Bibliography on Authority of the Law / Bibliographie sur l'autorité de la loi

Key Words / Mots clés : ordre de la loi, permission de la loi

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updated and corrections / mise à jour et corrections: 4 April 2010

©by / par François Lareau, 2007, Ottawa, Canada
First posted on the internet on 26 October 2007

Selected Bibliography on Authority of the Law
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Bibliographie choisie sur l'autorité de la loi

I- Canadian Law / Droit canadien

BOURQUE, Sophie (Mme la juge), "Les moyens de défense", dans Barreau du Québec, École, Droit pénal: Infractions, moyens de défense et peine, Cowansville: Éditions Yvon Blais, 2007, aux pp. 175-207, et voir la "défense des personnes autorisées a) Les personnes qui appliquent la loi", aux pp. 193 -194 (Collection; Collection de droit 2007-2008; vol. 12), ISBN: 9782896350322; copie à la Bibliothèque de la Cour suprême du Canada, KF 385 ZB5 C681 v. 12 1007-08;

    "L'article 25 C.cr.¹⁶⁹ édicte qu'une personne qui, par la loi, est autorisée ou obligée à faire quoi que ce soit dans l'exécution ou l'application de la loi, est justifiée, si elle s'appuie sur des motifs raisonnables, à utiliser la force nécessaire à l'exécution de ses fonctions¹⁷⁰.

    Bien qu'on pense surtout aux agents de la paix et que souvent l'utilisation de leurs pouvoirs a fait couler beaucoup d'encre, cette disposition s'applique à toute personne autorisée par la loi à appliquer ou à administer la loi. Ainsi, le citoyen qui procède à une arrestation en vertu de l'article 494 C. cr., le gardien de sécurité dans un magasin à rayons¹⁷¹, un préposé aux bénéficiaires¹⁷² ou les gardiens de prison¹⁷³ sont toutes des personnes visées par les articles 25 et suivants C.cr.

    Il y a donc trois éléments nécessaires pour la justiication de l'utilisation de la force: premièrement, il faut que la personne soit autorisée à agir; deuxièmement, il faut qu'elle s'appuie sur des motifs raisonnables et, troisièmement, elle ne peut utiliser que la force nécessaire¹⁷⁴.
[...]
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169. Notons que la Cour suprême dans l'affaire R. c. Finta, [1994] 1 R.C.S. 701, EYB 1993-67654, a décidé que l'article 25 C.cr. ne permettait pas la défense d'obéissance à un ordre d'un supérieur lorsqu'une personne raisonnable aurait su que les gestes qu'elle posait constituaient un crime contre l'humanité ou un crime de guerre.

170. Notons que le Code criminel, auc articles 25 et suivants C. cr., prévoit une série de dispositions relativement à la justification de l'utilisation de la force, dans certaines situations particulières telles la prévention d'une violation de la paix ou d'une infraction, l'évasion et la répression d'émeutes.

171 R. c. Wilson, (1994) 29 C.R. (4th) 302 (C.S. C.-B.); R. v. Asante-Mensah, REJB 2003-44444 (C.S.C.).

172. R. c. Trottier, REJB 2002-36831 (C.Q.).

173. R. c. Berrie, (1976) 24 C.C.C. (2d) 66 (C.P. C.-B.); R. c. F. (V.A.), (1990) 53 C.C.C. (3d) 74 (Q.B. Sask.).

174. D'ailleurs, l'article 26 C.cr. vient également préciser que tout excès de force entraîne la responsabilité criminelle de la personne qui l'a commis." (p. 193)

CANADA, COMMISSION OF INQUIRY CONCERNING CERTAIN ACTIVITIES OF THE ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE, Freedom and Security under the Law, Second Report -- Volume 1, [Ottawa]: The Commission, 1981, xxii, 664 p., and see "Criminal Code, Section 25(1) -- 'Protection of Persons acting Under Authority'" pp. 377-379, ISBN: 0660109514 (Chairman: Mr. Justice D.C. McDonald); available at http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/200/301/pco-bcp/commissions-ef/mcdonald1979-81-eng/mcdonald1979-81-eng.htm (accessed on 17 February 2009); also published in French/aussi publié en français: COMMISSION D'ENQUÊTE SUR CERTAINES ACTIVITÉS DE LA GENDARMERIE ROYALE DU CANADA, Liberté et la sécurité devant la loi: deuxième rapport -- volume 1, [Ottawa]: La Commission, 1981, ISBN: 0660907682 (vol.1 et 2) (Président: D.C. McDonald); disponible à http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/200/301/pco-bcp/commissions-ef/mcdonald1979-81-fra/mcdonald1979-81-fra.htm (vérifié le 17 février 2009);

CANADA, Department of Justice Canada, Reforming the General Part of the Criminal Code: A Consultation Paper, [Ottawa]; [Department of Justice Canada], [November 1994], v, 35 p., and see "Appendix -- What this consultation paper does not deal with", at p. 35; this publication is available at my Digital Library at http://www.lareau-law.ca/DigitalLibrary.html; also published in French/aussi publié en français: Ministère de la Justice Canada, Projet de réforme de la Partie générale du Code criminel: Document de consultation, [Ottawa], [Ministère de la Justice Canada], [Novembre 1994], v, 39 p., et voir "ANNEXE -- Quelles questions le présent document n'aborde-t-il pas?", à la p. 39; cette publication est disponible à ma Bibliothèque digitale à http://www.lareau-law.ca/DigitalLibrary.html;

"APPENDIX
What this consultation paper does not deal with
...
For a variety of reasons, this paper does not discuss a number of other General Part issues. These include: the way to deal with the physical element of an offence, some fault elements of crimes , attempts to commit an offence, people who counsel others to commit offences or conspire with others to commit offences, other defences (such as entrapment, emergency surgical or medical treatment), the principle of legality, omissions, extraterritorial jurisdiction, double jeopardy, the treatment of people who act under legal authority or have been given orders to act a certain way, and the rules concerning people who have authority over children." (p. 35; emphasis added)

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"ANNEXE

Quelles questions le présent document de consultation n'aborde-t-il pas?

[...]

Pour diverses raisons, le présent document ne traite pas des questions suivantes concernant la Partie générale : l'élément matériel des infractions, l'élément moral exigé pour certaines infractions , les tentatives de commettre une infraction, le fait de conseiller à une personne de commettre une infraction ou de comploter avec une autre personne de commettre une infraction, la notion d'impossibilité, certains moyens de défense (notamment la provocation policière et le traitement chirurgical ou médical d'urgence), le principe de la légalité, les omissions, l'application extra-territoriale, la double incrimination, le traitement des personnes qui exercent des pouvoirs légaux ou qui ont reçu des ordres de supérieurs les forçant à agir d'une certaine façon et la discipline des enfants." (p. 39; mots mis en gras à la fin par moi)

CANADA, Department of Justice Canada, Law Enforcement and Criminal Liability: White Paper, June 2000; [Ottawa; Department of Justice Canada], 2001, 9, 4 p.; notes: tabled in the House of Commons, 19 September 2000, Sessional Paper no. 362-23; available at web.archive.org/web/20050211160024/http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/cons/lecl.html (accessed on 14 July 2006; web archive); also published in French / aussi publié en français: CANADA, Ministère de la Justice Canada, Application de la loi et responsabilité criminelle: livre blanc, juin 2000, [Ottawa; Department of Justice Canada], 2000, 10, 4 p.; notes: déposé à la Chambres des communes, le 19 septembre 2000, Document parlementaire no 362-23; disponible à web.archive.org/web/20020102033655/http://canada.justice.gc.ca/fr/cons/alrc.html (site visité le 14 juillet 2006; web archive);

CANADA, Officials of the Department of Justice Canada, and Members and Consultants of the Law Reform Commission of Canada, Toward a New General Part for the Criminal Code of Canada: A Framework Document on the Proposed New General Part of the Criminal Code for the Consideration of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General, [Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, December 1990], 137 p., and see "Protection of persons acting under legal authority" at pp. 73-75; available at my Digital Library at http://www.lareau-law.ca/DigitalLibrary.html; information on the French version/informations sur la version française, CANADA, Fonctionnaires du ministère de la Justice Canada et des membres de la Commission de réforme du droit du Canada et des conseillers auprès de celle-ci, Pour une nouvelle codification de la Partie générale du Code criminel du Canada. Document cadre sur la nouvelle Partie générale proposée du Code criminel présenté pour examen au Comité permanent de la Justice et du Solliciteur général, [Ottawa: Ministère de la Justice Canada, décembre 1990], 144 p.;

CANADA, Parliament, House of Commons, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Sub-Committee on the Recodification of the General Part of the Criminal Code of the Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General, [Ottawa]: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1992-1993, 11 Issues; note that the 11th issue consists of the report: First Principles: Recodifying the General Part of the Criminal Code of Canada: Report of the Sub-Committee on the Recodification of the General part of the Criminal Code of the Standing Committee on Justice and the Sollicitor General; also published in French/aussi publié en français: Parlement, Chambre des Communes, Procès-verbaux et témoignages du Sous-comité sur la Recodification de la Partie générale du Code criminel du Comité permanent de la justice et du Solliciteur général, [Ottawa]: I'Imprimeur de la Reine pour le Canada, 1992-1993, 11 fasicules; noter que le 11e fasicule contient le rapport : Principes de base: recodification de la Partie générale du Code criminel du Canada. Rapport du Sous-comité sur la recodification de la Partie générale du Code criminel du Canada du Comité permanent de la justice et du Solliciteur général;

"Persons Acting under Legal Authority

The Law Reform Commission recommended inclusion in the General Part of a provision stating that no one should be liable for performing an act required or authorized by law or for using force in doing so.²⁰⁶ This is consistent with the existing law.²⁰⁷ The Commission also suggested that no one should be entiled under this provision to use force causing serious harm or death. If there was a danger to personal safety, the defence of self-defence would apply. The Sub-Committee endorses the improvements on the law in this area recommended by the Law Reform Commission,

The Commission also recommended that no police officer be liable for using reasonable force to arrest a fleeing suspect or offender.²⁰⁸ The Sub-Committee is aware that this issue is currently under study by the Minister of Justice. As such, at present the Sub-Committee is relunctant to suggest any changes to the existing law on the degree of force available to police officers in apprehending fleeing suspects or offenders.
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206 Report 31, Recommendation 3(13), at 38.
207 Criminal Code, s. 25(1).
208 Ibid., Recommendation 3(13)(b), at 39." (First Principles: Recodifying the General Part of the Criminal Code of Canada, p.73)

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"Les personnes exerçant des pouvoirs légaux

La Commisison de réforme du droit recommande d'inclure dans la Partie générale une disposition prévoyant que nul n'est responsable s'il accomplit un acte exigé ou permis par une loi ou si, à cette fin, il emploie la force²⁰⁶. Cela serait conforme au droit actuel.²⁰⁷ La Commission propose aussi que nul ne puisse, en vertu de cette disposition, employer la force dans le dessein de causer la mort ou un préjudice corporel grave. Si la sécurité personnelle était en jeu, l'intéressé pourra invoquer la légitime défense. Le Sous-comité appuie les améliorations législatives que recommande dans ce domaine la Commission de réforme du droit.

La Commission recommande aussi de ne pas tenir responsable l'agent de paix qui emploie la force raisonnablement nécessaire pour arrêter un suspect ou un contrevenant ou pour empêcher sa fuite²⁰⁸. Le Sous-comité sait que le ministre de la Justice étudie présentement cette question. Voilà pourquoi actuellement le Sous-comité répugne à proposer toute modification aux dispositions concernant la force que les agents de la paix peuvent employer pour arrêter des suspects ou des contrevenants qui tentent de leur échapper. [...]
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206 Rapport 31, recommandation 3(13) à la p. 43.
207 Par. 25(1) du Code criminel.
208 Rapport 31, recommandation 3(13)b) à la p. 43." (Principes de base: recodification de la Partie générale du Code criminel du Canada, p. 78)

CANADA/PROVINCES, Report of the Working Group on Chapter 3 of the Law Reform Commission of Canada Report 30, Vol. 1, "Recodifying Criminal Law", [Ottawa]: [Department of Justice Canada], December 1987, vii, 80 p., and see "Clause 3(13) Protection of Persons Acting under Legal Authority" at pp.62-67; Research Note: this report is cited in the Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1988-1989 - 18th Annual Report, Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1989 at p. 37, ISBN: 0662573013 and in CANADA, Officials of the Department of Justice Canada and Members of the Law Reform Commission of Canada, Toward a New General Part forthe Criminal Code of Canada: A Framework Document on the Proposed New General Part of the Criminal Code for the Consideration of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General, supra. This report of the working group was submitted to the Federal-Provincial Coordination Committee of Senior Justice Officials. Members of the Working Group were from: the Department of Justice Canada, and from the following provincial Attorney General departments or Ministries/Departments of Justice: Ontario, Québec, New Brunswick, Saskatchewan, Alberta, Manitoba and British Columbia. This report is available from the Department of Justice Canada. It was obtained by François Lareau in 1998 under Access to Information Request number A98-00185; also available in French / aussi disponible en français: CANADA/PROVINCES, Rapport du Groupe de travail chargé de l'étude du chapitre 3 du Rapport no 30 de la Commission de réforme du droit du Canada "Pour une nouvelle codification du droit pénal" (Volume I), [Ottawa]: [Ministère de la Justice Canada], décembre 1987, vii, 88 p., et voir "Paragraphe 3(13) -- Protection des personnes exerçant des pouvoirs légaux", aux pp. 67-73; Notes de recherche : ce rapport est mentionné dans Commission de réforme du droit du Canada, 1988-1989, Dix-huitième Rapport annuel, Ottawa : Commission de réforme du droit du Canada, 1989, à la p. 40, ISBN: 0662573013 et dans CANADA, Fonctionnaires du Ministère de la Justice Canada et des membres de la Commission de réforme du droit du Canada, Pour une nouvelle codification de la Partie générale du Code criminel du Canada : document cadre sur la nouvelle partie générale proposée du Code criminel présenté pour examen au comité permanent de la justice et du solliciteur général, supra. Ce rapport du groupe de travail a été soumis au Comité fédéral-provincial de coordination composé de fonctionnaires de niveau supérieur de la justice. Les membres du groupe de travail proviennent du Ministère de la Justice Canada et des ministères des procuereurs généraux /ministères provinciaux de la justice de: l'Ontario, Québec, Nouvelle-Écosse, Saskatchewan, Alberta et Columbie-Britannique. Ce rapport est disponible au Ministère de la Justice Canada. Il a été obtenu par François Lareau en 1998 suite à une demande d'accès à l'information numéro A-98-00185;

[Excerpt from the Working Group's report dealing with "Clause 3(13) Protection of Persons Acting under Legal Authority" of the Law Reform Commission of Canada Draft Code contained in their report 30, see LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, Recodifying Criminal Law: Volume I, Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1986, infra]

"Recommendations

1. The present law on lawful authority, including sections 25-27 of the Criminal Code and the relevant common law, needs attention and simplification, and should be recodified (unanimous).

2. Clause 3(13) should be rejected as not representing a satisfactory solution to the problems posed by sections 25 to 27 of the present Criminal Code or to the other policy issues raised (unanimous).

3. Further work should be done towards resolving the policy issues raised (unanimous)." (p. 67)

THE CANADIAN ASSOCIATION OF POLICE CHIEFS, An Evaluation of Volume I of Report 30 Published by the Law Reform Commission Canada and Titled "Recodifying Criminal Law" for The Hon. Ray HNATYSHYN Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, [Ottawa?]: The Canadian Association of Police Chiefs, 1987, 112 p., see "Section 23: Protection of Persons Acting under Statute", at p. 37-40; note: the comments are on the legislative draft found at the end of the report and not on the recommendation itself; this paper is part of the papers of CANADA, House of Commons, Sub-Committee on the Recodification of the General Part of the Criminal Code of the Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General, 1992-1993; it was obtained in December 1998 from the Clerk of the Sranding Committee on Justice and Human Rights;

COCKBURN, A.E., "Copy ‘of Letter from the Lord Chief Justice of England PDF

dated the 12th day of June 1879, containing Comments and Suggestions in relation to the Criminal Code (Indictable Offences) Bill’”, Sessional Papers (Parliamentary Papers), (1878-79), vol. 59, pp. 233-252, paper number 232, 20 p., and see p. 17 on section 370; to situate Cockburn's letter, see François Lareau, "Notes on the English Draft Code (1878-1883)" PDF

, [Ottawa], August 1990, 11 p.;

okControlled Drugs and Substances Act, Statutes of Canada 2006, chapter 19, section 55; available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/ShowFullDoc/cs/C-38.8///en; also available in French / aussi disponible en français: Loi réglementant certaines drogues et autres substances, Lois du Canada, 2006, chapitre 19, article 55; disponible à http://lois.justice.gc.ca/fr/ShowFullDoc/cs/C-38.8///fr

Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (Police Enforcement) Regulations, SOR/97-234, available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/ShowFullDoc/cr/SOR-97-234//20071129/en?command=home&caller=
SI&search_type=all&shorttitle=controlled%20drugs&day=29&month=11&year=2007&search_domain=cr&showall=L&statuteyear=all&lengthannual=50&length=50 (accessed on 29 November 2007); the concept of exemption is used; also available in French/aussi disponible en français : Règlement sur l'exécution policière de la Loi réglementant certaines drogues et autres substances, DORS/97-234, disponible à http://laws.justice.gc.ca/fr/ShowFullDoc/cr/DORS-97-234//20071129/fr?command=home&caller=SI&search_type=all&shorttitle=controlled%20drugs&day=29&month=
11&year=2007&search_domain=cr&showall=L&statuteyear=all&lengthannual=50&length=50 (vérifié le 29 novembre 2007);

CÔTÉ-HARPER, Gisèle, 1942-, Pierre Rainville, 1964-, et Jean Turgeon, 1951-, Traité de droit pénal canadien, 4^e édition refondue et augmentée, Cowansville: Éditions Yvon Blais, 1998, lv, 1458 p., voir "L'obéissance aux lois" aux pp.1080-1082, ISBN: 2894512589;

COUGHLAN, Steve, "Common Law Police Powers and the Rule of Law", (2007) 47(2) Criminal Reports (6th) 266-270;

Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes Act, Statutes of Canada 2000, chapter 24, section 13, available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/ (accessed on 5 October 2007) / Loi sur les crimes contre l'humanité et les crimes de guerre, Lois du Canada, 2000, chapitre 24, article 13, disponible à http://laws.justice.gc.ca/fr/home (visité le 5 octobre 2007);

"Conflict with internal law
13. Despite section 15 of the Criminal Code, it is not a justification, excuse or defence with respect to an offence under any of sections 4 to 7 that the offence was committed in obedience to or in conformity with the law in force at the time and in the place of its commission."

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"Incompatibilité avec le droit interne

13. Par dérogation à l'article 15 du Code criminel, ne constitue pas une justification, une excuse ou un moyen de défense à l'égard d'une infraction visée à l'un des articles 4 à 7 le fait que l'infraction ait été commise en exécution du droit en vigueur au moment et au lieu de la perpétration ou en conformité avec ce droit."

The Criminal Code, 1892, 55-56 Victoria (1892), chapter 29 and see the comments of Martin in The Criminal Code of Canada with Annotations and Notes by J.C. Martin, infra, on the sections of the Code that were replaced in 1955 by section 25; see also the comments by Stuart,Canadian Criminal Law, 4th ed., infra; the 1892 code is available at my Digital Library at http://www.lareau-law.ca/DigitalLibrary.html; Code criminel, 1892; 55-56 Victoria (1892), chapitre 29, disponible à ma Bibliothèque digitale à http://www.lareau-law.ca/DigitalLibrary.html;

Criminal Code, R.S. 1985, c. C-46, available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/ (accessed on 5 October 2007); also published in French/aussi publié en français: Code criminel, L.R. 1985, ch. C-46, disponible à http://laws.justice.gc.ca/fr/home (visité le 5 octobre 2007);

"Obedience to de facto law
15. No person shall be convicted of an offence in respect of an act or omission in obedience to the laws for the time being made and enforced by persons in de facto possession of the sovereign power in and over the place where the act or omission occurs."

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"Protection of persons acting under authority
25. (1) Every one who is required or authorized by law to do anything in the administration or enforcement of the law

(a) as a private person,

(b) as a peace officer or public officer,

(d) by virtue of his office,

is, if he acts on reasonable grounds, justified in doing what he is required or authorized to do and in using as much force as is necessary for that purpose.

Idem
(2) Where a person is required or authorized by law to execute a process or to carry out a sentence, that person or any person who assists him is, if that person acts in good faith, justified in executing the process or in carrying out the sentence notwithstanding that the process or sentence is defective or that it was issued or imposed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction.

When not protected
(3) Subject to subsections (4) and (5), a person is not justified for the purposes of subsection (1) in using force that is intended or is likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm unless the person believes on reasonable grounds that it is necessary for the self-preservation of the person or the preservation of any one under that person’s protection from death or grievous bodily harm.

When protected
(4) A peace officer, and every person lawfully assisting the peace officer, is justified in using force that is intended or is likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm to a person to be arrested, if

(a) the peace officer is proceeding lawfully to arrest, with or without warrant, the person to be arrested;

(b) the offence for which the person is to be arrested is one for which that person may be arrested without warrant;

(d) the peace officer or other person using the force believes on reasonable grounds that the force is necessary for the purpose of protecting the peace officer, the person lawfully assisting the peace officer or any other person from imminent or future death or grievous bodily harm; and

(e) the flight cannot be prevented by reasonable means in a less violent manner.

Power in case of escape from penitentiary
(5) A peace officer is justified in using force that is intended or is likely to cause death or grievous bodily harm against an inmate who is escaping from a penitentiary within the meaning of subsection 2(1) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, if

(a) the peace officer believes on reasonable grounds that any of the inmates of the penitentiary poses a threat of death or grievous bodily harm to the peace officer or any other person; and

(b) the escape cannot be prevented by reasonable means in a less violent manner."

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"Defence [to child pornography]

163. (6) No person shall be convicted of an offence under this section if the act that is alleged to constitute the offence

(a) has a legitimate purpose related to the administration of justice or to science, medicine, education or art; and

(b) does not pose an undue risk of harm to persons under the age of eighteen years.

Question of law
(7) For greater certainty, for the purposes of this section, it is a question of law whether any written material, visual representation or audio recording advocates or counsels sexual activity with a person under the age of eighteen years that would be an offence under this Act."

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"Obéissance aux lois de facto
15. Nul ne peut être déclaré coupable d’une infraction à l’égard d’un acte ou d’une omission en exécution des lois alors édictées et appliquées par les personnes possédant de facto le pouvoir souverain dans et sur le lieu où se produit l’acte ou l’omission."

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"Protection des personnes autorisées
25. (1) Quiconque est, par la loi, obligé ou autorisé à faire quoi que ce soit dans l’application ou l’exécution de la loi :

a) soit à titre de particulier;

b) soit à titre d’agent de la paix ou de fonctionnaire public;

c) soit pour venir en aide à un agent de la paix ou à un fonctionnaire public;

d) soit en raison de ses fonctions,

est, s’il agit en s’appuyant sur des motifs raisonnables, fondé à accomplir ce qu’il lui est enjoint ou permis de faire et fondé à employer la force nécessaire pour cette fin.

Idem
(2) Lorsqu’une personne est, par la loi, obligée ou autorisée à exécuter un acte judiciaire ou une sentence, cette personne ou toute personne qui l’assiste est, si elle agit de bonne foi, fondée à exécuter l’acte judiciaire ou la sentence, même si ceux-ci sont défectueux ou ont été délivrés sans juridiction ou au-delà de la juridiction.

Quand une personne n'est pas protégée
(3) Sous réserve des paragraphes (4) et (5), une personne n’est pas justifiée, pour l’application du paragraphe (1), d’employer la force avec l’intention de causer, ou de nature à causer la mort ou des lésions corporelles graves, à moins qu’elle n’estime, pour des motifs raisonnables, que cette force est nécessaire afin de se protéger elle-même ou de protéger toute autre personne sous sa protection, contre la mort ou contre des lésions corporelles graves.

Usage de la force en cas de fuite
(4) L’agent de la paix, ainsi que toute personne qui l’aide légalement, est fondé à employer contre une personne à arrêter une force qui est soit susceptible de causer la mort de celle-ci ou des lésions corporelles graves, soit employée dans l’intention de les causer, si les conditions suivantes sont réunies :

a) il procède légalement à l’arrestation avec ou sans mandat;

b) il s’agit d’une infraction pour laquelle cette personne peut être arrêtée sans mandat;

c) cette personne s’enfuit afin d’éviter l’arrestation;

d) lui-même ou la personne qui emploie la force estiment, pour des motifs raisonnables, cette force nécessaire pour leur propre protection ou celle de toute autre personne contre la mort ou des lésions corporelles graves — imminentes ou futures;

e) la fuite ne peut être empêchée par des moyens raisonnables d’une façon moins violente.

Usage de la force en cas d'évasion d'un pénitencier
(5) L’agent de la paix est fondé à employer contre un détenu qui tente de s’évader d’un pénitencier — au sens du paragraphe 2(1) de la Loi sur le système correctionnel et la mise en liberté sous condition — une force qui est soit susceptible de causer la mort de celui-ci ou des lésions corporelles graves, soit employée dans l’intention de les causer, si les conditions suivantes sont réunies :

a) il estime, pour des motifs raisonnables, que ce détenu ou tout autre détenu représente une menace de mort ou de lésions corporelles graves pour lui-même ou toute autre personne;

b) l’évasion ne peut être empêchée par des moyens raisonnables d’une façon moins violente."

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Moyen de défense [pornographie juvénile]
(6) Nul ne peut être déclaré coupable d’une infraction au présent article si les actes qui constitueraient l’infraction :

a) ont un but légitime lié à l’administration de la justice, à la science, à la médecine, à l’éducation ou aux arts;

b) ne posent pas de risque indu pour les personnes âgées de moins de dix-huit ans.

Question de droit
(7) Il est entendu, pour l’application du présent article, que la question de savoir si un écrit, une représentation ou un enregistrement sonore préconise ou conseille une activité sexuelle avec une personne âgée de moins de dix-huit ans qui constituerait une infraction à la présente loi constitue une question de droit."

Criminal Code -- Annotated codes used by practioners/ codes annotés utilisés par les practiciens

in English (published every year) /en anglais:

GOLD, Allan D., The Practioner's Criminal Code, Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Canada, 2008;

GREENSPAN, Edward L. and Marc Rosenberg, annotations by, Martin's Annual Criminal Code 2008, Aurora: Canada Law Book Inc.;

WATT, David and Michelle Fuerst, annotations by, The 2008 Annotated Tremeear's Criminal Code, Toronto: Carswell, A Thomson Company;

in French/en français (publié chaque année):

COURNOYER, Guy et Gilles Ouimet, Code criminel annoté 2008, Cowansville: Éditions Yvon Blais, une société Thomson; note: législation bilingue/bilingual legislation;

DUBOIS, Alain et Philip Schneider, Code criminel et lois connexes annotés 2008, Brossard: Publications CCH Ltée;

CRIMINAL CODE BILL COMMISSION, Report of the Royal Commission Appointed to Consider the Law Relating to Indictable Offences: With an Appendix Containing a Draft Code Embodying the Suggestions of the Commissioners, London: HMSO, 1879, 209 p.. (series; C.(Command); 2345), (President: C.B. Blackburn); also published in British Parliamentary Papers, (1878-79), vol. 20, pp. 169- 378; available at my Digital Library at http://www.lareau-law.ca/DigitalLibrary.html;

The Criminal Code of Canada with Annotations and Notes by J.C. Martin, Q.C., Toronto: Cartwright & Sons, 1955, lxxxiii, 1206 p.; see pp. 72-100 on s. 25 which appeared for the first time in the 1955 "new" criminal code; Mr. J.C. Martin was counsel to the Royal Commission to Revise the Criminal Code, 1947-1952;

"[Comments on s. 25]

This section embodies the former s. 23-27, 29-32, and 41-45.

It has been observed that the criminal law could be enforced on no basis than a presumption that it is known to everyone. It is equally true that it could not be enforced on any other basis than the state owes protection to those to whom it entrusts the duty of enforcing it. It is an old maxim of law that 'Quando aliquid mandatur, mandatur et omne per quod pervenitur ad illud'. When anything is commanded, everything by which it can be accomplished is also commanded, or in other words, what the law requires it justifies.
......
It may be said in favour of the retention of these sections that, since they largely embody the common law, they are useful in formulating the rules of law applicable to particular cases and so serve the purpose of a code. However, in Canada, it was necessary to read them in the light of s. 646 et seq., which had no counterpart in the E.D.C. [English Draft Code]. Partly for that reason, partly because the cases almost invariably return to the common law, and partly in keeping with the general scheme of the revision as already mentioned, there has been a good deal of consolidation. In the result, and in accord with the principles stated at the beginning of this note s. 25 covers the former ss. 23 to 27, 29, 30 to 37, 39, and 11 to 45." (pp. 72, 74 and 79)

Eccles v. Bourque, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 739, (1974) 19 C.C.C. (2d) 129;

"It is the submission of counsel for the respondents that a person who is by s. 450 authorized to make an arrest is, by s. 25, authorized by law to commit a trespass with or without force in the accomplishment of that arrest, provided he acts on reasonable and probable grounds. I cannot agree with the submission. Section 25 does not have such amplitude. The section merely affords justification to a person for doing what he is required or authorized by law to do in the administration or enforcement of the law, if he acts on reasonable and probable grounds, and for using force for that purpose. The question which must be answered in this case, then, is whether the respondents were required or authorized by law to commit a trespass; and not, as their counsel contends, whether they were required or authorized to make an arrest. If they were authorized by law to commit a trespass, the authority for it must be found in the common law for there is nothing in the Criminal Code." (Mr. Justice Disckson, pp. 130-131 (C.C.C.))

Eccles v. Bourque, (1974) 14 C.C.C. (2d) 279 (B.C. C.A.);

"...it cannot fairly be said that a person who is authorized to make an arrest is, because of s. 25, authorized by law to commit a trespass with or without the use of force. In other words, wherever the Criminal Code confers a power to do a specific thing, s. 25 does not confer a power to do any and every thing that may assist or advance the exercise of the power. The purpose of s. 25(1) is twofold; it absolves of blame anyone who does something that he is required or authorized by law to do, and it empowers such person to use as much force as is necessary for the purpose of doing it." (Mr. Justice Robertson)

FERGUSON, Gerry and Greg Allen, "Undercover Police Activities: International and Canadian Perspectives" , in The International Centre for Criminal law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy, Promoting Criminal Justice Reform : A Collection of Papers from the Canada-China Cooperation Symposium, Vancouver: The International Centre for Criminal law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy, 2007, [viii], 482 p., at pp. 361-383, ISBN: 978-0-973043259; available at http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/Promoting%20Criminal%20Justice%20Reform%20070607.pdf (accessed on 5 March 2008);

FONTANA, James A. and David Keeshan, The Law of Search and Seizure in Canada, 6th ed., Markham (Ontario)L LexisNexis Butterworth, 2005, lxxxviii, 906 p.; copy at the Library of the Suorme Court of Canada, KF9630 F66 2005; table of contents available at http://www.lexisnexis.ca/bookstore/bookinfo.php?pid=25 (accessed on 18 October 2007);

FORTIN, Jacques et Louise Viau, Traité de droit pénal général, Montréal: Éditions Thémis, 1982, xi, 457 p., et voir "L'exécution de la loi" aux pp. 268-275 et en plus "L'obéissance à la loi de facto ou ultra vires" aux pp. 276-277; contribution importante;

GABIAS, Maurice, et al., Droit pénal général et pouvoirs policiers: Droit pénal III, 5^e édition, Mont-Royal (Québec): Modulo Éditeur, 2005, xvi, 512 p. ISBN: 2895930325; voir à propos de ce livre, http://www.modulogriffon.com/catalogue/livres/livre533.html (vérifié le 18 octobre 2007);

GRANT, Isabel, 1957-, Dorothy Chunn, 1943-, and Christine Boyle, 1949-, The Law of Homicide, Scarborough (Ontario): Carswell, 1994, see "Protection of Persons Acting under Authority - (a) The Armed Forces" at pp. 6-77 to 6-80, ISBN: 0459552562 (pbk.); there is also a loose-leaf edition which is updated, ISBN: 045955244;

KOURI, Robert P. et Suzanne Philips-Nootens, L'intégrité de la personne et le consentement aux soins, 2e éd., Cowansville (Québec): Éditions Yvon Blais, 2005, xxxv, 738 p., et vor en particulier "Le traitement imposé" aux pp. 356-358 (traitement et vaccination obligatoires; traitent de la loi provinciale et fédérale), ISBN: 2894518986; voir la table des matières à http://www.editionsyvonblais.com/Produits/753.asp (vérifié le 26 octobre 2007); copie à la Bibliothèque de la Cour suprême du Canada;

KREMNITZER, Mordechai, Doron Menashe and Khalid Ghanayim, "The Use of Lethal Force by Police", (September 2007) 53(1) The Criminal Law Quarterly 67-97;

LAFRENIÈRE, Gérald, "Police Powers and Drug-Related Offences, prepared for the Senate Special Committee on Illegal Drugs", Ottawa: Library of Parliament, Law and Government Division, 6 March 2001, v, 88 p., and see, in particular, "Illegal Activities" at pp. 82-87; available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/ille-e/library-e/powers-e.pdf (accessed on 3 September 2005); also published in French / aussi publié en français, Lafrenière, Gérald, "Les pouvoirs de la police et les infractions liées à la drogue. Produit pour le comité sénatorial spécial sur les drogues illicites", Ottawa: Bibliothèque du Parlement, Division du droit et du gouvernement, 6 mars 2001, et voir la partie "Les activités illégales"; disponible à http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-f/ille-F/library-f/powers-f.htm (visionné le 3 septembre 2005);

LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, Arrest, Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1986, [viii], 65 p., (series; Report; 29), ISBN: 0662544757, available at my Digital Library http://www.lareau-law.ca/DigitalLibrary.html; information on the French version/informations sur la version française, COMMISSION DE RÉFORME DU DROIT DU CANADA, L'arrestation, Ottawa: Commission de réforme du droit du Canada, 1986, [viii], 71 p.(Collection; Rapport; 29), ISBN: 0662544757;

"Work in Progress related to Arrest ...

Substantive Law

The degree of force which can be employed in effecting an arrest is part of the larger question of the use of force generally by persons authorized to take actions in the administration or the enforcement of the law. This topic is addressed in our Working Paper 29 entitled The General Part: Liability and Defences. While the original proposals made in that Working Paper may have to be modified slightly to take into account the particular problems of arrest, these matters are the subject of a separate process of consultation and will not be dealt in this Report.

A similar situation exists with respect to the Special Part of the criminal law dealing with the definition of particular offences. Clearly the extent to which police officers or others may interfere with the liberty of individuals by means of arrest will be determined in part by the kinds of conduct that the law defines as 'criminal'". (p. 14) [note: compare with Williams, infra]

___________ The General Part -- Liability and Defences, Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1982, [ix], 204 p., and see "Advancement of Justice" at pp. 111-119 and "Lawful Assistance" at pp. 119-(series; Working Paper; 29), ISBN: 0662514297; available at my Digital Library http://www.lareau-law.ca/DigitalLibrary.html; information on the French version/informations sur la version française, COMMISSION DE RÉFORME DU DROIT DU CANADA, Partie générale -- responsabilité et moyens de défense, Ottawa: Commission de réforme du droit du Canada, 1982, [x], 239 p., (Collection; Document de travail; 29); ISBN: 0662514297;

"DRAFT LEGISLATION

Law Enforcement

General rule
16. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, every one required or authorized by law to do anything in the administration or enforcement of the law is, if acting on reasonable grounds, justified in doing it and in using no more force than necessary for that pourpose.

Specific powers

(2) Without restricting the generality of subsection (1), every one is justified in

(a) effecting lawful arrest,

(b) preventing offences endangering life, bodily integrity, property or state security, and

Justification concerning defective process

(3) Every one required or authorized by law to execute a process or carry out a sentence is, if acting in good faith, justified under this section despite defect or lack of jurisdiction concerning such process or sentence.

Restriction on degree of force

(4) No one is justified by this section in using force which he knows is likely to cause serious bodily harm except when necessary

(a) to protect himself or those under his protection from death or bodily harm,

(b) to prevent the commission of an offence likely to cause immediate and serious injury,

(c) to overcome resistance to arrest, or to prevent escape by flight from arrest, for an offence endangering life, bodily integrity or state security,

(d) to prevent the escape of, or to recapture, a person believed to be lawfully detained or imprisoned for an offence endangering life, bodily integrity or state security." (pp. 113-114)

"DRAFT LEGISLATION

Lawful Assistance

17. The justifications provided by sections 13-16 [Self-defence, Protection of movable property; Protection of Immovable property; Law enforcement] above are available to every one in good faith assisting, or acting under the authority of, persons acting under these sections." (p. 119)

___________Recodifying Criminal Law: Volume I, Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1986, [xiii],117 p., and see "Clause 3(13) Protection of Persons Acting under Legal Authority", at pp. 36-37 (series; Report; 30), ISBN: 0662547322; note the change made between report 30 and 31 for clause 3(13); available at my Digital Library http://www.lareau-law.ca/DigitalLibrary.html; information on the French version/informations sur la version française, COMMISSION DE RÉFORME DU DROIT DU CANADA, Pour une nouvelle codification du droit pénal: Volume I, Ottawa: Commission de réforme du droit du Canada, 1986, [12], 131 p. (Collection; rapport; 30), ISBN: 0662547322;

"3(13) Protection of Persons Acting under Legal Authority.

(a) General Rule. No one is liable for:

(i) using such force as is reasonably necessary to prevent a crime likely to cause death, serious harm to the person or serious damage to property;

(ii) using such force as is reasonably necessary to effect an arrest authorized by law; or

(iii) performing an act required or authorized by or under federal or provincial statute or for using such force as is reasonably necessary to do so.

(b) Exception. This clause does not apply to anyone who purposely kills or seriously harms another person except where reasonably necessary to arrest, to prevent the escape of, or to recapture one who is dangerous to life." (p. 36)

_____________ Recodifying Criminal Law (Revised and Enlarged Edition of Report 30), Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1987, [16], 213 p., see "Clause 3(13) Protection of Persons Acting uner Legal Authority" at pp. 38-40 (series; Report; 31), ISBN: 0662547578; note the change made between report 30 and 31 for clause 3(13); available at my Digital Library http://www.lareau-law.ca/DigitalLibrary.html; information on the French version/informations sur la version française, COMMISSION DE RÉFORME DU DROIT DU CANADA, Pour une nouvelle codification du droit pénal (Édition révisée et augmentée du rapport n^o 30), Ottawa: Commission de réforme du droit du Canada, 1987, [16], 233 p., et voir le paragraphe 3(13) Protection des personnes exerçant des pouvoirs légaux", aux pp. 43-45 (Collection; rapport; 31), ISBN: 0662547578;

"3(13) Protection of Persons Acting under Legal Authority.

(a) General Rule. No one is liable for performing an act required or authorized by or under federal or provincial statute or for using such force, short of force meant to cause death or serious harm to another person, as is reasonably necessary to do so and is reasonable in the circumstances;

(b) Force Used by Peace Officers. No peace officer is liable for using such force as is reasonably necessary and is reasonable in the circumstances to arrest, recapture or prevent the escape of a suspect or offender." (pp. 38-39)

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"3(13) Protection des personnes exerçant des pouvoirs légaux.

(a) Règle générale. N'ul n'est responsable s'il accomplit un acte exigé ou permis par une loi fédérale ou provinciale, ou si, à cette fin, il emploie la force qui est raisonnablement nécessaire et qui est raisonnable dans les circonstances mais sans avoir le dessein de causer la mort ou un préjudice corporel grave à autrui;

(b) Emploi de la force par les agents de la paix. N'est pas responsable l'agent de la paix qui emploie la force qui est raisonnablement nécessaire et qui est raisonnable dans les circonstances pour arrêter un suspect ou un contrevenant, pour empêcher sa fuite ou pour le reprendre." (p. 43)

LÉTOURNEAU, Gilles, "La nécessité de réformer législativement les pouvoirs de police et la procédure pénale", (1991) 32(1) Les Cahiers de Droit 87-102;

NARVEY, Kenneth M., "The Excuse of 'Obedience to De Facto' - a Study of Section 15 of the present Criminal Code and of Section 68 of the 1927 Revision of the Criminal Code, With Special Reference to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity Committed Inside and Outside Canada", Montreal, May 30, 1989, 84 p.; copy at the Supreme Court of Canada Library KF 9235 N37 1989;

PUE, W. Wesley, Trespass and Expressive Rights, 2005, 77 p., available at http://www.ipperwashinquiry.ca/policy_part/research/pdf/Pue.pdf (accessed on 26 March 2006); this is a research paper commissioned by the Ipperwash Inquiry, The Ipperwash Inquiry was created by the Government of Ontario in November 2003, under the Public Inquiries Act. The Commissioner was the Honourable Sidney B. Linden. The final report was published in May 2007;

R. v. Campbell, [1973] 2 W.W.W. 246 (Alberta District Court)

"[comments on s. 15 of the Criminal Law, in obiter]

I understand s. 15 is in the Code for one purpose, and one purpose only, and that is to create a defence, on a criminal charge, for a person who has obeyed a law, or order, made by a person who, in some place and time, had some physical control over some portion of Canada, and purported to exercise a sovereign power which the Government of Canada did not recognize. In short, the section is intended to protect persons who have been subjected to the exercise of power by an enemy alien in our society, or some group inside our society which has achieved, momentarily or otherwise, de facto sovereignty, such as a revolutionary."

R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 Supreme Court Reports/Rapports de la Cour suprême du Canada 701; available at / disponible à http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/pub/1994/vol1/ (accessed on 24 August 2005); official text of the judgment in English and French versions/ texte officiel du jugement en version anglaise et française;

Judgment of Cory, J.
"Section 25 of the Code provides the accused with a justification for the use of as much force as is necessary to do anything in the administration or enforcement of a law, notwithstanding that the law is defective." (p. 825)

......

"The peace officer defence [s. 25 of the Code], set out above, is similar to the defence of obedience to military orders." (p. 826)

......

"Whether obedience to superior orders can shield an offender has been a concern of legal writers for centuries." (p. 828)

......

"Hence, Canadian courts have the discretion to convict a person of a war crime or a crime against humanity notwithstanding the existence of laws in the country where the offence was committed which justified or even required such conduct.

     The defence of obedience to de facto law is not the same as obedience to superior orders. Although at times, the superior orders which a soldier receives may become part of the domestic legal system, this would not change the nature of the order as far as the soldier was concerned. He or she would still be obliged to follow the order unless it were manifestly unlawful. Thus, the removal of the automatic right to claim obedience to de facto law does not affect the defence of obedience to superior orders." (pp. 840-841)

......

"Section 25 is akin to the defence of mistake of fact. Unless, the law is manifestly illegal, the police officer must obey and implement that law. Police officers cannot be expected to undertake a comprehensive legal analysis of every order or law that they are charged with enforcing before taking action. Therefore, if it turns out that they have followed an illegal order they may plead the peace officer defence just as the military officer may properly put forward the defence of obedience to superior
orders under certain limited conditions. The qualification is that the military officer must act in good faith and must have reasonable grounds for believing that the actions taken were justified. An officer acting pursuant to a manifestly unlawful order or law would not be able to defend his or her actions on the grounds they were justified under s. 25 of the Criminal Code.

     In the case at bar, the trial judge clearly instructed the jury that if the law was manifestly illegal, in the sense that its provisions were such that it had the factual qualities of a crime against humanity or a war crime, then the accused could not rely on the peace officer defence under s. 25 of the Code. The written instructions provided to the jury make it clear that the peace officer defence would not be available if a reasonable person in the accused's position would know that his or her
actions had the factual quality of a crime against humanity or a war crime. The peace officer defence would be available only if the law or orders were not manifestly illegal and if the accused honestly, and on reasonable grounds, believed his actions to be justified." (p. 842)
------
Judgement du juge Cory

"L'article 25 du Code permet à l'accusé de justifier l'utilisation de toute la force nécessaire pour faire quoi que ce soit dans l'application ou l'exécution de la loi, même si celle-ci est défectueuse." (p. 825)

......

"Le moyen de défense de l'agent de la paix [art. 25 du Code criminel], énoncé ci-dessus, est semblable au moyen de défense fondé sur l'obéissance à des ordres militaires." (p. 826)

......

" Les tribunaux canadiens ont donc le pouvoir discrétionnaire de déclarer une personne coupable d'un crime de guerre ou d'un crime contre l'humanité nonobstant l'existence, dans le pays où l'infraction a été commise, de lois justifiant ou même exigeant un pareil comportement.

     Le moyen de défense fondé sur l'obéissance à la loi de facto n'est pas identique à celui fondé sur l'obéissance aux ordres d'un supérieur. Bien qu'à certains moments les ordres émanant d'un supérieur puissent devenir partie d'un régime juridique interne, cela ne changerait pas la nature de l'ordre pour le soldat. Il serait toujours forcé d'obéir à l'ordre à moins que celui-ci ne soit manifestement illégal. Par conséquent, la suppression du droit automatique d'invoquer l'obéissance à la loi de facto n'a aucun effet sur le moyen de défense fondé sur l'obéissance aux ordres d'un supérieur." (pp. 840-841)

......

"L'article 25 s'apparente à la défense de l'erreur de fait. À moins que la loi ne soit manifestement illégale, le policier doit y obéir et la faire respecter. On ne peut s'attendre à ce que les policiers entreprennent, avant d'agir, une analyse juridique exhaustive de tous les ordres ou lois qu'ils sont tenus de faire respecter. Par conséquent, s'il appert qu'ils ont exécuté un ordre illégal, ils peuvent invoquer le moyen de défense de l'agent de la paix de la même manière que le militaire peut à juste titre invoquer le moyen de défense fondé sur l'obéissance aux ordres d'un supérieur dans certaines conditions restreintes. La réserve tient à ce que le militaire doit agir de bonne foi et avoir des motifs raisonnables de croire que les mesures prises étaient justifiées. L'agent qui agit conformément à un ordre ou une loi manifestement illégal ne serait pas en mesure de se défendre en faisant valoir que ses actes étaient justifiés aux termes de l'art. 25 du Code criminel.

     En l'espèce, le juge du procès a clairement indiqué au jury que, si la loi était manifestement illégale puisque, du fait de ses dispositions, elle revêtait les qualités factuelles du crime contre l'humanité ou du crime de guerre, l'accusé ne pouvait invoquer le moyen de défense de l'agent de la paix prévu à l'art. 25 du Code. Les directives écrites fournies au jury confirment que le moyen de défense de l'agent de la paix ne pouvait être invoqué si, placée dans la situation de l'accusé, une personne raisonnable aurait su que ses actes avaient la qualité factuelle du crime contre l'humanité ou du crime de guerre. L'accusé ne pourrait invoquer le moyen de défense de l'agent de la paix que si la loi ou les ordres n'étaient pas manifestement illégaux et que si, s'appuyant sur des motifs raisonnables, il croyait sincèrement ses actes justifiés." (pp. 842-843)

R. c. Trottier, 2002 CanLII 41589 (QC C.Q.), disponible à http://www.canlii.org/fr/qc/qccq/doc/2002/2002canlii41589/2002canlii41589.html (vérifié le 19 octobre 2007);

"DÉCISION

[25] La poursuite a prouvé les éléments essentiels de l'infraction: le défendeur a utilisé de façon intentionnelle la force sur le bénéficiaire, sans son consentement.

[26] Il s'agit maintenant de décider si le défendeur était justifié, pour des motifs raisonnables, de recourir à la force. De plus, il faut déterminer si le geste présente un caractère excessif.

[27] Le Tribunal doit en premier lieu examiner si le défendeur était autorisé par la loi à utiliser la force en raison de ses fonctions. Autrement dit, l'article 25 du Code criminel est-il applicable?

[28] Outres les dispositions du Code criminel, les procureurs ne réfèrent le Tribunal à aucune source législative, jurisprudentielle ou doctrinale à l'appui de leur thèse respective.

[29] La défense s'appuie essentiellement sur la description de tâches du préposé aux bénéficiaires, prévoyant notamment ce qui suit: «Intervenir physiquement lorsque nécessaire. Assurer la sécurité sur le département».

[30] Le Tribunal n'est pas convaincu que cette description correspond à une autorisation prévue par la loi. Après tout, une description de tâches est un document négocié entre des parties, assimilable à un contrat. Comme l'écrit la juge Bergeron dans Procureur général du Québec c. D.B., un protocole d'intervention, prévoyant le recours à la force, n'est pas une loi et ne peut autoriser ce qui est légalement proscrit[3].

[31] L'autorisation, au sens de l'article 25, doit nécessairement trouver une assise dans la loi.

[32] Le Tribunal trouve un premier élément de réponse dans l'admission des parties: le bénéficiaire est hospitalisé légalement pour suivre des traitements psychiatriques.

[33] Or, l'article 118.1 de la Loi sur les services de santé et les services sociaux[4], permet le recours à la force comme mesure de contrôle d'une personne dans un établissement. Ce recours n'est cependant possible «…que pour l'empêcher de s'infliger ou d'infliger à autrui des lésions. L'utilisation d'une telle force doit être minimale et exceptionnelle et doit tenir compte de l'état physique et mental de la personne.»

[34] De plus, le Tribunal tient compte de la Loi sur la protection des personnes dont l'état mental présente un danger pour elles-mêmes ou pour autrui[5] et des articles 26 à 31 du Code civil du Québec. La doctrine enseigne que le cadre d'intervention prévu par ces dispositions «…peut entraîner la privation de liberté pour un individu et sa détention contre son gré, pour une durée indéterminée, dans un hôpital.»[6]

[35] Si un bénéficiaire, en vertu de la loi, peut être privé de sa liberté, des mesures doivent nécessairement être prises pour rencontrer cet objectif.

[36] De telles mesures peuvent entraîner l'utilisation d'une force raisonnable, lorsque les circonstances le commandent, pour la sécurité du bénéficiaire et des autres patients. Le Tribunal interprète dans ce sens le mot «lésions» de l'article 118.1.

[37] Selon cette logique, le Tribunal conclut que le défendeur est une personne autorisée par la loi à utiliser la force nécessaire, en raison de ses fonctions, selon l'article 25 du Code criminel.

[38] Cette interprétation de la loi colle d'ailleurs à la description de tâches et aux témoignages entendus. Guy Privé, préposé aux bénéficiaires, Lise Caron, infirmière auxiliaire, Roger Tremblay, assistant infirmier chef, et le défendeur, ont déclaré au Tribunal qu'il arrive au personnel, en certaines circonstances, pour des raisons de sécurité, d'intervenir physiquement à l'endroit des bénéficiaires.

[39] Vu cette conclusion concernant l'application de l'article 25 du Code criminel, il ne sera pas nécessaire de décider si le bénéficiaire est un intrus au sens de l'article 41. [...]¸"

"Radiocommunication Act (subsection 4(1) and paragraph 9(1)(b)) Exemption Order (Security, Safety and International Relations), No. 2008-1", SOR/2008-292; here the exemption approach is used, available at http://canadagazette.gc.ca/partII/2008/20081029/pdf/g2-14222.pdf (accessed on 29 October 2008) / "Décret d'exemption de l'application de la Loi sur la radiocommunication (paragraphe 4(1) et alinéa 9(1)b) -- sécurité et relations internationales) n^o 2008-1" , DORS/2008-292, disponible à http://canadagazette.gc.ca/partII/2008/20081029/pdf/g2-14222.pdf (vérifié le 23 octobre 2008);

ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE -- RCMP LEARNING, available at http://www.rcmp-learning.org/ (accessed on 2 December 2007); information on the French version/informations sur la version française, GENDARMERIE ROYALE DU CANADA, , disponible à http://www.rcmp-learning.org/ (vérifié le 2 décembre 2007);

SCOTT, Ian D., "Legal Framework of use of Force by Police in Ontario", (February 2008) 53(3) The Criminal Law Quarterly 331-359;

STEPHEN, James Fitzjames, Sir, 1829-1894, A Digest of the Criminal Law (Crimes and Punishments), 4th ed., London: Macmillan, 1887, xl, 441, and see article 201, "Lawful Force", at pp. 145-146; pdf conversion completed on 17 August 2006;
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- Table of Contents
- i-xl and 1-29        (Cover page; Table of cases; Table of statutes; List of Abbreviations; Contents; Preliminary; articles 1-34);
- 30-94     (articles 35-134);
- 95-164   (articles 135-222);
- 165-232 (articles 223-294);
- 233-295 (articles 295-354);
- 296-365 (articles 355-398); and
- 366-441 (Appendix of Notes, Index).

STRIBOPOULOS, James, "In Search of Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Police Powers and the Charter", (2005) 31 Queen's Law Journal 1-74; available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1582979 (accessed on 3 April 2010);

STUART, Don, 1943-, "Annotation: R. v. Finta (1994) 28 C.R. (4th) 265 (S.C.C.)" (1994) 28 C.R. [Criminal Reports] (4th) 269-271. Research Note by François Lareau: The article deals in part with s. 25 of the Criminal Code and obedience of superior orders. The Finta decision is available at R. v. Finta, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701 ( http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/en/pub/1994/vol1/html/1994scr1_0701.html ). Note de recherche par François Lareau: Cet article discute notamment de l'art. 25 du Code criminel et de l'obéissance aux ordres supérieurs. L'arrêt Finta est disponible à R. c. Finta, [1994] 1 R.C.S. 701 (http://www.lexum.umontreal.ca/csc-scc/fr/pub/1994/vol1/html/1994rcs1_0701.html);

__________Canadian Criminal Law, 4th ed., Scarborough (Ontario): Carswell, 2001, liv, 733 p., and see "Protection of Persons Administering and Enforcing the Law", at pp. 497-502, ISBN: 0459261703 and 0459261118 (pbk.); there is now a 5th ed.: 5th ed., Toronto: Thomson/Carswell, 2007, xix, 815 p., ISBN: 978 0779812950;

"This [subsection 25(1)] is a thoroughly perplexing provision. If someone is acting pursuant to a legal power to enforce the law his conduct is justified. There is no need for a provision that he is justified if he acts on 'reasonable grounds'. The provision only covers new ground in providingf that, if he acts on reasonable grounds, he will be justified in using 'as much force as is necessary'.

Section 25(1) appeared for the first time in the amalgamation of 1955. It was said to embody previous law. This is inaccurate. What the drafters did, in their sincere to amalgamate and simplify, was to confuse the distinct issues of powers of arrest and justifications. The typical formula for arrest powers was, at the time, 'reasonable and probable grounds'. This was taken out of context and inserted in a section addressed to the question of whether it was justified for those enforcing the law to use force. The 1955 amalgamation replaced a general justification clause that had been in our Code since 1892, reading as follows:

31. Every one justified or protected from criminal responsibility in executing any sentence, warrant or process, or in making any arrest, and every one lawfully assisting him, is justified, or protected from criminal responsibility, as the case may be, in using such force as may be necessary to overcome any force used in resisting such execution or arrest, unless the sentence, process or warrant can be executed or the arrest effected by reasonable means in a less violent manner." (p. 498)

THOMSON, Claude R ., Liability of members of the R.C.M.P. to prosecution and conviction under Canadian law : immunity and defences, Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Toronto : [s.n., 1980?], vi, 70 leaves in various foliations.; copy at Sécurité publique et Protection civile Canada, Bibliothèque et Centre d'information/Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada, Library and Information Centre; HV 7641.A8 T4;

VIAU, Louise, "Le contrôle pénal de la police", (1989) 23(2-3) La Revue Juridique Thémis 363-386;

II- Comparative Law / Droit comparé

ALBANIA, Criminal Code of the Republic of Albania, available at at http://www.legislationline.org/upload/legislations/0f/55/d46a10bcf55b80aae189eb6840b4.htm (accessed on 18 July 2006); also available at available at http://pbosnia.kentlaw.edu/resources/legal/albania/crim_code.htm (accessed on 18 July 2006);

"Article 21
Exercising a Right or fulfilling a duty

A person bears no criminal responsibility if he acts to exercise rights or fulfill duties determined by law or an order ruled by a competent authority, unless the order is obviously unlawful.

When the criminal act is committed as a result of an unlawful order, then the person who has given such an order shall be held responsible."

ALGÉRIE, Code pénal, disponible à http://www.droit.mjustice.dz/code_penal.pdf (consulté le 20 octobre 2007);

"Les faits justificatifs
Art. 39. -- Il n'y a pas d'infraction
1^o Lorsque le fait était ordonné par la loi ou autorisé par la loi."

ALLEMAGNE, Code pénal du royaume de Bavière/ traduit de l'allemand avec des explications tirées du commentaire officiel (exposé des motifs) et un appendice par Ch. Vatel, Paris: A. Durand, 1852, xl, 389 p.; disponible à http://books.google.com/books?id=qW4DAAAAQAAJ&pg=PA1&dq=intitle:p%C3%A9nal&as_brr=1 (site visité le 13 mai 2007);

"ART. 124.
III. — Dommage causé par l'exercice d'un droit.

Quiconque exerce d'une manière légale un droit qui lui appartient est, d'après les lois pénales, aussi bien que d'après les lois civiles, irresponsable du dommage qui peut en résulter (1).

(1) Pour que l'acte ue donne lieu à aucune peine, il faut : 1° l'existence d'un droit; 2° l'exercice régulier de ce droit. Alors s'applique l'adage : qui jure suo utitur, neminem lœdit." (p. 107)

AMELUNG, Knut, "Obedience to Superior Order and Corporal Punishment as an Educational Method", (Winter-Spring 1996) 30(1-2) Israel Law Review 154-160, and see "Acts authorized by law as mentioned in article 49, section 1", at pp. 154-156; see text in ISRAEL, infra, where section 49 is numbered as 39M;

"Acts authorized by law as mentioned in article 49, section 1

Initially, a German scholar would be tempted to view the provision on article 49, section 1, as redundant. From a German point of view, it is evident that someone, who is authorized by law to act in a certain way, does not do so unlawfully. One of the first principles German students learn in their criminal law lectures, is that every act permitted by statute is in effect the justification of what is by definition a criminal offence. This is derived from a principle, which we call 'unity of law'. This means that there may not be any contradictions in the law, and that an act permitted by it cannot also be forbidden by criminal code.

Upon closer examination, however, one could say that the provision in article 49, section 1, serves to fulfill some functional aspects.

First, the provision reads that there is no criminal liability if an act is authorized by 'law', rather than by 'statute'. As I interpret it, this means that justification may also be a function of precedent and customary law. This corresponds to the German experience. ..." (pp. 154-155)

THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, Model Penal Code and Commentaries (Official Draft and Revised Comments), Part I - General Provisions §3.01 to 5.07, Philadelphia: The American Law Institute, 1985, xl, 506 p., see "Section 3.03 Execution of Public Duty", at pp. 22-30;

"Explanatory Note

Subsection (1) [of section 3.03] provides the general justification for conduct required ir authorized by public or official duty.
....
Comment

General Principle. This section recognuzes the unquestionable principle that conduct in the execution of public duty should be justifiable even though otherwise within the ambit of the criminal law. Some formulation is necessary to give a defense to the policeman who exceeds posted speed limits in apprehending a fugitive, the marshall who trespasses to execute a warrant, the sheriff who seizes property to satisfy the judgment of a court, and so on. Because public duties of immense variety can be found in the statutory and common law of every state, in a section like this it would be unwieldy to attempt a complete catalogue giving attention to the precise contours of each public responsibility. Subsection (1) adopts the safer course of incorporating by reference the law that defines the duty in question, and of providing a defense to a criminal charge if that law requires or authorises the particular conduct." (pp. 23-24)

___________Model Penal Code: Proposed Official Draft, Philadelphia: The American Law Institute, 1962, xxii, 346 p., see "Subsection 1.13(10) and section 2.04;

"Section 3.03 Execution of Public Duty

(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2) of this Section, conduct is justifiable when it is required or authorized by:

(a) the law defining the duties or functions of a public officer or the assistance to be rendered to such officer in the performance of his duties; or

(b) the law governing the execution of legal process; or

(d) the law governing the armed services or the lawful conduct of war; or

(e) any other provision of law imposing a public duty.

(2) The other sections of this Article apply to:

(a) the use of force upon or toward the person of another for any of the purposes dealt with in such sections; and

(b) the use of deadly force for any purpose, unless the use of such force is otherwise expressly authorized by law. or occurs in the lawful conduct of war.

(3) The justification afforded by Subsection (1) of this Section applies:

(a) when the actor reasonably believes his conduct to be required or authorized by the judgment or direction of a competent court or tribunal or in the lawful execution of legal process, notwithstanding lack of jurisdiction of the court or defect in the legal process; and

(b) when the actor believes his conduct to be required or authorized to assist a public officer in the performance of his duties, notwithstanding that the officer exceeded his legal authority." (pp. 46-47)

___________ Model Penal Code: Tentative Draft No. 8, Philadelphia: The American Law Institute, 1958, [vi], 139 p., see "Section 3.03 Execution of Public Duty" at pp.10-11;

AUSTRALIA, Australian Capital Territory, Criminal Code 2002, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/act/consol_act/cc200294/ (accessed on 5 October 2007);

"Sect 43
Lawful authority

A person is not criminally responsible for an offence if the conduct required for the offence is justified or excused under a law."

___________ Commonwealth Attorney's General in association with the Australian Institute of Judicial Administration, The Commonwealth Criminal Code: A Guide for Practitioners, March 2002, 369 p., see "Lawful Authority" at pp. 232-233, ISBN: 0642210349; available at http://www.ag.gov.au/www/criminaljusticeHome.nsf/AllDocs/RWP1E51ED9C5B665D5FCA256BDB00227895?OpenDocument (accessed on 16 August 2003)

__________Northern Territory, Criminal Code Act, and see the elaborate provisions on this subject, available at http://notes.nt.gov.au/dcm/legislat/legislat.nsf/d989974724db65b1482561cf0017cbd2/844dc0b3481cda42692572e200029226?OpenDocument (accessed on 25 October 2007);

___________Queensland, Criminal Code Act 1899, see sections 31 (Justification and excuse—compulsion); available at http://www.legislation.qld.gov.au/LEGISLTN/CURRENT/C/CriminCode.pdf (accessed on 30 August 2005);

"31 Justification and excuse—compulsion
(1) A person is not criminally responsible for an act or omission, if the person does or omits to do the act under any of the following circumstances, that is to say—

(a) in execution of the law;
(b) in obedience to the order of a competent authority which he or she is bound by law to obey, unless the order is manifestly unlawful;
(c) when the act is reasonably necessary in order to resist actual and unlawful violence threatened to the person, or to another person in the person’s presence;
(d) when—
(i) the person does or omits to do the act in order to save himself or herself or another person, or his or her property or the property of another person, from serious harm or detriment threatened to be inflicted by some person in a position to carry out the threat; and
(ii) the person doing the act or making the omission reasonably believes he or she or the other person is unable otherwise to escape the carrying out of the threat; and
(iii) doing the act or making the omission is reasonably proportionate to the harm or detriment threatened.

(2) However, this protection does not extend to an act or omission which would constitute the crime of murder, or any of the
crimes defined in sections 81(2) and 82, or an offence of which grievous bodily harm to the person of another, or an
intention to cause such harm, is an element, nor to a person who has by entering into an unlawful association or
conspiracy rendered himself or herself liable to have such threats made to the person.
(3) Whether an order is or is not manifestly unlawful is a question of law." (emphasis in bold added)

___________Review Committee, Review of Commonwealth Criminal Law - Interim Report - Principles of Criminal Responsibility and Other Matters, Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1990, see "Lawful Authority" at pp. 155-159 (Chairman: Sir Harry Gibbs), ISBN: 0644127244;

"The Review Committee considers that for the sake of completeness it would be desirable to include in the proposed consolidating law a provision to the effect that a person does not commit an offence by doing any act required or authorised by any law of the Commonwealth. It is intended that such a provision should refer only to statute laws (and subordinate legislation thereunder)." (p. 158)

___________Western Australia, Criminal Code, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/consol_act/cc94/ (accessed on 30 August 2005);

31. Justification and excuse: Compulsion
A person is not criminally responsible for an act or omission if he does or omits to do the act under any of the following circumstances, that is to say —

(1) In execution of the law;
(2) In obedience to the order of a competent authority which he is bound by law to obey, unless the order is manifestly unlawful;

(3) When the act is reasonably necessary in order to resist actual and unlawful violence threatened to him, or to another person in his presence;

(4) When he does or omits to do the act in order to save himself from immediate death or grievous bodily harm threatened to be inflicted upon him by some person actually present and in a position to execute the threats, and believing himself to be unable otherwise to escape the carrying of the threats into execution;

But this protection does not extend to an act or omission which would constitute an offence punishable with strict security life imprisonment, or an offence of which grievous bodily harm to the person of another, or an intention to cause such harm, is an element, nor to a person who has, by entering into an unlawful association or conspiracy, rendered himself liable to have such threats made to him.

Whether an order is or is not manifestly unlawful is a question of law." (emphasis in bold added)

BALESTRIER-CANILHAC, L. S. de, Politicon ou choix des meilleurs discours, sur tous les sujets de politique, traités dans la première assemblée nationale de France: avec une analyse historique et critique des motions et opinions sur les mêmes sujets, Tome 1, Paris: Laurent, 1792; disponible à (vérifié le 22 février 2009)

"Projet des premiers articles de la constitution lu dans la séance du 28 juillet 1789, par M. Mounier, membre du Comité, chargé du plan de constitution

CHAPITRE PREMIER

Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen [...]

XVI. Il est permis à tout homme de repousser la force par la force, à moins qu'elle ne soit employée en vertu de la loi" (voir les pp. 30 et 33)"

BURCHELL, E.M., J.R.L. Milton and J.M. Burchell, South African Criminal Law and Procedure, Vol I, General Principles of Criminal Law by EM Burchell and PMA Hunt, 2nd ed., Cape Town: Juta, 1983, lxii, 512 p., ISBN: 070211345X (hardcover) and 0702113468 (softcover);

"Authority ...

Acts which would otherwise be criminal are justified if done within the limits of authority conferred by law. Where the right or duty to act proceeds from the State the authority is public, otherwise it is private [e.g. lawful correction of children].

Whether public or private authority is relied upon, the accused's act will be justified only if it was in fact authorized by law. If no such authority existed his act will be unlawful...." (p. 359)

CANALS, Jose M. and Henry Dahl, translated by, "Standard Penal Code for Latin America", (1990) 17 American Journal of Criminal Law 263-288, and see article 15; available at http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/Latspc.htm; note de recherche: pour une traduction française du Code pénal type latino-américain, voir RAMIREZ, infra;

"Article 15

No crime is committed by those who act in the performance of a legal duty or in the lawful exercise of a right."

CHILI, Codigo Penal, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20020305071522/http://www.viajuridica.cl/index.asp?art=81&dc=38449 (accessed on 20 October 2007);

"Art. 10. Están exentos de responsabilidad criminal: ...

10. El que obra en cumplimiento de un deber o en el ejercicio legítimo de un derecho, autoridad, oficio o cargo."

CLIVE, Eric (from CBE, Edinburgh), Pamela Ferguson (from Dundee), Christopher Gane and Alexander McCall Smith presented A Draft Criminal Code for Scotland with commentary to the Minister of Justice in August 2003; see s. 22, "Lawful authority", at pp. 59-63; available at http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/downloads/cp_criminal_code.pdf (accessed on 24 September 2007);

"22 Lawful authority
(1) A person is not guilty of an offence if the acts in question are justified by lawful authority.
(2) An act is justified by lawful authority if⎯

(a) it is required by an enactment or rule of law;

(b) an enactment or rule of law confers a right to do it or authorises it; or

(3) The following are, in particular, regarded as having lawful authority to act in the proper exercise of their role or functions⎯

(a) judges, officers of court, members of the armed forces, police officers and prison officers;

(b) members of the public assisting police officers in the exercise of their functions or exercising any lawful power of arrest or responsibility to prevent crime;

(d) teachers and others having the lawful care or control of a child or young person; and

(e) guardians, relatives and others having the care of, or a legitimate role in relation to the welfare of, an adult with incapacity within the meaning of the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 (asp 4).

(4) Nothing in this section justifies—

(a) the use of force which is excessive in the circumstances;

(b) the infliction of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or corporal punishment; or

(c) any violence, abuse, or maltreatment by those exercising the responsibilities or roles mentioned in subsection (3)(c)(d) or (e).

(5) In deciding whether an act is done in the proper exercise of a responsibility, authority, role or function, account can be taken of superior orders which are not manifestly unlawful."

CORNELIS, Ludo and Pierre Van Ommeslaghe, "Les 'faits justificatifs' dans le droit belge de la responsabilité aquilienne", in Journées d'études sur le droit de la responsabilité (1984: Gand, Belgique), Limpens, Jean, 1910-1979, Centre interuniversitaire de droit comparé, In memoriam Jean Limpens : Studiedagen aansprakelijkheidsrecht, Gent, 23-24 maart 1984 = In memoriam Jean Limpens : Journées d'études sur le droit de la responsabilité, Gent, 23-24 mars 1984 = In memoriam Jean Limpens : Symposium on Civil Liability, Gent, 23-24 March 1984, Antwerpen : Kluwer rechtswetenschappen, 1987, xxvii, 311 p., aux pp. 265-287, et voir "L'ordre de ou la permission de la loi", aux pp. 280-281 (series; Interuniversitair Centrum voor Rechtsvergelijking; 12), (Collection; Centre interuniversitaire de droit comparé; 12), ISBN: 9063212879; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, K923 Z9 I56 1987; droit civil mais un article utile pour les chercheurs et chercheuses;

CROATIA, Criminal Code in English, available at http://www.vsrh.hr/CustomPages/Static/HRV/Files/Legislation__Criminal-Code.doc, (accessed on 26 September 2007);

"Lawful Use of Force
Article 32

There shall be no criminal offense when an authorized person uses force in accordance with the law."

CZACHORSKI, Witold, "Causes de justification -- Note pour les pays socialistes", in Journées d'études sur le droit de la responsabilité (1984: Gand, Belgique), Limpens, Jean, 1910-1979, Centre interuniversitaire de droit comparé, In memoriam Jean Limpens : Studiedagen aansprakelijkheidsrecht, Gent, 23-24 maart 1984 = In memoriam Jean Limpens : Journées d'études sur le droit de la responsabilité, Gent, 23-24 mars 1984 = In memoriam Jean Limpens : Symposium on Civil Liability, Gent, 23-24 March 1984, Antwerpen : Kluwer rechtswetenschappen, 1987, xxvii, 311 p., at pp. 251-264, et voir "Ordre de la loi ou sa permission -- Commandement de l'autorité légitime", aux pp. 257-259 (series; Interuniversitair Centrum voor Rechtsvergelijking; 12), (Collection; Centre interuniversitaire de droit comparé; 12), ISBN: 9063212879; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, K923 Z9 I56 1987; droit civil mais un article utile pour les chercheurs et chercheuses;

DANDO, Shigemitsu, 1913-, The Criminal Law of Japan: The General Part, Littleton (Colorado): Fred B. Rothman, 1997, xxiv, 521 p., and see Section 6.04 "Acts Done Pursuant to Law; Acts Performed in the Course of Lawful Pursuits", at pp. 92-97 (Series; Publications of the Comparative Criminal Law Project, vol. 19);

"The Penal Code of Japan contains certain general provisions governing grounds excluding illegality, embodied in Article 35:

An act done in accordance with laws or ordinances or in the course of lawful pursuits is not punishable." (p. 92)

DINSTEIN, Yoram, "Defences", in Gabrielle Kirk McDonald and Olivia Swaak-Goldman, eds., Substantive and procedural Aspects of International Criminal Law. The Experience of International and National Courts", vol. I, Commentary, The Hague-London-Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2000, xvi,705 p., at pp. 367-388, and see "Obedience to National Law" at pp. 382-383, ISBN: 9041111336; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, K5000 S83 2000, v. 1;388;

"Obedience to national legal norms must be distinguished from obedience to superior orders. Superior orders may be illegal from the perspective of national law as much as international law. Should that be the case, no clash between the two legal systems would be generated by the illegal orders. But when a national law decrees the commission of acts constituting international offences, the cardinal question is that of the relationship between international and national law.
......
When international law directly imposes penal obligations on individuals, any provisions of national law colliding head-on with such obligations are annulled by international law. In the words of an American military tribunal, in 1948, in the German High Command trial:

'International Common Law must be superior to and, where it conflicts with, take precedence over National Law or directives issued by any national governmental authority. A directive to violate International Criminal Common Law is therefore void and can afford no protection to one who violates such law in reliance on such a directive.⁶⁸' " (p. 382)

-----
68 German High Command Trial, 15 I.L.R. 376, 396 (United States Military Tribunal, Nuremberg 1948).

___________"International Criminal Law", (1985) 20 Israel Law Review 206-242, and see "Obedience to National Law", at pp. 239-240;

ENGLAND AND WALES, The Law Commission, Codification of the Criminal Law: A Report to the Law Commission, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1985, vi, 246 p. (series; Law Com. No. 143), ISBN: 0102270856;

"Act authorised by law.
48. -- (1) A person does not commit an offence by doing an act which, in the circumstances which exist or which he believes to exist, he is authorised to do by --
(a) the judgment or order of a competent court or tribunal; or
(b) the law governing the execution of legal process; or
(c) the law governing the armed forces or the lawful conduct of war; or
(d) the law defining the duties or functions of a public officer or the assistance to be rendered to such an officer in the performance of his duties; or
(e) any other rule of law imposing a public duty.

(2) In this section 'armed forces' means any of the naval, military or air forces of the Crown.

Act justified or excused by law.
49. -- (1) A person does not commit an offence by doing an act which is justified or excused by --
(a) any enactment; or
(b) any rule of the common law, except insofar as the rule is inconsistent with this or any other enactment.

Rules of the common law.
(2) Nothing in this Act shall limit any power of the courts to determine the existence, extent or application of any rule of the common law referred to in subsection (1) and continuing to apply after the commencement of this Act." (p. 197)

-----

Clause 48: Acts authorised by law ...

It [clause 48] contains nothing which would not fall within the more general provision of clause 49 but its inclusion is justified on the ground that the Code should be as informative as possible and, where there are established particular rules, it should spell them out. ...

The clause is based on section 3.03 of the American Model Penal Code. Its substance appears to be uncontroversial, indeed largely self-evident. If the defendant is authorised to do an act by any rule of law, it cannot be an offence for him to do it. It will, however, be necessary to refer to the particular branch of the law mentioned in order to determine whether the particular act is or is not authorised. ...

It would be impossible to produce a definitive list of public duties. Hence the need for paragraph (c). Thi is, however, confined to public duties and would not extend to a mere contractual duty. ...

Clause 49: Acts justified or excused by law ...

Preservation of defences. The principal purpose of this clause is that ...of preserving and allowing the possibility of the continuing development of defences at common law. The provision is necessary to take account od such common law rights as those of the parent or schoolteacher to detain or chastise a child; that of a doctor to render aid to, or practise surgery on, an unconcious patient...

Clause 49(1). Paragraph (a) is included for the sake of completeness. If a statutory provision justifies or excuses the doing of any act, it is plain that the act does not amount to an offence...

Clause 49(2). This subsection has effect in relation to any rule of the common law, justifying or excusing an act, which is not inconsistent with the Code or any other Act and which therefore continues in force after the enactment of the Code. The subsection preserves any power which the courts now have to determine the existence, extent and application of any such rule. ...

The preservation of the common law defence must necessarily preserve the power of the courts to determine its limits, perhaps by deciding that it extends more widely than has hitherto been supposed. It would be impossible, however, to limit the power of the court to extending the ambit of a defence. They might decide that the ambit is narrower than previously stated. ....It certainly leaves open the possibility of some extension by the courts of potential criminal liability; but that is a price which must be paid for the preservation of common law defences." (pp. 128-129; notes omitted)

___________ The Law Commission, A Criminal Code for England and Wales, vol. 1: Report and Draft Criminal Code Bill and vol. 2: Commentary on Draft Criminal Code Bill, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, [1989], v, 278 p. (series; Law Com. No. 177), ISBN: 0102299897;

"Acts justified or excused by law.
45. A person does not commit an offence by doing an act which is justified or excused by --
(a) any enactment; or
(b) any 'enforceable Community right' as defined in section 2(1) of the European Communities Act 1972; or
(c) any rule of the common law continuing to apply by virtue of section 4(4)." (p. 62)

------

"Clause 45...Defence provided by an enactment...The self-evident proposition that, if a statutory provision justifies or excuses the doing of any act, that act does not amount to an offence is stated by paragraph(a) for the sake of completeness. ...." (p. 234)

ETHIOPIA, The Criminal Code of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 2004, available at http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/70993/75092/F1429731028/ETH70993.pdf (accessed on 30 September 2007);

"Article 68.-Acts Required or Authorized by Law.

Acts required or authorized by law do not constitute a crime and are not punishable; in particular:

(a) acts in respect of public, State or military duties done within the limits permitted by law;

(b) acts reasonably done in exercising the right of correction or discipline; or

(c) acts done in the exercise of private rights recognized by law, where the conditions and limits of the exercise of such rights are not exceeded."

FRANCE, Code pénal, art. 122-4;

"Article 122-4
N'est pas pénalement responsable la personne qui accomplit un acte prescrit ou autorisé par des dispositions législatives ou réglementaires.

N'est pas pénalement responsable la personne qui accomplit un acte commandé par l'autorité légitime, sauf si cet acte est manifestement illégal." (http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/WAspad/ListeCodes?heure=170046560981&lalangue=FR, site visité le 3 août 2006)

------

"ARTICLE 122-4
A person is not criminally liable who performs an act prescribed or authorised by legislative or regulatory provisions.

A person is not criminally liable who performs an action commanded by a lawful authority, unless the action is manifestly unlawful." (http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/html/codes_traduits/code_penal_textan.htm, accessed on 3 August 2006)

GRAVEN, Philippe, L'infraction pénale punissable, Berne : Éditions Staempfli, 1993, xv, 346 p., (Collection; Précis de droit Staempfli), ISBN: 372720978X; il y a maintenant une deuxième édition soit une mise à jour par Bernhard Sträuli, 1995, 376 p., ISBN: 3727209836;

"N'imposant aucune obligation, ne conférant aucun droit, l'art. 32 [du Code pénal suisse, maintenat remplaçé par l'art. 14, voir Suisse infra]. n'a qu'une valeur déclarative. Dans la mesure où il se borne à reconnaître l'existence de justifications extra-pénales et à rappeler ainsi, notamment aux magistrats non professionnels, l'unité de l'ordre juridique, il est superflu, et l'art. 15 de l'AP 1985, même s'il en élimine certaines imperfections, aurait donc pu s'abstenir de le reprendre." (p. 111, édition de 1993)

GREEN, L. C. (Leslie Claude), 1920-, "Legal Issues in the Eichmann Trial", (1962-63) 37 Tulane Law Review 641-684, and see "Ungerichtes Recht", at pp. 680-684;

"It is true that in the common law the idea of a law which runs counter to a higher natural law being invalid is not acceptable,¹⁷⁷ although in McCall v. McDowall¹⁷⁸ it was conceded that an order -- law--might be 'so palpably atrocious...that one ought instinctively feel that it ought not be obeyed.' On the Continent, however, and particularly in Germany since 1945, it is accepted that legislator's law might have to give way before universally recognized principles of law. Even Dr. Servatius accepted that 'not everything which a legislator decides is law. The power of legislation has its limits.'¹⁷⁹ In fact, the present German position, as expressed in the decisions of the Bundesgerichtshof, has been summarized as dollows: 'Basically, the law required to be known is positive law...but that law is assumed to incorporate a minimum standard of morality and to be valid only to the extent that it conforms to certain basic conceptions of justice prevailing among civilized nations.'¹⁸⁰
------
177 See Austin, The Province of Jurisprudence Determined 185 (Library of Ideas ed. 1945).
178 1 Abb. 212 (N.Y. 1887).
179 Rosenne, 6,000,000 Accusers: Israel's Case Against Eichmann 297 (1961).
180 Ryu & Silving, Error Juris: A Comparative Study, 24 U. Chi. L. Rev. 421, 463 (1956).

The legal philosopher who has done most to propagate the idea of ungerichtes Recht is Radbruch:

'Preference must be given to positive law, duly enacted and supported by the authority of effective state power, even where the contents of such law are unjust and do not respond to demands of social utility, unless the contrast between the positive enactment and justice reaches so intolerable a degree that the enactment, being 'wrong law,' must yield to justice...Where justice is not even sought, where equality which constitutes the core of justice is conciously denied in enacting positive law, there the statute is not merely wrong law; rather, it is not law at all.'¹⁸¹

Radbruch's views, and the acceptance of them by the German courts, have been adversely criticised by, for example, Hart.¹⁸² ...
------
181 Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie 335, 347 (1950).
182 Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593, 618-21 (1958)." (pp. 681-682)

INDIA, Indian Law Commissioners, A Penal Code prepared by the Indian Law Commissioners, and published by Command of the Governor General of India in Council -- Reprinted from the Calcutta Edition, London: Pelham Richardson, 1838, viii, 138 p.,and see PDF p. 7; reprint in Birmingham (Ala.): Legal Classics Library, c1987; and in Union (New Jersey): The Lawbook Exchange Ltd., 2002, ISBN: 158477018X;

India, Indian Penal Code, available at http://498a.org/contents/ipc_explained.pdf (accessed on 27 September 2007);

"76. Act done by a person bound, or by mistake of fact believing himself bound, by law
Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is, or who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake of law in good faith believes himself to be, bound by law to do it.
Illustrations
(a) A, a soldier, fires on a mob by the order of his superior officer, in conformity with the commands of the law. A has committed no offence.
(b) A, an officer of a Court of Justice, being ordered by that Court to arrest Y, and, after due enquiry, believing Z to be Y, arrests Z. A has committed no offence.

77. Act of Judge when acting judicially
Nothing is an offence which is done by a Judge when acting judicially in the exercise of any power which is, or which in good faith he believes to be, given to him by law.

78. Act done pursuant to the judgment or order of Court
Nothing which is done in pursuance of, or which is warranted by the judgment or order of, a Court of Justice; if done whilst such judgment or order remains in force, is an offence, notwithstanding the Court may have had no jurisdiction to pass such judgment or order, provided the person doing the act in good faith believes that the Court had such jurisdiction.

79. Act done by a person justified, or by mistake of fact believing himself justified, by law
Nothing is an offence which is done by any person who is justified by law, or who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake of law in good faith, believes himself to be justified by law, in doing it.
Illustration
A sees Z commit what appears to A to be a murder. A, in the exercise, to the best of his judgment exerted in good faith, of the power which the law gives to all persons of apprehending murderers in the fact, seizes Z, in order to bring Z before the proper authorities. A has committed no offence, though it may turn out that Z was acting in self-defence."

IRAQ, Penal Code, available at available at http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/Iraqi_Penal_Code_1969.pdf (accessed on 18 July 2006);

"Performance of a duty

Paragraph 39 - There is no crime if the act occurs in performance of a duty prescribed by the Code.

Paragraph 40 - There is no crime if the act is committed by a public official or agent in the following circumstances:

(1) If he commits the act in good faith in the performance of his legal duty or if he considers that carrying it out is within his jurisdiction.

(2) If he commits the act in performance of an order from a superior which he is obliged to obey or which he feels he is obliged to obey. It must be established in these circumstances that the belief of the offender in the legitimacy of the act is reasonable and that he committed the act only after taking suitable precautions. Moreover, there is no penalty in the second instance if the Code does not afford the official an opportunity to question the order issued to him.

Exercising a legal right
Paragraph 41 - There is no crime if the act is committed while exercising a legal right. The following are considered to be in exercise of a legal right:
(1) The punishment of a wife by her husband, the disciplining by parents and teachers of children under their authority within certain limits prescribed by law or by custom.
(2) A surgical operation or professional treatment when it is carried out with the consent of the patient or his legal representative or without their consent in cases of emergency
(3) An act of violence during the course of a sporting event when the rules of that sport have been complied with:
(4) An act of violence committed against any person caught in the act of committing a felony or misdemeanour with a view to apprehending him."

IRELAND, The Law Reform Commission, Report -- Defences in Criminal Law, Dublin: The Law Reform Commission, 2009, xix, 226 p., and see Chapter 3 "Public Defence", at pp. 77-105 (series; report; LRC 95-2009), ISSN: 1393-3132; available at http://www.lawreform.ie/publications/rDefencesinCriminalLaw.pdf (accessed on 28 December 2009);

ISRAEL, Unofficial English Translation " "Penal Law--Draft Proposal and New Code", (Winter-Spring 1996) 30(1-2) Israel Law Review 5-27, available at http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/israeli.htm (accessed on 25 October 2007); see comments by AMELUNG, supra;

"34M. A person shall bear no criminal liability for an act done by him under any one of the following:
(1) he is bound or authorized to do it under law;
(2) he does it on the order of a competent authority while bound under law to obey such authority, save where the order is manifestly unlawful;
(3) where the act requires consent under law - he does it while having reason to assume that it must be done without delay to save a person's life or bodily integrity, or in order to prevent serious injury to a person's health and, in the circumstances of the case, the doer of the act is unable to obtain consent;
(4) he does it with consent in the course of a medical intervention or treatment designed to benefit the patient or another person;
(5) he does it in the course of a sports activity, or a game, not contrary to law and according to the accepted rules of such activity or game." (emphasis added; we have used here the text of the of the Buffalo Criminal Law center; in the enacted New Penal code of the State of Israel, the section number is not 34M but 49).

The Italian Penal Code Translated by Edward M. Wise in collaboration with Allen Maitlin. Introduction by Edward M. Wise, Lttleton (Colorado): Fred B. Rothman and London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1978, xli, 249 p., see articles 51 and 55, (series; American series of foreign penal codes; vol. 23), ISBN: 08377700434;

"Article 51. Exercise of a Right or Performance of a Duty.
The exercise of a right or performance of a duty imposed by law or by lawful order of the public authorities shall preclude punishability.

If an act constituting an offense is committed by order of the authorities, the public officer who has issued the order shall be liable for the offense.

The person who has carried out the order shall also be liable for the offense, except where, owing to error of fact, he believed he was obeying a lawful order.

One who carries out an unlawful order shall not be punishable when the law does not permit him to question the lawfulnesss of the order.

......

Article 55. Negligent Excess.
When, in committing any of the acts designated in Articles 51 [Exercise of a Right or Performance of a Duty], 52 [Lawful Defense], 53 [Lawful Use of Arms] and 54, the limits prescribed by law or by order of the authorities or imposed by necessity are negligently exceeded, the provisions of law relating to crimes of negligence shall apply, if the act is designated by law as a crime or negligence." (pp. 17-18)

------

"Art. 51 - Esercizio di un diritto o adempimento di un dovere

   L'esercizio di un diritto o l'adempimento di un dovere imposto da una norma giuridica o da un ordine legittimo della pubblica Autorità, esclude 
la punibilità.

   Se un fatto costituente reato è commesso per ordine dell'Autorità, del reato risponde il pubblico ufficiale che ha dato l'ordine. 

   Risponde del reato altresì chi ha eseguito l'ordine, salvo che, per errore di fatto, abbia ritenuto di obbedire a un ordine legittimo.

   Non è punibile chi esegue l'ordine illegittimo, quando la legge non gli consente alcun sindacato sulla legittimità dell'ordine.

......

Art. 55 - Eccesso colposo

Quando, nel commettere alcuno dei fatti preveduti dagli articoli 51 [Esercizio di un diritto o adempimentodi un dovere], 52 [Difesa legittima], 53 [Uso legittima delle armi] e 54, si eccedono colposamente i limiti stabiliti dalla legge o dall'ordine dell'Autorità ovvero imposti dalla necessità, si applicano le disposizioni concernenti i delitti colposi, se il fatto è preveduto dalla legge come delitto colposo." (http://www.usl4.toscana.it/dp/isll/lex/cp_l1.htm#L1t3c1, accessed on 3 August 2006)

------

"ART. 51 -- Exercise d'un droit ou accomplissement d'un devoir. --
    L'exercise d'un droit ou l'accomplissement d'un devoir, imposé par une règle juridique ou par ordre légitime de l'Autorité publique, n'est pas punissable.

    Si un fait, constituant une infraction, est commis par ordre de l'Autorité publique, le fonctionnaire public qui l'a ordonné en répond toujours.

    Celui qui a exécuté l'ordre répond aussi de l'infraction, à moins que, par suite d'une erreur de fait, il n'ait cru obéir à un ordre légitime.

    N'est pas punissable celui qui exécute un ordre illégitime, lorsque la loi ne lui accorde aucun moyen de se rendre compte de la légitimité de cet ordre.

[...]

ART. 55. -- Excès non intentionnel (colposo). --
    Lorsque, en commettant l'un des faits prévus par les articles 51 [Exercise d'un droit ou accomplisement d'un devoir], 52 [Légitime défense], 53 [Usage légitime des armes] et 54, on dépasse sans intention les limites établies par la loi, ou par l'ordre de l'Autorité, ou imposées par la nécessité, on applique les dispositions concernant les délits non intentionnels, si le fait est prévu par la loi comme délit non intentionnel." (Code pénal italien de 1930, traduction de P. de Casabianca avec mise à jour par V. de Toma, avec une notice spéciale sur ce code par Marc Ancel avec la collaboration de Yvonne Marx, dans Les Codes pénaux européens, Tome II, Paris: Centre français de droit comparé, 1956, pp. 871-1014, aux pp. 881-882 (Nouvelle Collection du Comité de législation étrangère et de droit international));

JAPAN, Penal Code in English, available at http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/PC.pdf (accessed on 29 September 2007);

"Article 35. (Justifiable Acts)

An act performed in accordance with laws and regulations or in the pursuit of lawful business is not punishable."

JOH, Elizabeth E., "Breaking the Law to Enforce it: Undercover Police Participation in Crime" (July 2, 2009), Stanford Law Review, Vol. 62, available at SSRN: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1429162, accessed on 29 September 2009;

JOLOWICZ, J.A., "Grounds of Justification -- English Law", in Journées d'études sur le droit de la responsabilité (1984: Gand, Belgique), Limpens, Jean, 1910-1979, Centre interuniversitaire de droit comparé, In memoriam Jean Limpens : Studiedagen aansprakelijkheidsrecht, Gent, 23-24 maart 1984 = In memoriam Jean Limpens : Journées d'études sur le droit de la responsabilité, Gent, 23-24 mars 1984 = In memoriam Jean Limpens : Symposium on Civil Liability, Gent, 23-24 March 1984, Antwerpen : Kluwer rechtswetenschappen, 1987, xxvii, 311 p., at pp. 223-248, and see "Legal Duty and Authority: Statutory Authority", at pp. 232-234 (series; Interuniversitair Centrum voor Rechtsvergelijking; 12), (Collection; Centre interuniversitaire de droit comparé; 12), ISBN: 9063212879; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, K923 Z9 I56 1987; civil law but useful for researchers;

JURIS PEDIA, "Ordre de la loi", disponible à http://fr.jurispedia.org/index.php/Ordre_de_la_loi_(fr) (vérifié le 18 mai 2009);

KILLIAS, Martin, Précis de droit pénal général, Berne: Éditions Staempfli, 1998, xlv, 300 p. (Collection; Précis de droit Staempfli), ISBN: 3727209895;

"L'illicéité comme élément constitutif non écrit

L'ordre juridique constitue un ensemble. Quoique subdivisé en plusieurs branches, le droit cherche à assurer une harmonie entre celles-ci et les règles qu'elles contiennent. Il n'est donc pas concevable que soit punisable un acte licite (rechtsmässig), voire commandé par une autre loi. Par exemple, un témoin ne peut pas d'une part être obligé de dire tout ce qui est pertinent et véridique et d'autre part être tenu de garder le secret sur certains faits: il faut donc prévoir une procédure permettant de le délier de son secret; dans la mesure où l'obligation de garder le secret subsiste, le témoin ne peut pas être sanctionné pour son refus de dévoiler ces mêmes faits; s'il est délié de son secret, il ne commet aucune violation de son devoir de discrétion (art. 320 ou 321 CP) s'il dépose à propose de ce qui est pertinent et vériddique.

Tout acte n'est donc punissable que s'il est illicite (rechtswidrig); s'il est licite -- peu importe en vertu de quelle loi ou de quel principe -- il ne peut pas être punissable. L'illicéité (die Rechtswidrigkeit) représente ainsi un élément constitutif non écrit de toutes les infractions, à l'instar du rapport de causalité en matière de délits matériels qui sont aussi des délits de lésion. Étant donné que cela paraît si fondamental et trivial, le législateur s'est abstenu de le répéter dans la définition de chaque infraction. Il a préféré mettre dans la partie générale du Code (art. 32 C.P.) [voir Suisse, infra] une réserve qui rappelle qu'aucun acte n'est punissable s'il est licite.

Lors de l'examen de la punissabilité d'un acte quelconque, il faut donc toujours se demander s'il n'est pas licite en vertu d'une réglementation concernant peut-être un autre domaine juridique." (p. 93)

LIMPENS, Jean, Robert M. Kruithof and Anne Meinertzhagen-Limpens, "Liability for One’s Own Act", in André Tunc, Chief Editor, International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, volume XI, Torts, Part 1, Chapter 2, pp. 2-2 to 2-140, and see in particular, "Grounds of Justifications", at pp. 2-167 to 2-192, and for "LEGAL DUTY AND LAWFUL AUTHORITY", pp. 2-181 to 2-186 and 2-192, Tübingen: Mohr J.C.B (Paul Siebeck) and The Hague/Boston/London: The Hague: Martin Nijhoff, 1983, ISBN: 3166445420 (Mohr) and 9024727871 (Nijhoff); copy at the Library of Parliament, Ottawa, Br. B K530 I58 V. II pt. 1; tort law but very useful for researchers;

LASSERRE, M. Emmanuel, Étude sur les cas de non-culpabilité et les excuses en matière pénale suivant la science rationnelle, la législation positive et la jurisprudence, Toulouse: Imprimerie de Bonnal et Gibrac, 1877, 375 p.; pdf et Internet complétés le 2 juin 2007;
PDF
- Table des matières;
- 1-186;
- 187-375;

MONGOLIA, Criminal Code, available at http://www.ecoi.net/file_upload/432_tmpphpqd46LN.pdf (accessed on 27 September 2007);

"Article 41. Inflicting Harm to the Offender in the Course of Arrest

41.1. Inflicting harm to the offender or fugitive convict aimed at suppression of the possibility to commit a new crime, delivering him/her to the state authorities in the course ofapprehension by the victim or another person shall not constitute a crime."

"Article 44. Fulfilling orders and decrees
44.1. Causing harm to the rights and interests protected by this Code in the course of fulfilling mandatory orders or decrees shall not constitute a crime. The person giving an illegal order or decree shall be subject to criminal liability for the harm caused.

44.2. A person causing harm to others’ rights and interests protected by this Code by fulfilling a knowingly illegal order or decree shall be subject to criminal liability. A person who fails to fulfill a knowingly illegal order or decree shall not be subject to criminal liability."

MASCALA, Corinne, "Ordre de la loi (Art. 122-4)", 2002, 19 p., in Juris-Classeur pénal, Paris: Éditions du Juris-Classeur, vol. 1, copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, bibliothèque de droit, FTX, General, KJV 7979 .J87 v. 1;

MOSTAFA, Mahmoud M., Principes de droit pénal des pays arabes, Préface de Marc Ancel, Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1972, iii, 190 p., voir "L'exercice du droit" aux pp. 45-46 et "L'accomplissement du devoir" aux pp. 47-50 (collection; Les grands systemes de droit pénal contemporains; vol. 5); copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, FTX General, FTX General: KMC 974 .M67 1972;

"L'EXERCICE DU DROIT
42. -- Source de la justification
[...]

En tout cas la justification de l'infraction commise dans l'exercice d'un droit est une chose communément admise et n'a pas besoin de texte. La loi ne peut autoriser un acte et le punir en même temps; c'est dans ce sens que l'article 186/1 du Code libanais, l'article 185/1 du Code syrien et l'article 62/1 du Code jordanien se sont exprimés en disposant que : 'L'acte autorisé par la loi n'est pas punissable.' " (pp. 45-46)

"L'ACCOMPLISSEMENT DU DEVOIR
[...]
46. -- L'ordre de la loi et le commandement de l'autorité constituent deux causes indépendantes." (pp. 47-48)

NETHERLANDS, The Dutch Penal Code, Translated by Louise Rayar and Stafford Wadsworth in collaboration with Mona Cheung, Gudule Geelen, Marjolein Heesbeen, Maike de Lange, Gert Van Slik, and Jolien Zwarts, Revision by Hans Lensing, Instructions by Grat Van Den Heuvel and Hans Lensing, Littleton (Colorado): Rothman, 1997, xxiii, 277 p., (The American series of penal codes; vol. 30), ISBN: 0837700507; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, K5001 A63 no. 30;

"Article 42

A person who commits an offense in carrying out a legal requirement is not criminally liable." (p. 73)

PORTUGAL, Penal Code -- General Part in English, available at http://www.verbojuridico.net/download/portuguesepenalcode.pdf (accessed on 30 September 2007); and for the Codigo de Processo Penal, available at http://web.archive.org/web/20031208174840/http://www.cea.ucp.pt/lei/penal/penalind.htm (accessed on 11 June 2004 and on 19 October 2007 for web archive);

"Article 31

Exclusion of unlawfulness

1- The act is not criminally punishable when its unlawfulness is excluded by the legal system considered as a whole.

2- Namely, the act is not unlawful when committed:

a) In legitimate defence;

b) In the exercise of a right;

c) In fulfilment of a duty imposed by law or by an authority legitimate order;

d) With the consent of the holder of the harmed legal interest."

----

"Art. 31º Exclusão da ilicitude

1 O facto não é punível quando a sua ilicitude for excluída pela ordem jurídica considerada na sua totalidade.

2 Nomeadamente, não é ilícito o facto praticado:

a) Em legítima defesa;

b) No exercício de um direito;

c) No cumprimento de um dever imposto por lei ou por ordem legítima da autoridade; ou

d) Com o consentimento do titular do interesse jurídico lesado."

RAMIREZ, Juan Bustos and Manuel Valenzuela Bejas, Le système pénal des pays d'Amérique latine (avec référence au Code pénal type latino-américain), Traduit de l'espagnol par Jacqueline Bernat De Celis, Paris: Éditions A. Pedone, 1983, 159 p., et voir sur l'article 15 du Code pénal type, les pp. 61-63, ISBN: 2233001184; note: for an English version of section 15, see CANALS, supra;

"ARTICLE 15. -- Ne commet pas de délit celui qui agirait dans l'accomplissement d'un devoir légal ou dans l'exercice légitime d'un droit.

[...]

REMARQUES COMPARATIVES

a) L'analyse de la législation. Comme on a pu s'en rendre compte, la totalité des codes pénaux latino-américains prévoient d'une manière ou de l'autre cette cause de justification, qui provient du Code pénal espagnol de 1848-1850.

L'opinion dominante des auteurs latino-américains est également claire à ce sujet et la plupart l'incluent expressément dans leurs oeuvres.

Nous estimons cependant que cette cause de justification n'ajoute absolument rien, qu'elle pose simplement l'un des aspects fondamentaux de l'antijuridicité, c'est-à-dire que dans l'ordonnancement juridique il y a aussi des règles permissives, qui prévalent sur les règles exceptionnelles que sont les règles prohibitives (ou impératives), et que de telles règles permissives se trouvent naturellement dans tout l'ordonnancement. Ce qui est normal et ordinaire c'est la règle permissive, et il ne suffit pas qu'il n'existe pas de norme permissive pour être dans la sphère de l'interdiction, il faut qu'il y ait en outre une règle prohibitive expresse (ou une règle impérative).

En réalité, si cette disposition avait une fonction, ce serait simplement de clarifier le principe d'antijuridicité, qui n'a pas réellement besoin d'une déclaration légale, et qui est donc superflue. D'autre part, elle ne peut en aucun cas être estimée comme une cause spéciale de justification. On poiurrait bien dire que sa présence dans le code pénal a un sens pédagogique, mais cela est équivoque, car cela tend à faire croire que l'antijuridicité et les causes de justification sont établies par le code pénal, alors qu'en réalité c'est un code des prohibitions et des ordres prohibitifs. Il est d'ailleurs si évident que ce principe ne constitue pas une cause de justification spécifique que, lorsque les auteurs veulent en faire usage, il leur faut de toute nécessité avoir recours à des causes de justification qui se trouvent dans d'autres branches du droit.

b) L'analyse du contenu des principes. [...]

1. L'accomplissement d'un devoir légal. Accomplit un devoir légal celui qui exécute ce que la loi ordonne. [...]

2. L'exercice légitime d'un droit. On souligne dans ce cas la légitimité de l'exercice, ce qui en fin de compte vient accentuer davantage le caractère général et déclaratoire de cette disposition, car ladite légitimité ne peut s'apprécier que par rapoport à une cause concrète et à la forme dans laquelle elle est réglementée." (pp. 61-63)

ROMANIA, Penal Code, available at http://www.legislationline.org/upload/legislations/18/e2/c1cc95d23be999896581124f9dd8.htm (accessed on 24 September 2007);

"Order of the law and command of legitimate authority

Art.24 – (1) The commission of an act incumbent upon one or authorised by the law shall not be considered an offence if it has been executed according to the conditions provided in the law.

(2) The accomplishment of an act ordained by the legitimate authority shall not be an offence if the order is given in the form provided in the law and it is not obviously illegal."

ROUQUETTE, Théophile, Des excuses légales et des faits justificatifs en matière criminelle, Toulouse: Bonnal et Gibrac, 1866; disponible à http://books.google.com/books?vid=HARVARD32044103179586&printsec=titlepage#PPP5,M1 et à http://books.google.com/books?id=D1kOAAAAYAAJ&source=gbs_summary_s&cad=0 1 et (vérifiés le 30 mai 2008);

SCOTLAND, A Draft Criminal Code for Scotland with commentary, see CLIVE, supra;

SNYMAN, C.R., A Draft Criminal Code for South Africa with a Commentary, Cape Town: Juta, 1995, xl, 133 p., ISBN: 0702133345;

"Execution of public duty
2.8 Conduct is not unlawful if it is authorized by

(a) the judgment or order of a competent court or tribunal;
(b) the law governing the execution of a legal process;
(c) the law defining the duties or functions of a public officer or the assistanece to be rendered to such officer in the performance of his duties;
(d) the law governing the armed services or the lawful conduct of war; or
(e) any other provisions of a law which impose a public duty." (p. 5)

STOLL, Hans, "Grounds of Justification as a Defence to Liability -- German Law", in Journées d'études sur le droit de la responsabilité (1984: Gand, Belgique), Limpens, Jean, 1910-1979, Centre interuniversitaire de droit comparé, In memoriam Jean Limpens : Studiedagen aansprakelijkheidsrecht, Gent, 23-24 maart 1984 = In memoriam Jean Limpens : Journées d'études sur le droit de la responsabilité, Gent, 23-24 mars 1984 = In memoriam Jean Limpens : Symposium on Civil Liability, Gent, 23-24 March 1984, Antwerpen : Kluwer rechtswetenschappen, 1987, xxvii, 311 p., at pp. 207-221, and see "Statutory Authority", at p. 213 (series; Interuniversitair Centrum voor Rechtsvergelijking; 12), (Collection; Centre interuniversitaire de droit comparé; 12), ISBN: 9063212879; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, K923 Z9 I56 1987; civil law but useful for researchers;

SUISSE, Code pénal; disponible à http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/3/311.0.fr.pdf (vérifié le 16 octobre 2007); note de recherche: le code pénal suisse contient des nouvelles dispositions dans sa Partie générale adoptées en 2007; l'art. 14 a remplaçé l'art. 32;

"Art. 14
3. Actes licites et culpabilité.

Actes autorisés par la loi

Quiconque agit comme la loi l’ordonne ou l’autorise se comporte de manière licite, même si l’acte est punissable en vertu du présent code ou d’une autre loi."

----------

"[Ancien] Art. 32
8. Actes lcites.
Loi, devoir de fonction ou de profession

Ne constitue pas une infraction l'acte ordonné par la loi, ou par un devoir de fonction ou de profession; il en est de même de l'acte que la loi déclare permis ou non punissable."

_____________"Message concernant la modification du Code pénal suisse (dispositions générales, entrée en vigueur et application du Code pénal) et du code pénal militaire ainsi qu'une loi fédérale régissant la condition pénale des mineurs du 21 septembre 1998", dans FF (Feuille fédérale) 199 II, pp. 1787-2221; disponible à http://www.ejpd.admin.ch/etc/medialib/data/sicherheit/gesetzgebung/strafgesetzbuch_allg.Par.0005.File.tmp/bot-stgb-at-f.pdf (consulté le 21 octobre 2007); contribution importante;

"212.31 Loi (art. 14)
Comme l'article 32 CP se borne à rappeler l'unité de l'ordre juridique en prévoyant que le comportement ordonné ou déclaré permis par la loi ne constitue pas une infraction, la commission d'experts proposait de le biffer. Beaucoup de participants à la procédure de consultation ont toutefois vivement critiqué cette proposition au motif que l'article 32 CP assurait une certaine sécurité juridique. Aussi, vous proposons-nous de maintenir cette norme avec quelques modifications formelles. Le nouvel article 14 P limite les sources de justification à l'obligation légale (Gesetzespflicht) et à l'autorisation légale (Gesetzeserlaubnis). Il ne mentionne plus le devoir de fonction (Amtspflicht) ni le devoir professionnel (Berufspflicht), qui ne constituent pas, de l'avis unanime de la doctrine, une source justificative autonome. La mention du devoir de fonction et du devoir professionnel ne peut dès lors qu'induire en erreur en faisant penser que l'accomplissement de ces devoirs peut justifier une infraction même s'il ne s'appuie pas sur une loi. Le projet supprime par ailleurs la mention du droit en vigueur assimilant l'acte non punissable (straflos) à un acte licite. Cette assimilation constitue en effet une erreur, car, si les actes licites ne sont assurément pas punissables, il existe des actes illicites qui ne peuvent pas être punis pour des motifs étrangers à l'illicéité de l'acte en cause. Ainsi, l'infraction commise par un irresponsable est un acte illicite qui ne sera pas puni, car son auteur n'est pas coupable". (notes omises)

TUNISIE, Code pénal, disponible à http://www.jurisitetunisie.com/tunisie/codes/cp/menu.html (vérifié le 20 octobre 2007);

"Article 42. ^Note Modifié par la loi n° 2005-46 du 6 juin 2005 portant approbation de la réorganisation de quelques dispositions du code pénal et leur rédaction.- ~~N'est pas punissable, celui qui a commis le fait en vertu d'une disposition de la loi ou d'un ordre de l'autorité compétente.~~
N'est pas punissable, celui qui a commis un fait en vertu d'une disposition de la loi ou d'un ordre de l'autorité compétente."

UNITED KINGDOM, Her Majesty's Commissioners for Revising and Consolidating the Criminal Law, PDF

Second Report of Her Majesty's Commissioners for Revising and Consolidating the Criminal Law, London: Her Majesty Stationery Office, 1846, 75 p. (series; c. (Command) 709); pdf and Internet completed on 7 August 2007; also published in British Parliamentary Papers (1846), vol. 24, pp. 107-182; and in Irish University Press Series of British Parliamentary Papers: Reports From The Royal Commission on Revising and Consolidating The Criminal Law With Appendices and Index 1845-49, vol. 5, Legal Administration Criminal Law, Dublin: Shannon University Press, 1971, pp. 169-244;

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, The National Commision on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Study Draft of a New Federal Criminal Code (Title 18. United States Code), Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., for sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970, lxiv, 344p.; notes: "Consists of materials under consideration by the Commission preparatory to its final report to the President and Congress in November of 1970" (source: Hollis catalogue, Harvard University); research note: a copy of the Final Report of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws with the proposed criminal code is available at http://wings.buffalo.edu/law/bclc/codein.htm (accessed on 25 October 2007);

"§ 601. Justification
(1) Defense. Except as otherwise expressly provided, justification or excuse under this Chapter is a defense.
.....

§ 602. Execution of Public Duty
(1) Authorized by Law. Conduct engaged in by a public servant in the course of his official duties is justified when it is required or authorized by law." (Study Draft, pp. 38-39)

VAN GERVEN, Walter, Jeremy and Pierre Larouche, Cases, Materials and Text on National, Supranational and International Tort Law, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2000, xcix, 969 p., see Chapter 3, "Liability for One's Own Conduct", part 3.2.4, "Grounds of Justification", sub-part sub-part 3.2.4.A, "Statutory Duty, Authority or Permission", (series: Common Law of Europe Casebooks series), ISBN: 1841131393; available at http://www.law.kuleuven.ac.be/casebooks/tort.php (accessed on 6 February 2006); and see also "Grounds of justification" (Comparative overview discussion) at pp. 356-357; civil law (tort law) but very useful for researchers; "copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, KJC1640 T672 2000;

WILLIAMS, Glanville, 1911-1997, Textbook of Criminal Law, 2nd ed., London : Stevens, 1983, xlvii, 1007 p., ISBN: 0420468501 and 0420468609 (pbk.);

"PUBLIC AUTHORITY: POWERS OF ARREST

    The powers of interference with persons and property possesses by public officials (and by private individuals on public grounds) are extremely numerous. The rest of this chapter is concerned only with the right to use force to prevent crime or effect an arrest. We begin with arrest, but with a prefatory remark.

    The law of arrest has for centuries been an Augean stable, because of its neglect by the Home Office. New statutory powers of arrest are continually being added, but they vary vastly in their details and are obscure on many points. Despite the practical importance of the subject we can deal with it only in outline, because not only is it complicated but it is not wholly relevant to a book on the substantive criminal law. It comes within our purview for two reasons.

    First, a valid arrest is a justification on the charge of an offence like assault and false imprisonment, which would otherwise be regarded as being committed against the person arrested. An illegal arrest, in contrast is not, properly speaking, an arrest at all; it can be called an 'arrest' only when the word is used in invisible quotation marks. An illegal 'arrest' is no more an arrest than an illegal 'marriage' is a marriage. It is a false imprisonment, and frequently involves an assault.

    Secondly, certain offences connected with the administration of justice involve proof that the defendant was resisting or escaping from arrest or other unlawful detention, or helping someone else to do. These offences are escape, rescue, assault with intent to resist arrest, wounding with intent to resist lawful apprehension, and (where a question of arrest is involved) assaulting an officer in the execution of his duty.

    In these two ways the law governing the validity of an arrest enters into the substantive law. Nevertheless, it belongs primarily to criminal procedure. For this reason the following relatively brief statement of the law is reduced for the most part, to the gabble of small print, and the reader is left to decide whether he wishes to include it within his present study." (pp. 485-486; notes omitted; emphasis in bold added) [compare with Law Reform Commission of Canada, Arrest, supra]

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