature of an prohibited act, shall not intentionally commit an offence.

§ 2. Whoever commits an offence in the justified but mistaken conviction that a circumstance has occurred, which constitutes a feature of a prohibited act carrying a less severe penalty, shall be subject to criminal liability under the provision regarding the circumstance warranting this lesser liability.

Article 29. Whoever commits a prohibited act in the justified but mistaken conviction that a circumstance has occurred which excludes unlawfulness or guilt, shall not commit an offence; if the mistake of the perpetrator is not justifiable, the court may apply extraordinary mitigation of the penalty."

POTUGAL, Penal Code -- General Part in English, available at http://www.verbojuridico.net/download/portuguesepenalcode.pdf  (accessed on 30 September 2007);

"Article 16
Mistake about circumstances of the act

1- The Mistake about fact or law elements of a type of crime or about prohibitions the knowledge of which is reasonably indispensable for the agent to become aware of the act unlawfulness excludes intent.

2- The rule established in the previous number applies to the mistake about a state of things that, if existing, would have excluded the unlawfulness of the fact or the agent’s fault.

3- Punishability is safeguarded in negligence general terms."


PRADEL, Jean, "Présentation générale du projet de Code pénal européen sur les délits d'affaires (euros-délits), [2003] Revue pénitentiaire et de droit pénal 277-287; l'article est suivit du texte du Code aux pp. 289-308;

"Article 5.  Dol et erreur

[...]

2.  N'agit pas dolosivement celui qui ne connaît pas le fait au moment de sa commission.  Il n'y a pas lieu à dol lorsque la méconnaissance ou ignorance est évitable et que cela résulte d'une erreur d'évaluation ou d'une erreur de droit.

3.  Ne sera pas sanctionné d'une peine prévue pour fait dolosif, celui qui au moment de la commission considère de manière erronée que des circonstances particulières se sont produites et dont l'existence puisse justifier le comportement (art. 8 et 9).  Ce qui est mentionn antérieurement est également applicable dans les hypothèses où l'erreur est évitable.  Dans ce cas, si l'erreur est sdue à une négligence ou à une imprudence grave, l'auteur peut être sanctionné conformément aux dispositions des articles 4, alinéas 2 et 6"

PRADEL, Jean, Droit pénal comparé, Paris: Dalloz, 1995, viii, 733 p., ISBN: 2247019315;  il y a maintenant une 2e éditon:  Paris: Dalloz, 1995, x, 803 p., ISBN: 2247041108, copie à la Bibliothèque de la Cour suprême du Canada;

" La règle générale est que l'erreur si elle porte sur un élément essentiel de l'infraction supprime le dol en sorte que l'infraction ne peut être retenue que comme infraction d'imprudence  -- si l'on peut reprocher une faute à l'agent.  L'acte ne peut donc être retenu comme infraction intentionnelle, mais tout au plus comme infraction involontaire.  [...]

En revanche, si l'erreur porte sur un élément secondaire de l'infraction, la responsabilité pour infraction intentionnelle subsiste.  En cas d'erreur sur la personne (l'agent croit tuer A et tue B qu'il prend pour A) ou la maladresse dite aberratio ictus (l'agent vise A et par erreur tue B), la responsabilité subsiste.  Au cas d'erreur, les juges retiennent en général, le meurtre sur la personne effectivement atteinte.  Et au cas de maladresse, les juges ont parfois hésité entre retenir une tentative de meurtre sur la personne visée et homicide par imprudence sur la personne atteinte ou bien retenir seulement l'homicide volontaire." (pp. 300-301; notes omises)

PRICE, Terry L., "Faultless Mistake of Fact: Justification or Excuse?", (Summer/Fall 1993) 12(2) Criminal Justice Ethics 14-28;


____________"Mistakes of Fact and Agent Voluntariness: Aristotle, Aquinas, and Conformity to Will", (January 2003) 80(2) Modern Schoolman: A Quarterly Journal of Philosophy 99-113;


RADULESCO, Jean, De l'influence de l'erreur sur la responsabilité pénale, Paris : éditions de la ″Vie universitaire″, 1923, 173 p.;  thèse, Université de Paris, 1923; titre noté dans mes recherches mais livre non consulté (22 septembre 2007);


RAMIREZ, Juan Bustos and  Manuel Valenzuela Bejas, Le système pénal des pays d'Amérique latine (avec référence au Code pénal type latino-américain),  Traduit de l'espagnol par Jacqueline Bernat De Celis, Paris: Éditions A. Pedone, 1983, 159 p. et voir les pp. 116-122;

"ARTICLE 27.  --  N'est pas punissable celui qui aurait agi dans la conviction qu'il manque au fait quelques-unes des exigences nécessaires à l'existence du délit selon sa description légale.

    Cependant, si l'erreur provenait d'une faute, le fait ne sera puni que lorsque la loi aura prévu sa réalisation 'fautive'.  Les mêmes règles s'appliuqueront à celui qui supposerait de façon erronée l'existence de circonstances justificatives du fait réalisé.


ARTICLE 28. -- N'est pas coupable celui qui par une erreur invincible agirait avec la conviction que le fait réalisé n'est pas punissable.

    Si l'erreur n'était pas incible, le fait sera réprimé d'une peine non inférieure à la moitié du minimum ni supérieure à la moitié du maximum de celle qui aura été prévue pour le délit correspondant.


ARTICLE 29.  -- Si, par suite d'une erreur de l'agent, le fait réalisé était différent de celui qu'il s'était proposé, il lui sera imposé la peine correspondante au fait le moins grave." (p. 118)


Recent Cases, "Criminal Law -- Acts in Defense of Others -- Mistake of Fact", (1923-24) 72 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 325-326;


REICH, J.F., " 'No Provincial or Tansient Notion': The Need for a Mistake of Age Defense in Child Rape Prosecutions", (2005) 57(2) Vanderbilt Law Review 693-740;


REVILLE, N.J., "Self-Defence: Courting Sober but Unreasonable Mistakes of Fact", (1988) 52 Journal of Criminal Law 84-95;


ROBINSON, Paul H., 1948-, Criminal Law Defences, vol. 1 of 2, St. Paul (Minnesota): West, 1984,  ISBN: 0314815139 (set);


ROBINSON, Paul H., 1948-, and John M., Darley, Justice, Liability, and  Blame: Community Views and the Criminal Law, Boulder (Colorado, USA): Westview Press, 1995, xvii, 299 p., ISBN: 0813324505, (Series: New directions in social psychology); see Chapter 4, "Doctrines of Culpability: When Is One's Violation of a Legal Rule Blameworthy?", pp. 83-125, and, in particular, "Study 8: Offense Culpability Requirements and Mistake/Accident Defenses" at pp. 84-96 and the "Chapter Summary" at p. 123-125;


ROMANIA,  Penal Code, available at http://www.legislationline.org/upload/legislations/18/e2/c1cc95d23be999896581124f9dd8.htm (accessed on 24 September 2007);

"Error de facto

          Art.33 – (1) An act provided in the criminal law shall not be an offence if the perpetrator, at time of perpetration, was unaware of the existence of a state, situation or circumstance on which the criminality of the act depends.

(2) A circumstance not known by the perpetrator at the time of perpetration shall not be an aggravating circumstance.

(3) Para.(1) and (2) shall apply also to acts committed by negligence that are punished by criminal law, only if the unawareness of the state, situation or circumstance concerned is not in itself the result of negligence."
   

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court / Statut de Rome de la Cour pénale internationale
 

"Article 32
Mistake of fact or mistake of law
1. A mistake of fact shall be a ground for excluding criminal responsibility only if it negates the mental element required by the crime." (available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/english/rome_statute(e).pd , accessed on 29 September 2007)

------
"Article 32
ERREUR DE FAIT OU ERREUR DE DROIT
1. Une erreur de fait n’est un motif d’exonération de la responsabilité pénale que si elle fait disparaître l’élément psychologique du crime." (disponible à http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/french/rome_statute(f).pdf, consulté le 29 septembre 2007)

___________"Draft Report of the Intersessional Meeting from 19 to 30 January 1998 in Zutphen, the Netherlands" in M. Cherfif Bassiouni, 1937-, compiled by, The Statute of the International Criminal Court : a documentary history, Ardsley, N.Y. : Transnational Publishers, c1998, xxii, 793 pp., at pp. 221-311, (document number: A/AC.249/1998/L.13, 1998), ISBN:1571050957; copy at the Library of Parliament, KZ6310 S72 (library Br.B.); available at http://web.archive.org/web/20040720010500/http://www.npwj.net/cdrom/zut/zut.pdf and http://www.npwj.org/1998/05/31/1998_05_31_icc_compilation_un_documents_and_draft_icc_statute_diplomatic_conference  (accessed on 24 September 2007);
 

___________"Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, vol. 1, (Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee during March-April and August 1996)", in M. Cherfif Bassiouni, 1937-, compiled by, The Statute of the International Criminal Court : a documentary history, Ardsley, N.Y. : Transnational Publishers, c1998, xxii, 793 pp., at pp. 385-439, (document number: G.A., 51 st Sess., Supp. No. 22, A/51/22, 1996), ISBN:1571050957; copy at the Library of Parliament, KZ6310 S72 (library Br.B.);  available at   http://web.archive.org/web/20040719155140/http://www.npwj.net/cdrom/vol1/vol_1.pdf  and http://www.npwj.org/1998/05/31/1998_05_31_icc_compilation_un_documents_and_draft_icc_statute_diplomatic_conference  (accessed on 24 September 2007);
 

___________"Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, vol. 2, (Compilation of Proposals)", in M. Cherfif Bassiouni, 1937-, compiled by, The Statute of the International Criminal Court : a documentary history, Ardsley, N.Y. : Transnational Publishers, c1998, xxii, 793 pp., at pp. 441-616 (document number: G.A., 51 st Sess., Supp. No. 22, A/51/22, 1996), ISBN:1571050957; copy at the Library of Parliament, KZ6310 S72 (library Br.B.);  available at http://web.archive.org/web/20030828030555/http://www.npwj.net/cdrom/vol2/vol2_a.pdf (accessed on 15 December 2002) and http://www.npwj.org/1998/05/31/1998_05_31_icc_compilation_un_documents_and_draft_icc_statute_diplomatic_conference  (accessed on 24 September 2007);
 

ROUQUETTE, Théophile, Des excuses légales et des faits justificatifs en matière criminelle, Toulouse: Bonnal et Gibrac, 1866; disponible à http://books.google.com/books?vid=HARVARD32044103179586&printsec=titlepage#PPP5,M1 et  à http://books.google.com/books?id=D1kOAAAAYAAJ&source=gbs_summary_s&cad=0 1 et (vérifiés le 30 mai 2008);

SALAND, Per, "International Criminal Law Principles" in Roy S. Lee, ed., The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations, Results, The Hague/London/Boston: KLuwer Law International, 1999, xxxv, 657 p., at pp. 189-216, ISBN: 904111212X (hardcover) and 904111243X (pbk.); see "XIII. Article 32, Mistake of  fact or mistake of law" at p. 210;


SAMUELS, "Drafting the Criminal Code", (1992) 13 Statute Law Review 229-239;

"e.  Transferred Fault (or Malice) (Clause 25)

    (1) In determining whether a person is guilty of an offence, his intention to cause, or his awareness of a risk that he will cause, a result in relation to a person or thing capable of being the victim or subject-matter of the offence shall be treated as an intention to cause or, as the case may be, an awareness of a risk that he will cause, that result in relation to any other person or thing affected by his conduct.

    (2) Any defence on which a person might have relied on a charge of an offence in relation to a person or thing within his contemplation is open to him on a charge of the same offence in relation to a person or thing not within his contemplation.


    Transferred fault or malice is not a principle of law.  The definition of intentional or reckless assault already cover the matter.

    D intended to assault A but hit B: guilty.  D intended to assault A but missed and broke a window: if reckless, guilty.  D intended to break window A but broke window B: guilty.  D intended to break a window but missed and hit A: of if reckless, guilty.  There is no problem.

    The clause is a sort of philosophical excursus, suitable for a seminar discussion, but not in in a forensic context.  It is confusing, unhelpful, adds nothing, and need not and should not be there." (pp. 232-233; note: after the words "within his contemplation", I have changed the text, by starting a new paragraph.  Clause 25 finishes with the words "within his contemplation".  This clause 25 is from The Law Commission, Criminal Law: Legislating the Criminal Code : Offences against the Person and General Principles - A Consultation Paper, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1992, v, 131 p.(series; Consultation Paper No. 122),  ISBN: 011730204X);


SATZGER, Helmut, "German Criminal Law and the Rome Statute -- A Critical Analysis of the New German Code of Crimes against International Law", (2002) 2  International Criminal Law Review 261-282, and see discussion on excessive self-defence and mistake as to justified self-defence, at pp. 270-271;
 

SCALIOTTI, Massimo, Defences before the International Criminal Court: Substantive grounds for excluding criminal responsibility – Part 2", (2002) 2(1) International Criminal Law Review 1-46, on "mistake of fact and mistake of law, see pp. 1-16;
 

SEIDMAN, Robert B., "Mens Rea and the Reasonable African: The Pre-Scientific World-View and Mistake of Fact", (1966) 15(4) The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1135-1164;
 

___________"Witch Murder and Mens Rea: A Problem of Society under Radical Social Change", (1965) 28 Modern Law Review 46-61;


SENDOR, Benjamin B., "Mistakes of Fact: A Study in the Structure of Criminal Conduct", in Michael Louis Corrado, ed., Justification and Excuse in the Criminal Law, New York/London: Hamden: Garland, 1994, xxxviii, 625 p., pp. 163-196 (series; vol. 831, Garland Reference Library of Social Science;  vol. 1, Garland  Studies in Applied Ehics), ISBN: 0815308256; originally published in (1990) 25 Wake Forest Law Review 707-782;


SERBIA and MONTENEGRO, Criminal Code, 2005, available at  http://www.legislationline.org/upload/legislations/dc/a9/576c23dc41967e427086bf4c2b45.pdf (accessed on 5 July 2006);

"Mistake of Fact
(Error Facti)
Article 28
(1) An act shall not be considered a criminal offence if it was done out of a compelling mistake of fact.

(2) A compelling mistake of law exists where the perpetrator was not required or could not avoid a mistake about particular circumstance, which is a statutory element of the criminal
offence, or about particular circumstance, which, had it existed, would have rendered such act permissible.

(3) If the perpetrator’s mistake was due to negligence, he shall be guilty of criminal offence committed by negligence, if such offence is provided by law."

SIMESTER, A.P., "Mistakes in Defence", (1992) 12 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 295-310;


SIMONS, Kenneth W., "Mistake and Impossibility, Law and Fact, and Culpability: A Speculative Essay", (1990-91) 81 The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology  447-517;


SLIEDREGT, Elies van, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian Law, The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2003, xxiv, 437 p., see "Article 32 ICC Statute: Mistake", at pp. 301-316, ISBN: 9067041661; copy at Ottawa University, FTX General, K5064 .S53 2003;
 

___________"Defences in International Criminal Law", 44 p., see "ARTICLE 32 OF THE ICC STATUTE: MISTAKE", at pp. 27-32, available at  http://www.isrcl.org/Papers/Sliedregt.pdf (accessed on 11 August 2004); important contribution; "Paper to be presented at the conference Convergence of Criminal Justice Systems: Building Bridges Bridging the Gap, The International Society For the Reform of Criminal Law.  17th International Conference, 25 August 2003 -- not for quotation."; available at "This paper is based on the PhD research recently published at T.M.C. Asser Press: E. van Sliedregt, The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for Violations of International Humanitarian Law, The Hague, 2003"; research note: this book has been ordered by Ottawa University, Law Faculty, on 20 April 2004 (11 August 2004);


SLOVENIA, Republic of,  Penal Code, available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/18/34287694.pdf  (accessed on 14 April 2006); as of 28 September 2004, Unofficial translation, Source: the Commission for the Prevention of Corruption (OECD);

"Mistake of Fact
Article 20

(1) The perpetrator who, at the time of the committing of a criminal offence, was either not aware of a statutory element of such an offence or that he erroneously believed that circumstances were present which, if they were true, would justify his conduct, shall not be held to be liable under criminal law.

(2) If the perpetrator was in error due to his negligence, he shall be held liable for the committing of a criminal offence when such a degree of criminal liability constitutes a statutory element of the offence in question."


SMITH, A.T.H., "Rethinking the Defence of Mistake", (1982) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 429-439;


SUISSE, Code pénal, art. 13, "Erreur sur les faits"; disponible à http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/c311_0.html (consulté le 22 septembre 2007);

"Erreur sur les faits
Art. 13

1 Quiconque agit sous l’influence d’une appréciation erronée des faits est jugé d’après cette appréciation si elle lui est favorable.

2 Quiconque pouvait éviter l’erreur en usant des précautions voulues est punissable pour négligence si la loi réprime son acte comme infraction de négligence."


SWOBODA, Innocent Robert, Ignorance in Relation to the Imputability of Delicts: The Imputability of Delicts,  Washington (D.C.): The Catholic University of America Press, 1941, xii, 271 p. (series: The Catholic University of America Canon Law Studies; No. 143);


TIRAQUEAU, André, 1488-1558, Le «De Poenis Temperandis» de Tiraqueau (1559).  Introduction, traduction et notes par André Laingui et préface de Jean Imbert, Paris : Economica, 1986, vii, 342 p. (Collection Histoire), notes: Société d'histoire du droit et publié avec le concours du CRNS, ISBN:  2717810447; copie à l'Université Carleton, Ottawa;


TITTLE, Peg. "Sexual Activity, Consent, Mistaken Belief, and Mens Rea",  (1996) 3(1) Philosophy in the Contemporary World 19-23;  title noted in my research but article not consulted; no copy of this periodical according to the AMICUS catalogue (verification 29 July 2003);

TRIFFTERER, Otto, "Article 32: Mistake of fact or mistake of law" in Otto Triffterer, ed., Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers' Notes, Article by Article, Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999, xxviii, 1295 p. at pp. 555-571, ISBN: 378906173; copy at the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, call number: legal KZ 6310 .C734 1999;
 

U.K., Ministry of Defence, The Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict / UK Ministry of Defence, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, lv, 611 p., and see "Mistake of Fact", at p. 442, ISBN: 0199244545; copy at the University of Ottawa, FTX General, FTX, KZ 6385 .M285, reserve;

VERHAEGEN, Jacques, "Aberratio ictus ou le problème pénal du coup dévié", (1974-75) Revue juridique Zaire, numéro jubilaire 187-194; titre noté dans ma recherche mais article non consulté; aucune bibliothèque n'a ce numéro dans la région d'Ottawa;


___________ "L'erreur fautive de fait exclusive du dol" dans Liber amicorum José Vanderveeren, Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1997, 214 p., à la p. 203, ISBN: 2802710133;
 

___________"L'erreur non invincible de fait et ses effets en droit pénal belge", (1989) Revue de droit pénal et de criminologie 17-27;

VILLEY, Edmond, "De l'intention, de l'ignorance, de l'erreur et de la bonne foi en matière pénale", (1876-1877) La France judiciaire - Partie I aux pp. 313-324, voir "L'ignorance du faitt" aux p. 321-324; copie à la bibliothèque de la Cour suprême du Canada, Ottawa; 

 
WEINREB, Lloyd L., "Comment on Basis of Criminal Laibility; Culpability; Causation: Chapter 3; Section 610"  in Working Papers of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws,  vol.1, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970, xxv, 742 p., at pp. 105-151, see "Section 304. Ignorance or Mistake Negating Culpability" at pp. 136-141;----------------------------

WEISS, Deborah M., "Scope, Mistake, and Impossibility: The Philosophy of Language and Problems of Mens Rea", (1983) 83 Columbia Law Review 1029-1064;

WELLS, Celia, "Swatting the Subjectivist Bug", [1982] Criminal Law Review 209-220;
 

WERLE, Gerhard, in cooperation with Florian Jessberger, Wulf Burchards, Volker Nerlich and Belinda Cooper, Principles of International Criminal Law, The Hague: TMC Asser Press, c2005, xii, 485 p., and see "Mistake of Fact",  pp. 150-151, ISBN: 9067041963 and 9067042021 (pbk.); copy at the University of Ottawa, FTX General, K5000 .W47 2005;


WHITTIER, Clarke Butler, "Mistake in the Law of Torts", (1902) 15 Harvard Law Review 335-352;
 

WILLIAMS, Glanville L., "Homicide and the Supernatural", (1949) 65 Law Quarterly Review 491-503;
 

WOODRUFF, Owen E., "Mistake of Fact as a Defence", (1958-59)  63 Dickinson Law Review 319-333;