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by / par ©François Lareau, 2003-, Ottawa, Canada
First posted on the internet on 20 October 2003

Selected Bibliography on
Diminished Responsibility/Capacity
----------------------
Bibliographie choisie sur
la responsabilité atténuée en droit pénal
 

Part II - Comparative Law

See also: Diminished Responsibility/Capacity in  Canadian Criminal Law
               La responsabilité atténuée en  droit pénal canadien
 

ABLETT KERR, Judith, "A Licence to Kill or an Overdue Reform? The Case of Diminished Responsibility”,  (1997) 9 Otago Law Review 1-13; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa;
 

THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, Model Penal Code and Commentaries (Official Draft and Revised Comments), Part I General Provisions §§ 3.01 to 5.07, Philadelphia: The American Law Institute, 1985,  xl, 506 p., see section 4.02, at pp.216-222;

[Comment on § 4.02(1)]

"Mental Condition Relevant to an Element of the Offense.
Subsection (1) was designed to resolve an issue as to which there was and is a division of authority.  Some jurisdictions decline to accord evidence of mental disease or defect an admissibility coexistence with its relevance to prove or disprove a material state of mind.  It has been more commonly recognized, however, that there exist degrees of mental disease or defect that fall short of that required for invoking the defense of irresponsibility, but that may properly be put in evidence as tending to show that the defendant lacked the specific mens rea required for the commission of the offense charged.  Under the Model Code, evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect is uniformly admissible, insofar as it is relevant to the possession of a material state of mind.  Hence, regardless of whether or not the defense of irresponsibility could be raised, such evidemce would be admissible if relevant to the question of whether the defendant possessed the purpose of causing the death of a human being required to sustain a charge of murder under Section 210.2(1)(a).  Similarly, such evidence might be introduced to show that a defendant deludedly believed an item he stole to be his own, and thus lacked the purpose to take another's property required for larceny.

The Institute perceived no justification for a limitation on evidence that may bear significantly on a determination of the mental state of the defendant at the time of the commission of the crime.  If states of mind are accorded legal significance, psychiatric evidence should be admissible when relevant to prove or disprove their existence to the same extent as any other relevant evidence.  It is true that when a claim is successfully made that the defendant did not have the state of mind necessary for an offense, there is no provision for automatic commitment, as there is under Section 4.08 for those who successfully claim the defense of irresponsibility of Section 4.01.  But procedures for civil commitment remain available, and often the defendant who lacks the state of mind for a more serious offense will still be guilty of a lesser offense based on recklessness or negligence.

    This section differs importantly from certain notions of diminished, or partial, responsability.  Decisions in many states with statutes distinguishing first degree and second degree murder have held evidence of mental impairment may be admitted to show the absence of 'premeditation and deliberation' required for the higher degree of the offense.  The courts of California have gone further and indicated (1) a mentally impaired person who plans and carries out a killing may nevertheless lack the capacity for full and meaningful reflection implicit in the first degree murder requirement of 'wilful, deliberate, and premeditated' action, and (2) a person whose mental condition prevents his appreciation of social duties does not act with 'malice' when he commits an intentional killing, and is consequently guilty of manslaughter rather than murder.  In England, the idea of diminished responsibility has received statutory recognition as a basis for distinguishing grades of intentional homicide.

    In contrast, the Model Code does not distinguish degrees of murder, and provides no special defenses to murder based on the lesser degrees of mental impairment.  Plainly, many mentally disturbed persons are capable of acting purposefully or knowingly in the minimal sense intended by the Model Code (Section 2.02), and this section provides no defense against a murder charge for one who kills with that state of mind.  Such a defendant must invoke the defense of irresponsibility of Section 4.01 or claim under Section 210.3 that his crime was only manslaughter because he acted under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse.

    Some states with recent revisions have adopted the principle of this subsection, but most do not address the issue." (pp. 217-220; notes omitted)

___________Model Penal Code and Commentaries (Official Draft and Revised Comments), Part II Definition of Specific Crimes §§ 210.0 to 213.6, Philadelphia: The American Law Institute, 1980,  xliv, 439 p., see section 210.3, at pp. 43-80, and in particular, pp. 53-54 and 65-73;

"Mental or Emotional Disturbance.  ...  This provision [section 210.3] includes the common-law doctrine of provocation but is not so limited in its scope.   ...   It also may allow an inquiry into areas which have been treated as part of the law of diminished responsibility or the insanity defence." (pp. 53-54)
 

"Diminished Responsibility  ...

    Defining diminished responsibility is a task of some subtlety.  Courts complicate the matter by using the phrase for two entirely different concepts.  The first is essentially a rule of evidence.  It posits that evidence of mental incapacity or abnormality is admissible whenever relevant to prove that the defendant did not have a state of mind required for commission of the offense. ...

    The second meaning of diminished responsibility is far more controversial.  It involves not merely the admissibility of evidence but rather the implicit redefinition of homicide offenses.  Diminished responsibility in this sense may permit proof of mental abnormality or defect of a certain severity to preclude liability for first-degree murder.  More serious incapacity may be held to bar conviction for murder of any degree and thus reduce the crime to manslaughter.  ...

Using the concept of diminished responsibility to reduce intentional homicide to manslaughter may be expressed as a refinement of 'malice aforethought' to include intent to kill only if that intent is the product of a healthy mind.  Alternately, diminished responsibility may be described as a partial defense to murder based on mental abnormality or defect.  While there is no substantive difference in the competing formulation, it may be better to speak of diminished responsibility as a partial or incomplete defense simply to avoid further compounding the prevailing confusion surrounding the meanings of 'premeditation' and 'malice aforethought.'

    The first step has been widely adopted. ...

    Reducing murder to manslaughter is another matter.  Very few jurisdiction allow mental disease or defect to reduce intentional homicide to manslaughter.  Traditionally, such mitigation arises only from the rule of provocation.  ...  Unlike provocation, diminished responsibility is entirely subjective in character. It looks into the actor's mind to see whether he should be judged by a lesser standard than that applicable to ordinary men.  It recognizes the defendant's own mental disorder or emotional instability as a basis for partially excusing his conduct.  This position undoubtedly achieves a closer relation between criminal liability and moral guilt.   ...  But this approach has its costs.  ...   In short, diminished responsibility brings formal guilt more closely into line with moral blameworthiness, but only at the costs of driving a wedge between dangerousness and social control.

    The Model Code does not recognize diminished responsibility as a distinct category of mitigation.  Of course, Section 4.02 does permit use of psychiatric testimony to negate required state of mind. ...There are, however, important differences between the operation of Section 210.3 in this context and the substantive version of diminished responsibility discussed above. Unlike the cases that have recognized this form of diminished responsibility as a mitigation, the Model Code does not authorize mitigation on the basis of individual abnormality without any measure of the defendant against an objective standard.  ... The fact that, given the actor's 'situation,' the jury will be called upon to determine the 'reasonableness' of the actor's conduct will require this factor to be taken into account.

    Moreover, Section 210.3 does not call upon the courts to determine whether particular types of mental disorder should preclude liability for murder in any definitional sense.  The issue is put by the Model Code in terms of what aspects of the actor's 'situation' should be regarded as relevant to the mitigation that is effected by the provision.  The court will have a role in determining the extent to which the inquiry will be individualized and hence in determining whether evidence of abnormality will be admissible as part of the actor's 'situation'.  It does not necessarily follow, therefore, that a version of the diminished responsibility doctrine will be accepted in a jurisdiction that adopts the Model Code formulation." (pp. 65-73; notes omited)
 

___________Model Penal Code: Proposed Official Draft, Philadelphia: The American Law Institute, 1962, xxii, 346 p., see sections 4.01 and 4.02 at pp. 66-67 and section 210.3, at p. 126;

 
"§ 4.01. Mental Disease or Defect Excluding Responsibility.

(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.

(2) As used in this Article, the terms "mental disease or defect" do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct."
 

"§ 4.02. Evidence of Mental Disease or Defect Admissible When Relevant to Element of the Offense [; Mental Disease or Defect Impairing Capacity as Ground for Mitigation of Punishment in Capital Cases].

(1) Evidence that the defendant suffered from a  mental disease or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did or did not have a state of mind that is an element of the offense.

[ (2) Whenever the jury or the Court is authorized to determine or to recommend whether or not the defendant shall be sentenced to death or  imprisonment upon conviction, evidence that the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect is admissible in favor of sentence of imprisonment.]"
 

"§ 210.3. Manslaughter.

(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when:

(a) it is committed recklessly; or
(b) a homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be.

(2) Manslaughter is a felony of the second degree"
 

ARENELLA, Peter, "Diminished Capacity", in Stanford H. Kadish, editor in Chief, Encyclopedia of Crime and Justice, 1st ed., New York: Free Press, 1983, volume 2, at pp. 612-617, ISBN: 0029181100 (set of 4 volumes);
 

___________"The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage", (1977) 77 Columbia Law Review 827-865; copy at Ottawa University, KFN 5069 .C657  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

ARMITAGE, A.L., "The Homicide Act 1957", [1957] Cambridge Law Journal 183-193, see "Diminished Responsibility" at pp. 187-190;
 

ASHWORTH, A.J., "The Butler Report - (4) The Butler Committee and Criminal Responsibility", [1975] The Criminal Law Review 687-696, see "Diminished Responsibility" at pp. 692-693; copy at Ottawa University, KD 7862 .C734  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT PÉNAL  (AIDP) (International Association of Penal Law) and Istituto Superiore Internazionale di Scienze Criminali (ISISC) (International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences) and Max Planck Institute for Foreign and International Criminal Law (MPI), Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court -- Alternative to the ILC-Draft -- (Siracusa-Draft), prepared by a Committee of Experts Siracusa/Freiburg, July 1995, 88 p.; available at  http://www.iuscrim.mpg.de/forsch/straf/referate/sach/hispint/siracusa.pdf (accessed on 10 December 2005);

"Art. 33 c
Age of Responsibility and Mental Capacity

3. A person is not responsible under this Statute when at the time of the commission of a crime he suffered from a serious mental or psychotic disorder which made him substantially unable to understand the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conduct himself according to such an understanding." (p. 51)
 

"14. Trial for murder-diminished responsibility

(1) A person on trial for murder shall not be convicted of murder if, when the act or omission causing death occurred, the accused was suffering from an abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent cause or whether it was induced by disease or injury) that substantially impaired his or her mental responsibility for the act or omission.

(2) An accused has the onus of proving that he or she is, by virtue of subsection (1), not liable to be convicted of murder.

(3) A person who, but for subsection (1), would be liable (whether as principal or accessory) to be convicted of murder is liable to be convicted of manslaughter.

(4) The fact that a person is, by virtue of subsection (1), not liable to be convicted of murder does not affect the question whether any other person is liable to be convicted of murder in respect of the same death.

(5) Where, on a trial for murder, the accused contends:

(a)  that he or she is entitled to be acquitted on the ground that he or she was mentally ill at the time of the act or omission causing the death; or

(b)  that he or she is, by virtue of subsection (1), not liable to be convicted of murder;

the prosecution may offer evidence tending to prove the other of those contentions and the court may give directions as to the stage of the proceedings at which that evidence may be offered." (available at  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/act/consol_act/ca190082/, accessed on 27 September 2003)

___________Model Criminal Law Officers Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General, Model Criminal Code, Chapter 2 General Principles of Criminal Responsibility -- Discussion Draft, Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printer, July 1992, x, 107 p., (Chairman: David Neal), ISBN: 064425372X;

"The 'defences' of provocation, diminished responsibility and infanticide will also be determined in the Homicide part of the Code." (p. 63)

___________Model Criminal Law Officers Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General,  Model Criminal Code, Chapter 2 General Principles of Criminal Responsibility - Final Report December 1992, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, Commonwealth of Australia, 1993, x, 119, [ii] p.,  (Chairman: David Neal), ISBN: 0644287438; note: "Chapters 1 and 2 of the Model Criminal Code, which were released in the Criminal Law Officers Committee (now Model Criminal Code Officers Committee) Final Report of December 1992 was modified by the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General in 1993 shortly before the Commonwealth Government drafted what was enacted as the Criminal Code Act 1995", see  http://www.ag.gov.au/www/rwpattach.nsf/viewasattachmentPersonal/743ACB88E0EE2266CA256BB30000A0E5/$file/modelcode_ch1_general_principles.pdf(accessed on 27 September 2003);

"The 'defences' of provocation, diminished responsibility and infanticide will also be determined in the Homicide part of the Code." (p. 71)

___________Model Criminal Law Officers Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General,  Model Criminal Code, Chapter 5, Fatal Offences Against the Person, Canberra: Commonwealth Government Publications, 1998, ix, 234 p., see "Diminished Responsibility" at pp. 113-131, ISBN: 0642209448; copy at Ottawa University, KU 4050 .M64 1998 FTX;

"Conclusion
The practical difficulties associated with diminished responsibility frustrate its purpose.  Public confidence in the defence, and more generally the law, is damaged by the perception that it operates to excuse persons because of the often deplorable manner in which they kill.  These cases are viewed, certainly by juries at least, as murder.  The extent to which the defendants abnormal state of mind impacted upon the killing is adequately considered in sentencing.  For these reasons, the Committee agrees with the Law Reform Commission of Victoria's view that the partial defence of diminished responsibility should not be introduced.

Recommendation
The Committee recommends that there be no partial defence of diminished responsibility." (p. 129 and 131)

___________NEW SOUTH WALES, Crimes Act 1900,

"23A Substantial impairment by abnormality of mind

(1) A person who would otherwise be guilty of murder is not to be convicted of murder if:

(a) at the time of the acts or omissions causing the death concerned, the person’s capacity to understand events, or to judge whether the person’s actions were right or wrong, or to control himself or herself, was substantially impaired by an abnormality of mind arising from an underlying condition, and

(b) the impairment was so substantial as to warrant liability for murder being reduced to manslaughter.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) (b), evidence of an opinion that an impairment was so substantial as to warrant liability for murder being reduced to manslaughter is not admissible.

(3) If a person was intoxicated at the time of the acts or omissions causing the death concerned, and the intoxication was self-induced intoxication (within the meaning of section 428A), the effects of that self-induced intoxication are to be disregarded for the purpose of determining whether the person is not liable to be convicted of murder by virtue of this section.

(4) The onus is on the person accused to prove that he or she is not liable to be convicted of murder by virtue of this section.

(5) A person who but for this section would be liable, whether as principal or accessory, to be convicted of murder is to be convicted of manslaughter instead.

(6) The fact that a person is not liable to be convicted of murder in respect of a death by virtue of this section does not affect the question of whether any other person is liable to be convicted of murder in respect of that death.

(7) If, on the trial of a person for murder, the person contends:

(a) that the person is entitled to be acquitted on the ground that the person was mentally ill at the time of the acts or omissions causing the death concerned, or

(b) that the person is not liable to be convicted of murder by virtue of this section, evidence may be offered by the prosecution tending to prove the other of those contentions, and the Court may give directions as to the stage of the proceedings at which that evidence may be offered.

(8) In this section:
     "underlying condition" means a pre-existing mental or physiological condition, other than a condition of a transitory kind." (available at  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nsw/consol_act/ca190082/, accessed on 27 September 2003)
 

___________NEW SOUTH WALES,  Law Reform Commission, Partial defences to murder: diminished responsibility, Sydney : Law Reform Commission, 1997, x, 100 p. (series; Report; 82), available at http://www.agd.nsw.gov.au/lrc.nsf/pages/R82TOC (accessed on 13 September 2003);
 

____________NEW SOUTH WALES, Law Reform Commission, Provocation, diminished responsibility and infanticide, Sydney: Law Reform Commission, 1993, x, 145 p. (series; Discussion paper New South Wales Law Reform Commission; 31), ISBN: 0731011546; available at  http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lrc.nsf/pages/DP31TOC;
 

___________NORTHERN TERRITORY, Criminal Code of the Northern Territory Act, section 37;

"37. Diminished responsibility

When a person who has unlawfully killed another under circumstances that, but for this section, would have constituted murder, was at the time of doing the act or making the omission that caused death, in such a state of abnormality of mind as substantially to impair his capacity to understand what he was doing or his capacity to control his actions or his capacity to know that he ought not do the act, make the omission or cause that event, he is excused from criminal responsibility for murder and is guilty of manslaughter only." (available at  http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/nt/consol_act/ccotntoa498/ , accessed on 27 September 2003)

___________QUEENSLAND, Criminal Code 1899, section 304A;

"304A Diminished responsibility

(1) When a person who unlawfully kills another under circumstances which, but for the provisions of this section, would constitute murder, is at the time of doing the act or making the omission which causes death in such a state of abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind or inherent causes or induced by disease or injury) as substantially to impair the person's capacity to understand what the person is doing, or the person's capacity to
control the person's actions, or the person's capacity to know that the person ought not to do the act or make the omission, the person is guilty of manslaughter only.

(2) On a charge of murder, it shall be for the defence to prove that the person charged is by virtue of this section liable to be convicted of manslaughter only.

(3) When 2 or more persons unlawfully kill another, the fact that 1 of such persons is by virtue of this section guilty of manslaughter only shall not affect the question whether the unlawful killing amounted to murder in the case of any other such person or persons." (source: http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/legis/qld/consol%5fact/cc189994/?query=title+%28+%22criminal%22+%29, accessed on 27 September 2003)

____________QUEENSLAND, The Criminal Code Review Committee, Final Report of the Criminal Code Review Committee to the Attorney-General, June 1992, 410 p. (Chair: Robin S. O'Regan);

"QCC s. 304A Diminished responsibility.
The present provision should be retained." (p. 297)

___________QUEENSLAND, Queensland Law Reform Commission, Working Paper on Proposals to Amend the Practice of  Criminal Courts in Certain Particulars: Criminal Code, [Brisbane: Queensland law Reform Commission], 1977,  seePart V, "Insanity and Diminished Responsibility",  (series; Working Paper; 19); available at http://www.qlrc.qld.gov.au/wpapers/wp19.pdf  (accessed on 15 November 2006);

___________Review Committee, Review of Commonwealth Criminal Law - Interim Report - Principles of Criminal Responsibility and Other Matters, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1990,  vii, 491, iii, 31, 5, 3 p. (Chairman: Sir Harry Gibbs), ISBN: 0644127244;

"9.43  In Queensland, New South Wales and the Northern Territory a person charged with murder may be convicted only of manslaughter if, at the time of the act or omission which caused death, he or she was suffering from an abnormality of mind which (in New South Wales) substantially impaired his mental responsibility⁽⁴¹⁾ or, in Queensland and the Northern Territory, which substantially impaired his or her capacity to understand what he or she was doing, or his or her capacity to control his or her actions, or his or her capacity to know that he or she ought not to do the act or make the omission⁽⁴²⁾.  This 'defence' of diminished responsibility is available only in cases of murder.  The Review Committee considers that it is unnecessary to include a provision of this kind in the proposed consolidating law.  The submission made to the Review Committee by the A.F.P. was opposed to the inclusion of any such provision.

9.44 The Review Committee recommends that: ...

(d) the proposed consolidating law should not make any provision regarding a 'defence' of diminished responsibility to a charge of murder or any other offence" ...

NOTES...
(41) Crimes Act 1900 (N.S.W.), section 23A
(42) Criminal Code (Qld.), section 304A; Criminal Code (N.T.), section 37" (pp. 106-108)

___________QUEENSLAND, Taskforce on Women and the Criminal Code, Report of the Taskforce on Women and the Criminal Code,  [Brisbane] : Office of Women's Policy, 2000, 1 volume, various pagings, and see Chapter 6, "Defences to Violence"; available at http://www.women.qld.gov.au/Docs/Women_and_the_Criminal_Code/Women_and_the_Criminal_Code.pdf (accessed on 8 February 2006) and http://www.qldwoman.qld.gov.au/?id=75 (accessed on 8 February 2006);

___________SOUTH AUSTRALIA, Criminal Law and Penal Methods Reform Committee of South Australia, Fourth Report: The Substantive Criminal Law,  [Adelaide : The Committee], 1977, xlviii, 460 p., see pp. 44-46 on diminished responsibility (Chairman: The Honourable Justice Roma Flinders Mitchell);

[p. 44]
"14    Diminished Responsibility.  The defence of diminished responsibility, applicable to a charge of murder, was introduced in England under the Homicide Act, 1957.  Section 2(1) of that Act provides:
 

[p. 45]

Where a person kills or is party to the killing of another, he shall not be convicted of murder if he was suffering from such abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury) as substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts or omissions in doing or being a party to the killing.

Where a person, who otherwise would be liable to be convicted of murder, is found to suffer from the abnormality of mind referred to in s. 2(1) he is liable to be convicted of manslaughter and not of murder.  In 1960 in the case of Byrne³⁴ Lord Parker L.C.J. said that the term 'abnormality of mind' as used in s. 2(1) of the Homicide Act, 1957 meant a 'a state of mind so different from that of the ordinary human beings that the reasonable man would term it abnormal.'  His Lordship added 'It appears to us to be wide enough to cover the mind's activities in all its aspects, not only the perception of physical acts and matters, and the ability to form a rational judgment whether the act is right or wrong, but also the ability to exercise will power to control physical acts in accordance with that rational judgment.'³⁵  Such a defence is of considerable importance where the death penalty is the only penalty provided for murder and where it is for the Executive to decide whether that penalty should be carried out or commuted.  There have been cases in South Australia, prior to the abolition of the death penalty, when the Court of Criminal Appeal has seen fit, notwithstanding that it has dismissed an appeal from a conviction for murder, to record the fact that it has appeared that the defendant acted when in a state of diminished responsibility.³⁶  Although the defence of diminished responsibility is not available in South Australia an indication to this effect was doubtless of assistance to the Executive in deciding whether to commute the penalty to one of life imprisonment.  The death penalty for murder now having been abrogated, we can see no advantage in introducing a defence of diminished responsibility.  It is for the Parole Board to evaluate any evidence of abnormality of mind of a person convicted of murder
------
³⁴ (1960) 44 Cr.App.R. 246 at 262.
³⁵ See also Rose v. Rose (1961) 45 Crim.App.R. 102 (P.C.)
³⁶ See for example R. v. Joyce [1970] S.A.S.R. 184 at 199.
 

[p. 46]
which may, to some extent, extenuate his offence and also to have regard to the dangerousness of the prisoner which his mental abnormality may indicate in determining whether and when he will be released upon parole.³⁷  Section 2 of the Homicide Act, 1957 (UK) has been criticised as containing imprecise expressions and concepts which have no place in the criminal law, and we agree with this criticism.  It has been suggested nevertheless that there is a case for retention of the defence of diminished responsibility unless the mandatory life sentence of murder is abolished.  In our First Report we have recommended the retention of the life sentence.³⁸  Notwithstanding this fact we do not recommend the introduction of the defence of diminished responsibility.  If a person who is not insane but suffers from a condition such as that intended to be covererd by s. 2 of the Homicide Act, 1957 (Eng.) is convicted of murder, he can receive any treatment which may be appropriate for him while in prison and in particular he may trreated in the new security hospital adjacent to Yatala Labour Prison.  His condition can be taken into consideration in the determination of any question in relation to parole.
 

14.1  Recommendation with respect to Diminished Responsibility.
We do not recommend the introduction of a defence of diminished responsibility in charges of murder. ...

------
³⁷ See Prisons Act, 1936-1976 (S.A.), s. 42k.
³⁸ Chapter 2, paras. 3.7, 3.7.1, 3.7.2, 3.9.

___________VICTORIA, Law Reform Commission of Victoria, Mental Malfunction and Criminal Responsibility, [Melbourne]: The Commission, 1988, [vii], 95 p., see Chapter 6, "Diminished Responsibility", at pp. 49-62 (series; Discussion Paper; number 14), ISBN: 0724167307; copy at home;
 

___________VICTORIA, Law Reform Commission of Victoria, Mental Malfunction and Criminal Responsibility, [Melbourne]: The Commission, 1990, iii, 113 p. (series; Report 34), see on diminished responsibility, pp. 47-53, ISBN: 0730605671; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, KF384 ZD7 R46 no. 34;

"Conclusion.  Eighteen of the submissions that addressed the issue of diminished responsibility were in favour of its introduction.  Five opposed it.  Their reasons are represented in the arguments already presented.  A majority of the Commission has concluded that the arguments against the introduction of diminished responsibility are more persuasive.  They do not believe that diminished responsibility should be introduced either as a general defence or as a special defence to murder.  The minority favours the introduction of a diminished responsibility defence based on mental abnormality which would reduce murder to manslaughter, attempted murder to attempted manslaughter, and, in the case of other offences, would result in a verdict of 'guilty but with diminished responsibility', without any automatic consequence for the sentence.  The reasons for the minority's conclusions are more fully set out in the Discussion Paper.

    Recommendation 26

    The defence of diminished responsibility should not be introduced." (p. 53; one note omitted)

___________VICTORIA, Law Reform Commissionner, Provocation and Diminished Responsibility as Defences to Murder, Melbourne : Law Reform Commissioner, Victoria, 1982, 48 p. (series; Report; 12); copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, KF384 ZD7 R46 no. 12;

"SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS ...

4.  Diminished responsibility as a partial defence to a charge of murder should be made available in Victoria by an amendment to the Crimes Act 1958 (paras. 2.49-2.53)

5. Legislation to effect this reform should be expressed in terms similar to those suggested by the [English] Criminal Law Revision Committee, with the addition of a definition of 'mental disorder' for the purposes of the section (paras. 2.55-2.56)

6.  The maximum sentence for manslaughter in section 5 of the Crimes Act 1958 should be increased to imprisonment for life.  (para. 2.59-2.63)

7.  A section similar to section 6 of the English Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964 should be enacted in Victoria (paras 2.65-2.66)

8.  The persuasive burden of proof in diminished responsibility should be on the Crown and this should be the subject of legislation (para. 2.67)

9.  Provision should be made enabling a Magistrates' Court to commit for manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility if the defendant consents or if he has been committed for trial on a charge of murder allowing a defendant with his consent to be so indicted for manslaughter. (para 2.72)

10.  There should be a crime of attempted manslaughter by reason of provocation and/or diminished responsibility.  To facilitate this reform sections 11, 12 and 13 of the Crimes Act 1958 should be repealed and the maximum sentence for attempted murder in section 14 of that Act be increased to imprisonement for life.  (paras 2.73-2.76)." (p. 47)

___________VICTORIA, Law Reform Commissionner, Diminished Responsibility as a defence to murder, Melbourne (Victoria): Law Reform Commissioner, 1981, 40 p., (series; working paper; number 7); copy at the library of the Supreme Court of Canada, KF 384 ZD7 W67 no. 7;
 

___________VICTORIA, Victorian Law Reform Commission, Defences to Homicide: Issues Paper, Melbourne (Victoria): Victorian Law Reform Commission, 2002, ix, 129 p., on "Diminished Responsibility", see pp. 44, 82-87 and 105-109,  ISBN: 0957967853, available at  http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/CA256902000FE154/Lookup/Homicide/$file/Issues_Paper.pdf (accessed on 15 February 2003);
 

___________VICTORIA, Victorian Law Reform Commission, Defences to Homicide -- Final Report, Melbourne (Victoria): Victorian Law Reform Commission, 2004, lvi, 360 p., on diminished responsibility, see pp. 232-243, ISBN: 0975149776; available at  http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/CA256902000FE154/Lookup/Homicide_Final_Report/$file/FinalReport.pdf (accessed on 15 January 2005);
 

___________VICTORIA, Victorian Law Reform Commission, Defences to Murder, Options Paper, Melbourne (Victoria): Victorian Law Reform Commission, 2003, xxxii, 410 p., see Chapter 5, "People with Mentally Impaired Functioning Who Kill", at pp. 169-220; ISBN: 0958182973; copy available at complete paperavailable http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/CA256902000FE154/Lookup/Homicide/$file/Options_Paper.pdf (accessed on 14 December 2003);
 

___________WESTERN AUSTRALIA, Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, The Criminal Process and Persons Suffering from Mental Disorder, [Perth, W.A.]: The Commission, [1991], 127 p., on diminished responsibility, see pp. 38-46 and 49-50 (series; discussion paper; project number 69); copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, KF 384 ZD8 D57 no. 69 c.2;
 

___________Law Reform Commission of Western Australia, Report on the Criminal Process and Persons Suffering from Mental Disorder, [Perth, W.A.] : The Commission, [1991], 117 p., see "Diminished Responsability", at pp. 33-39 (series; report; project number 69); copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, KF 384 ZD8 R46, no. 69;
 

___________Michael Murray, The Criminal Code - A General Review, [presented to the Attorney-General of Western Australia], Wembley: Western Australia : Government Printer, 1983, 2 volumes (xvi, 653 p.); note: known as the "Murray Report";

"DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY

Before leaving Section 282, I think it is appropriate to record that I have considered the provisions in relation to diminished responsibility which have been introduced in the U.K. by the Homicide Act, 1957, Section 2; the Queensland Code, Section 304A (introduced in 1961); and the N.S.W. Crimes Act, Section 23A (introduced in 1974), all of which are designed to reduce a crime from wilful murder or murder to manslaughter on the basis of diminished responsibility.

That concept involves what the sections describe as a state of abnormality of mind which substantially impairs the offender's capacity to understand what he is doing or his capacity to control his actions, or his capacity to know that he ought not to do the act or make the omission in question.  A number of problems have arisen in relation to this provision, not the least of which is its vagueness, particularly in connection with the question when the capacities referred to in the sections may be taken to be substantially impaired.

Difficulties have also arisen in distinguishing this concept from the states of sanity and insanity respectively.  It all seems to be a matter of degree.  Insanity, of course, involves the loss of any of the capacities referred to above, and the concept of substantial impairment of those capacities is a slippery one, because it seems logically to follow that if the capacities or any of them have not been lost, when they exist, at least in sufficient degree for the offender to remain criminally responsible for his actions.

In addition, it is to be noted that like insanity the burden of establishing the concept of diminished responsibility lies upon the defence.  On the other hand the burden of negativing provocation remains with the Crown, and in factual terms there is much in common between provocation, which must be negatived by the Crown, and diminished responsibility, which must be established on the balance of probabilities by the defence.  In practice the two matters are often raised in homicide cases together, and the confusion which results can be, I am told, quite startling, and I would not be surprised to hear that that was so.  In practice, I am told that the provision has been difficult to manage in the context of a jury trial.  I can see no logical justification or other reason which impels its introduction in this state, and I therefore decline to recommend that it be enacted.  A similar conclusion was reached by the Mitchell Committee in S.A. (4th Report, 46)" (vol. 1, pp. 179-180)
 

AUSTRIA / AUTRICHE, Code pénal autrichien dans Les nouveaux codes pénaux de langue allemande: Autriche (1974), République démocratique allemande (1968) et République fédérale d'Allemagne (1975), Paris: La  Documentation française avec le concours du Centre français de droit comparé, 1981, 565 p., (Collection des codes pénaux européens du Comité de législation étrangère et de droit international du Ministère de la Justice, sous la direction de Marc Ancel avec la collaboration de Yvonne Marx; tome 5), ISBN: 2110006579;

"Irresponsabilité

ARTICLE 11.  --  Quiconque, au moment de la commission de l'acte, est dans l'incapacité de discerner le caractère contraire au droit de ses actes ou d'agir en témoignant d'un tel discernement, par maladie mentale, faiblesse d'esprit, trouble profond de la conscience ou autre perturbation grave du psychisme équivalent à ces états, n'agit pas de façon fautive." (p. 16)
 

"Placement dans un établissement pour délinquants mentalement anormaux

ARTICLE 21. -- (1) Si une personne commet un acte passible d'une peine privative de liberté d'une durée supérieure à un an, et si elle ne peut être condamnée au seul motif qu'elle l'a commis sous l'emprise d'un état excluant sa responsabilité (art. 11) et qui repose sur une anomalie des facultés ou du psychisme portée à un haut degré, le tribunal doit ordonner le placement de cette personne dans un établisement pour délinquants mentalement anormaux, si, compte tenu de sa personnalité, de son état et de la nature de l'acte, il y a lieu de craindre qu'elle se livre autrement, sous l'influence de son anomalie mentale ou psychique, à un acte entraînant des conséquences graves et passible d'une sanction pénale.

(2)  Si une telle éventualité est à redouter, doit également être placé d'office dans un établissement pour délinquants mentalement anormaux quiconque, sans être irresponsable, commet, sous l'influence de son anomalie mentale ou psychique portée à un haut degré, un acte passible d'une peine privative de liberté d'une durée supérieure à un an.  Dans un tel cas, le placement doit être ordonné en même temps qu'est rendue la décision sur la peine." (pp. 20-21)
 

"Circonstances attéuantes spéciales

ARTICLE 34. -- Il y a circonstance atténuante spéciale, notamment si le coupable :

1. a commis l'acte après dix-huit ans, mais avant vingt et un ans révolus, ou s'il l'a commis sous l'empire d'un état mental anormal, s'il est faible d'esprit ou si son éducation a été très négligée; " (p. 28)

___________Austrian Penal Code / Code pénal autrichien -- in German / en allemand, see sections 11, 21 and 34, par. 1;
 

BAL, Peter and Frans Koenraadt, "Criminal Law and Mentally Ill Offenders in Comparative Perspective", (2000) 6 Psychology, Crime and Law 219-250;
 

BALL, Benjamin, 1833-1893, De la responsabilité partielle des aliénés, Paris: J.-B. Baillière et fils, 1886, 39 p.; note: extrait de L'Encéphale, journal des maladies mentales et nerveuses; title noted in my research but document not consulted; according to my verification on 16 October 2003 of the National Library of Canada catalogue AMICUS, there is no copy of this work in Canadian libraries covered by AMICUS;
 

BALL, Jeremy A., "Solving the Mystery of Insanity Law: Zealous Representation of Mentally Ill Servicemembers", (December 2005)  The Army Lawyer  1-46; available at http://www.jagcnet.army.mil/JAGCNETINTERNET/HOMEPAGES/AC/ARMYLAWYER.NSF/c82df279f9445da185256e5b005244ee/01517effd824d9c2852570df0071542e?OpenDocument (accessed on 27 May 2006);

BANTEKAS, Ilias, "Defences in International Criminal Law", in Dominic McGoldrick, Peter Rowe, and Eric Donnelly, eds., The Permanent International Criminal Court: Legal and Policy Issues, Oxford (England)/Portland (Oregon): Hart Publishing, xviii, 498 p., at pp. 263-284, and see "Mental Incapacity, at pp. 282-283 (series; Studies in International Law; volume 5), ISBN: 1841132810; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, KZ 6310 P47 2004;
 

BARBER, Catherine M., Juror's Responses to Different Versions of Diminished Capacity and Intoxication Defenses, Ph.D. Thesis, Temple University, 1993, x, 135 leaves; see  Dissertation Abstracts International, volume: 54-02, Section: B, page: 1148; title noted in my research but thesis not consulted; according to my verification on 10 October 2003 of the National Library of Canada catalogue AMICUS, there is no copy of this work in Canadian libraries covered by AMICUS;
 

BARTHOLOMEW, Allen A., "Psychopathy, Sex, Chromosome, Abnormalities, and the Criminal Law", (1971-72) 4 The Adelaide Law Review 273-293, see "Diminished Responsibility" at pp. 288-290;
 

BERHNHEIM, J., "General Report"  in Criminological Colloquium (7th : 1985), Studies on criminal responsibility and psychiatric treatment of mentally ill offenders : reports presented to the seventh Criminological Colloquium (1985),  Strasbourg : Council of Europe, 1986, 103 p., at pp. 89-103 (series;  Collected studies in criminological research; volume 24), ISBN:  9287108994; also published in French / aussi publié en français: Colloque criminologique (7me : 1985 : Strasbourg), Études sur la responsabilité pénale et le traitement psychiatrique des délinquants malades mentaux : rapports/ présentés au septième Colloque criminologique (1985), Strasbourg : Conseil de l'Europe, Comité européen pour les problèmes criminels, c1986, 109 p. (Collection; études relatives à la recherche criminologique; volume 24), ISBN: 9287108986;

    "In many legal systems there is the intermediate concept of diminished responsibility.  This provision is based, among other things, on the idea that moral responsibility is not a matter of all or nothing: the degree of responsibility varies from one person to another, and from one moment to another in the same person (B. Wooton).

    The introduction of degrees of responsibility gives the judge more flexibility in adapting his sentence to the personal situation of the offender.  It may well be asked, however, whether the freedom the judge requires could not be obtained more simply, without introducing a legal and psychiatric discussion of responsibility, for instance by developing a broader system of attenuating circumstances based on objective data.

    In English law, diminished responsibility can only be invoked in cases of homicide which may lead to a charge of murder: if the plea is successful, the charge is reduced to manslaughter.  Murder carries a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment, whereas in the case of manslaughter the judge has greater freedom in sentencing.

    Whatever the models adopted by the various national legal systems, it is important to retain a sense of proportion when the choice is between punishment and placement in a psychiatric institution.  As far as possible, the accused should be able to decide himself whether he intends to use a defence related to his level of responsibility, in particular in the case of minor offences." (p. 90)

BLAKE, George, ed., The trials of Patrick Carraher, London/Edinburgh/Glasgow: William Hodge, 1951, xiii, 278 p. (series; Notable British trials series; volume 74); copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, KF220 N682 C37 1951;

"This case is worthy of attention as discussion of Scottish criminal law on culpable homicide and diminished responsibility.   Defendant lived in slum area of Glasgow; involved with youth gangs, criminal in nature; violent young men engaged in all kinds of unlawful acts: burglaries, assaults, property damage.   Defendant was leader in gang activities; accused of stabbing victim to death with a chisel in a street brawl.   Defendant had been in a state of drunken stupor, drinking alcohol continually.   The defense was "diminished responsibility", a doctrine of Scottish law.   The jury (15 members in Scotland) returned a verdict of guilty of murder. Proceedings in Court of Criminal Appeals covered in Appendix: verdict sustained; defendant hung.   Opinion of appeals court excellent and worthy of careful study; discusses psychopathic personality and drunkenness as forms of insanity, not enough to justify acquittal, but may be basis of culpable homicide.   Opinion discusses different kinds of mental diseases; the result may be less than murder in the first degree.(source: http://www.lawlibrary.state.mn.us/ar2000/trialbib6a.html, accessed on 1 October 2003)

BOLAND, Faye, Anglo-American insanity defence reform : the war between law and medicine, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998, x, 193 p., see Chapter 5, "The Homicide Act, 1957 and Its Origin" at pp. 98-124 and Chapter 6, "The Defence of Diminished Responsibility in English Law", at pp. 125-169, ISBN: 1840147164; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, KF 9242 B65 1998 c.01;
 

___________"The Criminal Justice (Mental Disorder) Bill 1996", [1997] 4 Web of Current Legal Issues in association with Blackstone Press Ltd.; available at  http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/1997/issue4/boland4.html;
 

__________Diminished responsibility as a defence in Ireland having regard to the law in England, Wales and Scotland, Ph.D. thesis, University of Leeds (Centre for Criminal Justice Studies), 1996, [2], iii, 269 leaves; title noted in my research but volumes not consulted; according to my verification on 10 October 2003 of the National Library of Canada catalogue AMICUS, there is no copy of this work in Canadian libraries covered by AMICUS;
 

___________"Diminished Responsibility as a Defence in Irish Law: Past English Mistakes and Future Irish Directions", (1996) 5 Irish Criminal Law Journal 19; title noted in my research but article not consulted; no copy of this particular volume in the Ottawa area libraries;
 

___________"House of Lords: Diminished Responsibility and Intoxication: R v Dietschmann", (2003) 67(5) The Journal of Criminal Law 395-399, with the commentary at pp. 398-399;
 

BOULEY, D., C. Massoubre, C. Serre, F. Lang, L. Chazot, et J. Pellet, "Les fondements historiques de la responsabilité pénale", (juillet-août 2002) 160 (5-6) Annales medico-psychologiques 396-405;

"6. La médicalisation de la responsabilité [...]
e. La systématisation de l´expertise psychiatrique
C´est dans ce climat de défiance que la circulaire Chaumié s´impose (12 décembre 1905). Elle donne quasiment les pleins pouvoirs à l´expert aliéniste pour la détermination du degré de responsabilité d´un prévenu. Elle introduit également la notion très controversée de la folie partielle et de la conséquente responsabilité atténuée (faisant écho aux circonstances atténuantes inscrites dans la loi de 1832).

La polémique et les contestations s´enflamment sous la plume notamment de Joseph Grasset qui fustige, dans un article publié dans La Revue des deux Mondes en 1906, l´idée d´une folie intermédiaire et d´une responsabilité médiane. Dans cet article, Grasset reprend l´argumentaire développé dès 1863 par Falret dans les Annales Médico-psychologiques : « Les distinctions entre les divers degrés de responsabilité et d´irresponsabilité ne sont plus admissibles […], dans le domaine de la loi, on ne peut admettre les distinctions flottantes basées sur des degrés souvent inappréciables » [7].

Un an plus tard se tient à Genève le Congrès des médecins aliénistes et neurologues. La critique rejoint celle de Grasset et précise que la responsabilité, qu´elle soit morale ou sociale, est d´ordre métaphysique ou juridique et non d´ordre médical. Le congrès « émet le vœu que les magistrats dans leurs ordonnances, leurs jugements ou leurs arrêts s´en tiennent au texte de l´article 64 du Code pénal et ne demandent pas au médecin expert de résoudre les dites questions qui excèdent sa compétence » [4].

Malgré les protestations et les multiples appels à définition [17], la justice reste floue dans les contours juridiques qu´elle attribue à la responsabilité ; son appréciation demeure l´apanage des experts psychiatres." (pp. 402-404    )
------
"4.  Chauvaud F., "Les experts du crime", (2000), pp. 154-155 Aubier, Paris.
7. Falret J., "De la responsabilité morale et de la responsabilité légale des aliénés", Ann Méd Psychol, Volume: 21, (1863), pp. 238-257.
17. Mathie L., "Étude sur la responsabilité atténuée", Arch Anthrop Crim, Volume: XXV, (1910), pp. 729-729." (p. 405)
 
 

BROMBERG, Walter, 1900-, "Diminished Capacity as an Alternative to McNaghten in Californian Law", (1992) 20(2) Bulletin of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 179-183; copy at Ottawa University, RA 1151 .A43  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

BROOKBANKS, Warren, "Diminished Responsibility: Balm or Bane" in Movements and markers in criminal policy, [Auckland, N.Z.] : Legal Research Foundation, 1984, 82 p., (series; Publication, Legal Research Foundation; ISSN: 0111-2015; number 23), ISBN:  0508981300; title noted in my research but article not consulted; no copy of this book in the Ottawa area libraries according to my verification of the AMICUS catalogue on 7 October 2003;
 

___________"Insanity in the criminal law: reform in Australia and New Zealand", [2003] The Juridical Review 81-103; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada;
 

___________"Status in New Zealand of defences of provocation, diminished Responsibility and excessive self-defence with regard to domestic violence", being Appendix D in The Law Commission, Overseas Studies, which is part of the Appendices to the consultation paper, Partial Defences to Murder, 31 October 2003, xiii, 249 p. (series; consultation paper; number 173); this study by Brookbanks, at pp. 125-150, is available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/files/cp173apps.pdf (accessed on 27 April 2005); see also Appendix G, "Relevant Statutory Provisions and Proposed Provisions";
 

BROWN, Betty R., Notes and Comments, "Criminal Law -- Mental Defect --Partial Responsibility", [1947] Wisconsin Law Review 109-114; copy at Ottawa University, KFW 2469 .W57  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

BROWN, B.J., "Diminished Responsibility", (1961) 3 University of Malaya Law Review 331-336; copy at Ottawa University, KQB 0 .M342  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

BROWN, Jeff, "Proposition 8: Origins And Impact--A Public Defender’s Perspective, (1992) 23 Pacific Law Journal 881-945, see "Diminished Capacity", at pp. 912-925; copy at Ottawa University, KFC 69 .P324  Location: FTX Periodicals; this periodical's name was subsequently changed to McGeorge Law Review in 1997;
 

BRYANT, Robert Park and Corbin Brooke Hume, Recent Developments, "Diminished Capacity -- Recent Decisions and an Analytical Approach", (1977) 30 Vanderbilt Law Review 213-237; copy at Ottawa University, KFT 69 .V35  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

BUCHANAN, Alec,  Psychiatric Aspects of Justification, Excuse and Mitigation in Anglo-American Criminal Law, Philadelphia: Jessica Kingley Publishers, 2000, 160 p. (series; Forensic focus; 17),  ISBN: 1853027979; Contents: Preface and acknowledgements, p. 9; Chap. 1, Preliminaries, 11-21; Chap. 2, The Theory of Justification and Excuse, 22-42; Chap. 3, Psychiatric Aspects of Mitigation, 43-62; Chap. 4, How Can Mental States Excuse?, 63-83; Chap.5, What Does the Law Allow to Excuse?, 84-107; Chap. 6, Drawbacks of the Present Provision, 108-120; Chap. 7, Alternatives to the Present Provision, 121-132; Chap. 8, Summary, 133-134; Cases cited, 135-138; References, 139-150; Subject Index, 151-160;
 

BURCHELL, Jonathan, "Provocation, Diminished Responsibility and the Use of Excessive Force in Self-Defence in South African Law", being Appendix F in The Law Commission, Overseas Studies, which is part of the Appendices to the consultation paper, Partial Defences to Murder, 31 October 2003, xiii, 249 p. (series; consultation paper; number 173); this study by Professor Burchell, at pp. 184-212, is available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/files/cp173apps.pdf (accessed on 27 April 2005); see also Appendix G, "Relevant Statutory Provisions and Proposed Provisions";
 

BURNHAM, William, 1947-, "The New Russian Criminal Code: A Window unto Democratic Russia", (2000) 26(4) Review of Central and East European Law 365-424, and see "Diminished Capacity", at pp. 393-394; copy at Carleton University; copy at the University of Ottawa, FTX periodicals HX 530 .R47;
 

BYERS, Ellen, "Mentally Ill Criminal Offenders and the Strict Liability Effect: Is There Hope for a Just Jurisprudence in an Era of Responsibility/Consequences Talk?", (2004-2005) 57 Arkansas Law Review 457-537;
 

CAMPBELL, I.G. (Ian Graham), 1945-, Mental Disorder and Criminal Law in Australia and New Zealand, Sydney/Wellington: Butterworths, 1988, xlii, 237 p., see "Diminished responsibility" at pp. 141-145, ISBN: 0409494828 (Aus.) and 0409788740 (NZ); copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa, KF 9242 C35;
 

CANALS, Jose M. and Henry Dahl, translated by, "Standard Penal Code for Latin America", (1990) 17 American Journal of Criminal Law 263; available at  http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/Latspc.htm; see articles 19 to 22; note de recherche: pour une traduction française du Code pénal type latino-américain, voir RAMIREZ, infra;
 

CASEY, Juliette, "Diminished Responsibility and Battered Women Who Kill",  (30 November 2001, issue 38) Scots Law Times (News) 311-317; copy at the library of the Supreme Court of Canada, location: Room C, U.K. Law reports, JUR; important contribution;
 

CASTILLO BARRANTES, J. Enrique, Délinquants anormaux mentaux, imputabilité diminuée et responsabilité atténuée : étude comparative du droit pénal français et costarricain, Bordeaux : Université de Bordeaux I, Faculté de droit, de sciences sociales et politiques, 1974, 418 p.; note: Thèse (Ph.D.)--Université de Bordeaux I, 1974; copie à l'Université de Montréal; directeur de thèse: Jean-Pierre Delmas St. Hilaire; titre noté dans mes recherches mais thèse non encore consultée;
 

CHALMERS, James, "Abnormality and Anglicisation: First Thoughts on Galbraith v HM Advocate (No 2)", (2002) 6 Edinburgh Law Review 108–116; title noted in my research but article not consulted; no copy of this periodical in the Ottawa area libraries covered by the AMICUS catalogue of Library and Archives Canada (verification of 14 May 2005);
 

__________"Collapsing the Structure of Criminal Law: Drury v HM Advocate", (2001) Scots Law Times (News) 241-245; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada;
 

___________"Merging Provocation and Diminished Responsibility: Some Reasons for Scepticism", [2004] Criminal Law Review 198-212;

"Summary: In an earlier article in the Review, Professors Mackay and Mitchell  argued that the pleas of provocation and diminished responsibilitu should be merged into one single partial defence, 'building upon' the plea of 'extreme mental or emotional disturbance' found in the Model Penal Code.  This article argues that it is wrong to interpret the Model Code's partial defence as a 'merged' plea, and that there are various reasons to reject any proposal to merge the two pleas in English law." (p. 198) [Note: the article is R.D. Mackay and B.J. Mitchell, "Provoking Diminished Responsibility: Two Pleas Merging into One", (2003) The Criminal law Review 745]

___________“Reforming the Pleas of Insanity and Diminished Responsibility: Some Aspects of the Scottish Law Commission’s Discussion Paper” (2003) 8(2) Scottish Law and Practice Quarterly  79-94;  title noted in my research but article not consulted; according to my verification on 13 October 2003 of the National Library of Canada catalogue AMICUS, there is no copy of this periodical in Canadian libraries covered by AMICUS;
 

CHALMERS, James, Christopher Gane, Fiona Leverick, "Partial Defences to Homicide in the Law of Scotland", being Appendix E in The Law Commission, Overseas Studies, which is part of the Appendices to the consultation paper, Partial Defences to Murder, 31 October 2003, xiii, 249 p. (series; consultation paper; number 173); this study of Scottish jurists, at pp. 151-183, is available at  http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/files/cp173apps.pdf (accessed on 27 April 2005); see also Appendix G, "Relevant Statutory Provisions and Proposed Provisions";
 

CHINA, Penal Code,

"Article 18.   A mentally ill person who causes dangerous consequences at a time when he is unable to recognize or unable to control his own conduct is not to bear criminal responsibility after being established through accreditation of legal procedures; but his family or guardian shall be ordered to subject him to strict surveillance and arrange for his medical treatment. When necessary, he will be given compulsory medical treatment by the government.

A person whose mental illness is of an intermittent nature shall bear criminal responsibility if he commits a crime during a period of mental normality.

A mentally ill person who commits a crime at a time when he has not yet completely lost his ability to recognize or control his own conduct shall bear criminal responsibility but he may be given a lesser or a mitigated punishment.

An intoxicated person who commits a crime shall bear criminal responsibility." (available at  http://www.qis.net/chinalaw/prclaw60.htm#Chapter II1, accessed on 27 September 2003) (also available at  http://www.chinajnbook.com/business/criminal01.htm, accessed on 27 September 2003);

CLARK, C.R., "Specific intent and diminished capacity" in Allen K. Hess, 1945-,  and Irving B. Weiner, eds., Handbook of Forensic Psychology, 2nd ed., New York : John Wiley, c1999, xii, 756 p., at pp. 350-378, ISBN: 0471177717;  title noted in my research but article not consulted; no copy of this periodical in the Ottawa area libraries covered by the AMICUS catalogue of Library and Archives Canada (verification of 13 November 2005);
 

CLARK, Charles R., "Clinical Limits of Expert Testimony on Diminished Capacity", (1982) 5 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 155-170;
 

CLIVE, Eric (from CBE, Edinburgh), Pamela Ferguson (from Dundee), Christopher Gane and Alexander McCall Smith presented A Draft Criminal Code for Scotland with commentary to the Minister of Justice in August 2003, see section 38, "Culpable homicide"; available at  http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/downloads/Code%20and%20Commentary%2030%20July%202003%20as%20submitted.pdf, accessed on 13 October 2003;
 

COHEN, M.D., "Medical Evidence and Diminished Responsibility", (25 June 1981) 131 New Law Journal 667-668;
 

COHEN, Neil P., Michael G. Johnson, and Tracy B. Henley, "The Prevalence and use of Criminal Defenses: A Preliminary Study", (1992-93) 60 Tennessee Law Review 957-982;
 

COLLINS, Philip and Thomas White, "Depression, homicide and diminished responsibility: new Scottish directions", (July 2003) 43(3) Medicine, Science and the Law 195-202; copy at Ottawa University, RA 1001 .M49  Location: FTX Periodicals;

"In a recent Scottish Appeal Court opinion (Kim Louise Scarsbrook or Galbraith v. Her Majesty's Advocate, 2001) it was successfully argued by the appellant that her conviction of murder was unsound inter-alia on the basis of overly restrictive pre-existing definitions of diminished responsibility in Scottish law resulting in unduly narrow directions being given by the trial judge to the jury in her case. We felt it timely to present a revised overview of the defence of diminished responsibility in Scotland and to consider the issues surrounding its applicability in cases of clinical depression. The psychiatric literature regarding depression and homicide is reviewed." (source:  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov:80/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12899423&dopt=Abstract, accessed on 27 September 2003)

Comments, "Criminal Law -- Partial Insanity -- Evidentiary Relevance Defined", (1961-62) 16 Rutgers Law Review 174-180; copy at Ottawa University, KFN 1869 .R88  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

COOK, Kate, "Killing in desperation -- Kate Cook explores recent proposals to change the laws of murder", (16 January 2004) 154 New Law Journal 64-65; issue number 7111; see "Diminished responsibility" at p. 65;
 

COOPER, Grant B., "Diminished Capacity", (1971) 4 Loyola University of Los Angeles Law Review 308-330; copy at Ottawa University, KFC 69 .L69  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

COUPEL, Alfred, De la responsabilité atténuée en droit pénal - Thèse pour le doctorat, Paris : Arthur Rousseau, 1902, 130 p.; thèse de doctorat; copie à la Bibliothèque du Barreau de Montréal;

"TABLE DES MATIÈRES

INTRODUCTION......1

CHAPITRE  PREMIER
Histoire de la Responsabilité.  Comment on est arrivé à concevoir des responsabilité partielles......5

CHAPITRE II
§ I. Responsabilité atténuée et responsabilité partielle......12
§ II.  Groupes des demi-responsabilités......14

CHAPITRE III
Conceptions juridiques de la Responsabilité atténuée......28

CHAPITRE IV
Pour conclure à la Responsabilité atténuée sur quel critérium s'appuyer:
    Critérium psychologique......38
    Critérium psychologique et pathologique......40
    Critérium pathologique......44
Ce sont des cas d'individualisation judiciaire de la peine......51

CHAPITRE V
La théorie de ls Responsabilité atténée est passée dans les Codes.  Lesquels? -- Effet: excuse légale......54

CHAPITRE VI
Si on ne l'admet pas dans la loi à titre d'excuse, comment procède-t-on?  Les circonstances atténuantes......87

Exposé du système actuel de notre C. P.  Améliorations nécessaires:

Choix de la peine:

Proposition d'un juré dédoublé: Les spécialistes fixent le choix de la peine......87
Les magistrats en déterminent la durée.  Indétermination absolue ou relative.  Du rôle
de l'administration pénitentiaire......100

Exécution de la peine: Dans les asiles prisons, maisons de garde, d'isolement; utiliser l'amende, la libération condit. le sursis.  Nécessité d'une tutelle constante des demi-responsabilités......111

Conclusion......118
Bibliographie......127" (pp. 129-130)
 

CROCKER, Phyllis L., "Concepts of Culpability and Deathworthiness:  Differentiating Between Guilt and Punishment in Death Penalty Cases", (1997-98) 22 Fordham Law Review 21-86;
 

CUMES, Guy, "Reform of Diminished Responsibility in New South Wales", (1999) 6(2) Psychiatry, Psychology and  Law 175-187;

DALGARD, Odd Steffen, "Problems Arising from the Use of Psychiatric Expertise to Assess Mitigation or Exclusion of Criminal Responsibility",  in Criminological Colloquium (7th : 1985), Studies on criminal responsibility and psychiatric treatment of mentally ill offenders : reports presented to the seventh Criminological Colloquium (1985),  Strasbourg : Council of Europe, 1986, 103 p., at pp. 51-70 (series;  Collected studies in criminological research; volume 24), ISBN:  9287108994; also published in French / aussi publié en français: Colloque criminologique (7me : 1985 : Strasbourg), Études sur la responsabilité pénale et le traitement psychiatrique des délinquants malades mentaux : rapports/ présentés au septième Colloque criminologique (1985), Strasbourg : Conseil de l'Europe, Comité européen pour les problèmes criminels, c1986, 109 p. (Collection; études relatives à la recherche criminologique; volume 24), ISBN: 9287108986;

"Mitigation of criminal responsibility

    As stated earlier by Schreiber at this colloquium, all European countries surveyed for our study have recognised that there are states of mental disorder that mitigate responsibility, but which do not exclude it completely.  In some countries, the law does not expressly mention diminished responsibility, but the question may be raised in connection with the decision of sanctions.  Normally, mitigated responsibility leads to reduced punishment, possibly combined with special security measures.

    There are two main approaches to the decision about mitigated responsibility: it may be a question of different degrees of disturbance of the same types of mental disorder which may lead to total exclusion of responsibility ('the uniform approach') or it may be a question of other types of mental disorder.  Both approaches are represented in the European countries surveyed.

    From a psychiatric point of view, the problems will again be contingent on the extent to which the psychiatrist may keep his professional frame of reference, or has to answer questions which are not psychiatric in nature.

    If the verdict of mitigated responsibility is based on well-defined psychiatric categories, different from those leading to total exclusion of responsibility, the problems may not be too great.  If, on the other hand, the psychiatrist has to answer questions about the degree of disturbance in understanding and controlling one's behaviour as a result of mental disorder, we are back to the same problem as discussed in the previous chapter.  It thus follows that the 'uniform approach' is the most problematic one from a psychiatric point of view." (pp. 58-59)
 

"(1) Basic Concepts ...

Criminal capacity means an ability (based on an individual's personality as an integrated entity, as described above) to comprehend the illegality of an act and consequently to generate a normal internal restraint, on the basis of which an individual exercises self-control and refrains from acting.  To state the premise simply, criminal capacity is an ability to distinguish right from wrong and to control one's activities on the basis of that distinction.

    If, because of disorder, mental competence becomes impaired to the point of mental incomptence, the individual becomes a 'person whose mind has been lost' and is nonculpable.  If the extent of impairment is 'extreme,' the individual is denominated a 'weakminded person' whose culpability is limited or restricted. If only one aspect of competence is destroyed, a person is viewed to have only partial capacity.  Scholarly opinion, generally takes the position that partial responsibility should not be recognized.

(2) Security Measures

    Loss of mind and weakmindedness generate differing problems of security measures.  This will be covered later." (pp. 143-147; notes omitted)
 

DAWSON, J., "Diminished Responsibility: The difference it makes", (August 2003) 11(1) Journal of Law and Medicine 103-111;  title noted in my research but article not consulted; no copy of this periodical in the Ottawa area libraries covered by the AMICUS catalogue of Library and Archives Canada (verification of 14 May 2005);

"Should there be a defence of diminished responsibility after the mandatory life sentence for murder has been abolished? This is the main question posed in this article, on the basis of a review of the central features of the defence and its surrounding forensic context. The views of the defence taken by the Law Reform Commissions of New South Wales and New Zealand are then compared. In conclusion, it is argued that opinions about the continuing validity of the defence of diminished responsibility are bound to be influenced by wider positions taken on the value of rules, as opposed to discretion, in the criminal law." (source:  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=14526730&dopt=Abstract , accessed on 14 May 2005);

DELL, Suzanne and Alan Smith, "Changes in the Sentencing of Diminished Responsibility Homicides", (1983) 142 British Journal of Psychiatry 20-34; copy at Ottawa University, RC 321 .J82  Location: RGN Periodicals;

"The majority of men convicted of manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility used to receive hospital orders,
but are now receiving prison sentences. A sample of offenders convicted between 1966 and 1977 was studied to see
the reasons for the change. It was found that the make-up of the offender population did not change materially over the
period, nor did the willingness of judges to make hospital orders. What changed was the pattern of treatment recommendations made by the examining doctors in their court reports." (source:  http://bjp.rcpsych.org/cgi/content/abstract/142/1/20 , accessed on 14 September 2003)

DELL, Suzanne, "The detention of diminished responsibility homicides", (1983) 23 British Journal of Criminology 50-60, copy at Ottawa University, HV 6001 .L633 Location: MRT Periodicals;
 

___________"Diminished Responsibility Reconsidered", [1982] The Criminal Law Review 809-818; copy at Ottawa University, KD 7862 .C734  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

____________"The Mandatory sentence and Section 2", (March 1986) 12(1) Journal of Medical Ethics 28-31; copy at Ottawa University, R 724 .J68  Location: RGN Periodicals;

"Sentencing in homicide depends on how psychiatrists view the issues of Section 2. In most killings that do not involve clear-cut mental disorder, strong emotions and stress play a part. Both can be cited in aid of diminished responsibility. If doctors cite them, however tentatively, it becomes feasible for the court to review any mitigating factors and to choose an appropriate penalty. Otherwise, the mandatory penalty is imposed. Thus doctors, by opining not on the medical but on the legal and moral aspects of Section 2, decide who shall automatically get a life sentence and who shall not. Anomaly and injustice are the results. They would be remedied by the abolition of the mandatory sentence for murder." (source: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov:80/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=3959037&dopt=Abstract, accessed on 27 September 2003)

___________Murder into Manslaughter.  The Diminished Responsibility Defence in Practice, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1984, 77 p., (series; Maudsley monographs; 27), ISBN: 0197121519; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, KF9235 D44 -;
 

DIAMOND, Bernard L., "Criminal Responsibility of the Mentally Ill", (1961-62) 14 Stanford Law Review 59-86;
 

___________"Social and Cultural Factors as a Diminished Capacity Defense in Criminal Law", (1978) 6 Bulletin of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law195-208; copy at Ottawa University, RA 1151 .A43  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

___________"With Malice Aforethought", (1957) 2 Archives of Criminal Psychodynamics 1; title noted in my research but article not consulted; no copy of this periodical in the Ottawa area libraries;

"Diminished Responsibility in English Law", from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diminished_responsibility_in_English_law accessed on 8 March 2008;
 

DIX, George E., "Psychological Abnormality and Capital Sentencing: The New 'Diminished Responsibility' ", (1984) 7 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 249-267; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada;
 

___________"Psychological Abnormality as a Factor in Grading Criminal Liability: Diminished Capacity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Like", (1971) 62 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, and Police Science 313-334; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada;
 

DRESCHSLER, C.T., Annotation, "Comment Note. -- Mental or Emotional Condition as Diminishing Responsibility for Crime", (1968) 22 A.L.R. (3d) 1228-1262; A.L.R. = American Law Reporter;
 

DRESSLER, Joshua, "Reaffirming the Moral Legitimacy of the Doctrine of Diminished Capacity: A Brief Reply to Professor Morse", (1984) 75(3) The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 953-962; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada;
 

EDWARDS, C.N., "Behavior and the law reconsidered: psychological syndromes and profiles", (January 1998) 43(1) Journal of Forensic Sciences141-150; article not consulted yet; copy at the National Library of Canada and Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, Canadian Agriculture Library, both in Ottawa;

"Recently, a new concept of behavior and the law has emerged which looks beyond the defendant's satisfaction of the elements which define the charge. This formulation, which considers not simply the objective facts but motive, intent, and circumstance, has marked a legal shift from diminished capacity to diminished responsibility. Still in evolution, this trend has challenged the relationship between law and the behavioral sciences, and prompted serious reconsideration of the role of each. This paper examines the landmarks of the movement, considers its implications, and looks to the future." (source:  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov:80/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=9456534&dopt=Abstract, accessed on 27 September 2003)

ELKINS, James R., "Criminal Law -- Diminished Capacity", College of Law / West Virginia University, Fall, 2003, available at  http://myweb.wvnet.edu/~jelkins/crimlaw/psy/diminished.html, accessed on 12 October 2003;
 

ELLIOTT, Catherine, "What Future for Volontary Manslaughter?", (June 2004) 68(3) The Journal of Criminal Law 253-263, see "Diminished Responsibility" at pp. 257-258 and "Reform of Diminished Responsibility" at pp. 261-262; note: the article examines the Law Commission's Consultation Paper: Partial Defences to Murder, June 2003;
 

ELLIOTT, D.W., "The Homicide Act, 1957", [1957] The Criminal Law Review 282-292; copy at Ottawa University, KD 7862 .C734  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

ESER, Albin, "Article 31: Grounds for excluding criminal responsibility" in Otto Triffterer, ed., Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Observers' Notes, Article by Article, Baden Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1999, xxviii, 1295 p. at pp. 537-554, ISBN: 3789061735; copy at the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, call number: legal KZ 6310 .C734 1999; available at http://www.freidok.uni-freiburg.de/volltexte/3922/pdf/Eser_Grounds_for_excluding_criminal_responsibility.pdf (accessed on 5 May 2008); 

" 'Destruction' of the person's 'capacity to appreciate' or 'to control'

    Even in as far as the before mentioned defective state of mind would be interpreted in a road way, it could find a corrective by means of the requirement that the mental defect must 'destroy' and not only diminish the persons's capacity.  As again different from various national penal codes, the Statute itself does not contain a special rule for 'diminished responsibility'³³, in a given case the Court would have to resort to paragraph 3 (infra III). ...
------
³³ As proposed by the Prepatory Committee in its compilation of 1996 in article L Proposal I para. 2, supra note 6*, at p. 97, with possible reduction of the sentence." (p. 546)
 

*note 6 reads: "Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/AC.249/CRP.9 (4 Apr. 1996), Annex : General principles of Criminal Law. Cf., in addition, Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Vol. II (Compilation of Proposals), U.N. Doc A/51/22 (1996), pp. 79 et seq., in M. Ch. Bassiouni, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 441-616, 480 et seq." (p. 540)

FELD, Vivian, Case Notes, "Criminal Law -- Partial Insanity -- Murder", (1946-47) 20 Southern California Law Review 95-99; copy at Ottawa University, KFC 69 .S696  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

FELTHOUS, Alan R., "Diminished Capacity: Subterfuge or just defense?", (January 2000) 25(1) AAPL Newsletter 10-11; AAPL = American Academy of  psychiatry and the Law; available at  http://www.emory.edu/AAPL/newsletter/N251_diminished_capacity.htm (accessed on 27 September 2003);
 

FIELDS, L., "Blameworthiness, Insanity and Diminished Responsibility", (Summer 1992) 7(2) International Journal of Moral and Social Studies 139-152; ISSN   0267-9655; title noted in my research but article not consulted; no copy of this periodical in the Ottawa area libraries covered by the AMICUS catalogue of Library and Archives Canada (verification of 13 November 2005);
 

___________"Exoneration of the mentally ill",  (December 1987) 13(4) Journal of Medical Ethics 201-205;  copy at Ottawa University, R 724 .J68  Location: RGN Periodicals;

"Mental illness may be manifested in the impairment of understanding or of volitional control. Impairment of understanding may be manifested in delusions. Impairment of volitional control is shown when a person is unable to act in accordance with good reasons that he himself accepts. In order for an impairment of understanding or of self-control to exculpate, the offence must be causally connected with the impairment in question. The rationale of exculpation in general, which applies also to the case of mental illness, is that the offence does not indicate a morally bad attitude in the offender. A consequence of this rationale is that Kenny is wrong to hold that no injustice would result from the elimination of the legal defence of diminished responsibility." (source:  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov:80/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=3694641&dopt=Abstract, accessed on 27 September 2003)

FINGARETTE, Herbert and Ann Fingarette Hasse, Mental Disabilities and Criminal Responsibilities, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979, xi, 321 p., see in particular, Chapter 8, "Diminished Mental Capacity", at pp. 117-133, ISBN: 0520036301;
 

FINGARETTE, Herbert, "Diminished Mental Capacity as a Criminal Law Defence", (1974) 37 Modern Law Review 264-280; copy at Ottawa University, KD 322 .M62  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

FLETCHER, George P.,  Rethinking Criminal Law, Boston: Little, Brown, 1978, xxviii, 898 p.; reprint in: Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, see "Diminished Capacity" at pp. 250-253, ISBN:  0195136950;
 

___________"What Is Punishment Imposed For?", (1994) 5 Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 101-111;

    "The significant feature of culpability, as it bears on punishment, is that it comes in degrees. The person who kills under provocation or while suffering from diminished capacity acts with partial culpability. In sentencing, the presumptively reduced culpability of those who are contrite or who have made amends has the impact of reducing punishment. This, as I pointed out earlier, is the feature that renders criminal liability different from tort liability.

    The intersection of two factors, then, determines the level of punishment that justly fits the crime. One is the scale of the wrongdoing; the other is the degree of culpability. They come together in this formula devised by Robert Nozick: P = r.H. The level of punishment equals the degree of responsibility (varying from 0 to 1) times the scale of wrongdoing. Causing rather than just risking harm increases the scale of the wrongdoing. Bringing about the harm negligently rather than intentionally reduces the "r" factor.

    Punishment is imposed, therefore, for wrongdoing as reduced by the extent to which culpability is diminished. This way of understanding punishment is lost on those who think of culpability as an independent factor or even as the central factor in structuring criminal liability." (p. 109)

FOREL, Auguste, 1848-1931 et Albert Mahaim, 1867-1925, Crime et anomalies mentales constitutionnelles : la plaie sociale des déséquilibrés à responsabilité diminuée, Genève : Kündig, 1902, 302 p.; title noted in my research but book not consulted; according to my verification on 13 October 2003 of the National Library of Canada catalogue AMICUS, there is no copy of this work in Canadian libraries covered by AMICUS;
 

FOX, Richard, "The Killings of Bobby Veen: The High Court on Proportion in Sentencing", (1988) 12 Criminal Law Journal 339-366, see "Community Protection and Mental Disorder", at pp. 358-362; copy at Ottawa University, KTA 0 .C735, Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

FRANCE, Code pénal,

"Article 122-1

N'est pas pénalement responsable la personne qui était atteinte, au moment des faits, d'un trouble psychique ou neuropsychique ayant aboli son discernement ou le contrôle de ses actes.

La personne qui était atteinte, au moment des faits, d'un trouble psychique ou neuropsychique ayant altéré son discernement ou entravé le contrôle de ses actes demeure punissable; toutefois, la juridiction tient compte de cette circonstance lorsqu'elle détermine la peine et en fixe le régime." (source:  http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/RechercheSimpleCode?commun=CPENAL&code=, visionné le 5 octobre 2003)

FRANCE, Penal Code, Translation

"ARTICLE 122-1

A person is not criminally liable who, when the act was committed, was suffering from a psychic or neuropsychic disorder which destroyed his discernment or his ability to control his actions.

A person who, at the time he acted, was suffering from a psychic or neuropsychic disorder which reduced his discernment or impeded his ability to control his actions, remains punishable; however, the court shall take this into account when it decides the penalty and determines its regime." (source: http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/html/codes_traduits/code_penal_textan.htm , accessed on 5 October 2003)

FRASER, David, "Still Crazy after all these Years: A Critique of Diminished Responsibility",  in Stanley Meng Heong Yeo, ed., Partial Excuses to Murder, Leichhardt (N.S.W., Australia):  The Federation Press, 1991, xvii, 287 p. at pp. 112-124, ISBN: 1862870470;

"Summary

Criticisms of the defence of diminished responsibility focus on the conflict between legal categories and those of psychology or psychiatry.  Such criticisms, are, however, misplaced and erroneous.  Rather than creating conflicting narratives, law and psychiatry both seek to define and delimit a common fundamental category, the 'individual'.  Each discourse, through the creation of the 'bad' or the 'mad' individual, serves to perpetuate the underlying theoretical norm of a social structure which denies the essential character of our connection with others.  Both law and psychiatry serve as tools of denial, rather than of affirmation, of our humanity." (p. 112)
 

GARDNER, John and Timothy Macklem, "No Provocation without Responsibility: A Reply to Mackay and Mitchell", [2004] The Criminal Law Review 213-218; note: see R.D. Mackay and B.J. Mitchell, "Provoking Diminished Respoonsibility: Two Pleas Merging into One?", [2003] The Criminal Law Review 745;
 

GAROFALO, Raffaele, barone, 1851-1934, Criminology. Translated by Robert Wyness Millar. With an introd. by E. Ray Stevens, Montclair, N.J., Patterson Smith, 1968 [c1914], xl, 478 p. (series; Patterson Smith reprint series in criminology, law enforcement, and social problems. Publication no. 12); copy at Ottawa University, FTX General, HV 6038 .G35 1968;

    "A decidedly senseless feature of the present system is that of treating semi-insanity as an extenuating circumstance.  In such case, the punishment prescribed by law is inflicted, but the length of its term is greatly cut down.  It is because of this feature that there have occurred, and in fact occur every day, instances of homicidal criminals and incendiaries, monomaniacs perhaps, but nevertheless extremely dangerous offenders, escaping with a sentence of a few years' imprisonment.  If we were to take the resolute stand that these individuals are really insane, the result would be their confinement for life, or what appears much more practicable, for an indefinite term.

    This sort of extenuating circumstance, indeed, seems to exist for the sole benefit of the alienist experts.  As one author has justly observed: 'However great may be the faults of the criminal law, the harm which they work is as nothing compared to what is suffered from insanity experts.  There is hardly a criminal case in which at least one expert may not be found ready to testify to the partial responsibility of the accused, that is to say, when he does not see fit to declare him completely irresponsible.  Were it not that judges and juries sometimes have the courage to disregard such testimony, or else become thoroughly disgusted with the witness' answers, the acquittals continually ensuing would be a public scandal." ¹ ...
------
¹ Frassati, 'Lo sperimentalismo nel diritto penale,' p. 327 (Turin, 1892)." (pp. 286-287)

GARVEY, Stephen P., "Passion's Puzzle", (2004-2005) 90 Iowa Law Review 1677-1745, and see "Diminished Capacity", at pp. 1738-1744;

GEIS, Gilbert, "Pathological Gambling and Insanity, Diminished Capacity, Dischargeability, and Downward  Sentencing Departures", (2004) 8(6) Gaming Law Review 347-360;

GENETTI, Andrea, Third Circuit Review, "Criminal Law, Distinguishing Lack of Mens Rea from Insanity: United States v. Pohlot", (1988) 33 Villanova Law Review 654; copy at Ottawa University, KFP 69 .V55 , Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

GERMANY/Allemagne, Les nouveaux codes pénaux de langue allemande: Autriche (1974), République démocratique allemande (1968) et République fédérale d'Allemagne (1975), Paris: La  Documentation française avec le concours du Centre français de droit comparé, 1981, 565 p., (Collection des codes pénaux européens du Comité de législation étrangère et de droit international du Ministère de la Justice, sous la direction de Marc Ancel avec la collaboration de Yvonne Marx, tome 5); voir les articles 20 et 21 du Code pénal allemand à la p. 333,  ISBN: 2110006579;

"ARTICLE 20
Irresponsabilité en raison de troubles psychiques

N'agit pas responsable de son acte celui qui, lors de la commission de l'acte est, en raison d'un trouble psycho-pathologique, d'un trouble profond de la conscience, ou d'une faiblesse d'esprit, ou de tout autre affaiblissement intellectuel, incapable d'en apprécier le caractère illcite, ou d'agir selon ce discernement.
 

ARTICLE 21
Responsabilité atténuée

Si la capacité de l'auteur de comprendre le caractère illicite de l'acte ou d'agir selon son discernement est, lors de la commission de l'acte, diminuée de façon importante pour l'une des causes mentionnées à l'article 20, la peine peur être atténuée par application de l'article 49, alinéa 1.

___________The Penal Code of the Federal Republic of Germany, Translated  by Joseph J. Darby With an Introduction by Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, Littleton (Colorado):  F.B. Rothman and London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1987, xxvi, 257 p., (series; The American Series of Foreign Penal Codes; vol. 28), ISBN: 0837700485, see sections 20 and 21; Research note: available on the internet /disponible sur l'internet Buffalo Criminal Law Center (and click after on "Criminal Law Resources on the Internet");

"§ 20. Lack of criminal capacity because of mental disorder

    A person is not criminally responsible if at the time of the act, because of a psychotic or similar serious mental disorder, or because of a profound interruption of consciousness or because of feeblemindedness or any other type of serious mental abnormality, he is incapable of understanding the wrongfulness of his conduct or of acting in accordance with this understanding.
 

§ 21. Diminished capacity

    If, at the time of the crime, the capacity of the perpetrator to understand the wrongfulness of his conduct or of acting in accordance with this understanding is substantially diminished due to the existence of grounds set forth in § 20, his punishment shall be reduced in accordance with the provisions of § 49(l)." (pp. 55-56)

___________The German penal code : as amended as of December 19, 2001 / translated by Stephen Thaman ; with an introduction by Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, Buffalo, NY : William S. Hein, 2002 ( series; The American series of foreign penal codes; volume 32),  ISBN : 083770054X (cloth);

"§ 20. Lack of Capacity to Be Adjudged Guilty Due to Emotional Disorders

    A person acts without guilt if, during the commission of an act, due to a pathological emotional disorder, profound  consciousness disorder, mental defect or any other serious mental abnormality, he is incapable of appreciating the wrongfulness of the act or acting in accordance with such appreciation.
 

§ 21. Diminished Capacity

    If the capacity of the perpetrator to appreciate the wrongfulness of the act or to act in accordance with such appreciation is substantially diminished during the commission of the act due to one of the reasons indicated in § 20, the punishment may be mitigated pursuant to § 49(l)." (p. 9)

GIBEAUT, John, "A Matter over Mind: The Supreme Court is Poised to Review the Insanity Defense, an Issue That Has Confounded Courts, Psychiatrists and Lawyers", (April 2006) ABA Journal 32-39; case of Clark v. Arizona, No 05-5966 (oral arguments 19 April 2006); copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada;

GILBERT, Jérémie, "Justice not Revenge: The International  Criminal Court and the 'Grounds to Exclude Criminal Responsibility' -- Defences or Negation  of Criminality?", (June 2006) 10(2) The International Journal of Human Rights 143-160, and on diminished responsibility, see pp. 145-146;

GILLETT, G.R., "Intent in law and medicine", (April 1991) New Zealand Law Journal 115-121; copy at Ottawa University, KTC 0 .B887  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

GLUECK, Sheldon, 1896-, Law and Psychiatry: Cold War or Entente Cordiale?, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1962, viii, 181 p.; copy at Ottawa University, FTX general, KF 9242 .G4 1962;

.
GOLDBERG, Hank M., " Proposition 8: A Prosecutor’s Perspective", (1992) 23 Pacific Law Journal 947-971, see "Abolition of the Diminished Capacity Defense", at pp. 951-955; copy at Ottawa University, KFC 69 .P324  Location: FTX Periodicals; this periodical's name was changed to McGeorge Law Review in 1997;
 

GOODMAN, Ellen and Deirdre O'Connor, "Diminished Responsibility -- Its Rationale and Application", (1977) 1 Criminal Law Journal 204-213; copy at Ottawa University, KTA 0 .C735  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

GORDON, Walter L., "Old wine in old bottles: California mental defenses at the dawn of the 21st century", (2003) 32(1) Southwestern University Law Review 75-96; copy at Ottawa University, KFC 69 .S697  Location: FTX Periodicals; good summary of the evolution of the defence of diminished capacity;
 

GORDON, Gerald H.,  The criminal law of Scotland. Vol. 1 / by Sir Gerald H. Gordon, 3rd ed. edited by Michael G.A. Christie, Edinburgh : W. Green, 2000, liv, 541 p., see "Diminished Responsibility", Chapter 11, at pp. 451-473; cover title: Criminal Law; copy at the library of the Supreme Court of Canada, KF9220 ZC8 G67 2000;
 

GRASSET, Joseph, Dr., 1849-1918,  Demifous et demiresponsables, 2e édition, Paris: F. Alcan, 1907, viii, 217 p.; copie à l'Université d'Ottawa; note: pour éviter les erreurs, "Demifous" n'a pas de trait-d'union;
 

___________La responsabilite atténuée des inculpés : question médicosociale; conférence faite à l'Ecole des Hautes Études le 16 avril 1913, Montpellier, 1913, 100 p.; titre noté dans mes recherches mais livre non consulté; selon ma vérification du catalogue AMICUS effectuée le 13 octobre 2003, il n'y aurait pas de copie de ce livre dans les bibliothèques comprises dans ce catalogue couvrant le Canada;

__________ La responsabilité des criminels, Paris: Les Éditions Nouvelles, 1908; disponible à http://www.archive.org/details/laresponsabilit01grasgoog  (vérifié le 30 novembre 2008); aussi disponible à  http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k55347295.r=.langEN (vérifié le 1er octobre 2009);
 

___________The Semi=Insane and the Semi=Responsible (Demifous et Demiresponsables), translated by Smith Ely Jelliffe, New York and London: Funk and Wagnalls, 1907, xxxv, 415 p.; copy at Ottawa University, RC 454.4 .G7313 1907;
 

GRAVEN, Philippe,  L'infraction pénale punissable, Berne : Éditions Staempfli, 1993, xv, 346 p., voir "Les cas ordinaires d'anomalie (art. 10 et 11)" aux pp. 222-228 (Collection; Précis de droit Staempfli), ISBN: 372720978X; il y a maintenant une deuxième édition soit une mise à jour par Bernhard Sträuli, 1995, 376 p.,  ISBN: 3727209836; note: voir http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/c311_0.html (visionné le 14 septembre 2003), pour l'art. 10 (Responsabilité. Irresponsables) et l'art. 11 (Responsabilité restreinte) du Code pénal suisse;
 

GREAT BRITAIN, Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders, Home Office, Report of the Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department and the Secretary of State for Social Services by command of Her Majesty, October 1975 , London : Her Majesty Stationery Office, 1976, xv, 330 p., see in particular, Chapter 19, "Diminished Responsibility and Infanticide", at pp. 241-251 (series; Cmnd; 6244), ISBN: 0101624409 (Chair: Mr. Butler);

[Diminished Responsibility] Solutions

(i) Our first choice
19.14   In the light of those considerations our own decided preference would be for the abolition of the mandatory life sentence for murder and abolition of diminished responsibility. ...

(ii) Our second choice
19.17  If the mandatory life sentence is in the event to be retained, we would wish to keep section 2 of the Homicide Act in its essentials but we recommend an improvement in the wording.  We point out in paragraph 19.5 above that the present wording of section 2 gives rise to difficulties of interpretation.  We propose the following rewording which would remove some of the difficulties but not materially alter the practical effect of the section:

'Where a person kills or is party to the killing of another, he shall not be convicted of murder if there is medical or other evidence that he was suffering from a form of mental disorder as defined in section 4 of the Mental Health At 1959 and if, in the opinion of the jury, the mental disorder was such as to be an extenuating circumstance which ought to reduce the offence to manslaughter.'

...

(iii) Our third choice
19.20  A less satisfactory alternative, if the mandatory sentence is to remain, is that the provision for diminished responsibility under section 2 of the Homicide Act should go, but on a conviction of murder the judge should have the discretion, where the appropriate medical evidence is forthcoming, to make a hospital order or a probation order with a condition of psychiatric treatment, in place of awarding the life sentence.  The judge would still not be allowed to sentence for a fixed term or to give a discharge.  However, once the principle of a mandatory sentence is breached there is then no reason for preventing the full exercise of judicial discretion.  Also the defendant, who may have been severely disordered at the time of the offence, may have recovered by the time of the trial, in which case a hospital order could not be made and a psychiatric probation order would be inappropriate." (pp. 246-248)

___________Criminal Bill Commission, Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Consider the Law Relating to Indictable Offences: With an Appendix Containing a Draft Code Embodying the Suggestions of the Commissioners, Command 2345 in Sessional Papers (1878-79), vol. 20, pp. 169- 378 (President : C.B. Blackburn); also published in Royal Commission Select Committee and Other Reports on the Criminal Law with Proceedings Minutes of Evidence Appendix and Index 1847-1879, Shannon: Irish University Press, 1971 (series; Irish University Press Series of British Parliamentary Papers; Legal Administration Criminal Law; vol. 6) at pp. 369-579, ISBN: ; copy of the Irish University Press publication at Ottawa University, FTX General, KD 7850 .I75 1968  v.6;

"Section 22, which relates to insanity, expresses the existing law. ...It must be borne in mind, that, although insanity is a defence which is applicable to any criminal charge, it is most frequently put forward in trials for murder, and for this offence the law -- and we think wisely -- awards upon conviction a fixed punishment which the judge has no power to mitigate.  In the case of any offence, if it should appear that the offender was afflicted with some unsoundness of mind, but not to such a degree as to render him irresponsible -- in other words where the criminal element predominates, though mixed in a greater or less degree with the insane element, -- the judge can apportion the punishment to the degree of criminality, making alowance for the weakened or disordered intellect.  But in a case of murder this can only be done  by an appeal to the executive; and we are of opinion that this diificulty cannot be successfully avoided by any definition of insanity which would be both safe and practicable, and that many cases must occur which cannot be satisfactorily dealt with otherwise than by such an appeal." (pp. 17-18 of Command 2345)

___________Criminal Law Revision Committee, Working Paper on Offences Against the Person August 1976, London: H.M.S.O. 1976, iv, 74 p., see "Dimished Responsibility" at pp. 23-25 (paragraphs 61-63), (series; working paper;); copy at Carleton University, Ottawa, UK1 HO 700 76.W55 (the only place where I found a copy in Ottawa); members of the Committee include Glanville Williams;
 

___________Criminal Law Revision Committee, Report, 14th: Offences against the Person, London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, [1980], viii, 150 p., see "Special Defences to Murder Charges -- Provocation and Diminished Responsibility" at pp. 33-44 (series; Command 7844), ISBN:  0101784406;

"Diminished responsibility ...

92.  The Butler Committee considered and reported upon the defence of diminished responsibility and how it has worked in practice.  They recommended that, if the mandatory life sentence of murder is retained, the definition of diminished responsibility in section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 should be reworded in order to remove some of the difficulties of interpretation.  They suggested the following.

'Where a person kills or is party to the killing of another, he shall not be convicted of murder if there is medical or other evidence that he was suffering from a form of mental disorder as defined in section 4 of the Mental Health At 1959 and if, in the opinion of the jury, the mental disorder was such as to be an extenuating circumstance which ought to reduce the offence to manslaughter.'

There can be no doubt that the wording of section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 is unsatisfactory.  We agee that the suggested rewording referred to above provides a more easily recognisable diagnostic framework for doctors giving evidence, and the task of judges would be made easier.  However, when we considered the rewording we had two reservations.  First, we were concerned about the requirement that the defendant, when he killed, must be suffering 'from a form of mental disorder as defined in section 4 of the Mental Health Act 1959...'.  The Butler Committee were of the opinion that this rewording would not materially alter the practical effect of the section.  Initially, however, we felt some doubt about whether the rewording might be to some extent restrictive and leave outside the revised definition some offenders who are now regarded by the courts as falling within section 2.  The kind of case we had in mind was the depressed father who kills a severely handicapped subnormal child or a morbidly jealous person who kills his or her spouse.  In our experience such defendants are not necessarily suffering form a mental disorder of such a kind as to justify the making of a hospital order and are commonly dealt with by the courts, following the section 2 verdict, under the ordinary sentencing provisions applicable to manslaughter, for example, by a relatively short custodial sentence or a conditional discharge or probation order.  Because of our doubts, this matter was further considered by the medical advisers to the Department of Health and Social Security, who have advised that the proposed rewording would not exclude the kind of cases we had in mind.  Having looked at the matter again, we are satisfied that this view is right having regard to the wide terms in which the definition of mental disorder in section 4 of the Mental Health Act 195 is drafted.  We now accept that the types of mental disturbance we had in mind would be within the definition of mental disorder in section 4 of the Act of 1959, and therefore within the rewording proposed by the Butler Committee for section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957, notwithstanding that they fall outside the criteria in section 60 of the Act of 1959 and are not such as to justify the making of a hospital order.

    93.  Our other reservation with regard to the Butler Committee's rewording of the section is that we think that in one respect it may be too lax.  The new definition recommended provides that a defendant shall not be convicted of murder if there is evidence that he was suffering from a mental disorder 'and if, in the opinion of the jury, the mental disorder was such as to be an extenuating circumstance which ought to reduce the offence to manslaughter.'  We appreciate that the concluding words are intended to leave it to the jury to assess whether in all the circumstances the mental disorder is such as ought to reduce the offence to manslaughter, and we agree that any Bill dealing with diminished responsibility should make it clear that the function of the jury extends to this issue as well as to the question whether some degree of mental disorder is present.  However, if this formula were implemented a judge would have to direct a jury to consider, first, whether the defendant was suffering from a mental disorder as defined by section 4, secondly, if he was, whether the mental disorder was an extenuating circumstance and, thirdly, whether that extenuating circumstance was such that it ought to reduce the offence from murder to manslaughter.  On that final question the judge would have to give some guidance to the jury as to what extenuating circumstances ought to reduce the offence, and in practice that means that the mental disorder, has to be substantial enough to reduce the offence to manslaughter.  We consider that the definition should be tightened up so as to include that ingredient upon which the jury will have to be directed, which will give to the jury the necessary guidance.  A form of wording which in our opinion tightens up the latter part of the proposed definition and which we favour is '...the mental disorder was such as to be a substantial enough reason to reduce the offence to manslaughter.'  But two other ways of dealing with the laxity in the Butler Committee formula are:

(ii) '... the mental disorder was of such a degree as to be a substantial reason to reduce murder to manslaughter' or
(ii) '...the defendant was suffering from mental disorder to such a degree that he ought not to be held responsible for murder and that in consequence the offence ought to be reduced to manslaughter.'

We have been informed that of our suggested wordings the medical advisers to the Department of Health and Social Security, prefer the first, as we do, since (notwithstanding that similar words are used in section 60 of the Mental Health Act 1959) they consider that phrases like 'such a degree as' in the second and third form of the suggested rewording migh present difficulties to doctors as it is not possible to measure degrees of mental disorder.  There could therefore be no assurance of comparability between opinions given by different doctors in different cases, which would add to the difficulties of the medical witness.

.........

Recommendations

99.  1. Defences of provocation and diminished responsibility should be retained but with some changes (paragraph 75). ...

6. The definition of diminished responsibility should be reworded.  Some possible forms of rewording are suggested in paragraphs 92-93.

7.  The burden on the defendant in respect of both provocation and diminished responsibility should only go to adducing sufficient evidence to raise an issue (paragraph 94).

8.  Provision should be made enabling a magistrates' court, if the defendant consents, to commit for manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility or, if he has been committed for trial on a charge of murder, allowing a defendant, if he consents, to be indicted for manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility (paragraphs 95 and 96).

9.  There should be an offence of attempted manslaughter by reason of provocation or diminished responsibility (paragraph 98)." (pp. 38-44; notes omitted)

___________Homicide Act 1957, section 2, on diminished responsibility;

"2. (1) Where a person kills or is party to the killing of another, he shall not be convicted of murder if he was suffering from such abnormality of mind (whether arising from a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury) as substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts or omissions in doing or being a party to the killing.

(2) On a charge of murder, it shall be for the defence to prove that the person charged is by virtue of this section not liable to be convicted of murder.

(3) A person who but for this section would be liable, whether as principal or as accessory, to be convicted of murder shall be liable instead to be convicted of manslaughter."

___________House of Commons, Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 1956-57, Debates in Committee on Homicide Bill, 1957;
 

___________House of Lords, Select Committee on Murder and Life Imprisonment, Report of the Select Committee on Murder and Life Imprisonment, Volume I - Report and Appendices, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1989, 126 p., (series; HL Paper 78-I, Session 1988-89), ISBN: 0104868899 (Président : L. Nathan);

[p. 27]
"Provocation and diminished responsibility

    77.  In England and Wales, although all the elements of murder as described above are proved, the defendant must be acquitted of murder and convicted of manslaughter if

(a) He was provoked to lose his self-control by something said or done, or both, which was enough to make a reasonable man do as he did; or

(b) He was suffering from an abnormality of mind which substantially impaired his mental responsibility for the act or omission in question (diminished responsibility).

    78.  In Scotland, diminished responsibility and provocation are also available as defences to murder.  However, provocation is defined rather more narrowly in Scotland than in England and Wales.  In Scotland, it is required that:

"there must have been actual injury or alarming threats producing reasonable perturbation"

for provocation to be made out.  The Lord Justice General (Q 2072) commented that there was a general feeling in Scotland that the defence should be widened, and said that a re-consideration of the substance of the defence would be timely.
 

Infanticide

    79.  In England and Wales, but not in Scotland, a woman who would otherwise be guilty of murder must be acquitted of murder and convicted of infanticide is she kills her child of less than twelve months when the balance of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child or by reason of the effect of lactation consequent upon the birth.

    80.  The primary function of the defences of diminished responsibility and provocation and the offence of infanticide is to free the judge from the duty to impose a mandatory sentence, originally a sentence of death and, since 1965, a sentence of life imprisonment, when the specified conditions are satisfied.  He is enabled to impose whatever sentence he thinks appropriate to the particular facts of the case. If the mandatory sentence were to be abolished, there would then be a strong case for abolishing these defences as well.  Their primary function would have disappeared.  Abolition of the defences would bring the law of murder into line with the principles of the rest of the criminal law.  The defences are peculiar to the law of murder.  For example, a person charged with causing grievous bodily harm with intent, contrary to section 18 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, may have been acting under provocation or with diminished responsibility or both, or be a woman who injured her child under the age of twelve months when the balance of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not having fully recovered from the effect of giving birth to the child.  These matters are no defence to the charge but will be taken into account by the judge in imposing sentence.  If the judge can do this adequately for an offence under section 18 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, or any other offence (and the law assumes he can), then he can do so on a charge of murder.

    81.  This was the approach of the Advisory Council on the Penal System, the Butler Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders¹ (which was concerned only with diminished responsibility) and, at one time, the Law Commission.  Some of those who submitted evidence to the Committee, including three of the judges who expressed views were of like mind.  But a majority of the Criminal Law Revision Committee² saw virtue in retaining the defences even if the judge was given an unfettered discretion in sentencing for murder, for the following reasons:

(i) The jury's verdict, accepting or rejecting the defence, would assist the judge in sentencing;
(ii) a jury might be relunctant to convict of murder in a clear case of provocation or diminished responsibility and might acquit a guilty person altogether if told that the alternative of manslaughter was not open to them;
(iii) the finding of provocation or diminished responsibility may enable the public to understand why a seemingly lenient sentence has been passed on a person who has taken another's life.

______
1 Cmnd. 6244, Chapter 19.
2 Fourteen Report, paragraph 76.
 

[p. 28]

    82.  The Law Commission is now of a similar opinion: even if the sentence became discretionary the defences would serve the valuable function of removing certain specific categories of acts from the stigma attaching to a conviction for murder and of ensuring that the facts were determined after a proper hearing before a jury.  The Lord Chief Justice also stressed that it is not right that a person acting under diminished responsibility or provocation should be the subject to the stigma of a conviction of murder (Q 831).
 

Opinion of the Committee

    83.  The Committee agree with this opinion and recommend that these defences should be retained, whether or not the sentence for murder were to become discretionary.

    84.  The Committee note the suggestion (p. 551) that the offence of infanticide is no longer necessary, and that the defence of diminished responsibility could be used instead.  The offence of infanticide does not exist in Scotland, and cases are dealt with as cases of culpable homicide with diminished responsibility.  The Committee make no recommendation on whether the law should be changed in England and Wales, but suggest that the matter should be further considered.
 

The substance of the defences

    85.  The evidence to the Committee includes some weighty criticism of the substance of the defences.  Judges criticised the defence of diminished responsibility as being difficult to explain to a jury.  The Lord Chief Justice and nine judges thought that the defence of provocation should be reconsidered, considering the 'reasonable man' test to be logicaly unworkable or as rendering the defence almost unworkable if it were strickly applied by juries (p. 565, Q 831). The Committee have not considered in detail the technical problems of the defences to murder, because this matter was outside their terms of reference.  The Committee note, however, that these matters have already been considered by the Criminal Law Revision Committee in their Fourteenth Report,¹ and that their recommendations (which, inter alia, would eliminate the concept of the reasonable man) have been incorporated by the Law Commission into the draft Criminal Code, clauses 56-58. ...
------
1 Criminal Law Revision Committee, Fourteenth Report, 1980, Cmnd. 7844, paragraphs 75-99." (pp. 27-28)

___________Law Commission; Notice : the Home office has asked the Law Commission in July 2003 to review the operation of diminished responsibility and provocation; a consultation paper is scheduled to be published in October 2003, followed by a report in Spring 2004; source: http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/files/Partial_Defences.pdf (accessed on 11 October 2003);
 

___________The Law Commission, Codification of the Criminal Law: A Report to the Law Commission, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1985, vi, 246 p., on diminished responsibility, see pp. 146-148 and 202-203 (series; Law Com. No. 143), ISBN:  0102270856;

"[Diminished responsibility] 58. -- (1) This section applies where the person who kills or is a party to the killing of another is suffering from a form of mental abnormality which is a substantial enough reason to reduce his offence to manslaughter.

['Mental abnormality']  (2) In this section 'mental abnormality' means mental illness, arrested or incomplete development of mind, psychopathic disorder, and any other disorder or disability of mind, except intoxication.

[Mental abnormality and intoxication] (3) Where the person suffering from mental abnormality is also intoxicated this section applies only where it would apply if he were not intoxicated." (p. 202)

__________The Law Commission, A Criminal Code for England and Wales, vol. 1: Report and Draft Criminal Code Bill and vol. 2: Commentary on Draft Criminal Code Bill, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, [1989], v, 278 p. see vol. 1, p. 67, clause 56, "Diminished responsibility"  and vol. 2, pp. 251,  comments on clause 56  (series; Law Com. No. 177), ISBN: 0102299897;

"[Diminished responsibility. 56. -- (1) A person who, but for this section, would be guilty of murder is not guilty of murder if, at the time of his act, he is suffering from such mental abnormality as is a substantial enough reason to reduce his offence to manslaughter.

['Mental abnormality']  (2) In this section 'mental abnormality' means mental illness, arrested or incomplete development of mind, psychopathic disorder, and any other disorder or disability of mind, except intoxication.

[Mental abnormality and intoxication] (3) Where the person suffering from mental abnormality is also intoxicated, this section applies only where it would apply if he were not intoxicated." (vol. 1, p. 67)

......................................

"Clause 56: Diminished responsibility

    14.15  As in the corresponding clause in the Code team's Bill, this clause adopts the Committee's preferred definition of diminished responsibility (which was also favoured by the medical advisers to the Department of Health and Social Security).  The phrase, 'at the time of his act' -- which may be the act of causing death or of procuring, assisting or encouraging that act -- has been included to make it clear beyond reasonable doubt that the jury must look to that time and not to the time of trial.

    14.16  The definition of 'mental abnormality' in subsection (2) is the definition of 'mental disorder' in section 4 of the Mental Health Act 1959 (now section 1(2) of the Act of 1983) which the Committee, after some hesitation, was persuaded was appropriate for this purpose.⁹  Intoxication (the state of being disordered or stupefied by alcohol or other drugs) is excluded.  We note that in Tandy¹⁰ the Court of Appeal held that intoxication may found diminished responsibility if the defendant is suffering from alcoholism which renders the taking of 'the first drink' involuntary.  As we are implementing the recommendations of the Committee rather than codifying the present law, we have not thought it right to attempt to include this rather difficult concept in the clause. ...
-----
⁹ Fourteenth Report, para 92.  The term 'mental disorder' is not used here, because it is used with a narrower meaning elsewhere in the Code: see clauses 34 and 36.
¹⁰ [1989] 1 All E.R. 267." (vol. 2, p. 251)
 

___________The Law Commission, Partial Defences to Murder: Provisional Conclusions on Consultation Paper No 173, 1 May 2004, 16 p., available at  http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/files/cp173-prov.pdf (accessed on 2 May 2004);
 

___________The Law Commission, Partial defences to murder: report, London: Stationery Office, 2004, vi, 313 p., (series; report; number 290), ISBN: 0101630123; the report is available at  http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/files/lc290.pdf (accessed on 27 April 2005) and the Appendices at  http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/files/Appendices.pdf (accessed on 27 April 2005);
 

___________Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1949-1953, Report / Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1949-1953: Report, London: Her Majesty's Stationery office, 1953, x, 506 p., see "Diminished Responsibility", at pp. 130-144 and the comparative law, at pp. 413-416 (series; command number 8932);
 

GREECE / GRÈCE, The Greek penal code / translated by Nicholas B. Lotis; introduction by Giorgios Mangakis, South Hackensack, N.J.: Rothman, 1973, xii, 205 p. (series; The American series of foreign penal codes; volume 18), ISBN: 0837700388; copy at Ottawa, University, FTX General, KKE 3794.31950 .A5213 1973; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, K5001 A63 no. 18;

"Article 34
Disturbance of Mental Activity or Conscience

An act shall not be imputable to its perpetrator if, at the time of commission, by reason of a morbid disturbance of his mental activity or of his conscience, he was unable to understand the unjustified character of his act or to act in accordance with such understanding.

...

Article 36
Diminished Responsibility as to Imputability

1.  If, due to mental conditions described in Article 34, a person's capacity for imputability has been substantially reduced, but not entirely removed, a lesser punishment shall be imposed (Article 83).

2.  The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not be applicable to voluntary intoxication." (pp. 47-48)

___________Code pénal grec de 1950, traduction de M. Ch. Bourthoumieux d'après le texte allemand traduit par le Dr Brynolf-Honkasalo,  avec une notice spéciale sur ce code par Marc Ancel avec la collaboration de Yvonne Marx, dans Les Codes pénaux européens, Tome II, Paris: Centre français de droit comparé, 1956, aux pp. 713-796 (Collection; Nouvelle Collection du Comité de législation étrangère et de droit international); copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, FTX General,   KJC 7973.8 .C626 1956, volume 2;

"ART. 34.  -- Troubles des facultés mentales ou de la conscience. -- Un acte n'est pas imputable à son auteur lorsqu'au moment de sa commission, l'auteur n'est pas en mesure de comprendre le caractère de son acte et d'agir en conséquence, par suite d'un trouble pathologique de ses facultés mentales ou de sa conscience.

...

ART. 36. -- Imputabilité atténuée. --

1. Si, en raison de l'un des troubles psychiques mentionnés par l'article 34, l'imputabilité déterminée par ce même article se trouve essentiellement diminuée, sans avoir complètement disparu, une peine réduite est applicable.

2.  La disposition de l'alinéa précédent n'est pas applicable en cas d'ivresse fautive." (pp. 721-722)

GRIEW, Edward, " 'Diminished Responsibility' and the Trial of Lunatics Act, 1883", [1957] The Criminal Law Review 521-529;  copy at Ottawa University, KD 7862 .C734  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

___________"The Future of Diminished Responsibility", [1988] The Criminal Law Review 75-87;  copy at Ottawa University, KD 7862 .C734  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

___________ "Reducing Murder to Manslaughter: Whose Job?", (1986) 12(1) Journal of Medical Ethics 18-23; copy at Ottawa University, R 724 .J68 Location: RGN Periodicals;

"[Abstract] This paper compares two versions of the diminished responsibility defence, which reduces murder to manslaughter: the present statutory formulation and a proposed reformulation. The comparison confirms that evidence such as psychiatrists are commonly invited to give in murder cases takes them beyond their proper role.  Paradoxically, although the two formulations mean essentially the same thing, the proposed change of wording must have the practical effect of subduing the  psychiatrist's evidence. This conclusion leads to speculation about why psychiatrists are at present allowed so large a function in diminished responsibility cases and to some general observations about the role of the expert in relation to those of judge and jury. (source:  http://jme.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/abstract/12/1/18, accessed on 20 September 2003)

GRIFFITH, Gareth and Honor Figgis, Crimes Amendment (Diminished Responsibility) Bill 1997: Commentary and Background, New South Wales Parliamentary Library Research Service, 1997 (series; briefing paper; number 19/97); see the executive summary at  http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/web/PHWebContent.nsf/PHPages/ResearchBf191997?OpenDocument (accessed on 20 September 2003);
 

GULBIS, Vitauts, Annotation, "Admissibility of Expert Testimony as to Whether Accused Had Specific Intent Necessary for Conviction", (1982) 16 A.L.R. (4th) 666-686; A.L.R. = American Law Reporter;
 

HALL SMITH, Robert, Notes and Comments, "Insanity -- An Argument for Partial Responsibility", (1953) 41 Kentucky Law Journal 232-249; copy on microfilm at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa;
 

HALL WILLIAMS, J.E., Notes of Cases, "The Psychopath and the Defence of Diminished Responsibility", (1958) 21 Modern Law Review 544-549; copy at Ottawa University, KD 322 .M62  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

HAMILTON, John, "Manslaughter: Assessment for Court" in Robert Bluglass and Paul Bowden, eds., with an introduction by Nigel Walker, Principles and Practice of Forensic Psychiatry, Edinburgh and New York: Churchill Livingstone, 1990, xxi, 1405, 10, 84, 53 p., see "Diminished Responsibility" at pp. 206-211, ISBN:  0443035784; copy at CISTI, Canada Institute for Scientific and Technical Information, Ottawa / ICIST, Institut canadien de l'information scientifique et technique, Ottawa, RA1151 P957;
 

HAMILTON, John R., "Diminished Responsibility", (1981) 138 British Journal of Psychiatry 434-436;  copy at Ottawa University, RC 321 .J82  Location: RGN Periodicals;
 

___________"Insanity legislation", (1986) 12 Journal of Medical Ethics 13-17; copy at Ottawa University, R 724 .J68  Location: RGN Periodicals;

"Author's abstract
The McNaughton Rules, which are used when someone pleads insanity at the time of a homicide, are out of date and unsatisfactory.  Suggestions have been made about how the insanity defence can be reformulated.  The preference of a defence of diminished responsibility means abandoning an ancient and humane principle of not convicting those who are so mentally disordered as not to be responsible for their actions. There is a need for Parliament to consider changes to the law both to prevent the mentally disordered being sent to prison inappropriately, and because the Mental Health Act 1983 has not taken account of rare cases where an offender such as an epileptic might be found legally insane but not mentally disordered." (p. 13) (Partial source:  http://jme.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/abstract/12/1/13, accessed on 14 October 2003)

HASSE, A.F., "Keeping Wolff from the Door: California Diminished Capacity Concept", (1972) 60 California Law Review 1641-1655; copy at Ottawa University, KFC 69 .C335  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

HAVEL, Richard W., "A Punishment Rationale for Diminished Capacity", (1970-71) 18 UCLA [Los Angeles : School of Law, University of California, Los Angeles] Law Review 561-580; copy at Ottawa University, KFC 69 .U34  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

HAYES, Susan C., "Diminished Responsibility: The Expert Witness' Viewpoint" in Stanley Meng Heong Yeo, ed., Partial Excuses to Murder, Leichardt (NSW): Federation Press, with the assistance of the Law Foundation of New South Wales, [1990], vii, 287 p., at pp. 145-157, ISBN: 1862870470;

"Summary

In rasing a defence of diminished responsibility, expert evidence is presented concerning whether the accused has an abnormality of mind, whether the abnormality has arisen from the causes mentioned in statutes, and whether there is substantial impairment.  In some jurisdictions there is the added complication that the statute refers to the accused's 'mental responsibility' for her or his acts or omissions.  The latter phrase presents a problem because it can be argued that responsibility is a moral judgment, not a judgment particular to mental health.  One issue to be resolved, therefore, is the extent of the contribution of expert testimony, and when such testimony spills over from expert into lay areas.  Nevertheless, the defence of diminished responsibility is an attractive one for the expert witness because it recognises a continuum of mental abnormality and does not necessitate an artificial dichotomy of sane or insane.  Furthermore, it is appropriate for defendants who have mental abnormalities which cannot be subsumed under the McNaghten guidelines for insanity.  Such a group includes intellectually disabled offenders.  The role of the expert witness is to present detailed and accurate information about the process of assessment of the accused, and the bases for specialist inferences and expert opinion." (p. 145)

HELD, Kenneth, "Diminished Capacity in California: A Diminished Future or Capacity for Change", (1980) 8 San Fernando Valley Law Review 203-217; copy at Ottawa University, KFC 69 .U535  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

HERMANN, D.H.J., "Criminal Defenses and Pleas in Mitigation Based on Amnesia", (1986) 4 Behavioral Sciences and the Law 5-26; title noted in my research but no copy of this particular periodical number was found in the Ottawa area libraries (number missing at Ottawa University); article not consulted;
 

HIGGINS, J., "The Origins of the Homicide Act 1957", (1986) 12 Journal of Medical Ethics 8-12; copy at Ottawa University, R 724 .J68  Location: RGN Periodicals;

"Editor's note
This paper traces the history of the concepts of insanity and diminished responsibility in English law.  Insanity as a defence in Law has two components, and these two components developed quite separately.  The idea that an insane may not know what he or she is doing when he or she commits an offence, and is for this reason not guilty, goes back to the thirteenth century.  The other component, which developed in the seventeenth century, was known as the 'right-wrong test'.  According to this a person who commits an offence may be not guilty on the grounds that he does not know that what he is doing is wrong.  The concept of diminished responsibility originated in the middle of the nineteenth century and was developed in Scottish law.  It was not until almost a century later that it was accepted South of the Border." (p. 8)

HODELET, Nicola, and Rajan Darjee, "The Galbraith Judgment and the Defence of Diminished Responsibility in Scotland", (October 2005) 45(4) Medicine, Science and the Law 297-302;

HOLLWEG, Matthias, "Modification of Criminal Law and Its Impact on Psychiatric Expert Opinions", (Winter 1998) 21(1) International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 109-116;

HORDER, Jeremy, "Between Provocation and Diminished Responsibility", (1999) 10(2) King's Colllege Law Journal 143-166; copy at Ottawa University, KD 460 .K5532  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

___________Excusing crime, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004,  xx, 295 p., (series; Oxford monographs on criminal law and justice),  ISBN: 0198264828; copy at the SCC Library, KF9235 H67 2004;
 

___________"Pleading Involuntary Lack of Capacity", (1993) 52(2)Cambridge Law Journal 298-318; copy at Ottawa University, KD 322 .C329  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

HUCKABEE, H.M. (Harlow M.), "Avoiding the Insanity Defense Strait Jacket: The Mens Rea Route", (1987-88) 15 Pepperdine Law Review 1-32; copy at Ottawa University, KFC 69 .P46  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

___________"Dodging the Insanity Defense with Diminished Capacity", available at  http://www.diminishedcapacity.com/ (site last updated on 17 August 1999) (accessed on 23 August 2003);
 

___________"Evidence of Mental Disorder on Mens Rea Constitutionality of Drawing the Line at the Insanity Defense", (1988-89) 16 Pepperdine Law Review 573-661; copy at Ottawa University, KFC 69 .P46  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

___________"Mental Disability: Evidence On Mens Rea Versus The Insanity Defenses", (1992-93) 20 Western State University Law Review 435-526; copy at Ottawa University, KFC 69 .L38  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

HUGHES, Graham, "The English Homicide Act of 1957", (1958-59) 49 Criminal Law, Criminology & Police Science 521-532, see "Diminished Responsibility" at pp. 525-527; volume 49 is missing from Ottawa University; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa;
 

HUNTER, Jill and Jenny Bargen, "Diminished Responsibility: 'Abnormal' Minds, Abnormal Murderers and What the Doctor Said"  in Stanley Meng Heong Yeo, ed., Partial Excuses to Murder, Leichhardt (N.S.W., Australia):  The Federation Press, 1991, xvii, 287 p. at pp. 125-144, ISBN: 1862870470;

"Summary

Traditionally, from a purely doctrinal perspective there has been little scope for using psychiatric or psychological evidence in assessing mental responsibility for crime.  There has been an immense and growing tension between the 'legal' view of mental illness and responsibility and medical knowledge.  As the law has remained static in its views the gulf between the medical and legal perspectives has widened.  In Whitworth v R we see evidence that in considering the defence of diminished responsibility the judiciary is beginning to be receptive to more enlightened medical knowledge.  Consequently, anomolous limitations to the defence are showing signs of erosion.  Additionally, the High Court appears to be in the process of abandoning procedural law limitations which so far have prevented a broad consideration of a defendant's mental processes.  In particular, the archaic abnormal/normal dichotomy is being put to rest.

The significant practical advantages in using psychiatric evidence are illustrated in Troja's case.  Arguably the law should rapidly embrace the expansion of psychiatric and psychological evidence in court.  However, before such a move is made an assessment of forensic psychiatry is necessary.  A discourse that is tainted with class, race and gender-based stereotypes, which already plague the law, should not be encouraged to make incursions into the criminal law." (p. 126)

HURTADO POZO, José,  Droit pénal -- Partie générale, 2, Zurich: Schulthness Polygraphischer Verlag, 2002, xli, 396 p., voir "Capacité de culpabilité restreinte (responsabilité restreinte)" aux pp. 161-163 et "Actio libera in causa" aux pp. 163-168, ISBN: 3725544700;
 

ICELAND / Islande, General Penal Code,

"Section 15
A person who was, at the time an act was committed, totally unable to control his actions on account of mental disease,  retardation or deterioration, or on account of impaired consciousness or other similar condition, shall not be punished.
 

Section 16
A mentally deranged person, such as on account of retardation, deterioration, sexual abnormality or other aberrance, without this condition being as serious as defined in Section 15, shall be punished if punishment is, under the circumstances and after medical opinion has been obtained, deemed likely to have effect.

If an institution for such persons comes into being, a criminal judgment may provide that the offender may serve his [sentence] 1) there.
1) Act No. 82/1998, Section 1."

(General Penal Code, No. 19/1940, with subsequent amendments, Act on Criminal Responsibility of Legal Persons, No. 144/1998; available at http://brunnur.stjr.is/interpro/dkm/dkm.nsf/pages/eng_penal_code , accessed on 7 October 2003)

IRELAND, Irish Law Reform Commission, "Summary of Irish Law -- Irish Law Reform Commission: Provocation, Diminished Responsibility and Excessive [Self-] Defence", being Appendix C in The Law Commission, Overseas Studies, which is part of the Appendices to the consultation paper, Partial Defences to Murder, 31 October 2003, xiii, 249 p. (series; consultation paper; number 173); this study of the Irish Law Reform Commission, at pp. 98-124, is available at  http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/files/cp173apps.pdf (accessed on 28 April 2005); see also Appendix G, "Relevant Statutory Provisions and Proposed Provisions";
 

ISRAEL, CLINICAL CRIMINOLOGY HOME PAGE, on the law of Israel, http://members.tripod.com/~dazc/, accessed on 28 September 2003; I have been unable to ascertain the name of the author, but his e-mail is: dazc@netvision.net.il

"In August 1995 the latest revision of the Israel criminal code came in to effect. Among the changes in the code were two which affect the definition legal rights of the mentally disabled: the definition of insanity was changed and a diminished capacity clause was introduced into the law." (source:  http://members.tripod.com/~dazc/history.htm, accessed on 28 September 2003)"
 

"Diminished Capacity: In cases of murder the mandatory life sentence may be mitigated if as a result of a severe mental disorder or defect of the intellect the defendent was limited in a way similar to but to a lesser degree than that described in par. 34(8). OR if the defendent was in a state of severe mental distress due to prolonged severe abuse of the defendent or a member of his family on the part of the victim of his crime. This clause was also adopted in 1995 ..." (source:  http://members.tripod.com/~dazc/isinsan.htm, accessed on 28 September 2003)

ITALY/ITALIE, Code pénal italien  de 1930, traduction de P. de Casabianca avec mise à jour par V. de Toma,  avecune notice spéciale sur ce code par Marc Ancel avec la collaboration de Yvonne Marx, dans Les Codes pénaux européens, Tome II, Paris: Centre français de droit comparé, 1956, aux pp. 871-1014 (Nouvelle Collection du Comité de législation étrangère et de droit international); copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, KJC 7973.8 .C626 1956, vol. 2, location: FTX general;

"ART. 88. -- Démence totale. -- N'est pas imputable celui qui, au moment où il a commis le fait, était, par suite d'infirmité, dans un état mental tel qu'il excluait la capacité de comprendre ou de vouloir.

ART. 89. --  Démence partielle. -- Celui qui, au moment où il a commis le fait, était, par suite d'infirmité, en un état mental tel qu'était amoindrie grandement, sans être abolie sa capacité de comprendre ou de vouloir, répond de l'infraction commise, mais la peine est diminuée." (p. 889)

___________The Italian Penal Code [of 1930] translated by Edward M. Wise, in collaboration with Allen Maitlin; introd. by Edward M. Wise, Littleton, Colo. : F. B. Rothman, 1978, xlvi, 249 p. (Series; The American series of foreign penal codes; 23),  ISBN: 0837700434;

"Article 88.  Total Mental Deficiency.

    Anyone who, at the time he committed the act, was, by reason of infirmity, in such a state of mind as to preclude capacity to understand and to will shall not be responsible.
 

Article 89.  Partial Mental Deficiency.

    Anyone who, at the time he committed the act, was, by reason of infirmity, in such a state of mind as to greatly diminish, without precluding, his capacity to understand and to will, shall be liable for the offense committed; but the punishment shall be reduced." (pp. 32-33)
 

"Art. 88 - Vizio totale di mente
Non è imputabile chi, nel momento in cui ha commesso il fatto, era, per infermità, in tale stato di mente da escludere la capacità di intendere o di volere.

Art. 89 - Vizio parziale di mente
Chi, nel momento in cui ha commesso il fatto, era, per infermità, in tale stato di mente da scemare grandemente, senza escluderla, la capacità d'intendere o di volere, risponde del reato commesso; ma la pena è diminuita.

JAFFE, Richard S., "The Diminished-Capacity Defense", (1986) 22(9) Trial 32-33, 35-36, 38-39; no copy at Ottawa University; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa;
 

JAMES, Hazel, doing Ph.D. thesis on diminished responsibility, at Nottingham University; lqxhj@nottingham.ac.uk (information as of 14 April 2003)

"The PhD focuses on the legal concept mens rea, which means having the necessary mental intent to commit the crime, and the neuroscientific research on consciousness. The analysis is of homicide cases where the defences of  insanity and diminished responsibility are raised as mens rea comes under scrutiny.

In such cases expert medico-psychological evidence is submitted on the mental state of the accused, with particular 'psy' diagnoses resulting in the accused not being held responsible. The current legal approach will be evaluated in light of the neuroscience of consciousness, which challenges many traditional premises underpinning the legal approach.

The purpose of the project therefore is to review fundamental legal principles and procedures that relate to the attribution of responsibility for our decisions, in light of the latest scientific thinking. (source: http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/igbis/people/hjames.htm, accessed on 23 August 2003);

JANSSEN, Sander, "Mental condition defences in supranational criminal law", (2004) 4(1) International Criminal Law Review 83-98; see "Insanity", at pp. 84-87, and more particularly "The ICTY: the Celebici case", at pp. 85-87; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada;
 

JAPAN, The Penal Code of Japan, 2002, originally translated by Fukio Nakane, Eibun-Horeisha, 2002, iii, 86, 3 p. (series; EHS Law Bulletin Series; EHS Vol. II, numbers 2400 and 2402);

"(Insanity and quasi-insanity) (13)

    Article 39.  An Act of an insane person shall not be punished.

     2. Penalty may be reduced for an act of a quasi-insane." (p. 17)
 

"L'imputabilité (Schuldfähigkeit)³⁶ désigne le minimum d'aptitude au discernement et à l'autonomie exigé par la loi pour la responsabilité pénale.  Si l'imputablité fait défaut, l'objet du reproche de faute tombe, parce que l'acte ne repose plus sur une formation de volonté reprochable. [...] L'imputabilité fait défaut également lorsqu'en raison d'un trouble mental, d'un profond trouble de la conscience, d'une faiblesse d'esprit ou d'une autre anomalie psychique grave, l'auteur n'est pas en état de se rendre compte de l'illégitimité de l'acte et d'agir en conséquence (§ 20 [du Code pénal allemand]).  Le concept de trouble mental englobe les maladies mentales proprement dites au sens psychiatrique du terme (psychoses).  Le cas principal du profond trouble de conscience est celui de l'état passionnel (haine, colère, jalousie); toutefois, la jurisprudence refuse ici d'exclure la responsabilité lorsque l'auteur aurait pu éviter la naissance de cet état³⁷.   Par faiblesse d'esprit, on entend les troubles graves et innés de l'intelligence. Enfin, les anomalies psychiques graves comprennent les psychopathies, névroses et perversions, que le droit allemand assimile aux maladies mentales véritables quand elles excluent la capacité de discernement et d'action de l'auteur³⁸.  La responsabilité est réduite pour les personnes dont la capacité de discernement et d'action est sensiblement diminuée pour les causes énumérées au § 20; pour elles, il n'y a cependant pas exclusion de responsabilité, mais seulement réduction facultative de peine selon le § 49, alinéa 1^er." (p. 271)
 

"36. KRÜPELMAN, Die Neugestaltung der Vorschriften über die Schuldfähigkeit, ZStW 88 (1976), p. 6 et s. -- LENCKNER, Strafe, Schuld und Schuldfähigkeit, in: Handbuch der forensischen Psychiatrie, 1972, vol. 1, partie A, p. 42 et s. -- SCHNEIDER, Die Beurteilung der Zurechnungsfähigkeit, 4^e éd., 1961 -- WITTERie Beurteilung Erwachsener im Strafrecht, in: Handbuch der forensischen Psychiatrie, 1972, vol. 2, p. 19 et s.

37.  OGH 25 avril 1950: OGHSt 3, 19 (23) -- BGH 1^er juill. 1952: BGHSt 3, 194 (199) -- BGH 10 oct. 1957: BGHSt 11, 20 (23).

38. KRÜPELMAN, Motivation und Handlung im Affekt, Festschrift für H. Welzel, 1974, p. 374 et s.  -- VOGT, Die Forderungen der psychoanalytischen Wissenschaft für die Interpretation der Merkmale der Schuldfähigkeit, 1979." (p. 290)
 

JOLIDON, Pierre, L'appréciation de la responsabilité pénale selon le CPS [Code pénal suisse] (Art. 10 et 11), thèse, Université de Berne, 1956, 96 p.;  note: voir http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/c311_0.html (visionné le 14 septembre 2003), pour l'art. 10 (Responsabilité. Irresponsables) et l'art. 11 (Responsabilité restreinte) du Code pénal suisse; titre noté dans mes recherches mais livre non consulté; selon ma vérification du catalogue AMICUS effectuée le 19 septembre 2003, il n'y aurait pas de copie de ce livre dans les bibliothèques comprises dans ce catalogue couvrant le Canada;
 

KEEDY, Edwin R., "A Problem of First Degree Murder: Fisher v. United States", (1950-51) 99 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 267-292;
 

KEITH OF AVONHOLM, Lord, "Some Observations on Diminished Responsibility", (1959) 4 The Juridical Review 109-118; copy at Ottawa University, KD 322 .J854  Location: FTX Periodicals; also published in  (1959) 27 Medico-Legal Journal 4-15;
 

KENNY, Anthony, "Anomalies of Section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957", (March 1986) 12 Journal of Medical Ethics 24-27; copy at Ottawa University, R 724 .J68  Location: RGN Periodicals;

"[Abstract] Section 2 of the 1957 Homicide Act is indefensible: the concept of 'mental responsibility' is a hybrid which turns the psychiatrist witness either into a thirteenth juryman or a spare barrister. But reform does not lie along the lines suggested by the Butler Committee or the Criminal Law Revision Committee. The latter leaves the jury with insufficient guidance; the former returns to the bad eighteenth century policy of treating mental illness not as a factor in determining responsibility but as a status exempting from responsibility. The much criticised McNaughton rules provide a sounder basis for deciding where responsibility should be assigned in criminal cases." (source:  http://jme.bmjjournals.com/cgi/content/abstract/12/1/24, accessed on 11 October 2003)

___________"Can responsibility be diminished" in R.G. (Raymond Gillepsie) Frey and Christopher W. Morris, eds., Liability and responsibility : essays in law and morals, Cambridge [England]; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1991, x, 430 p., at pp. 13-31 (chapter 1) (Series: Cambridge studies in philosophy and law),  ISBN: 0521392160 (hardcover); copy at Ottawa University, K 230 .F74 L53 1991 FTX; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, K230 F74 L53 1991;
 

KILLIAS, Martin en collaboration avec Bernard A. Dénéréaz, Précis de droit pénal général, Berne: Staempfli, 1998, xlv, 300 p., voir "Les cas ordinaires d'irresponsabilité et de responsabilité restreinte" aux  pp. 138-144 (collection; Précis de droit Staempfli),  ISBN:  3727209895; il existe aussi une 2^e édition, Berne, 2001 que je n'ai pas encore consultée;
 

KOREA (South), The Korean criminal code / editor-in-cheif, Gerhard O. W. Mueller, South Hackensack, N.J. : Rothman, [c1960], x, 145 p. (series;  The American series of foreign penal codes; volume 2); translation and the introduction by Paul Ryu; copy at Ottawa University, FTX General, KPA 3794.3 1953 .A6 M84 1960;

"Article 10
Persons Suffering from Mental Disorders

Section (1).  A person who, due to a mental disorder, is unable to pass rational judgments or to control his will, is not punishable.

Section (2).  The punishment of a person who, due to a mental disorder, is deficient in the capacity mentioned in the preceding Section, shall be mitigated.

Section (3).  The provisions of the preceding two Sections shall not apply to the criminal conduct of a person who, anticipating the risk of committing crime, has intentionally incurred mental disorder." (p. 35)

KRAUSZ, Frederic Ron, "The Relevance of Innocence: Proposition 8 and the Diminished Capacity Defense", (1983) 71(4) California Law Review 1197-1215; copy at Ottawa University, KFC 69 .C335  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

KROBER,  Hans Ludwig and Steffen Lau, "Bad or Mad? Personality disorders and legal responsibility -- the German situation", (2000) 18(5) Behavioral Sciences and the Law 679-690;

"Criminal offenders have a high rate of personality disorders (PDS), especially Antisocial Personality Disorders and psychopathy, but criminal acts are not necessarily the result of PD. Findings from psychiatric research suggest that the development of PD is influenced by genetic factors, that can result in deviant traits in temper, emotionality and cognitive style.  There is general agreement that those peculiarities and vulnerabilities find their expression and structure only under a complex interplay of stimulating or impairing environmental influences. Do these genetic factors-or other factors-diminish a person's criminal responsibility? There is no difficulty in diagnosing PDs, but the challenging questions arise in forensic assessments of defendants for criminal responsibility who have a PD. This article discusses the German legal situation and special problems created by the term of "diminished" criminal responsibility. In contrast  to the Anglo-American legal situation, the German criminal law obliges the court to order an indeterminate forensic - psychiatric confinement, in addition to punishment, if the offender had acted under diminished criminal responsibility and is now still considered to be dangerous. The convicted offender remains under the control of the criminal court during psychiatric hospitalization. The change from handling the personality disordered offender as a criminal to handling him as someone with a mental disorder creates a social option for  extended state interventions, including indeterminate hospitalization." (source: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov:80/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11113968&dopt=Abstract&itool=iconabstr, accessed on 27 September 2003)

KRUG, Peter, Notes and Comments, "The Emerging Mental Capacity Defense in International Criminal Law: Some Initial Questions of Implementation", (2000) 94 American Journal of International Law 317-335;

LII / Legal Information Institute, "Diminished Capacity", available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/index.php/Diminished_capacity  (accessed on 13 August 2007);
 

LaFAVE, Wayne R., Substantive Criminal Law, 2nd ed., [St. Paul, Minn.]: Thomson/West Group, 2003, vol. 2, "Partial Responsibility" at pp. 12-26, ISBN: 031410805X; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, KV 9219 L382 2003 v. 2;

[Contents]
"§ 9.2 Partial Responsibility
      Analysis
Subsec.
(a) Distinguished From Insanity Defense.
(b) Specific Applications.

(1) First or Second Degree Murder.
(2) Murder or Manslaughter.
(3) Crime or no Crime.

(c) Policy Considerations.
(d) Constitutional Considerations." (p. 12)

LEFORT, Paul, De la responsabilité partielle en droit pénal - Thèse pour le doctorat, Lille : Imprimerie A. Taffin-Lefort, 1901, 97 p.; copie à la Bibliothèque du Barreau de Montréal;

"TABLE DES MATIÈRES

INTRODUCTION......9
HISTORIQUE......13

CHAPITRE PREMIER
Des causes de la responsabilité partielle......23
    § I.  Causes morales.....24
    § II. Causes pathologiques......36

CHAPITRE DEUXIÈME
La responsabilité partielle et les différentes écoles philosophiques......51
    § I.  L'école classique......52
    § II. L'école italienne......56
    § III.  L'école néo-classique......61

CHAPITRE TROISIÈME
De quelques controverses auxquelles donne lieu la théorie de la responsabilité partielle......65
    § I.  Fondement de la responsabilité partielle......65
    § II. Excuse légale ou circonstances atténuantes?......71

CHAPITRE QUATRIÈME
De l'application pratique de la théorie de la responsabilité partielle......83
    § I.  De la procédure et du jugement......83
    § II. Des mesures à prendre contre le demi-responsable......88

CONCLUSION......93"

LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, Cornell Law School, " 'Diminished Capacity' vs. 'Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity' ", available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/background/insane/capacity.html, accessed on 12 October 2003;
 

LEIB, Charles Robert, "Diminished Capacity: Its Potential Effect in California", (1970) 3 Loyola University of Los Angeles Law Review 153-168; copy at Ottawa University, KFC 69 .L69  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

LEWIN, Travis H.D., "Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Cases for Purposes Other than the Defense of Insanity", (1975) 26 Syracuse Law Review 1051-1115; copy at Ottawa University, KF 382 .A1 S95  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

LOGOZ, Paul, 1888-, Commentaire du Code pénal suisse, Partie Générale, 2e éd. mise à jour avec la collaboration d'Yves Sandoz, Neuchâtel : Delachaux & Niestlé, 1976, 569 p., sur les articles 10-12 du Code pénal, voir les pp. 69-81, ISBN: 2603000578;
 

LOWNIE, Ralph H.,  The Doctrine of Diminished Responsibility in English Criminal Law, Ph.D. thesis University of Kent at Canterbury, 1989, iv, 395, [11] leaves; Dissertation Abstracts International, vol. 50-12, section A, p. 4079; the New York University Law Library has a copy, NYUL KN63 L69 D6; title noted in my research but thesis not consulted yet;
 

MacKAY, R.D., "The Abnormality of Mind Factor in Diminished Responsibility", [1999] The Criminal Law Review 117-125;

"Summary: Section 2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957 restricts diminished responsibility pleas to abnormalities of mind which arise from one of the bracketed causes contained in the subsection.  It is only recently that the Court of Appeal has begun to give any detailed consideration to the aetiological complexities of section 2(1).  This article draws on these appellate decisions and gives a critical anallysis of the current legal position." (p. 117)

___________“Diminished Responsibility and Mentally Disordered Killers” in Andrew Ashworth and Barry Mitchell, eds., Rethinking English Homicide Law, Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2000, xx, 205 p., at pp. 55-83,  ISBN: 0198299044 and 019829915X (pbk);  copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa, KF9305 R48 2000;
 

___________"Diminished Responsibility: Some Observations Arising from Three Case Studies", (1986) 26 Medicine, Science and the Law 60-65; copy at Ottawa University, RA 1001 .M49  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

___________Mental Condition Defences in the Criminal Law, Oxford University Press, 1995, 274 p., see Chapter 4, "Diminished Responsibility and Infanticide", at pp. 180-214 (series; Oxford Monographs on Criminal Law and Justice), ISBN: 0198259956;
 

___________"Pleading Provocation and Diminished Responsibility Together", [1988]  The Criminal Law Review 411-423; copy at Ottawa University, KD 7862 .C734  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

___________"Some Thoughts on Reforming the Law of Insanity and Diminished Responsibility", [2003] The Juridical Review 57-80; copy at Ottawa University, KD 322 .J854  Location: FTX Periodicals;

"As part of its project on reform of the law of insanity and diminished responsibility, the Scottish Law Commission sponsored a seminar in order to learn about developments in the law in other jurisdictions.  One of the contributions was a paper by Professor R.D. Mackay of De Montfort University.  In this revised version of his paper, Professor Mackay critically examines the current law of England and Wales in unfitness to plead, insanity as a defence and the plea of diminished responsibility.  He also considers previous proposals for reform of the law, as well as the implications of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).  Finally, Professor Mackay argues that English law is in need of reform and he proposes new formulations of the definitions of insanity and diminished responsibility which English law should adopt." (p. 57)

MacKAY, R.D. (Ronald D.), and B.J. Mitchell, "Provoking Diminished Responsibility:  Two Pleas Merging Into One?", [2003] The Criminal Law Review 745-759;

"Summary: In its current review of Partial Defences to Murder, the Law Commission has been requested to consider, inter alia, the law and practice of both provocation and diminished responsibility, including (1) whether they should continue to be partial defences to murder and (2) if so, whether they should remain separate or be combined.  In this paper we consider the implications of the decision in R. v Morgan Smith and argue that, as it is no longer practical or desirable to keep the two pleas separate, a combined defence would be an appropriate vehicle for reform." (p. 745)

MAIER, Albert (Docteur en droit), La responsabilité restreinte selon le Code pénal suisse du 21 décembre 1937, [S.l.], [s.n.], 1941 (Fribourg/Suisse: Impr. Hodel), ix, 108 p.; informations provenant du Catalogue Collectif RERO (Suisse);  texte non consulté;
 

MARKS,  Laurence, and Tony Van den Bergh,  Ruth Ellis : a case of diminished responsibility?, London : Penguin Books, 1977, ISBN: 0354085093 and  0140129022; copy at Carleton University, 345/.4202523/M346; title noted in my research but book not consulted yet;

MATHÉ, Lucien, 1873-,  La responsabilité atténuée: lois faites dans les divers pays, lois à  faire concernant les criminels à responsabilite attenuée, Paris: Vigot, 1911, xvii, 128 p.; titre noté dans mes recherches mais thèse non consultée; selon ma vérification du catalogue AMICUS effectuée le 13 octobre 2003, il n'y aurait pas de copie de ce livre dans les bibliothèques comprises dans ce catalogue couvrant le Canada;
 

MATHIE, L., "Étude sur la responsabilité atténuée", (1910) 25 Arch. Anthrop Crim  729;
 

MAUDSLEY, Henry, 1835-1918, Responsibility in mental disease, New York : D. Appleton, 1897, xi, 338 p. (series; Selected library of modern science), copy at Ottawa University, MRT Gegenral, RC 454.4 .M38 1897; also published in French/aussi publié en français: Le crime et la folie, Paris : G. Baillière, 1880, 4e éd., 297, [39] p. (Collection; Bibliothèque scientifique internationale; volume 8), copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, MRT General, K 5077 .M48 1880, usage restreint à la bibliothèque;

    "It would certainly be vastly convenient, and would save a world of trouble, if it were possible to draw a hard and fast line, and to declare that all persons who were on one side of it must be sane and all persons who were on the other side of it must be insane.  But a very little consideration will show how vain it is to attempt to make such a division.  That nature makes no leaps, but passes from one complexion to its opposite by gradations so gentle that one shades imperceptibly into another, and no one can fix positively the point of transition, is a sufficient trite observation.  Nowhere is this more true than in respect of sanity and insanity; it is unavoidable therefore that doubts, disputes and perplexities should arise in dealing with particular cases." (pp. 41-42)

McAULEY, Finbarr and J. Paul MacCutcheon, Criminal liability : a grammar, Dublin : Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell, 2000, lxxvi, 950 p., see Chapter 15, "Diminished Responsibility" at pp. 705-732, ISBN:  1858001552 (pbk.) and 1858000580 (hbk);

"Although it is commonly referred to as the defence of diminished responsibility, at least three different models of the plea can be identified: the minimalist, maximalist and mens rea models, respectively.  The minimalist model, which has its origin in Scots law, defines diminished responsibility as a kind of quasi-insanity.  The maximalist model, which is based on section 2 of the English Homicide Act 1957, takes the broader view that diminished responsibility consists of any mental abnormality that substantially impairs a defendant's responsibility for his actions, irrespective of whether or not it approximates to legal insanity.  The mens rea model, which was developed by the California Supreme Court, identifies diminished responsibility with the erosion through mental illness of the defendant's capacity to entertain the requisite malice aforethought for murder.  In what follows each of these models is considered in turn, with a view to exploring the case for adapting it to Irish conditions." (p. 706)

McCALL-SMITH, A., "Commentary: Exoneration of the mentally ill", (December 1987) 13(4) Journal of Medical Ethics 206-208;  copy at Ottawa University, R 724 .J68  Location: RGN Periodicals;
 

McCOLGAN, Aileen, "General Defences",  in Donald Nicolson and Llois Bibbings, eds., Feminist Perspectives on Criminal Law, London/Sydney: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 2000, xxx, 282 p., Chapter 8 at pp. 137-158, and see"Diminished responsibility" at pp. 140-141 and "Provocation and diminished reponsibility" at pp. 148-152, ISBN: 1859415261; copy at Ottawa University, FTX general, KD 7850 .F46 2000;
 

McSHERRY, Bernadette, "Premenstrual Syndrome and Criminal Responsibility", (1994) 1(2) Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 139-151;

___________"The Return of the Raging Hormones Theory: Premenstrual Syndrome, Post Partum Disorders and Criminal Responsibility", (1993) 15 Sydney Law Review 292-316, see on diminished responsibility, pp. 311-312;
 

MELAMED, Yuval, Roberto Mester, Jacob Margolin and Gal Levertuv, "The concept of severe mental disorder and the amended law of reduced punishment for murder", (2003) 22(2) Medicine and Law 259-266; copy at Ottawa University, RA 1001 .M423  Location: FTX Periodicals;

"According to the 1995 amendment 300a of the Israeli Penal Law 1977, punishment for murder may be reduced in cases where "a severe mental disorder" is present. As a consequence, psychiatrists are called upon to define the mental disorder and to assess its impact on the actions of the murderer. This constitutes a major challenge both for the courts and for forensic psychiatrists who are still in the process of learning the ramifications of this medico-legal issue. We suggest that, from the psychiatrist's point of view, the law be used only for people suffering from mental disorders which are very closely associated with psychotic mental illness." (source:  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov:80/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=12889645&dopt=Abstract, accessed on 4 October 2003)

MENDEZ, Miguel A., "Diminished Capacity in California: Premature Reports of its Demise", (1991) 3 Stanford Law & Policy Review 216-226; title noted in my research but article not consulted; no copy of this periodical in the Ottawa area libraries;
 

MICHELON, Maurice, Les demi-fous et la responsabilité dite atténuée,  Lyon : impr. de R. Schneider, 1905, 177 p.; thèse de droit, Université de Lyon, Faculté de droit, 1906; titre noté dans mes recherches mais livre non consulté; selon ma vérification du catalogue AMICUS effectuée le 19 septembre 2003, il n'y aurait pas de copie de ce livre dans les bibliothèques couvertes par ce catalogue;
 

MILTE, Kerry L., Aallen A. Bartholomew and Frank Galbally, "Abolition of the Crime of Murder and of Mental Condition Defences", (1975) 49 The Australian Law Journal 160-172, see on diminished responsibility, pp. 163-167; note: two colums per page;
 

MITCHELL, B., "Diminished Responsibility Manslaughter", (1997) 8 Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 101–117; copy at Solliciteur général Canada, Bibliothèque ministérielle et centre de référence / Solicitor General Canada, Ministry Library and Reference Centre, Ottawa; note: periodical now named: The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology; title noted in my research but article not consulted yet;
 

___________"Putting Diminished Responsibility into Practice: A Forensic Psychiatric Perspective", (1997) 8 Journal of  Forensic Psychiatry 620 to approx. 634; copy at Solliciteur général Canada, Bibliothèque ministérielle et centre de référence / Solicitor General Canada, Ministry Library and Reference Centre, Ottawa; note: periodical now named: The Journal of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology; title noted in my research but article not consulted yet;
 

MORICARD, Louis, De la responsabilité partielle ou atténuée en matière pénale, Paris : A. Rousseau, 1898, 103 p.; thèse pour le doctorat, Université de Paris, Faculté de droit;  titre noté dans mes recherches mais thèse non consultée; selon ma vérification du catalogue AMICUS effectuée le 14 octobre 2003, il n'y aurait pas de copie de ce livre dans les bibliothèques comprises dans ce catalogue couvrant le Canada;
 

MORRIS, Grant H., 1940-, The Insanity Defense: A Blueprint for Legislative Reform, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1975, xv, 133 p., see "Diminished Responsibility" at pp. 75-83, ISBN: 066900054X; copy at Ottawa University, FTX General: KF 9242 .M6 1975;
 

MORSE, Stephen J., "Craziness and Criminal Responsibility", (1999) 17(2) Behavioral Sciences and the Law 147-164;
 

___________"Diminished Capacity", in Joshua Dressler, editor in chief, Encyclopedia of crime & justice, 2nd ed., New York : Macmillan Reference USA, c2002,  4 v. (xxxvi, 1780 p.), in vol. 2, at pp. 528-553, ISBN : 002865319X (for the set of 4 volumes) and 0028653211 (for vol. 2 only);
 

___________"Diminished Capacity" in Stephen Shute, John Gardner and Jeremy Horder, eds., Action and Value in Criminal Law, Oxford: Clarendon Press,  1993 and 1996 (first paperback issue), x, 314 p. at pp. 239-247, ISBN: 0198258062 and 0198260792 (pbk.);
 

___________"Diminished Capacity: A Moral and Legal Conundrum", (1979) 2 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 271-298; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada;
 

___________“Diminshed Rationality, Diminished Responsibility,” (2003) 1(1) Ohio State Journal of  Criminal Law 289 to approx 308;  available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/pwagner/adhoc/spring2003/morse.pdf (accessed on 23 August 2003);
 

___________"Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity", (1984) 75 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 1-55; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada;
 

MOUSOURAKIS, George, Criminal Responsibility and Partial Excuses, Aldershoot (UK) and Brookfield (Vermont/USA): Ashgate Publishing Company, 1998, vi, 216 p., ISBN: 1855219433; see Table of Contents  for Chapter 5, "Cumulative Provocation and Diminished Responsibility" at pp. 155-175;
 

___________"Cumulative Provocation and Criminal Liability", (2000) 64 The Criminal Law Journal 332-338; Table of Contents: Reliance on Diminished Responsibility...334; Combined Defence of Provocation and Diminished Responsibility...336; Summary...338";

"Summary
Where there is no evidence suggesting that the accused was sufficiently provoked, or that she acted in the heat of passion as a result, as required for the provocation defence to apply, the accused may still be entitled to a partial defence on different grounds, such as diminished responsibility or a defence of extreme emotional disturbance.  If evidence suggests that the accused suffered from an abnormality of mind and was provoked, provocation and diminished responsibility may be pleaded together.  Such a combined defence may be accepted either on the basis of provocation or on that of diminished responsibility or, possibly, on both.  The latter should be the case where the requirements of both defences appear to be satisfied." (p. 338)

MUBARAK, Jill, compiled by, Diminished capacity : a bibliography of law review literature 1949 to date, Los Angeles : University of Southern California Law Center, 1979, 23 leaves (series; ASA V. Call Law Library. Bibliography series; no. 86); copy at McGill University, Nahum Gelber Law Library/Université McGill, Bibliothèque de droit Nahum Gelber; not consulted;
 

NÉRET, A., La responsabilité atténuée, thèse, Faculté de droit de Paris, Université de Paris, 1908, 177 p.;  titre noté dans mes recherches mais thèse non consultée; selon ma vérification du catalogue AMICUS effectuée le 13 octobre 2003, il n'y aurait pas de copie de cette thèse dans les bibliothèques comprises dans ce catalogue couvrant le Canada;
 

NETHERLANDS, The Dutch Penal Code / translated by Louise Rayar and Stafford Wadsworth ; in collaboration with Mona Cheung ... [et al.] ; revision by Hans Lensing ; introductions by Grat Van Den Heuvel and Hans Lensing, Littleton, Colo. : F.B. Rothman, c1997, xxiii, 276 p. (series;  The American series of foreign penal codes; volume 30); copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, K5001 A63 no. 30; see "Committal to a Psychiatric Hospital and Placement on an Entrustment Order", Article 37 to 38i, at pp. 66-72;
 

NEUSTATTER, W. Lindesay, "Psychiatric Aspects of Diminished Responsibility in Murder", (1960) 28 Medico-Legal Journal 92-101; copy at the Library of the Suprme Court of Canada, Ottawa;
 

NEW ZEALAND, Crimes Consultative Committee, Crimes Bill 1989 - Report of the Crimes Consultative Committee: Presented to the Minister of Justice, [Wellington], 1991, 123 p., ISBN: 0477076165, see pp. 48-49 (Chairman: Right Honourable Mr. Justice Casey); research note: there is no provision on diminished responsibility in the Crimes Bill 1989, but nevertheless, the Committee commented upon this defence;

"Clause 28 - Insanity ...

Two submissions on the bill raised the question of what should happen to offenders who are mentally disabled but not in such a way as to come within the definition of legal insanity [i.e., clause 28].  This is a major issue in itself, and one that needs to be revisited.  It is however not part of an exercise to review the Crimes Act.  Instead, we believe that the relevant provisions in the Criminal Justice Act 1985 need to be re-examined so as to make better provision for the appropriate disposition of convicted offenders who fall into the above category." (p. 17 and 19)

.......

"Diminished responsibility

This overview would be incomplete without some mention of the diminished responsibility defence in section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957 (UK).  Some submissions commented on section 2.  In essence, this defence provides that a person charged with murder is to be convicted of manslaughter, not murder, if he or she was at the time suffering from an abnormality of the mind arising from arrested development, inherent causes or disease or injury, and that abnormality resulted in substantial impairment of mental responsibility.

The case for the plea of diminished responsibility largely rests on the fact that, if there is a fixed sentence of life imprisonment for murder, there should be some way for the court to avoid the mandatory sentence in cases where there is evidence of mental disorder falling short of legal insanity.  Diminished responsibility is very much a device for untying the hands of the court in murder cases.

So far as we are aware, the issue of diminished responsibility has not been considered in New Zealand since 1961.  When the Crimes Bill of that year was being enacted the intention was to incorporate a diminished responsibility defence if the proposal to abolish capital punishment for murder was lost.  The clauses were however abandoned when the House voted in favour of abolishing capital punishment.

The operation of the defence in England has attracted criticism.  Terms such as 'substantial impairment' and 'mental responsibility' are extremely hard for medical witnesses to use as a yardstick.  Several commentators argue that the plea is used where sympathy for the defendant is evoked rather than in cases where there is some specific kind of mental disability.  In other words, the question becomes whether there are any mitigating circumstances.  That question is really too broad to be dealt with by way of a formal defence in a criminal trial.

The commentators also mention some technical issues.  For example, cases have apparently arisen where defendants who wanted to deny committing an offence have had to run the defence of diminished responsibility instead, for fear of receiving a mandatory life sentence for murder if their preferred defence did not succeed.

Clause 56 of the English Law Commission's draft code makes continued provision for a defence of diminished responsibility, which is not surprising as the draft also proposes to retain the mandatory life sentence for murder.  Under clause 56 the defence will succeed if at the time of the act the offender was suffering from 'such mental abnormality as is substantial enough reason to reduce his offence to manslaughter'.  This is a rather loose and subjective formulation.  It seems to us fairer and more consistent to allow matters of mitigation to be taken into account on sentence, as will be possible if the mandatory life sentence for murder is abolished.

In essence, our view of the position is that a range of matters can, in justice, amount to mitigating circumstances on a charge of homicide.  It is not useful to single out particular types of circumstances and elevate them into special defences.  In the case of the diminished responsibility defence, the difficulties involved in special treatment are exacerbated by complexities in achieving sufficiently precise wording for the statutory defence.

The appropriate disposition of mentally abnormal offenders who are not legally insane and are therefore convicted of offences is of course well beyond our brief.  The Committee has however commented under clause 28 on the desirability of re-examining this problem. " (pp. 48-49)

NEW ZEALLAND LAW COMMISSION, Battered defendants: victims of domestic violence who offend : a discussion paper, Wellington, N.Z. : The Commission, 2000, vii, 75 p., see "Diminished Responsibility" ar pp. 34-42 (series; Preliminary paper; number 41), ISBN: 1877187542 (pbk.); copy available at  http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/documents/publications/Pp41bd.pdf;

"109 DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY IS A PARTIAL DEFENCE.  It reduces liability for murder to manslaughter if the defendant was not legally insane at the time of the killing but was suffering from an abnormality of mind that substantially impaired his or her mental responsibility. The rationale for the defence is that if total mental incapacity absolves all blame, then serious mental incapacity short of total impairment should reduce culpability. Diminished responsibility is not a defence in New Zealand. It is a statutory defence in England,¹⁴¹ New South Wales,¹⁴² Australian Capital Territory,¹⁴³ Queensland,¹⁴⁴ Northern Territory,¹⁴⁵ Singapore,¹⁴⁶ the Bahamas,¹⁴⁷ Barbados,¹⁴⁸ Hong Kong¹⁴⁹ and in 14 states in the United States of America.¹⁵⁰ ...
------
¹⁴¹ Homicide Act 1957 (UK), s 2.
¹⁴² Crimes Act 1990 (NSW), s 23A.
¹⁴³ Crimes Act 1990 (ACT), s 14.
¹⁴⁴ Criminal Code 1961 (QLD), s 304A.
¹⁴⁵ Criminal Code (NT), s 37.
¹⁴⁶ Exception 7 to s 300 of the Penal Code (Singapore). A conviction for murder carries a mandatory death penalty in Singapore.
¹⁴⁷ Bahama Islands (Special Defences) Act 1959, s 2.
¹⁴⁸ Offences Against the Person Amendment Act 1973 (Barbados), s 3.
¹⁴⁹ Homicide Ordinance (Cap 339) (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the PRC), s 3.
¹⁵⁰ Susan Hayes “Diminished Responsibility: The Expert Witness’ Viewpoint” in Yeo (ed) Partial Excuses to Murder (Federation Press, Sydney, 1990) 145, 146." (p. 34)

NIVEAU, G., et E. Sozonets, "Criminal responsibility assessment in Switzerland: changes and continuity", (December 2001) 16(8) European Psychiatry 483-490; title noted in my research but article not consulted; no copy of this periodical in the Ottawa area libraries;

"BACKGROUND: The factors that experts use to assess criminal responsibility are not very well known. Changes in the importance attributed to certain diagnoses are occasionally mentioned in the literature. The aim of this study is to identify the existence and the nature of such modifications. METHOD: We compared the socio-demographic, criminological and psychiatric characteristics of two samples of psychiatric assessments carried out in Geneva, Switzerland in 1973-74 (N = 75) and 1997-98 (N = 94). RESULTS: The two groups of subjects described by the experts' reports appear to be quite different in several characteristics. However, the rate at which experts conclude their reports in favour of diminished responsibility was not found to be significantly different. The logistic regression shows that the diagnosis of personality disorder is the only variable that influenced the experts differently for the 1997-98 period compared to the 1973-74 period. CONCLUSION: In Geneva, psychiatric experts still continue to ascribe diminished responsibility to offenders suffering from psychosis or depression. However, the population that undergoes psychiatric assessments nowadays has changed considerably." (source:  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov:80/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed&list_uids=11777739&dopt=Abstract, accessed on 27 September 2003)

NORWAY, Penal Code, see sections 39, 44, 45 and 56 (available at  http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal_affairs/Legal_co-operation/Conferences_and_high-level_meetings/European_Public_Prosecutors/00_Norway_Penal%20Code.asp (accessed on 27 September 2003)
 

Notes, "Premeditation and Mental Capacity", (1946) 46 Columbia Law Review 1005-1012; copy at Ottawa University, KFN 5069 .C657  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

O'CONNOR, D. (Desmond) and P.A. (Paul A.) Fairall, Criminal Defences, 3rd ed., Sydney: Butterworths, 1996, xxxii, 328 p., see "Diminished Responsibility" at pp. 297-309, ISBN: 0409308463; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa, KF 9240 026 1996 c.01;
 

O'DOHERTY, Stephen, "Provocation and Diminished Responsibility: Sections 2 and 3 of the Homicide Act 1957", (2001) 165 Justice of the Peace and Local Government Law 776-780; 

O'DONOVAN, Katherine, "Defences fo Battered Women Who Kill", (1991) 18 Journal of Law and Society 219-240, see "Diminished Capacity" at pp. 229-230; copy at Ottawa University, HM 34 .B735, Location:  FTX Periodicals;
 

O'REAGAN, Robin S., "Dininished Responsibility Under the Queensland Criminal Code", (1978) 2 Criminal Law Journal 183-197; copy at Ottawa University, KTA 0 .C735  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

____________Essays on the Australian Criminal Codes, Sydney: The Law Book, 1979, xix, 152 p., see Essay VI, "Dimished Responsibility" at pp. 89-111, ISBN: 0455199558; copy at home;
 

ORTOLAN,  J.-L.-E. (Joseph-Louis-Elzéar), 1802-1873, Éléments de droit pénal; pénalité, juridictions, procédure, suivant la science rationnelle, la législation  positive et la jurisprudence avec les données de nos statistiques criminelles. 5. éd., rev. complétée et mise au courant de la législation française et étrangère par Albert Desjardins, 2 tomes, Paris: E. Plon, Nourrit,  1886, iii, 660 p. (t. 1) et 668 p. (t. 2); copie à l'Université de Sherbrooke, Québec;

"Altérations des facultés de l'âme quant à leur influence sur les conditions de l'imputabilité et de la culpabilité

1^o Suivant la science rationnelle.

    302.  Le développement graduel des facultés de l'âme, dont nous venons de traiter, ne se produit pas toujours en l'homme régulièrement, ou bien, une fois produit, ne se maintient pas toujours intact.  La loi assignée à chaque être dans la création semble dévier quelquefois de son cours ordinaire.  Sous l'empire de causes tenant elles-mêmes à des lois plus générales bien qu'ignorées, des irrégularités, des accidents se présentent.  Par combien de points les facultés de l'âme ne sont-elles pas susceptibles d'avorter, de s'affaiblir ou de se désordonner!  Combien de variété dans les causes, dans les effets, dans le degré de semblables altérations!

    Le criminaliste ne peut plus se borner ici aux enseignements de la psychologie et de la physiologie, qui font leur étude l'une de l'âme, et l'autre de la vie à l'état normal; il lui faut recourir à ceux de la médecine légale ou judiciaire, qui étudie dans l'homme les défectuosités ou les altérations dont il peut être frappé.

    303.  Est-ce à dire que la loi pénale doive entrer dans les détails, énumérer les diverses altérations mentales, au risque d'en ometrre plusieurs, suivre en cela la médecine légale, s'égarer ou se mettre en la bonne voie avec elle, donnant un caractère légal à des termes techniques variables et différemment entendus?  Non, évidemment.  Le législateur ne peut procéder ainsi.  Il doit poser une règle générale, prise au point de vue exclusif du droit, qui puisse comprendre tous les cas.  Ce sera ensuite à la jurisprudence à en faire, dans chaque cause, l'application.

    304. Cette règle générale est facile à asseoir: il suffit de se reporter que joue dans les conditions de l'imputabilité et de la culpabilité chacune des facultés de l'âme dont nous avons déjà donné l'analyse, et, suivant l'effet produit par la maladie mentale sur l'une ou l'autre de ces facultés, de tirer la conclusion.

   305.  Toutes ces sortes de maladies, en effet, n'atteignent pas de la même manière le moral humain.  Si on les observe avec sagacité et avec le secours de l'analyse, on parvient à distinguer que c'est tantôt la raison morale, ou, en d'autres termes, la connaissance du juste et de l'injuste, tantôt la liberté, quelquefois les autres parties de l'intelligence, ou bien la sensibilité, qui se trouvent principalement affectées, soit ensemble, soit séparément, quoique, à vrai dire, il y ait toujours inévitablement plus d'un lien psychologique de l'une à l'autre, parce que le scalpel de la science ne peut pas faire que le moral de l'homme cesse d'être un tout.

    306.  Si donc, par suite d'une quelconque de ces affectations mentales, l'agent s'est trouvé entièrement privé, dans son acte, soit de la raison morale, soit de la liberté, il n'y a plus d'imputabilité.

    Si ces deux facultés, sans être détruites, ont été amoindries dans leur exercice, ou bien s'il n'y a eu d'affectées principalement que les autres parties de l'intelligence, ou même la sensibilité, agent provocateur de notre activité, l'imputabilité reste, mais la culpabilité diminue, et cette diminution offrira du plus ou du moins, selon le degré de l'altération.

    307.  Enfin il est même possible, dans ce dernier cas, que, les conditions de l'imputabilté subsistant toujours, la culpabilité s'abaisse tellement qu'elle ne comporte plus l'application d'une peine publique et qu'il ne reste à la charge de l'agent d'autre obligation que celle de réparer le préjudice par lui causé.  Il y a alors culpabilité civile et non culpabilité pénale.

    308.  On voit par là que ce qu'il importe de savoir pour l'application du droit, ce n'est pas précisément si l'agent avait, au moment de l'acte, telle ou telle maladie mentale, mais plutôt quel a été l'effet produit par la maladie sur ses facultés.  L'agent a-t-il agi ayant sa raison morale, ou, en termes plus simples, la connaissance du bien et du mal?  A-t-il agi ayant la liberté morale?  Ces deux facultés, quoique existant en lui, n'ont-elles pas été, l'une ou l'autre, amoindries dans l'exercice qu'il a pu en faire?  N'y avait-il pas quelque affaiblissement ou quelque désordre dans les autres parties de son intelligence, ou bien dans sa sensibilité?  Et quelles étaient la nature et l'étendue de ces affaiblissements ou de ces désordres?  Voilà la question de fait à poser et à résoudre, afin d'en déduire les conséqunces de droit." (Tome1, pp. 131-133)

___________ "Diminished Responsibility -- The Position in Singapore" (1987) 16 Anglo-American Law Review 268-289; copy at Ottawa University, K 588 .A15 A535  Location:FTX Periodicals;
 

___________Diminished responsibility, with special reference to Singapore, Singapore : Singapore University Press, National University of Singapore, c1990, xvi, 287 p., ISBN: 9971691388;  title noted in my research but volume not consulted; according to my verification on 13 October 2003 of the National Library of Canada catalogue AMICUS, there is no copy of this work in Canadian libraries covered by AMICUS;
 

PERR, Irwin N., "Alleged Brain Damage, Diminished Capacity, Mens Rea, and Misuse of Medical Concepts", (1991) 36 Journal of Forensic Sciences 722-727; copy at Ottawa University, RA 1001 .J86  Location: RGN Periodicals;

"ABSTRACT: As focus on the insanity defense diminishes, defendants may place emphasis on a lack of knowing or purposeful in order to negate a criminal charge.  This use of a mens rea defense in accord with Model Penal Code principles is exemplified by the current New Jersey statute.  Such a defense may result in a lesser charge or a finding of not guilty.  In addition to reviewing applicable law, this report presents a sex offense case in which remote brain damage was invoked as a purported basis for incapacity to formulate the required intent; the study also raises the issue of the inappropriate or questionable use of medical principles, a practice that diminishes professional credibility in the courts and in the community." (p. 722)

POLAND, Penal Code, 1997;

"[Translation] Article 31. § 1. Whoever, at the time of the commission of a prohibited act, was incapable of recognising its significance or controlling his conduct because of a mental disease, mental deficiency or other mental disturbance, shall not commit an offence.

§ 2. If at the time of the commission of an offence the ability to recognise the significance of the act or to control one's conduct was diminished to a significant extent, the court may apply an extraordinary mitigation of the penalty.

§ 3. The provisions of § 1 and 2 shall not be applied when the perpetrator has brought himself to a state of insobriety or intoxication, causing the exclusion or reduction of accountability which he has or could have foreseen. (available at  http://www.era.int/domains/corpus-juris/public_pdf/polish_penal_code1.pdf, accessed on 26 September 2003)

PORTELLI, S., "La pratique de l’art 122-1 du nouveau code pénal [français]", in, sous la direction de, Claude Louzoun et Denis Salas, Justice et psychiatrie: normes, responsabilité, éthique, Ramonville Saint-Agne: ÈRES, 1998, 312 p., aux pp. 153-162 (Collection; Études, recherches, actions en santé mentale en Europe), ISBN: 2865865053; titre noté dans mes recherches mais article non consulté; aucune copie de ce livre dans les biliothèques de la région d'Ottawa selon ma vérification du catalogue AMICUS; copie à l'Université de Montréal, Bibliothèque de droit, GJFD J96 1998;
 

POWER, D.J., "Diminished Responsibility", (October 1967) 7(4) Medicine, Science, and the Law 185-191; copy at Ottawa University, RA 1001 .M49, Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

PRADEL, Jean, Droit pénal comparé, 2e édition, Paris: Dalloz, 2002, x, 803 p., voir, "La psychopathie" aux pp. 339-340, (Collection; précis -- droit privé), ISBN: 2247041108 ; copie à la Bibliothèque de la Cour suprême du Canada, K 5015.4 P73 2002 c. 01;
 

PREVERSER, Sidney, "The English Homicide Act: A New Attempt to Revise the Law of Murder", (1957) 57 Columbia Law Review 624-652, see "Diminished Responsibility", at pp. 636-642; copy at Ottawa University, KFN 5069 .C657  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

PRINS, Herschel A., "Diminished Responsibility and the Sutcliffe Case: Legal, Psychiatric and Social Aspects (A 'Layman's' View)", (1983) 23 Medicine, Science and the Law 17-24; copy at Ottawa University, RA 1001 .M49  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

PROAL, Louis, Le crime et la peine, 2^e édition, Paris : F. Alcan, 1894, xxxvi, 548 p.; disponible à  http://gallica.bnf.fr/scripts/ConsultationTout.exe?E=0&O=N076990 (visionné le 11 octobre 2003);

[p. 370]
    "FAIBLESSE D'ESPRIT, RESPONSABILITÉ ATTÉNUÉE. -- Pout tous les cas qui sont en dehors de l'alinéation mentale (2), le principe des circonstances atténuantes bien appliqué permet de tenir compte des différents degrés de responsabilité.  Ainsi, si la faiblesse d'esprit n'est pas accompagnée d'un état pathologique, la responsabilité peut être atténuée, sans être entièrement supprimée.  Dans ce cas, je comprends que le médecin-expert conclue à une responsabilité limitée, c'est-à-dire atténuée, et que la justice, appliquant au prévenu des circonstances atténuantes, abaisse la peine dans de fortes proportions.  Ce sont aussi les conclusions de M. Falret, qui ont été développées par M. Parant dans l'Encéphale (1880, p. 543). "Nous devons, dit ce dernier, réclamer l'exonération de tous ceux qui présentent les stigmates de la maladie, tares héréditaires, surexcitations anormales, idées délirantes, et d'une manière générale, tous les accidents qui relèvent de la pathologie mentale."  Mais, si le faible d'esprit ne présente pas les signes d'une disposition morbide, il doit être déclaré responsable, avec des circonstances atténuantes.  Dans l'affaire Menesclou, les experts MM. Lasègue, Brouardel et Motet, tout en trouvant l'intelligence de l'accusé limité, l'ont à bon droit déclaré responsable.  (Annales d'hygiène et de médecinelégale, 1880, p. 445.)  Si la justice, dans l'application de la peine, peut se montrer indulgente pour les faibles d'esprit, elle ne doit pas cependant pousser cette indulgence jusqu'à l'impunité.

    L'atténuation de la peine, dans les cas où la responsabilité est limitée, n'a pas paru suffisante au législateur italien.  Il vient d'édicter, par l'article 47 du nouveau code pénal, une disposition
------
...
(2) L'idiotie rentre dans la folie mentale; c'est un arrêt de développement de l'intelligence produit par des lésions encéphaliques (V. Leçons sur l'idiotie, par Aug. Voilu.; Ces lésions ont été aussi constatées par M. Luys.
 

[p. 371]
qui me paraît très dangereuse.  "Quand l'état d'esprit, indiqué dans l'article précédent, est de nature à diminuer grandement l'imputabilité, sans toutefois l'exclure, la peine établie pour le délit commis est diminuée conformément aux règles suivantes: (Suit dans les quatre premiers paragraphes de l'article 47 l'indication des diverses atténuations de la peine.)  "Mais, ajoute le dernier paragraphe, si la peine prononcée est restrictive de la liberté personnelle, le juge peut ordonner qu'elle soit subie dans une maison de garde, tant que l'autorité compétente ne révoquera pas cette mesure, auquel cas le reste de la peine sera subi suivant le mode ordinaire."  Si le prévenu a été suffisamment responsable pour être déclaré coupable, est-il admissible que le juge traite le condamné comme un malade et lui fasse subir sa peine dans une maison de garde, c'est-à-dire dans un asile?  Si l'accusé n'est pas suffisamment responsable pour subir une peine, si son état mental troublé exige un traitement, pourquoi commencer par le déclarer coupable?  Il faut l'acquitter.  À mon avis, il y a une contradiction manifeste entre la déclaration de culpabilité et l'internement dans une maison de santé.  Encore une fois, s'il y a doute sur la responsabilité du prévenu, acquittez-le et placez-le dans un asile spécial pour les aliénés dits criminels; mais, si vous le déclarez coupable, ne le traitez pas en malade: l'acquittement du prévenu, dont la responsabilité n'est pas démontrée, est infiniment préférable à une déclaration de culpabilité suivie d'un traitement.  Lorsqu'un prévenu est acquitté en cas de doute sur son état mental, les principes sont respectés, la distinction du crime et de la folie est maintenue.  C'est à l'accusateur à prouver la responsabilité, et, s'il ne fait pas cette démonstration, le doute profite à l'accusé.  Mais commencer par déclarer un accusé coupable, et donner ensuite au juge le pouvoir de lui faire subir sa peine dans un hôpital, c'est traiter le criminel en malade; c'est paraître donner raison à ceux qui assimile le crime à la folie, c'est faire douter de la justice de la sentence, c'est enlever à la peine le caractère d'intimidation, qui est un des éléments qu'elle doit avoir, puisque cette peine pourra être convertie en traitement.  J'ajoute que cette faiblesse prendra même un caractère d'inhumanité; car si, après sa condamnation, l'accusé est traité en malade irresponsable, on se demandera pourquoi la justice lui a infligé la flétrissure d'une condamnation."

QUICK, Oliver and Celia Wells, "Getting Tough with Defences"", [June 2006] The Criminal Law Review 514-525, and see on diminished responsibility, pp. 519-521;

QUINAT, Anne, Les demi-fous : étude historique sur la responsabilité atténuée et la circulaire chaumie, thèse médecine, Université de Paris 7, 1989; dir. de thèse: Jean-Marc Alby; titre noté dans mes recherches mais thèse non consultée; selon ma vérification du catalogue AMICUS effectuée le 14 octobre 2003, il n'y aurait pas de copie de ce livre dans les bibliothèques comprises dans ce catalogue couvrant le Canada;

RADOSAVLJEVIC, Dragana, "Some Observations on the Lack of a Specific Diminished Responsibility Defence under the ICC Statute", (2011) 19(1) European Journal of Crime Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 37-56;

RAMIREZ, Juan Bustos and  Manuel Valenzuela Bejas, Le système pénal des pays d'Amérique latine (avec référence au Code pénal type latino-américain), Traduit de l'espagnol par Jacqueline Bernat De Celis, Paris: Éditions A. Pedone, 1983, 159 p., voir les pp. 97-108, ISBN: 2233001184; research note: for an English translation of articles 19-22 of the Standard Penal Code for Latin America, see CANALS, supra;

[Code pénal type latino-américain]

    "ARTICLE 19. -- N'est pas imputable celui qui, au moment de l'action ou de l'omission, et pour cause de maladie mentale, d'un développement psychique incomplet ou retardé ou d'une grave perturbation de la conscience, n'aurait pas la capacité de comprendre le caractère illicite du fait ou de se déterminer conformément à cette compréhension.  Le tribunal ordonnera que l'agent soit soumis à une mesure de sûreté curative, sauf le cas d'une grave perturbation de la conscience sans base pathologique, auquel cas aucune mesure ne sera appliquée.
 

    ARTICLE 20. -- Lorsque l'agent, par l'effet des causes auxquelles se réfère l'article 19, ne possédait pas pleinement au moment de l'action ou de l'omission la capacité de comprendre le caractère illicite du fait, ou celle d'agir conformément à cette compréhension, il lui serra appliqué une peine non inférieure à un tiers du minimum ni supérieure à un tiers du maximum prévus par la loi pour le délit correspondant.

    Lorsque l'application d'une peine sera considérée préjudicielle au traitement adéquat de l'agent du fait de l'existence de causes pathologiques, il lui sera appliqué seulement une mesure de sûreté curative.  Dans les autres cas, il pourra lui être applioqué une peine diminuée, une mesure curative ou les deux, dans l'ordre que le juge indiquera.
 

    ARTICLE 21. -- Lorsque l'agent aura provoqué la grave perturbation de la conscience dont il est question à l'article 19, il répondra du fait commis, en raison du dol ou de la faute qui seront les siens par rapport à ce fait au moment où il se sera placé dans ledit état.

    La peine pourra être aggravée jusqu'à atteindre un tiers de l'échelle pénale correspondante lorsque la perturbation de la conscience aura été provoquée par l'agent pour faciliter la réalisation du fait ou pour se procurer une excuse.
 

    ARTICLE 22. -- La grave perturbation de la conscience occasionnée par l'absorption de boissons alcooliques sera régie par les dispositions des articles 19 et 20 lorsque l'absorption aura été accidentelle ou fortuite, et par l'article 21 lorsqu'elle aura été intentionnelle ou imprudente, ou qu'elle aura eu lieu pour faciliter la réalisation du fait ou pour se procurer une excuse.

    La peine ne sera pas atténuée pour le motif que l'agent n'aurait possédé que partiellement, au moment de l'action ou de l'omission, la capacité de comprendre le caractère illicite du fait ou de se déterminer conformément à cette compréhension, lorsque la perturbation de la conscience aura été occasionnée par l'absorption intentionnelle ou imprudente de boissons alcooliques ou dans le but de réaliser le fait ou de se procurer une excuse.

    Les dispositions du présent article et des trois précédents seront applicables quand la perturbation grave de la conscience proviendra de l'usage de substances stupéfiantes, hallucinogènes ou autres semblables." (pp. 99-100)

RANDOLPH, Rae, "The Diminished Capacity Defense for Battered Women: An Alternative Political Approach", (1984) 70(4) Women Lawyers Journal 23-30; copy at Ottawa University, KF 299 .W6 W64  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

RASCH, W., Rasch, W., "Criminal responsibility in Europe" in  Robert Bluglass and Paul Bowden, eds., Principles and practice of forensic psychiatry, Edinburgh: Churchill Livingstone, 1990, at pp. 299-305; copy at ICIST, Institut canadien de l'information scientifique et technique/CISTI, Canada, Institute for Scientific and Technical Information, RA1151 P957; title noted in my research but article not consulted yet;
 

ROBINSON, Paul H., 1948-, Criminal Law Defences, 2 vol., St. Paul (Minnesota): West, 1984,  see in vol. 1, § 101.  Murder -- Diminished Capacity (Partial Responsibility), at pp. 474-478 and in vol. 1, § 102.  Murder -- Provocation/Extreme Emotional Disturbance, at pp. 479-493, ISBN: 0314815139 (set);

[Contents of relevant parts]
"§ 101.  Murder -- Diminished Capacity (Partial Responsibility)
    Table of Subsections

Subsc.
(a) In General.
(b) Diminished Capacity Negating a Required Mental State
(c) Diminished Capacity as a Form of Partial Insanity." (vol. 1, p. 474)

--------

"§ 102.  Murder -- Provocation/Extreme Emotional Disturbance
    Table of Subsections

Subsc.
(a) In General.
    (1) Provocation.
    (2) Extreme Emotional Disturbance.
(b) Provocation. ...
(c) Extreme Emotional Disturbance...
(d) Overlap With Diminished Capacity, § 101(c).
(e) Sentencing Mitigation." (vol. 1, p. 479)

RODA, J. Cordoba, "L'imputabilité diminuée dans le droit pénal espagnol", (1967) 38 Revue internationale de droit pénal 17-36; no copy at Ottawa University, K 5012 .R47  Location: FTX Periodicals, as this volume is missing (verification of 6 October 2003); copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa;
 

ROE, David Ya’ir Ronen, Jossef Lereya, Shmuel Fennig, Silvana Fennig, "Reduced punishment in Israel in the case of murder: Bridging  the medico-legal gap",  (2005) 28 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 222-230;

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,17 July 1998, in force 1 July 2002, see Part III, General Principles of Criminal Law, available at  http://www.un.org/law/icc/ (accessed on 4 December 2002);

"Article 21
 Applicable law

1.    The Court shall apply:

(a)     In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence;

(b)     In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties and the principles and rules of international law, including the established principles of the international law of armed conflict;

(c)  Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court from national laws of legal systems of the world including, as appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with international law and internationally recognized norms and standards.

2.         The Court may apply principles and rules of law as interpreted in its previous decisions.

3.         The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights, and be without any adverse distinction founded on grounds such as gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race, colour, language, religion or elief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or social origin, wealth, birth or other status."
 

"Article 31
Grounds for excluding criminal responsibility

1.         In addition to other grounds for excluding criminal responsibility provided for in this Statute, a person shall not be criminally responsible if, at he time of that person's conduct:

(a)  The person suffers from a mental disease or defect that destroys that person's capacity to appreciate the unlawfulness or nature of his or her conduct, or capacity to control his or her conduct to conform to the requirements of law;

     ...

2.    The Court shall determine the applicability of the grounds for excluding criminal responsibility provided for in this Statute to the case before it.

3.   At trial, the Court may consider a ground for excluding criminal responsibility other than those referred to in paragraph 1 where such a ground is derived from applicable law as set forth in article 21. The procedures relating to the consideration of such a ground shall be provided for in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence."
 

___________"Draft Report of the International Meeting from 19 to 30 January 1998 in Zutphen, the Netherlands" in M. Cherfif Bassiouni, 1937-, compiled by, The Statute of the International Criminal Court : a documentary history, Ardsley, N.Y. : Transnational Publishers, c1998, xxii, 793 pp., at pp. 221-311, (document number: A/AC.249/1998/L.13, 1998), ISBN:1571050957; copy at the Library of Parliament, KZ6310 S72 (library Br.B.); available at  http://www.npwj.org/iccrome/cdrom/ (accessed on 15 December 2002);
 

___________"Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, vol. 1, (Proceedings of the Preparatory Committee during March-April and August 1996)", in M. Cherfif Bassiouni, 1937-, compiled by, The Statute of the International Criminal Court : a documentary history, Ardsley, N.Y. : Transnational Publishers, c1998, xxii, 793 pp., at pp. 385-439, (document number: G.A., 51 st Sess., Supp. No. 22, A/51/22, 1996), ISBN:1571050957; copy at the Library of Parliament, KZ6310 S72 (library Br.B.); available at  http://www.npwj.org/iccrome/cdrom/ (accessed on 15 December 2002);
 

___________"Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, vol. 2, (Compilation of Proposals)", in M. Cherfif Bassiouni, 1937-, compiled by, The Statute of the International Criminal Court : a documentary history, Ardsley, N.Y. : Transnational Publishers, c1998, xxii, 793 pp., at pp. 441-616 (document number: G.A., 51 st Sess., Supp. No. 22, A/51/22, 1996), ISBN:1571050957; copy at the Library of Parliament, KZ6310 S72 (library Br.B.); available at  http://www.npwj.org/iccrome/cdrom/ (accessed on 15 December 2002);

 
"[*97]   Article L
 Insanity/Diminished mental capacity

   Proposal 1

1.   A person is not  criminally  responsible [is  legally  insane]  if  at  the  time  of  that  person's conduct that (would otherwise) constitutes  a  crime,  the  person suffers from a mental  disease or mental defect that results in the person lacking substantial capacity either  to  appreciate the criminality  [unlawfulness] of  his  or  her conduct or  to  confirm  his  or  her conduct to the requirements  of the  law [,  and such  mental  disease or  mental  defect  caused  the  conduct
constituting a crime.]"

2.   Where a person does not lack substantial capacity of the  nature and degree mentioned  in paragraph 1,  but  such  capacity is  nevertheless substantially  diminished  at  the  time  of  the person's conduct, the sentence shall [may] be reduced."

[Note .  The question was raised whether this defence should be included.

The question was also raised whether a provision was required to  deal with  the  issue  of whether the accused is fit to stand for trial.  That provision might  be  included in  the chapter on trial/procedural rules.

The  question  was raised as  to  what should  happen to  a  person  who  is  found  insane. Should the  person be released or be  detained in  a mental  institution?    If the  latter,  where?  Should provision for this be made in the articles concerning enforcement of sentences by  the Court and States Parties?

It  was observed  that  this  defence might  be more relevant  for  some  crimes  (e.g.  a  war crime,  such  as  killing  of  a  prisoner  of war) than  for  others  (e.g.  crimes  involving  the formulation of  policy,  such  as  genocide).   If  the  defence is  included,  possibly  it  should  be available only for some types of crimes?]
 

   Proposal 2
   Mental disorders

1.      A  person who,  at  the  time  of the  facts,  was  suffering from a  mental  or  neuropsychic disorder that destroyed his judgement or his control over  his  actions  shall  not  be  criminally responsible.

2.      When  the  mental  or  neuropsychic disorder from which the  person was suffering at  the time  of the  facts merely  altered  his  judgement  or  impeded  his  control  over  his  actions without  destroying  such  judgement  or  control,  he  shall  remain  criminally  responsible.  However, the Court  shall  take such circumstances into  account in  determining  the  sentence and the regime under which it shall be served.
 (source:  http://www.npwj.net/cdrom/vol2/vol2_a.pdf, accessed, accessed on 14 October 2003)

ROSEN, Harold Edward, Notes, "Criminal Law: Defense of Insanity: Partial Responsibility: Adequacy of Present Law", (1957-58) 43 Cornell Law Quarterly 283-289; copy at Ottawa University, KFN 5069 .C676  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

ROSSI, Pellegrino, 1787-1848, Traité de droit pénal, deuxième édition revu et précédé d'une introduction par M. Faustin Hélie, 2 tomes, Paris: Guillaume et C^ie, Libraires, 1855; copie à la Bibliothèque de la Cour suprême du Canada;

    "Nous finirons par l'examen rapide de quelques questions importantes.

    La plus grave est, sans aucun doute, celle de la démence partielle, qu'on désigne sous le nom de mélancolie, de manie sans délire, de monomanie.  Y a-t-il une démence partielle?  Les actes qu'on appelle des actes de monomanie sont-ils des actes de démence.

    Il paraît que le fait d'une démence partielle ne peut être révoqué en doute: il a été observé de tous.  Les anciens criminalistes l'ont remarqué.  Ils ont reconnu qu'il pouvait y avoir absence de raison, de connaissance du bien et du mal relativement à certains objets, sans qu'il y eût pour tout le reste d'altération sensible dans l'exercice des facultés intellectuelles et morales.  Ce cas se présentant on doit lui appliquer les mêmes règles que nous venons de tracer pour l'appréciation de la folie complète.  Le jugement est plus difficile: mais les principes sont les mêmes.  Le point à vérifier est toujours la non conscience du bien et du mal relativement à l'acte en question.

    Mais de ce qu'il existe une démence partielle, il ne suit point de là que tous les actes sans motif connu soient des actes de démence, que leurs auteurs les aient faits en ayant perdu toute conscience d'eux mêmes et de la nature de leurs actions." (Tome II, p. 44)

ROUQUETTE, Théophile, Des excuses légales et des faits justificatifs en matière criminelle, Toulouse: Bonnal et Gibrac, 1866; disponible à http://books.google.com/books?vid=HARVARD32044103179586&printsec=titlepage#PPP5,M1 et  à http://books.google.com/books?id=D1kOAAAAYAAJ&source=gbs_summary_s&cad=0 1 et (vérifiés le 30 mai 2008);

RUSSIAN FEDERATION, Criminal code of the Russian Federation, Transl. by William E. Butler. Introd. by William E. Butler and Maryann E. Gashi-Butler, 3rd ed., London: Simmonds & Hill; The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer International, 1999, xxvi, 224 p., ISBN: 1898029407 (Simmonds and Hill) and 9041195025 (Kluwer Law International);  note: see also articles 97-104 on "Compulsory Measures of Medical Character";

"Article 21.  Non-Imputability

    1.  A person who during the commission of a socially dangerous act is in a state of non-imputability, that is, could not be aware of the actual character and social danger of his actions (or failure to act) or direct them as a consequence of chronic mental disturbance, temporary disturbance, feeble-mindedness, or other state of mental illness, shall not be subject to criminal responsibility.

    2.  Compulsory measures of a medical character provided for by the present Code may be assigned by a court to a person who has committed a socially dangerous act in a state of non-imputability provided for by a criminal law.
 

Article 22.  Criminal Responsibility of Persons With Mental Disturbance Not Precluding Putability

    1.  A putable person who during the commission of a crime by virtue of mental disturbance could not fully be aware of the actual character and social danger of his actions (or failure to act) or direct them shall be subject to criminal responsibility.

    2.  Mental disturbance not precluding putability shall be taken into account by a court when assigning punishment and may serve as grounds for the assignment of measures of a medical character." (p. 10)

RUTHERFORD, Timothy C. and Michael J. Bayuk, "People v. Wetmore and the 'Absurdity' of Totally Diminished Capacity", (1979-80) 3 Criminal Justice Journal 323-339; copy at Ottawa University, KF 9202 .C753  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

RYU, Paul Kichyun, 1915-,  "The New Korean Criminal Code of October 3, 1953.  An Analysis of Ideologies Embedded in It", (1957) 48 Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and  Political Science 275-295; also found as "Introduction" in The Korean Criminal Code, translated by Paul Ryu, South Hackensack (N.J.): F.B. Rothman, 1960,  x, 145 p., at pp. 1-29 (series; The American Series of Foreign Penal Codes, vol. 2); note that the comments of Ryu applies to the 175 German Penal Code;

 
"[p. 27] Regarding 'partial responsibility' as a basis for a reduction of

[p.28] punishment, the German law recognizes diminished responsibility in cases where the cognitive or volitional capacity of the actor is diminished due to the enumerated causes.⁵⁹  The punishment in such cases may be reduced, in the judge's discretion, in accordance with the provisions on attempted crime.  Persons who have committed a crime in a state of diminished responsibility are, if public safety requires, committed by the court to an institution for cure and treatment and such commitment is ordered in addition to the punishment.⁶⁰  This German solution is the result of a practical compromise between two opposing historical philosophies, the classic retributory theory of punishment and the positivistic reformative theory.  The former requires that in the case of a person whose cognitive or volitional capacity is diminished the punishment should be reduced, whereas the latter insists that such a person is more dangerous to society than a normal person and that consequently his punishment should be increased.⁶¹

    By contrast, the conception of partial responsibility has been rejected both in the British Commonwealth⁶² and in most American jurisdictions.⁶³  This writer believes that the Anglo-American careful approach to this problem is commendable.  The scope of punishment must be judged comprehensively on the basis of a sound theory applicable to the entire field of criminal law rather than resolved in a piecemeal manner.  A sample provision for reduction of penalty in cases of diminished responsibility tends to oversimplify this important basic issue of criminal legislation.

    The uncritical reception by the Korean Code of the continental European concept of diminished responsibility is regrettable.  The Code provides:⁶⁴

Where, due to mental disorder, a person is deficient in the powers mentioned in the preceding section, the punishment sahll be mitigated.

------
⁵⁹ Section 51(2)
⁶⁰ Section 42b.
⁶¹ Saleilles, Individualization of Punishment (Jastrow transl., 1911) 56 et seq.
⁶² Except murder in Scotland.  Royal Commission on Capital Punishment (1949-1953) Report, Cmd. 8932 (1953) at 131, 413.
⁶³ Fisher v. United States, 80 App. D.C. 96, 149 F 2d 28 (1945), affd., 328 U.S. 463 (1946).  For comment see Keedy, 'A problem of First Degree Murder': Fisher v. U.S., 99 U. of Penna L. Rev. 267 (1950).
⁶⁴ Article 10(2)
 

[p. 29] It is hoped that a future revision of the Code will re-examine this provision and consider the question of diminished responsibility in contact with the fundamental problem of responsibility in general." (pp. 27-29, "Introduction" in The Korean Criminal Code)
 

SALEILLES, R. (Raymond), 1855-1912, L'individualisation de la peine, étude de criminalité sociale, Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan 1927, x, 288 p., p. 76 et suivantes; also published in English / aussi publié en anglais: The individualization of punishment. By Raymond Saleilles, with an introduction by Gabriel Tarde; translated from the second French edition by Rachel Szold Jastrow; with an introduction by Roscoe Pound, Boston, Little, Brown, 1913, xliv, 322 p. (series; The modern criminal science series);
 

SALIZE, Hans Joachim and Harald Dressing, eds., Placement and Treatment of Mentally Ill Offenders -- Legislation and Practice in EU Member States, European Commission, Health and Consumer Protection Directorate-General, Central Institute of Mental Health, Research  Project, 2005, 238 p., ; available at  http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_projects/2002/promotion/fp_promotion_2002_frep_15_en.pdf at (accessed on 10 April 2008); important contribution;

SCOTTISH LAW COMMISSION, Discussion paper on insanity and diminished responsibility, Edinburgh: The Stationery Office, 2003, vii, 121 p. (series; discussion paper; number 122), ISBN: 0108880958; available at http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/downloads/dp122_insanity.pdf (accessed on 2 November 2004);
 

___________Report on Insanity and Diminished Responsibility, Edinburgh: The Stationery Office, 2004, ix, 92 p., ISBN: 0108881393; note: "SE/2004/92";     available at  http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/downloads/rep195.pdf (accessed on 2 November 2004);
 

SCHREIBER, Hans-Ludwig, "Definitions of Criminal responsibility and of psychological and Pathological Factors which May Mitigate or Exclude Such Responsibility", in Criminological Colloquium (7th : 1985), Studies on criminal responsibility and psychiatric treatment of mentally ill offenders : reports presented to the seventh Criminological Colloquium (1985),  Strasbourg : Council of Europe, 1986, 103 p., at pp. 27-45  (series;  Collected studies in criminological research; volume 24), ISBN:  9287108994; also published in French / aussi publié en français: Colloque criminologique (7me : 1985 : Strasbourg), Études sur la responsabilité pénale et le traitement psychiatrique des délinquants malades mentaux : rapports/ présentés au septième Colloque criminologique (1985), Strasbourg : Conseil de l'Europe, Comité européen pour les problèmes criminels, c1986, 109 p. (Collection; études relatives à la recherche criminologique; volume 24), ISBN: 9287108986; important contribution to the subject / contribution importante au sujet;

"The degree of mental disorder and diminished responsibility

    In all the European countries investigated for this study, mental disorder has to be severe to exclude criminal responsibility: In Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, France, Iceland, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Spain, Cyprus, Portugal and in Great Britain, where that is also true where diminished responsibility according to the Homicide Act is concerned.  Swedish law does not expressly focus on the severity of the mental disorder, but severity does matter for the choice of the adequate sanction that depends on the individual circumstances of the offender and the offence.

    All European countries have recognised that there are states of mental disorder that mitigate responsibility but that do not exclude it completely.  In some countries, the law does not expressly mention diminished responsibility: in Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway, but the problem has been seen, since the laws contain regulations governing the imposition of measures of security and treatment on responsible offenders, especially the order of confinement to a psychiatric hospital.  ....

    In other investigated countries, there are laws governing diminished responsibility.  According to them, offenders whose responsibility is diminished are subject to punishment and/or the imposition of measures of treatment and security: in the Netherlands (Article 37.a, Section 1, Dutch penal Code), Austria (Articles 21, Section 2, and 34, No. 1, Austrian Penal Code), Greece (Article 36, Greek Penal Code), Iceland (Article 16, Penal Code of Iceland), Portugal (Article 20, Section 2, Penal Code of Portugal), Italy (Article 89, Italian Penal Code), Switzerland (Article 11, Swiss penal Code), Spain (Article 9, Section 1, Spanish penal Code) and Germany (Article 21, German Penal Code).  In Belgium (Article 71, Penal Code), only punishment, but not hospital orders, are provided for offenders whose responsibility is diminished.

    There are two possible criteria for distinguishing between irresponsibility and diminished responsibility: the degree of mental disorder, which constitutes a distinction only in quantity to the so-called 'uniform approach', or the kind of mental disorder which constitutes a distinction in quality.  Greece, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Italy, Spain, Belgium, Portugal, Austria, Iceland and Germany use the 'uniform approach'. ....

    Norwegian law also distinguishes between diminished responsibility and complete irresponsibility in quality.  According to the penal Code of Norway, certain disorders such as unconsciousness due to wilful intoxication, temporarily reduced consciousness and underdeveloped or permanently impaired mental capacity, cannot exclude responsibility, but only represent cases of diminished responsibility.

    British law contains the notion of diminished responsibility only when connected with homicide, according to the Homicide Act (Part I, Section 2).  Under this Act, certain kinds of mental disorder reduce murder to manslaughter.  That evades mandatory life sentence.  The accused is to be convicted, and in the course of sentencing, the Mental Health Act can be applied, under confinement to a mental hospital can be ordered.  .  According to the Homicide Act, however, diminished responsibility requires a severe menral disorder.

    In Great Britain, the McNaghten Rules establish complete irresponsibility, but they apply only to a few kinds of mental disorder and confinement to a psychiatric hospital is mandatory.  In British practice, almost every mentally disordered offender is considered responsible, but after conviction in the course of sentencing, the Mental Health applies, under which a hospital order can be issued.  Whether the offender suffers from severe or minor mental disorder is therefore of no importance as far as conviction is concerned.   ...." (pp. 31-33)

SCHMITT, Mark S., "Criminal Law -- First Degree Murder -- Psychiatric Testimony Admissible on Issue of Intent [Hughes v. Matthews, 576 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1978)]", (1979) Wisconsin Law Review 628-660;
 

SEIBERT, Kevin, Comment, "Admissibility of Psychiatric Testimony in the Guilt Phase of Bifurcated Trials: What’s Left After The Reforms of the Diminished Capacity Defense?", (1984), 16 Pacific Law Journal305-333;  copy at Ottawa University, KFC 69 .P324  Location: FTX Periodicals; this periodical's name was changed to McGeorge Law Review in 1997;
 

SILVING, Helen, Criminal Justice, Buffalo: Hein and Rio Piedras (Puerto Rico): University of Puerto Rico, 1971, 2 volumes;

"THE NEO-CLASSICAL SCHOOL

    Both the utilitarian and the absolutist branches of the Classical School tended toward liberalism, though 'liberalism' did not necessarily convey exactly the same scope of meaning.  Kant's stress on 'man's dignity' led to the posutulate of utmost preservation of 'privacy' of the individual sphere, while Bentam's emphasis on 'utlity' and 'greatest happiness of the greatest number' led to the demand of substantive 'legality' and government responsible vis-à-vis the individual rather then dedicated to increasing state power.  On the other hand, the criminologically oriented 'positivist school of law' as will be seen, was concerned with society rather than the individual.  To protect 'society,' it did not shy away from delivering the individual into the hands of the benevolent Welfare State.

    Classic 'legality,' with its most important safeguard, nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, could not be preserved in its pure form in the face of the 'scientific' realization that retributive punishment -- 'just retribution' or 'atonement' -- is not necessarily preventive.  Especially the principle of nulla poena sine lege, which in early stages of revolutionary 'legality' meant that each crime type must carry an exact degree of punishment determined by the judge automatically in accordance with the terms of a general statute, had to yield ground, and psychological, sociological and economic variants became recognized as items of consideration in the theory of punishment.  This gave rise to the birth of the so-called 'Neo-classical School of Criminal Law Thought'.

    The 'Neo-classical School' rejects purely abstract inquiries into the unanswerable dilemma of free will versus determinism.  In practical terms, in the view of this school, freedom -- as applied to a criminal act -- is the power to resist the evil impulse; and this, in turn, is the strength of character that an individual possesses to fight his inherent instinct and passions.  The strength is relative.  Freedom is thus a matter of degree.  It varies with objective conditions as well as with the personality of the actor.  Thus, there is need to define in a penal code general circumstances of mitigation that would take account of these factors, reflecting the degrees of freedom enjoyed by the particular defendant.  Apart from the absolute line of demarcation between legal insanity and total responsibility as contemplated, e.g., by the French Penal Code, Art. 64 [démence], relative gradations of responsibiloity must be recognized .  Punishment scales, within which the judge is empowered to individualize punishment, and advocacy of diminished responsibility are the most characteristic postulates of this school.

    The most distinguished representatives of the 'Neo-classical School' are Rossi, Ortolan, Garraud, Leveillé and Reinhard Franck.  The impact of this school has been particularly reflected in the introduction into German, Swiss Federal and Italian Penal Codes of the conception of 'diminished responsibility.' "(vol. 1, pp. 99-100)
 

"Murder.
300. Except in the cases hereinafter excepted culpable homicide is murder — ...

Exception 7.
Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender was suffering from such abnormality of mind (whether arising from
a condition of arrested or retarded development of mind or any inherent causes or induced by disease or injury) as
substantially impaired his mental responsibility for his acts and omissions in causing the death or being a party to
causing the death." (available at  http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/ , accessed on 27 September 2003)
 

SLOVENKO,  Ralph, "Diminished Capacity Revisited", (2000) 21(1) American Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 19-56; copy at Ottawa University, RA 1001 .A43  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

___________Psychiatry and Criminal Culpability, New York: Wiley, c1995, xii, 436 p., see "Diminished Capacity at pp. 151-167, ISBN:  0471054259;
 

___________Psychiatry in law / law in psychiatry, New York : Brunner-Routledge, 2002, 2 volumes, xxviii, 1052 p., see "Diminished Capacity", volume 1,  at pp. 269-290, ISBN: 0415933365X (set of two volumes) and 0415933633 (vol. 1); copy at Ottawa University, RGN General, KF 8965 .S57 2002;
 

SMITH, T.B.(Thomas Broun), 1915-, "Diminished Responsibility", [1957] The Criminal Law Review 354-364; copy at Ottawa University, KD 7862 .C734  Location: FTX Periodicals; reprint with the title "Diminished Responsibility in ****** " in T.B. Smith, 1915-, Studies Critical and Comparative, Edinburgh, W. Green; New York, Oceana Publications, 1962, xxxvii, 324 p., at pp. 241-251; copy at Ottawa University, FTX General: KDC 296 .S65 1962;
 

SNEED, Joseph T., Comments, "Insanity as a Defense in Criminal Law and Semi-Responsibility", (1946-47) 25 Texas Law Review 295-302; copy at Ottawa University, KFT 1269 .T482  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

SNYMAN, C.R., A Draft Criminal Code for South Africa with a Commentary,  Cape Town: Juta, 1995, xl, 133 p., ISBN: 0702133345;

"Capacity

    3.1  (1) A person is not guilty of an offence unless he possesses criminal capacity at the time the conduct which forms the basis of the offence takes place.

    (2) 'Criminal capacity', as the term is used in subsection (1) and elsewhere in this code, means the ability of a person

(a) to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct; and
(b) to conduct himself in accordance with such an appreciation of the wrongfulness of his conduct.

Diminished capacity

    3.2  If a court convicts a person of an offence but finds that at the time of the commissiion of the offence the person's capacity

(a) to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct; and
(b) to conduct himself in accordance with such an appreciation of the wrongfulness of his conduct.

was diminished, the court may take the fact of such diminished capacity into account when sentencing him." (p. 6)

SOMMER, Gary O., "Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility: Irreconciliable Doctrines Confused in STATE V. WILCOX", (1982-83) 14 The University of Toledo Law Review 1399-1426; copy at Ottawa University, KFO 69 .U55  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

SOUTH AFRICA, South Africa, Commission of Inquiry Into the Responsibility of Mentally Deranged Persons and Related Matters, Report of the Commission of Inquiry Into the Responsibility of Mentally Deranged Persons and Related Matters, [Pretoria : Government Printer, 1967], [iv], 81 p., see chapter 8 (Chair: Rumpff) (series; report; 69/1967); title noted in my research but report not consulted; this report is widely known as the "Rumpff Report";
 

___________Section 78(7) of the Criminal procedure Act 51 of 1977;
 

SPARKS, Richard F., " 'Diminished Responsibility' in Theory and Practice", (1964) 27 The Modern Law Review 9-34; copy at Ottawa University, KD 322 .M62  Location: FTX Periodicals;

"THE concept of 'diminished responsibility,' which was introduced into English law by section 2 of the Homicide Act, 1957, had previously been a part of Scottish law for nearly a hundred years.  Similar provisions, though not always under this name, exist in many European and American legal systems; the essence of these laws is that they provide for mitigation of punishment in cases in which the accused is mentally abnormal in some way, though not insane.  In this essay I shall criticise the apparent theoretical basis of section 2 of the 1957 Act, and try to show that this law and others like it rest on the mistaken view of the relationship between mental disorder and criminal liability; and I shall argue that it is never appropriate to base mere mitigation of punishment on mental disorder." (p. 9; notes omitted)

SPARR, L.F.¸ (Landy F.),  "Mental defenses and posttraumatic stress disorder: assessment of criminal intent", (July 1996) 9(3) Journal of Traumatic Stress 405-425, see "Diminished Capacity" at pp. 408-410; copy at CISTI, Canada Institute for Scientific and Technical Information, Ottawa, MAIN Ser, RC552.P67 J86 / ICIST, Institut canadien de l'information scientifique et technique, Ottawa; title noted but article not consulted yet;
 

___________"Mental Incapacity Defenses at the War Crimes Tribunal: Questions and Controversy", (2005) 33(1) Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 59-70; available at http://www.jaapl.org/cgi/reprint/33/1/59 (accessed on 15 May 2006); copy at the University of Ottawa, RA 1151 .A43  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

SPENCE, Christopher, Should Victoria Introduce A Defence Of Diminished Responsibility?, LL.B. thesis, Monash University, 1981, 91 leaves;  title noted in my research but thesis not consulted; according to my verification on 13 October 2003 of the National Library of Canada catalogue AMICUS, there is no copy of this thesis in Canadian libraries covered by AMICUS;
 

SPENCER, J.R., "Intentional Killings in French Law, revised August 2005, in The Law Commission, The Law of Murder: Overseas  Comparative Studies, [London: HMSO, 2005], at pp. 66-74; available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/comparative_studies.pdf (accessed on 27 December 2005); 

SPENCER, Seymour, "Homicide, Mental Abnormality and Offence" in Michael Craft and Ann Craft, eds., Mentally Abnormal Offenders, London : Baillière Tindall, 1984, xiv, 490 p., at pp. 88-115 (Essay number 7), ISBN: 0702010030; copy at Ottawa University, MRT General: HV 6133 .M45 1984;
 

STEELMAN, E. Selene, "A Question of Revenge: Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy and a Proposed Diminished Capacity Defense for Homicidal Mothers", (2002)  8 Cardozo Women's L.J. 261-312; copy at Ottawa University, KF 477 .A15 C37, Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

STÉFANESCO, Michel N., De la Responsabilité partielle, Paris : A. Rousseau, 1901, 115 p.; thèse pour le doctorat, Université de Paris, Faculté de droit;  titre noté dans mes recherches mais thèse non consultée; selon ma vérification du catalogue AMICUS effectuée le 13 octobre 2003, il n'y aurait pas de copie de ce livre dans les bibliothèques comprises dans ce catalogue couvrant le Canada;
 

STEINBERG, Laurence, and Elizabeth S. Scott, "Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death penalty", (2003) 58(12) American Psychologist 1009-1018;
 

STEPHEN, Sir James Fitzjames, A History of the Criminal Law of England, London: MacMillan, vol. 2, 1883, vi, 497 p.;

"...  I understand by the power of self-control the power of attending to general principles of conduct and distant motives and comparing them calmly and steadily with immediate motives and with the special pleasure or other advantage of particular proposed actions.  Will consists in an exertion of this power of attention and comparison up to the moment when the conflict of motives issues in a volition or act.  Diseases of the brain and the nervous sytem may in any one of many ways interfere more or less with will so understood.  They may cause definite intellectual error, and if they do so their legal effect is that of other innocent mistakes of fact.  Far more frequently they affect the will be either destroying altogether, or weakening to a greater or less extent, the power of steady calm attention to any train of thought, and especially to general principles, and their relation to particular acts.  They may weaken all the mental faculties, so as to reduce life to a dream.  They may act like a convulsion fit.  They may operate as resistible motives to an act known to be wrong.  In other words, they may destroy, they may weaken, or they may leave unaffected the power of self-control.

    The practical inference from this seems to me to be that the law ought to recognize these various defects of madness.  It ought, where madness is proved, to allow the jury to return any one of three verdicts: Guilty; Guilty, but his power of self-control was diminished by insanity; Not guilty on the ground of insanity." (pp. 174-175)
 

STOCKLY, Edwin W., Comments, "Mental Disorders and Criminal Responsibility: The Recommendations of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment", (1955) 33 Texas Law Review 482-498, see "The Doctrine of Partial Responsibility", at pp. 492-495; copy at Ottawa University, KFT 1269 .T482  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

SUBOTNIK, Eva E., "Past Violence, Future Danger?  Rethinking Diminished Capacity Departures under Federal Sentencing Guidelines Section 5K2.13", (2002) 102 Columbia Law Journal 1340-1372;
 

SUISSE, Code pénal; disponible à  http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/c311_0.html (visionné le 14 septembre 2003);

"Art. 10
2. Responsabilité.
Irresponsables

N’est pas punissable celui qui, étant atteint d’une maladie mentale, de faiblesse d’esprit ou d’une grave altération de la conscience, ne possédait pas, au moment d’agir, la faculté d’apprécier le caractère illicite de son acte ou de se déterminer d’après cette appréciation. Les mesures prévues aux articles 43 et 44 sont réservées.
 

Art. 11
Responsabilité
restreinte

Le juge pourra atténuer librement la peine (art. 66), si, par suite d’un trouble dans sa santé mentale ou dans sa conscience, ou par suite d’un développement mental incomplet, le délinquant, au moment d’agir, ne possédait pas pleinement la faculté d’apprécier le caractère illicite de son acte ou de se déterminer d’après cette appréciation.  Les mesures prévues aux articles 42 à 44 et 100bis sont réservées.
 

Art. 12
Exception

Les dispositions des articles 10 et 11 ne seront pas applicables si l’inculpé a provoqué lui-même la grave altération ou le trouble de la conscience dans le dessein de commettre l’infraction."
 

"Summary: This article discusses two issues concerning the taking of intoxicants and the availability of a defence of diminihed responsibility.  First it examines the position of persons addicted to the intoxicant and critically analyses the current basis on which any resulting intoxication may be regarded as a condition substantially impairing responsibility within section 2 of the Homicide Act 1957.  Next it examines how, for non-addicted persons, the taking of intoxicants may lead to the failure of a defence of diminished responsibility that, absent intoxicants, may have succeeded on the basis of other factors inherent to the accused." (p. 156)

SULLIVAN, J. Thomas, "The Culpability, or Mens Rea, 'Defense' in Arkansas", (2000) 53 Arkansas Law Review 805-884; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa;
 

SUMIEN, Paul, "Essai sur la théorie de la responsabilité atténuée de certains criminels", (1897) 26 Revue critique de législation et de jurisprudence 451-463; copie à la Bibliothèque de la Cour suprême du Canada (à noter que ce périodique est hors séquence dans l'ordre alphabétique de disposition des périodiques; il est à quelques périodiques après sa place normale); important contribution to the subject / contribution importante au sujet;
 

Survey of Maryland Court of Appeal Decisions, Criminal Law and Procedure, "Johnson v. State -- Diminished Capacity Rejected as a Criminal Defense", (1983) 42 Maryland Law Review 522-536; copy at Ottawa University, KFM 1269 .M358  Location, FTX Periodicals;
 

SWEEDEN, Penal Code, available in English at  see http://justitie.regeringen.se/propositionermm/ds/pdf/Penalcode.pdf;

"Chapter 29
On the Determination of Punishment and Exemption from Sanction ...

Section 3
In assessing penal value, the following mitigating circumstances shall be given special consideration in addition to what is prescribed elsewhere, if, in a particular case:

1. the crime was occasioned by the grossly offensive behaviour of some other person,
2. the accused, in consequence of a mental disturbance or emotional excitement, or for some other cause, had a markedly diminished capacity to control his actions,
3. the actions of the accused were connected with his manifestly deficient development, experience or capacity for judgement,
4. the crime was occasioned by strong human compassion or
5. the act, without being free from criminal responsibility, was such as is covered by Chapter 24.

The sentence imposed may be less severe than that prescribed for the crime in question if this is called for having regard to the
penal value of the crime. (Law 1994:458)"

TADROS, Victor, "Insanity and the Capacity for Criminal Responsibility", (2001) 5 Edinburgh Law Review 325-354;  title noted in my research but article not consulted; no copy of this periodical in the Ottawa area libraries covered by the AMICUS catalogue of Library and Archives Canada (verification of 14 May 2005);
 

___________"The Scots Law of Murder", September 2005, in The Law Commission, The Law of Murder: Overseas  Comparative Studies, [London: HMSO, 2005], at pp. 87-105; available at http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/comparative_studies.pdf (accessed on 27 December 2005);   

TAYLOR, Herman Leroy", "Partial Insanity as Affecting the Degree of Crime -- A Commentary on Fisher v. United States", (1946) 34 California Law Review 625-646; copy at Ottawa University, KFC 69 .C335  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

TENNANT, Edward E., Diminished responsibility manslaughter : the on-going case disposal dilemma, London: Minerva Press, 1995, xxiii, 727 p., ISBN:  1858631777; title noted in my research but thesis not consulted; according to my verification on 10 October 2003 of the National Library of Canada catalogue AMICUS, there is no copy of this work in Canadian libraries covered by AMICUS;
 

___________The future of the diminished responsibilty defence to murder, Chichester: Barry Rose Law Publishers, 2001, xxxi, 375 p., ISBN: 1200268120; contents:  "Ch. 1. The Accession of the Doctrine of Diminshed Responsibility into the Law of England and Wales; Ch. 2. The Practical Application of the Doctrine of  Diminished Responsibility in England and Wales;  Ch. 3. Objectives, Illustrations and Disposals; Ch. 4. The Material, the Host Factors and the Frequencies; Ch. 5. The Cross-Tabulation of the "Case Disposal" and the "Mental Problem" Variables; Ch. 6. Discussion; Ch. 7. Conclusions -- App. The Original Host Factors Isolated" (source: National Library of Canada catalogue); title noted in my research but book not consulted yet; no copy in the Ottawa area libraries;
 

___________"The Influence of Expert Medical Evidence in the Diminished Responsibility Defence to a Charge of Murder", (22 April 2000) 164(17) Justice of the Peace 319-322; not at Ottawa University; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa;
 

THIERRY, Henry, De la responsabilité atténuée, étude médico-légale, 1891, 240 p.; copy at McGill University, Osler library; titre noté dans mes recherches mais thèse pas encore consultée;
 

THORPE,  Andrew J., and  Donald E. Baumeister, "The Death Of Diminished Capacity And The Birth Of Diminished Actuality: A Recent California Review", (1991) 12(2) American Journal of Forensic Psychiatry 49-68; copy at Ottawa University, RA 1001 .A43  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

TIFFANY, Lawrence P. and Mary Tiffany, The legal defense of pathological intoxication : with related issues of temporary and self-inflicted insanity, New York : Quorum Books, 1990, xviii, 542 p., see Chapter 9, "Diminished Capacity and 'Extreme Mental and Emotional Disturbance' as Defense Theories for Pathological Intoxication", at pp. 347-370, ISBN : 0899305482;
 

TOLMIE, Julia, "Intoxication and Criminal Liability in New South Wales: - A Random Patchwork?",  (1999) 23 Criminal Law Journal 218-237, see on diminished responsibility, pp. 234-235;  refers to a new provision on diminished responsibility in 1997 (new s. 23A of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW));
 

TROTT, Ronald J., Commentary "Diminished responsibility and the drug scene", (1992) 87 British Journal of Addiction 189-192;
 

TURKEY / TURQUIE,  The Turkish criminal code / With an introduction by Nevzat Gürelli, South Hackensack, N.J. : Fred B. Rothman, c1965, xviii, 190 p. (Collection; The American series of foreign penal codes; volume 9), xvii, 190 p.; copy at the Library of the Suprme Court of Canada, Ottawa, K5001 A63 no. 9;

"47.  The punishment to be imposed upon a person who, at the time of commission of the act, was afflicted with mental disease which diminished his consciousness or his freedom of action in a considerable degree shall be reduced in the following manner:

1.  the punishment of death shall be reduced to heavy imprisonment of not less than fifteen years;

2.  life imprisonment shall be reduced to heavy imprisonment of fifteen to nineteen years; and,

3.  permanent disqualification to hold public office shall be reduced to temporary disqualification to hold public office.

Other punishments shall be reduced by one third to one half." (p. 28)

___________Code pénal turc de 1926, traduction de Kutbi Akkan avec mise à jour de Nissim Franco avec une notice spéciale sur ce code par Marc Ancel avec la collaboration de Yvonne Marx, dans Les Codes pénaux européens, Tome IV, Paris: Centre français de droit comparé, 1971, aux pp. 2107-2227  (Nouvelle Collection du Comité de législation étrangère et de droit international);

"ART.  47. -- La personne dont la conscience et la liberté d'action, au moment de la commission de l'acte, se trouvent, par suite d'une infirmité mentale, amoindries dans une grande proportion, aura la peine prévue réduite comme suit :

1^o  à la peine de mort seront substitués quinze ans de réclusion au moins;

2^o  à la réclusion à perpétuité seront substitués de dix à quinze ans de réclusion;

3^o  à l'interdiction à perpétuité d'exercer des fonctions publiques sera substituée l'interdiction à temps.

Les autres peines seront réduites d'un tiers à la moitié." (p. 2120)

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA LAW SCHOOL, News & Events, "Criminal Law Needs a Generic Excuse for Compromised Rationality, Morse Argues", posted 7 May 2003; availabble at  http://www.law.virginia.edu/home2002/html/news/2003_spr/morse.htm (accessed on 1 October 2003);

"Criminal law should include a new doctrinal excuse that would apply to all crimes committed by someone whose rationality is diminished, University of Pennsylvania Law Professor Stephen J. Morse said in the 10th P. Browning Hoffman Memorial Lecture in Law and Psychiatry April 22.

The new doctrine would acknowledge the diminished responsibility of those whose rationality is compromised, Morse said, and be applied case-by-case by judges and juries. It would reduce pressure to widen the insanity defense and dampen the invocation of new syndromes to help partially excuse someone of responsibility for a crime. Morse's idea is laid out in an article forthcoming in the Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law.

...

Morse proposed that the three verdicts now possible—guilty, not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity—should add a fourth: guilty but partially responsible. It  would require defendants to show, first, that their capacity for rationality was substantially diminished at the time of the crime by a mental or emotional illness for which the defendant was not responsible and, second, that this diminished rationality affected his or her conduct. The excuse would not apply in cases where the defendant could be shown to be culpable for his condition, such as in cases where someone stops taking a prescribed medication or uses illegal drugs. Stress, grief, fatigue and low intelligence could be other causes of non-culpable impairment, he also suggested."

VAN DER LANDEN, D., "Résolutions votées lors des congrès de l'Union internationale de droit pénal (Ordre chronologique)", (1990) 61 (1-2) Revue internationale de droit pénal / International Review of Penal Law 341-353;

"CONGRÈS DE HAMBOURG (12-14 septembre 1905)
 [...]

Question 3 -- Du traitement à appliquer aux délinquants à responsabilité atténuée.

1) Pour les défectueux (à responsabilité atténuée par influences d'ordre intrinsèque), délinquants ou non, qui sont dangereux pour eux-mêmes, pour leur milieu ou pour la société, le législateur doit décréter des mesures de sauvegarde (surveillance spéciale, asiles de sûreté et autres); 2) pour les défectueux délinquants, dangereux ou non, il y a lieu d'instituer une peine spéciale ou un traitement spécial." (p. 351)
 

WADDELL, Christopher William, Comment, "Diminished Capacity and California's New Insanity Test", (1979) 10 Pacific Law Journal 751-771; copy at Ottawa University, KFC 69 .P324  Location: FTX Periodicals; this periodical's name was changed to McGeorge Law Review in 1997;
 

WALL, Dr. Barry W., "Criminal Responsibility, Diminished Capacity, and the Gay Panic Defense", (2000) 28(4) The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 454-459;
 

WALKER, Nigel, Aggravation, Mitigation and Mercy in English Criminal Justice, London: Blackstone, 1999, xxvii, 270 p., ISBN: ISBN:  185431943469; title noted in my research but no copy of this book in the Ottawa area libraries according to my verification of the National Library of Canada catalogue AMICUS on 13 October 2003;
 

___________"Butler v. The CLRC and Others", [1981] The Criminal Law Review 596-601, see "the extension of diminished responsibility" at p. 597;
 

___________Crime and Insanity in England, vol. 1, Edinburgh, 1968, see Chapter 8, "Diminished Responsibility in Scotland", at pp. 138-146 and Chapter 9, "Diminished Responsibility Imported", at pp. 147-164;
 

WASIK, Martin, "Codification: Mental Disorder and Intoxication Under the Draft Criminal Code" (1986) 50 Journal of Criminal Law 393-404, see diminished responsibility at pp. 402-404;
 

___________"Partial Excuses in Criminal Law", (1982) 45 Modern Law Review 516-533; copy at Ottawa University, KD 322 .M62  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

WEIFOHEN, Henry and Winfred Overholser, "Mental Disorder Affecting the Degree of a Crime", (1946-47) 56 Yale Law Journal 959-981; copy at Ottawa University, KFC 3669 .Y34  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

WEIFOHEN, Henry, "Partial Insanity and Criminal Intent", (1929-30) 24 Illinois Law Review 505-527; copy at Ottawa University, KFI 1269 .I55  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

WEINSTOCK, R., G.B. Leong, and J.A. Silva , "California's diminished capacity defense : evolution and transformation", (1996) 24(3) Bulletin of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 347-366; copy at the National Library of Canada; Ottawa University, RA 1151 .A43  Location: FTX Periodicals has this periodical but this particular number is missing; article not consulted;

"[Abstract] Diminished capacity survives in California as a severely attenuated mens rea defense known as diminished actuality.  Some other states have similar limited strict mens rea defenses. The lost advantages of California's former expanded concept of diminished capacity are reviewed. As opposed to the all-or-none insanity defense, mens rea defenses permit the trier of fact to find gradations of guilt but are generally inapplicable unless the elements of a crime are redefined to permit consideration of motivational aspects, as California had done. The change from diminished capacity to a diminished actuality defense was a return to the complex, somewhat artificial legal concept of intent and a resurrection of confusing and antiquated common law definitions. The change was made in response to an unpopular jury verdict and a political climate in which little interest existed or still exists for understanding the reasons behind the commission of any crime. Some of the later restrictions imposed by the California Supreme Court on allowing voluntary intoxication to reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter logically should not apply to mental illness. Knowledge of the complex mens rea issues and the various relevant current defenses is essential for any forensic psychiatrist evaluating defendants in jurisdictions in which such defenses are admissible." (source:  http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=retrieve&db=pubmed&list_uids=8889134&dopt=Abstract, accessed on 14 October 2003)

WERLE, Gerhard, in cooperation with Florian Jessberger, Wulf Burchards, Volker Nerlich and Belinda Cooper, Principles of International Criminal Law, The Hague: TMC Asser Press, c2005, xii, 485 p., and see "Mental Disease or Defect",  pp. 157-158, ISBN: 9067041963 and 9067042021 (pbk.); copy at the University of Ottawa, FTX General, K5000 .W47 2005;
 

WHITLOCK, F.A., Criminal Responsibility and Mental Illness, London: Butterworths, 1963, viii, 156 p., see Diminished Responsibility" at Chapter 7, pp. 94-108; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, KF 9242 W45;
 

WILLIAMS, C.R., "Development and Change in Insanity and Related Defences", (2000) 24 Melbourne University Law Review 711-736, see in, particular, p. 723;

"[Abstract]  Developments in insanity and the related defences of automatism and substantially impaired responsibility over the course of the century are reviewed.  The origin and development of automatism as a response to the restrictions of the insanity defence is explained, and the continuing relevance of the defences of automatism and substantially impaired responsibility in jurisdictions in which judges have discretion to sentence for murder is questioned.  Legislative changes to the law of insanity are explained and the relationship between mental state defences and civil commitment is considered.  It is suggested that more flexible approaches to the disposition of persons found not guilty by reason of insanity or mental impairment are to be welcomed and that in the future the distinction between persons who have been found not guilty by reason of insanity and persons who have been civilly committed should be regarded as of less significance." (p. 711)

WILLIAMS, Glanville, 1911-, "Diminished Responsibility", [1960] 1 Medicine, Science and the Law 41-53; volume missing at Ottawa University and at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada; article not read;
 

___________Textbook of Criminal Law, 2nd ed., London : Stevens, 1983, xlvii, 1007 p., see "Provocation and Mental Disorder" at pp. 544-545 and "Diminished Responsibility", chapter 30, at pp. 685-696, ISBN: 0420468501 ; 0420468609 (pbk.);
 

WOLF, Deborah D., "Criminal Law -- Diminished Capacity Defense Limited to Specific Intent Crimes Having Lesser Included Offenses -- State v. Doyon 416 A. 2d 130 (R.I. 1980)", (1980) 15 Suffolk University Law Review 639-649; copy at Ottawa University, KFM 2469 .S84  Location: FTX Periodicals;
 

WOOTON OF ABINGER, Barbara F., 1897-, Crime and the Criminal Law, 2nd ed., London: Stevens and Sons, 1981, xii, 119 p., see Chapter 3, "The Problem of the Mentally Abnormal Offender", at pp. 65-86 and "Postcript to Chapter 3", at pp. 87-93; copy at Ottawa University, FTX General, HV 7343 .W6 1981;
 

___________"Diminished Responsibility.  A Layman's View", (1960) 76 The Law Quarterly Review 224-239; copy at Ottawa University, KD 322 .L37  Location: FTX Periodicals; note: "This is the Seventh Biennial Lecture in Criminal Science, deliverered at Cambridge on February 12, 1960, under the auspices of the Institute of Criminology" (p. 224)
 

WRIGHT, Fran, "Does New Zealand Need a Diminished Responsibility Defence?", (1998) 2 Yearbook of New Zealand Jurisprudence 109-129; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, KF 178 Y43 1998;
 

YEO, Stanley, "Commonwealth and International perspectives on the insanity defence", (February 2008) 32(1) Criminal Law Journal 7-17, and see "Diminished Responsibility", at pp. 15-16;

___________"Improving the Determination of Diminished Responsibility Cases", [1999] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 27-47; copy at Ottawa University, KQB 0 .S55  Location: FTX Periodicals; available at http://law.nus.edu.sg/sjls/articles/SJLS_Art4_Jul99.pdf(accessed on 6 October 2003);

"This study of Singaporean cases on diminished responsibility reveals that our judges have generally dealt with the elements of the defence in a haphazard manner. Furthermore, they have placed too much reliance on medical expert opinion. The submission is made that a close adherence to the model formulated by the English case of R  v Byrne  for determining diminished responsibility cases will considerably improve the judicial handling of such cases in our jurisdiction." (p. 27)

___________Editorial, "In Favour of Diminished Responsibility", (1999) 23 Criminal Law Journal 65-68; copy at Ottawa University, KTA 0 .C735  Location:  FTX Periodicals;
 

___________"Intoxication and Mental Disorder Defences", (2004) 16 Singapore Academy of Law Journal 488-500, and see "Intoxication and the Defence of Diminished Responsibility", at pp. 497-499;
 

___________"Partial Defences to Murder in Australia and India: Provocation, Diminished Responsability and Excessive Defence", being Appendix A in The Law Commission, Overseas Studies, which is part of the Appendices to the consultation paper, Partial Defences to Murder, 31 October 2003, xiii, 249 p. (series; consultation paper; number 173); this study by Yeo, at pp. iii-vi and 1-72  is available at  http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/files/cp173apps.pdf (accessed on 27 April 2005); see also Appendix G, "Relevant Statutory Provisions and Proposed Provisions";
 

___________"Reformulating Diminished Responsibility: The New South Wales Experience", (1999) 20 Singapore Law Review 159-176; article not consulted; no copy of this periodical available in the Ottawa area libraries, according to my verification of the National Library of Canada catalogue AMICUS, on 13 October 2003;
 

ZEEGERS, Michael, "Diminished Responsibility: A Logical, Workable and Essential Concept", (1981) 4 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 433-444; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada;
 

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