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updated on / mise à jour au: 14 April 2008

by / par  ©François Lareau, Ottawa, 2007-
First posted officially on the Internet: 12 October 2007
 

Selected Bibliography on Impossibility
                  - - - - - - - - - - -

Bibliographie choisie sur l'impossibilité
 
 
Note:

See also bibliographies on omission, automatism, conspiracy, attempt, and complicity at http://www.lareau-law.ca/droitpenal_.htm
Voir aussi les bibliographues sur l'omission, l'automatisme, le complot, la tentative et la complicité à http://www.lareau-law.ca/droitpenal_.htm.

I-- Canadian Law / Droit canadien

BERG, David, "Vagueness and Impossibility in Probation Conditions", (1996) 38 The Criminal Law Quaterly 472-494; 


CANADA, Department of Justice Canada, Reforming the General Part of the Criminal Code: A Consultation Paper, [Ottawa]; [Department of Justice Canada], [November 1994], v, 35 p., and see "Appendix -- What this consultation paper does not deal with", at p. 35; this publication is available at my Digital Library at http://www.lareau-law.ca/DigitalLibrary.html; also published in French/aussi publié en français: Ministère de la Justice Canada, Projet de réforme de la Partie générale du Code criminel: Document de consultation, [Ottawa], [Ministère de la Justice Canada], [Novembre 1994], v, 39 p., et voir "ANNEXE -- Quelles questions le présent document n'aborde-t-il pas?", à la p. 39; cette publication est disponible à ma Bibliothèque digitale à http://www.lareau-law.ca/DigitalLibrary.html;

"APPENDIX
What this consultation paper does not deal with
...
For a variety of reasons, this paper does not discuss a number of other General Part  issues.  These include: the way to deal with the physical element of an offence, some fault elements of crimes , attempts to commit an offence, people who counsel others to commit offences or conspire with others to commit offences, impossibility..." (p. 35; emphasis added)

-----------------

"ANNEXE

Quelles questions le présent document de consultation n'aborde-t-il pas?

[...]

Pour diverses raisons, le présent document ne traite pas des questions suivantes concernant la Partie générale : l'élément matériel des infractions, l'élément moral exigé pour certaines infractions , les tentatives de commettre une infraction, le fait de conseiller à une personne de commettre une infraction ou de comploter avec une autre personne de commettre une infraction, la notion d'impossibilité [...]" (p. 39; mots mis en gras à la fin par moi)


CANADA, Department of Justice Canada and James W. O'Reilly, Toward a New General Part of the Criminal Code of Canada -- Details on Reform Options --, [Ottawa]: [Department of Justice Canada], [December 1994], ii, 50 p, see pp. 5-6; this publication is available at my Digital Library at http://www.lareau-law.ca/DigitalLibrary.html;; information on the French version/informations sur la version française: Ministère de la Justice Canada et James W. O'Reilly, Pour une nouvelle codification de la Partie générale du Code criminel du Canada -- Options de réforme --, [Ottawa]: [Ministère de la Justice Canada], [décembre 1994], ii, 51 p., voir les pp.5-6; cette publication est disponible à ma Bibliothèque digitale à http://www.lareau-law.ca/DigitalLibrary.html;


CANADA, Department of National Defence/Canadian Forces, The Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces, vol.2,  QR&O article 103.16, "Disobedience of Lawful Command",  available at http://www.admfincs.forces.gc.ca/qr_o/vol2/tofc103_e.asp (accessed on 12 October 2007); also published in French/aussi publié en français: CANADA, Ministère de la défense nationale/Forces canadiennes, Ordonnances et règlements royaux applicables aux forces canadiennes, vol. 2, OR&F article 103.16, "Désobéissance à un ordre légitime", disponible à http://www.admfincs.forces.gc.ca/admfincs/subjects/qr_o/vol2/ch103_e.asp#103.16 (visionné le 23 août 2005);

"NOTES [to QR&O article 103.16, "Disobedience of Lawful Command"] ...
(E) An omission arising from misapprehension is not an offence under this section,
 nor is failure to obey a command where obedience would be physically impossible."
------

"NOTES [à l'OR&F article 103.16, "Désobéissance à un ordre légitime"] ...
(E) Une omission provenant d’un malentendu ne constitue pas une infraction aux termes du présent article; il en est de même du défaut d’obéir à un ordre lorsque l’obéissance est matériellement impossible."


CANADA, The Minister of Justice of Canada,  Proposals to Amend the Criminal Code (general principles), [Ottawa], [Department of Justice Canada], 28 June 1993, 17 p., see p. 2; this publication is available at my Digital Library at http://www.lareau-law.ca/DigitalLibrary.html;  information on the French version /informations sur la version française:  CANADA, Ministre de la Justice du Canada, Proposition de modification du Code criminel (principes généraux), [Ottawa], [Ministère de la Justice Canada], 28 ¸juin 1993, 17 p., et voir la p. 2; cette publication est disponible à ma Bibliothèque digitale à http://www.lareau-law.ca/DigitalLibrary.html;

"Voluntariness
12.1 (2)  No person commits an offence unless that person commits the act, or makes the omission, voluntarily."
----
"Fait volontaire
12.1 (2)  Nul ne commet une infraction si son fait n'est pas volontaire" (p. 2, section/article  6)
 

CANADA, Officials of the Department of Justice Canada, and  Members and Consultants of the Law Reform Commission of Canada, Toward a New General Part for the Criminal Code of Canada: A Framework Document on the Proposed New General Part of the Criminal Code for the Consideration of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General, [Ottawa: Department of Justice Canada, December 1990], 137 p., and see "Impossibility" at pp. 51-52; this publication is available at my Digital Library at http://www.lareau-law.ca/DigitalLibrary.html; information on the French version/informations sur la version française, CANADA, Fonctionnaires du ministère de la Justice Canada et des membres de la Commission de réforme du droit du Canada et des conseillers auprès de celle-ci, Pour une nouvelle codification de la Partie générale du Code criminel du Canada.  Document cadre sur la nouvelle Partie générale proposée du Code criminel présenté pour examen au Comité permanent de la Justice et du Solliciteur général, [Ottawa: Ministère de la Justice Canada, décembre 1990], 144 p.; disponible à ma bibliothèque digitale, http://www.lareau-law.ca/DigitalLibrary.html;;


CANADA, Parliament, House of Commons,  Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Sub-Committee on the Recodification of the General Part of the Criminal Code of the Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General, [Ottawa]: Queen's Printer for Canada, 1992-1993, 11 Issues; note that the 11th issue consists of the report:  First Principles: Recodifying the General Part of the Criminal Code of Canada: Report of the Sub-Committee on the Recodification of the General part of the Criminal Code of the Standing Committee on Justice and the Sollicitor General; also published in French/aussi publié en français: Parlement, Chambre des Communes, Procès-verbaux et témoignages du Sous-comité sur la Recodification de la Partie générale du Code criminel du Comité permanent de la justice et du Solliciteur général,  [Ottawa]: I'Imprimeur de la Reine pour le Canada, 1992-1993, 11 fasicules;  noter que le 11e fasicule contient le rapport : Principes de base: recodification de la Partie générale du Code criminel du Canada.  Rapport du Sous-comité sur la recodification de la Partie générale du Code criminel du Canada du Comité permanent de la justice et du Solliciteur général;

"Even more basic, perhaps, than the principle that the criminal sanction should be imposed only on those whose conduct is morally blameworthy is the idea that a person should be held responsible only for conduct over which he or she had control.  Canadian criminal law recognizes that where a person's conduct was involuntary, the criminal law does not ascribe responsibility to the person for it.  For example, a person is not guilty of the crime of assault if, because of an involuntary muscle spasm, he or she strikes another person." (First Principles: Recodifying the General Part of the Criminal Code of Canada, p.39)

------

"Un principe peut-être plus fondamental encore que celui que la sanction pénale ne s'applique qu'aux personnes ayant une conduite moralement répréhensible est l'idée que nul ne peut être tenu responsable de la conduite qui échappe à la volonté.  Le droit pénal canadien reconnaît que lorsque la conduite est involontaire, elle devrait pas engager la responsabilité pénale.  En effet, lorsque la personne agit involontairement, le droit pénal ne lui impose pas de responsabilité.  Par exemple, une personne n'est pas coupable de voies de fait si elle en frappe une autre par suite d'un spasme musculaire involontaire." (Principes de base: recodification de la Partie générale du Code criminel du Canada, p. 43)

CANADA/PROVINCES, Report of the Working Group on Chapter 3 of the Law Reform Commission of Canada Report 30, Vol. 1,  "Recodifying Criminal Law", [Ottawa]: [Department of Justice Canada], December 1987, vii, 80 p., and see "Clause 3(1) Lack of Control" at pp. 3-7;  Research Note:  this report is cited in the Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1988-1989 - 18th Annual Report, Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1989 at p. 37, ISBN: 0662573013 and in CANADA, Officials of the Department of Justice Canada and Members of the Law Reform Commission of Canada,  Toward a New General Part forthe Criminal Code of Canada: A Framework Document on the Proposed New General Part of the Criminal Code for the Consideration of the House of Commons Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General, supra.   This report of the working group was submitted to the Federal-Provincial Coordination Committee of Senior Justice Officials. Members of the Working Group were from: the Department of Justice Canada, and from the following provincial Attorney General departments or Ministries/Departments of Justice: Ontario, Québec, New Brunswick, Saskatchewan, Alberta, Manitoba and  British Columbia. This report is available from the Department of Justice Canada.  It was obtained by François Lareau in 1998 under Access to Information Request number A98-00185; also available in French / aussi disponible en français: CANADA/PROVINCES, Rapport du Groupe de travail chargé de l'étude du chapitre 3 du Rapport no 30 de la Commission de réforme du droit du Canada "Pour une nouvelle codification du droit pénal" (Volume I), [Ottawa]: [Ministère de la Justice Canada],  décembre 1987, vii, 88 p., et voir "Paragraphe 3(1) -- Conduite échappant à la volonté", aux pp. 3-7; Notes de recherche :  ce rapport est mentionné dans Commission de réforme du droit du Canada, 1988-1989, Dix-huitième Rapport annuel,  Ottawa : Commission de réforme du droit du Canada, 1989,  à la p. 40, ISBN: 0662573013 et dans CANADA, Fonctionnaires du Ministère de la Justice Canada et des membres de la Commission de réforme du droit du Canada, Pour une nouvelle codification de la Partie générale du Code criminel du Canada : document cadre sur la nouvelle partie générale proposée du Code criminel présenté pour examen au comité permanent de la justice et du solliciteur général, supra.   Ce rapport du groupe de travail a été soumis au Comité fédéral-provincial de coordination composé de fonctionnaires de niveau supérieur de la justice.  Les membres du groupe de travail proviennent du Ministère de la Justice Canada et des ministères des procuereurs généraux /ministères provinciaux de la justice de: l'Ontario, Québec, Nouvelle-Écosse, Saskatchewan, Alberta et Columbie-Britannique.  Ce rapport est disponible au Ministère de la Justice Canada.  Il a été obtenu par François Lareau en 1998 suite à une demande d'accès à l'information numéro A-98-00185;

[Excerpts from the Working Group's report dealing with clause 3(1) "Lack of Control" of the Law Reform Commission of Canada Draft Code contained in their report 30, see LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA, Recodifying Criminal Law: Volume I, Ottawa:  Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1986, infra]

"Common Law / Legal Writings

Defences of physical compulsion and physical impossibility are little developed in case law: presumably this issue is more commonly dealt with at the level of prosecutorial discretion.  It appears that the defence exists in cases involving physical impossibility.  The defence was raised, although it did not succeed on the facts, in Richard Lamer Foundation Inc. v. Construction Office of Quebec (1976), 36 C.R.N.S. 257 (Que. S.Ct.)
......

Position and Points in Issue...

The members of the Working Group all agree that clause 3(1)(a)(i) and (ii) are unnecessary and undesirable provisions.  Both merely outline a consequence of the culpability provisions in Chapter 2 [of the Law Reform Commission of Canada draft code in Report 30] dealing with the requirement of mens rea and actus reus.

As provisions in Chapter 2 make conduct and culpability prerequisites for criminal liability, the provision here is (as the LRC recognizes at p. 25) 'strictly speaking unnecessary'.

The term 'compulsion' as used by the LRC means physical compulsion only, as distinct from duress.  Articulation of physical compulsion a a defence is unnecessary; it would serve no useful purpose and possibly could lead to attempts to argue that it means more than physical compulsion, i.e. that it is an extension of duress.  As a practical consequence of the way the criminal law works, the courts will dissect and examine the language of the provision.  This is a danger whenever examples of a general principle are elaborated or logical conclusions and inferences are stated.

'Impossibility' as a term also presents problems.  It is unnecessary insamuch as it can be equated with mens rea and, as is the case with 'compulsion' above, use of the term 'impossibility' invites analysis and discretion and possible extension of its meaning by the courts.  The term could come to include other sources of impossibility, such as phobias, drunkenness, mental disorder, poverty, or illiteracy.  Some members would add legal impossibility, where it is impossible to fulfil a legal precondition to the lawful doing of an act; other members feel that when the precondition cannot be fulfilled, then the act simply cannot lawfully be done.

The members feel that the LRC proposal on compulsion and impossibility could lead to unforeseen and undesirable results.
......

Codification

In general, one of the justification for codifying a defence is to reflect a policy decision to limit the scope or availability of a more general principle; another is to create exceptions where application of the general principle would produce an undesirable result.  Consequently, the members feel it is inappropriate to codify anything that is merely a restatement of mens rea, unless it reflects a policy decision of this nature.

All members agree that codification of physical compulsion and physical impossibility is unnecessary and undesirable.  Codification is unnecessary, as these matters are conseqences of mens rea; and it is undesirable, inasmuch as it is likely to lead to unforeseen or undesirable results.
 ......

Recommendations

1.  Clause 3(1) should not be codified in its present form (unanimous).

2.  The provisions on physical compulsion and physical impossibility, in clauses 3(1)(a)(i) and (ii), should not be codified (unanimous)." (pp. 4-7)

 

CANADIAN BAR ASSOCIATION,  CRIMINAL RECODIFICATION TASK FORCE, Principles of Criminal Liability: Proposals for a New General Part of the Criminal Code - Report of the Criminal Recodification Task Force, Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, [1992],  x, 190 p., see pp. 18-19 and 26-28, ISBN: 0920742335;  note: This book is also published in CANADA, House of Commons, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Sub-Committee on the Recodification of the General Part of the Criminal Code of the Standing Committee on Justice and the Solicitor General, Issue 5 of November 2 and 18, 1992 at pp. 5A:1-5A:194; also published in French / aussi publié en français: ASSOCIATION  DU BARREAU CANADIEN, GROUPE DE TRAVAIL SUR LA NOUVELLE CODIFICATION DU DROIT PÉNAL, Principes de responsabilité pénale: proposition de nouvelles dispositions générales du Code criminel du Canada: Rapport du Groupe de travail sur la nouvelle codification du droit pénal, Ottawa : Association du Barreau canadien, [1992], xiii, 206 p., ISBN: 0920742351; note: aussi publié dans CANADA, Chambre des Communes, Procès-verbaux et témoignages du Sous-comité sur la Recodification de la Partie générale du Code criminel du Comité permanent de la justice et du Solliciteur général, fasicule 5 des 2 et 18 novembre 1992 aux pp. 5A:224-5A:434;  

"Conscious involuntary conduct

6. (1) No one is liable for prohibited conduct which, although conscious, is involuntary.

(2) Prohibited conduct is involuntary if it was not within one's ability physically to control.  Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, this includes:

(a) a spasm, twitch or reflex action,
(b) an act or movement physically caused by an external force, and

(c) an omission or failure to act as legally required due to physical impossibility.
(3) This section does not apply to conscious involuntary conduct due to provocation, rage, loss of temper, mental disorder, voluntary intoxication or automatism.

(4) If the involuntary prohibited conduct occurred because of a person's prior, voluntary blameworthy conduct, then that person may be held liable for that prior blameworthy conduct." (pp. 18-19)

CLARK, R.S., "The Defence of Impossibility and Offences of Strict Liability" (1968-69) 11 The Criminal Law Quarterly 154-174;


CÔTÉ-HARPER, Gisèle, 1942-, Pierre Rainville, 1964-, et Jean Turgeon, 1951-, Traité de droit pénal canadien, 4e édition refondue et augmentée, Cowansville: Éditions Yvon Blais, 1998, lv, 1458 p., voir "L'impossibilité" aux pp. 1289-1296, ISBN: 2894512589;
"Le moyen de défense d'impossibilité absolue tient de la maxime 'À l'impossible nul n'est tenu'.
[…]
L'impossibilité absolue représente un moyen de défense autonome recevable quel que soit le régime de responsabilité en cause.  Elle présente donc un intérêt indiscutable en matière d'infractions de responsabilité absolue.  La défense d'impossibilité absolue possède, en revanche, un intérêt atténué dans le domaine de la responsabilité stricte.  La défense de diligence raisonnable donne déjà droit à l'acquittement.  L'individu confronté à l'impossibilité d'obéir à la loi pourra arguer qu'une personne raisonnable n'aurait pas pu la respecter davantage." (pp. 1289 et 1292)


FERGUSON, Gerry, "Actus Reus and Automatism", February 1992, 36 p.; discussion paper prepared for the Canadian Bar Association, National Criminal Justice Section, Committee on Criminal Code reform, mentioned in The Canadian Bar Association Task Force REPORT, Principles of Criminal Liability: Proposals for a New General Part of the Criminal Code, Ottawa, [1992], x, 190 p., ISBN: 0920742335, at p. 189; copy  available from the Canadian Bar Association, Ottawa;

FORTIN, Jacques, 1937-1985, et Louise Viau, Traité de droit pénal général, Montréal: Éditions Thémis, 1982, xi, 457 p., et voir les pp. 199-200;

"L'impossibilité absolue.  L'impossibilité absolue décrit la situation de celui qui se voit empêché de remplir une obligation ou de faire quelque chose par la survenance d'un cas fortuit ou d'une force majeure.
[...]
En principe, la contrainte physique et l'impossibilité absolue devraient s'appliquer à toute infraction, quel que soit le régime de responsibilité qui la gouverne.  Cette proposition ne fait pas de doute en ce qui concerne l'infraction de mens rea.  Elle est également certaine en ce qui concerne l'infraction de responsibilité stricte puisque celle-ci, admettant la défense de diligence raisonnable, admet a fortiori la démonstration que l'accusé n'a pu faire autrement.  Elle est moins certaine en matière de responsibilité absolue [...] Du reste, on peut affirmer que l'arrêt Strasser c. Roberge [[1979] 2 R.C.S. 953] reconnaît en principe l'existence de ce moyen de défense." (pp. 199-200)

HALLEY, Paule, 1964-, Le droit pénal de l'environnement: l'interdiction de polluer, Cowansville: Éditions Yvon Blais, 2001, xxi, 403 p., voir "La défense d'impossibilité" aux pp. 213-222; ISBN: 2894515103; copie à la bibliothèque de la Cour suprême du Canada, KF 3775 ZB5 H35 2001; 

____________Instituer la prudence environnementale : le régime pénal québécois de lutte contre la pollution, thèse de doctorat, LL.D., Université de Montréal, 1994, ix, 332 p., voir "la défense d'impossibilité" aux pp. 194-204;
 

ILLICO INC., "La défense d'impossibilité", (CR-9627), voir http://www.illico.qc.ca/repertoire.php?id=090150 (consulté le 9 octobre 2007); texte non consulté;


INSTITUTE OF LAW RESEARCH AND REFORM, Defences to Provincial Charges, Edmonton: The Institute of Law Research and Reform, March 1984, ii, 123 p., see "Impossibility" at pp. 79-81 (series; Report No. 39);


LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF CANADA,  The General Part -- Liability and Defences, Ottawa: Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1982, [ix], 204 p., and see "Physical Compulsion and Impossibility", at pp. 69-71 (series; Working Paper; 29), ISBN: 0662514297; this publication is available at my Digital Library at http://www.lareau-law.ca/DigitalLibrary.html; information on the French version/informations sur la version française, Partie générale -- responsabilité et moyens de défense, Ottawa: Commission de réforme du droit du Canada, 1982, [x], 239 p., (Collection; Document de travail; 29); ISBN: 0662514297;


____________Recodifying Criminal Law: Volume I, Ottawa:  Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1986, [xiii],117 p., see clause 3(1)(a), "Lack of Control", at pp. 29-30 (series; Report; 30), ISBN: 0662547322; this publication is available at my Digital Library at http://www.lareau-law.ca/DigitalLibrary.html; information on the French version/informations sur la version française, Pour une nouvelle codification du droit pénal: Volume I, Ottawa: Commission de réforme du droit du Canada, 1986, [12], 131 p., voir le paragraphe 3(1), "Conduite échappant à la volonté", aux pp. 31-32 (Collection; rapport; 30), ISBN: 0662547322;

"3(1) Lack of Control.

(a) Compulsion, Impossibility, Automatism.  No one is liable for conduct which is beyond his control by reason of:
(i) physical compulsion by another;
(ii) in the case of an omission, physical impossibility to perform the act required; or
(iii) factors, other than loss of temper or mental disorder, which would similarly affect an ordinary person in the circumstances.
(b) Exception:  Negligence.  This clause shall not apply as a defence to a crime that can be committed by negligence where the lack of control is due to the defendant's negligence."


_____________ Recodifying Criminal Law (Revised and Enlarged Edition of Report 30), Ottawa:  Law Reform Commission of Canada, 1987, [16], 213 p., see clause 3(1)(a)(ii), Lack of Control (impossibility) (series; Report; 31), ISBN: 0662547578; this publication is available at my Digital Library at http://www.lareau-law.ca/DigitalLibrary.html; information on the French version/informations sur la version française, Pour une nouvelle codification du droit pénal (Édition révisée et augmentée du rapport no 30) , Ottawa: Commission de réforme du droit du Canada, 1987, [16], 233 p., sous-alinéa 3(1)a)(ii), Conduite échappant à la volonté (impossibilité) (Collection; rapport; 31), ISBN: 0662547578;


LÉTOURNEAU, Gilles et Pierre Robert, Code de procédure pénale du Québec annoté, 7e édition, Montréal : Wilson et Lafleur, 2007, xii, 985 p.;  note: droit pénal provincial; copie à la Bibliothèque de la Cour suprême du Canada, KF9619 Q42 L48;  les auteurs sont d'avis que  pour les infractions de responsabilité absolue, "une défense d'impossibilité est permise" (p.103).
 

LIBMAN, Rick,  1956-,  Libman on regulatory offences in Canada, Saltspring Island, BC : Earlscourt Legal Press, c2002-, 1 v. (loose-leaf), see section 7.8, "Impossibility and Due Diligence" and section 8.5, "Impossibility", ISBN: 0968233864; copy at the Library of the Supreme Court of Canada, Ottawa, KF 1292 A6 L53 2002; 
 

MARCOTTE, Alain,  "Les moyens de défense en matière pénale dans le contexte de l'obligation de protection du travailleur, victime potentielle",  dans  Développements récents en droit de la santé et sécurité au travail, 2001, Cowansville (Québec): Éditions Yvon Blais, 2001, xii, 308 p. aux pp. 171-204  (Collection; Service de la formation permanente Barreau du Québec; vol. 148), ISBN: 2895414700; voir "L'impossibilié absolue d'agir" aux pp. 199-200;
 

PARENT, Hugues, 1970-, Traité de droit criminel, Tome 1. L'acte volontaire et les  moyens de défense, Montréal : Éditions Thémis, 2003, xxviii, 587 p., voir "L'impossibilité" aux pp. 543-552, ISBN: 2894001703;

 ___________Traité de droit criminel, Tome Premier:  L'imputabilité, 2e édition, Montréal : Éditions Thémis, 2005, xxxii, 1023 p., voir le Chapitre 10, "L'impossibilité", aux pp. 715-725, ISBN: 2894001703; copie à la Bibliothèque de la Cour suprême du Canada, KF 9220 ZA2 P39 2005, t. 1, c. 01;    
 

PIETTE, Jean et Isabelle Fournier, "Le développement des moyens de défense en droit pénal de l'environnement", dans Développements résents en droit de l'environnement, Textes des conférences du colloque tenu le 14 octobre 1994, Éditions Yvon Blais, 1994, v, 411 p., aux pp. 291-306 et voir "La défense d'impossibilité", aux pp. 300-302, ISBN: 2890739945 (Formation permanente du Barreau du Québec - Volume 55); copie à l'Université d'Ottawa, FTX General: KEQ 885 .Z85 D476  1994;
 

STUART, Don, 1943-, Canadian Criminal Law: A Treatise, 4th ed., Toronto: Thomson/Carswell, 2001, liv, 732 p., ISBN: 0459261703 and 0459261118 (pbk.); note there is now a 5th ed., Toronto: Thomson/Carswell, 2007, xix, 815 p., ISBN: 978 0779812950;

"Separate Defence of Impossibility?

The case for a separate justification of impossibility has not been made out.  Situations claimed as appropriate for the defence of impossibility can be adequatekly dealt with by other general principles and developing a unique justification would involve unnecessary complexity.

 In addition to prosecutorial discretion, one of the main reasons for impossibility not being a live issue in criminal law is the general requirement of fault.

…...

A major reason why a separate defence of impossibilitty is unnecessary lies in the actus reus requirement, and in particular the notion that the act be voluntary in the sense of beyond the capacity to control." (p. 527, 4th ed.; notes omitted)

   

United States of America v. Dynar, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 462; on impossible attempts and conspiracies; available at http://csc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1997/1997rcs2-462/1997rcs2-462.html  (accessed on 9 October 2007);


II - Comparative Law / Droit comparé

ALEXIADIS, Stergios, "Grece [Greece]: Crimes against the Environment in Greece", (1994) 65 Revue internationale de droit pénal / International Review of Penal Law 959-971; note: Colloque préparatoire, section 1, Les atteintes à l'environnement, problèmes de droit pénal général, Ottawa (Canada), 2-6 novembre 1992;

"Physical impossibility, equatable with absolute or irresistible force (vis absoluta) excludes the existence of the 'act' as an element of the crime." (p. 968)


THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, Model Penal Code and Commentaries (Official Draft and Revised Comments), Part I - General Provisions  §§1.01 to 2.13, Philadelphia: The American Law Institute, 1985, liii, 420 p., see "Section 2.01.  Requirement of Voluntary Act: Omission as Basis of Liability: Possession as an Act", at pp. 212-224;
 

___________Model Penal Code: Proposed Official Draft, Philadelphia: The American Law Institute, 1962, xxii, 346 p.;

"Section 2.01 Requirement of Voluntary Act: Omission as Basis of Liability: Possession as an Act

    (1) A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct which includes a volontary act or the omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable." (p. 24) 


___________ Model Penal Code: Tentative Draft No. 4, Philadelphia: The American Law Institute, 1955, xv, 302 p., see "Section 2.01 Requirement of Voluntary Act: Omission as Basis of Liability: Possession as an Act", at pp.119-123;


AUSTRALIA, Attorney-General's Department, Review of commonwealth criminal law : interim report : principles of criminal responsibility and other matters, Canberra: Australian Government Publication Service, c1990, vii, 491, 31, 5, 3 p., see Chapter 4, "Voluntary Acts" at pp. 17-26, ISBN : 0644127244; note: "July 1990";

AUSTRALIA, Commonwealth of Australia, Criminal Code Act 1995, available at http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/pasteact/1/686/top.htm (accessed on 10 October 2007);

"SECT 4.2 Voluntariness

(1) Conduct can only be a physical element if it is voluntary.

(2) Conduct is only voluntary if it is a product of the will of the person whose conduct it is.

(3) The following are examples of conduct that is not voluntary:<
(a) a spasm, convulsion or other unwilled bodily movement;
(b) an act performed during sleep or unconsciousness;
(c) an act performed during impaired consciousness depriving the person of the will to act.

(4) An omission to perform an act is only voluntary if the act omitted is one which the person is capable of performing.

(5) If the conduct constituting an offence consists only of a state of affairs, the state of affairs is only voluntary if it is one over which the person is capable of exercising control.

(6) Evidence of self-induced intoxication cannot be considered in determining whether conduct is voluntary.

(7)  Intoxication is self-induced unless it came about:
(a) involuntarily; or
(b) as a result of fraud, sudden or extraordinary emergency, accident, reasonable mistake, duress or force." (see http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/html/pasteact/1/686/0/PA000260.htm, accessed on 10 October 2007)


AUSTRALIA, Criminal Law Officers, Committee of the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General,  Chapters 1 and 2, General Principles of Criminal Responsibity, Canberra : Published for the Attorney-General's Department by the Australian Government Publishing Service, 1992, ISBN: 0644287438; available at  http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/Modelcriminalcode_Chapter1and2-GeneralPrinciples  (accessed on 11 October 2007);

"202.2.2 An omission to perform an act is only voluntary if the act omitted to be performed is one which the person is capable of performing."

BURCHELL, Jonathan and John Milton, Principles of Criminal Law, Cape Town: Juta, 1991, xlvii, 669 p., and see Chapter 14, "Impossibility", at pp. 150-152, ISBN: 07212639X; research note: there is now a 2nd ed,  Kenwyn: Juta, 1997,  li, 734 p., ISBN: 0702138541 which I have not consulted yet;

"The defence of impossibility is relevant where it is impossible for the accused to comply with a positive injunction of the law....

Some writers regard the defence of impossibility as excluding the voluntary nature of an omission rather than constituting a ground of justification (or defence excluding unlawfulness). ...

REQUIREMENTS OF THE DEFENCE OF IMPOSSIBILITY

    For the defence to succeed there must be (1) a positive obligation imposed by law, compliance with which was (2) physically impossible (3) through no fault on the part of the accused." (1st ed., 1991, p. 150)


CAMERON, Neil, "Defences and the Crimes Bill",  in Neil  Cameron and Simon France, eds., Essays on Criminal Law in New Zealand: Towards Reform?, Wellington: Victoria University of Wellington Law Review in conjunction with Victoria University Press, 1990,  [iii], 243 p., at 57-82, see "Impossibility?" at pp. 80-81 (series; Victoria University of Wellington Law Review Monograph; number 3), ISBN: 0864732066; note: comments on NEW ZEALAND, Government, Crimes Bill 1989, infra, clause 19;

 

CLIVE, Eric (from CBE, Edinburgh), Pamela Ferguson (from Dundee), Christopher Gane and Alexander McCall Smith presented A Draft Criminal Code for Scotland with commentary to the Minister of Justice in August 2003; available at  http://www.scotlawcom.gov.uk/downloads/cp_criminal_code.pdf  (accessed on 24 September 2007);
 

"21  Impossibility of committing principal offence

(1) A person may be guilty of an offence of attempt, incitement or conspiracy, although the commission of the principal offence is impossible, if commission of the principal offence would have been possible in the circumstances which the person believed or hoped existed.
(2) In this section “principal offence” means the offence which is the object of the attempt, incitement or conspiracy.

COMMENTARY
An accused who attempts to commit a crime which is, in fact, incapable of success, is nonetheless guilty of attempting to commit that crime. The impossibility may be due to factors beyond the control of the accused, but this does not make such a person any less blameworthy or deserving of punishment. Attempting to bribe someone who does not, in fact, hold the relevant position of authority, is an example of an impossible attempt. Similarly, the accused who believes that his or her suitcase contains heroin may be guilty of attempting to possess drugs contrary to the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, even if the powder in the case turns out to be flour, or some other harmless substance.

Similar policy justifications apply in relation to the other preparatory offences.
There had been some uncertainty in the common law as to whether it was an offence to attempt to commit a crime, if the attempt was in fact incapable of success. This was settled by the case of Docherty v Brown.127 This section reiterates the common law position.
------
127 1996 JC 48; 1996 SLT 325; 1996 SCCR 136. 58" (p. 58)

-------

"26  Impossibility

A person is not guilty of an offence for failing to do something which was, in the circumstances and without fault on that person’s part, impossible for that person to do.

COMMENTARY

Section 26 provides that a person is not guilty of an offence for failing to do something which was, in the circumstances and without fault on that person’s part, impossible for that person to do. For example, a statute may require a person to remove fishing nets on a Sunday and may make it a criminal offence to fail to do so. Yet, because of a sudden tempest, it may be impossible to remove the nets.150 This section would provide an excusing defence.

This provision reflects the widely held belief that persons should only be held criminally responsible for behaviour for which they themselves are in some way responsible." (p. 70)


ENGLAND and WALES, The Law Commission, Codification of the Criminal Law: A Report to the Law Commission, London: Her Majesty's Stationery  Office, 1985, vi, 246 p., see comments on clause 43(2), "Physical incapacity"  at p. 113 and clause 43(2) at p.194 (series; Law Com. No. 143);
"Physical incapacity.
43. (2)  A person is not guilty of an offence by virtue of an omission to act if --
(a) he is physically incapable of acting in the way required; and
(b) his being so incapable is the result neither of anything done or omitted with the fault required for the offence nor of voluntary intoxication." (p. 194)

 
___________The Law Commission, A Criminal Code for England and Wales,vol. 1: Report and Draft Criminal Code Bill and vol. 2: Commentaryon Draft Criminal Code Bill, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office,  [1989], v, 278 p.; see vol. 1, clause 33(2), "Physical incapacity", at p. 58; examples at p. 163,  and in vol. 2, comments on that clause at p. 220 (series; LawCom. No. 177),  ISBN: 0102299897;

"Physical incapacity.
33. -- (2)  A person is not guilty of an offence by virtue of an omission to act if --
(a) he is physically incapable of acting in the way required; and
(b) his being so incapable is the result neither of anything done or omitted with the fault required for the offence nor of voluntary intoxication." (p. 58)


GORDLEY, James, "Impossibility and Changed and Unforeseen Circumstances", (summer 2004) 52 American Journal of Comparative Law (Summer 2004) 513-530, available at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/gordley1.html (accessed on 9 October 2007);


GROSS, Hyman,  A Theory of Criminal Justice, New York: Oxford University Press, 1979, xviii, 521 p., ISBN: 0195023498 and 0195023501 (pbk.);

"1.2.9.  Impossibility of compliance.  A person caanot help failing to do the impossible.  If by law roads must be kept in repair by property owners, but the roads are under flood waters, that fact will furnish grounds of exculpation.  If the presence in the country of an unregistered enemy alien is against the law, but the alien has been forcibly brought into the country by the authorities and kept unregistered in their custody, that fact again will provide the substance of an exculpatory claim that points to the impossibility of doing what the law requires.  The claim is simply that there was no opportunity to comply with the law -- which is one way of being unable to.  It is an extremely strong denial of responsibility , since the claim of inability in this form needs little, if any, qualification." (p. 158)


ITOH, Kensuke, "Japon [Japan].  Criminal Protection of the Environment and the General Part of Criminal Law in Japan", (1994) 65(3-4) Revue internationale de droit pénal/International Review of Criminal Law 1037-1050;

"A defense of physical impossibility may be allowed under the Japanese criminal law as a ground that negates illegality of the conduct in question.  Because the law cannot order what is physically impossible, there exists no legal duty to obey or obligation to fulfill a legal duty in the cases of physical impossibility.  Thus the impugned conduct cannot be illegal." (p. 1948)
. 

JACOBS, Michelle, "Requiring Battering Women Die: Murder Liability for Mothers Under Failure to Protect Statutes", (1998) 58 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 579-660, see " Impossibility of Performance in Omissions Cases", pp. 638-645;


KUNICKA-MICHALSKA, Barbara, and Wojeiech Radecki, "Pologne [Poland].  Protection of the Environment Through the Polish Penal Law", (1994) 65 Revue internationale de droit pénal / International Review of Penal Law 1105-1123; article in English and French / article en anglais et français; part of the Preparatory Colloquium, Section 1, Crimes against the Environment -- General Part, Ottawa (Canada), November 2-6, 1992;

"L'impossibilité physique
    L'impossibilité physique ne fait cependant pas partie de ces circonstances [excluant la délictuosité], car elle écarte la notion d'acte en général.  L'impossibilité physique est traitée comme une force majeure (vis absoluta), l'auteur ne commet donc pas l'acte au sens pénal du droit pénal, et pour cette raison il ne peut être question de responsabilité pénale." (p. 1117)


LAW SOCIETY OF SCOTLAND, THE, "Scottish Law Commission Consultation on the Draft Criminal Code for Scotland -- The Law Society of Scotland's Response", October 2004, 28 p., and see sections 21 and 26; available at http://www.lawscot.org.uk/uploads/Consultations/2004/CRIM-SLC%20Consultation%20on%20the%20Draft%20Criminal%20Code%20for%20Scotland%20(Oct%2004).pdf  (accessed on 9 October 2007);  for the draft code, see Clive, supra;

NEW ZEALAND, Crimes Consultative Committee, Crimes Bill 1989 - Report of the Crimes Consultative Committee: Presented to the Minister of Justice ,[Wellington]: [The Crimes Consultative Committee], 1991, 123 p., ISBN:0477076165, see pp. 11-12 on clause 29, "Involuntary acts" (Chairman: Mr.Justice Casey);

"Clause 19 -- Involuntary acts
This clause seeks to capture a core principle of criminal liability, namely, that a person should not be liable to punishment for an act or omission that is not voluntary.

That principle is simple enough to state, as evidenced by subclause(1).  A satisfactory statutory definition of involuntariness is, however, more elusive.  For that reason, the bill offers, by way of subclause(2), examples of what involuntariness means.  The provision is open-endedand does not purport to be a comprehensive definition.  Neither the English Law Commission draft code nor the United States Model Penal Code has been able to improve on this approach.

The submissions on the bill indicate that there may be difficulties even with the propositions contained in subclause (2).  It is also the case that subclause (3) fails to deal adequately with the relationship between voluntariness and intoxication.  That issue needs detailed  study and probably would require a separate clause if a proposition on voluntariness remained in the bill.

A substantial amount of time would be required to settle a comprehensive  definition of involuntariness.  The Committee is mindful of the difficulty  that other law reform bodies have had with the task.  In the circumstances, we consider that the better course is to set clause 19 aside for the time  being.  In the absence of a clause on involuntary acts the courts willcontinue to apply relatively well-settled common law principles." (pp. 11-12)


___________Government, Crimes Bill 1989, introduced in May  1989, xxvii, 156 p., see on clause 19, "Involuntary acts", pp. iv-v and 14;

"19.  Involuntary acts --
(1) A person is not criminally responsible for doing any act involuntarily or from omitting involuntarily to do any act.

(2) Without limiting the generality of subsection (1) of this section,--

(a) a person does an act involuntarily if the act --
(i) Is the result of a reflex, spasm, or convulsion; or
(ii) Is done while that person is asleep or unconscious; and
(b) A person omits involuntarily to do an act if, at the time of the omission, the person is physically incapable of doing the required act.
(3) This section does not apply to involuntariness caused by intoxication, whether by alcohol or any other substance." (p. 14)

----------
     "Clause 19 relates to involuntary actsand omissions. It owes something to clause 43 of the proposed Criminal Code (U.K.), and something to section 2.10(2) of the Model Penal Code (U.S.).

    Subclause (1) states the simple proposition that a person should not be punished for something done or omitted to be done by that person involuntarily.  This was described by Mr. JusticeWoodhouse in Kilbride v Lake [1962] NZLR 590 as 'a cardinal principle' of criminal code.

    Subclause (2) then deals with 2 distinctsclasses of cases where the law presently accepts that a person should be taken to  act involuntarily for the purposes of this rule.  It is important  to note that they are illustrative of the general rule: they are not an exhaustive definition of it.

    Subclause (2)(a) deals with cases involving automatism.  It has been drafted with cases such as R v Cottle [1958] NZLR 999 and R v Arnold [1985] NZLR 193 in mind.  Some may argue that subparagraph(ii) is not wide enough to reflect Arnold accurately.  That case tends to suggest that partial unconsciousnessmay be sufficient to establish a 'defence' of automatism.  However,such an argument would miss the point already made about the relationship between subclauses (1) and (2).  The real test is one of involuntariness. If the accused wasnot wholly unconscious but nevertheless acted involuntarily, he or she would be protected from criminal responsibility by subclause(1).

    Subclause (2)(b) is designed to meet cases such as Burns v Bidder [1967] 2 QB 277. In that case, a motorist was charged with failing to give way to a pedestrian on a crossing. In fact, he was incapable of doing so because his brakes failed.

    Subclause (3) is to ensure that the 'blinddrunk' do not have recourse to this clause." (pp. iv-v)

O'CONNOR, D. and P.A. Fairall, Criminal Defences, 2nd ed., Sydney: Butterworths, 1988, xxvii, 277 p., and see "Chapter 8 Impossibility", at pp. 116-143, ISBN: 0409492760; there is also a 3rd ed., in 1996;

"The fact that compliance with a particular law is impossible may be put forward as a general defence, or impossibility may be raised as a definitional problem in the crime of attempt and possibly conspiracy, incitement and aiding and abetting." (2nd ed., p. 116) 


"Resolutions of the Colloquium", (1983) 54(1-2) Revue internationale de droit pénal / International Review of Penal Law 77-79 (Actes du Colloque International, "Conception et principes du droit pénal économique et des affaires y compris la protection du consommateur", tenu à Freiburg-en-Brisgau, République Fédérale d'Allemagne, 20-23 septembre 1982, en préparation pour le 13e Congrès international de droit pénal de l'Association internationale de droit pénal (AIDP) au Caire en 1984 /  Report of the Proceedings of the International Colloquium, "Concept and Principles of Economic and Business Criminal Law",  held in Freiburg i. Br., Federal Republic of Germany, September 20-23, 1983, in preparation for the 13th International Congress of Penal Law of the International Association of Penal Law (IAPL) in Crairo, 1984; 

 "Culpability and criminal responsibility

9.  As a general rule of penal law, the principle of culpability should be applied in the field of economic and business offences.  Where strict liability offences exist they should at least be subject to the defense of impossibility.  Reform efforts should be directed to abolish strict liability offences as quickly as possible." (p. 78)

ROBINSON, Paul H., 1948-, Criminal Law Defences, St. Paul (Minnesota): West, 1984, see Vol. 1,  "§ 85. Inchoate Offenses and Complicity -- Impossibility Defense", at pp. 422-439 and  "§ 87. Omissions -- Impossibility Defense", at pp. 449-453,  ISBN: 0314815139 (set);

SMART, Ann, "Criminal Responsibility for Failing to do the Impossible" (1987) 103 Law Quarterly Review 532-563; copy at the University of Ottawa, FTX, Periodicals, KD 322 .L37;
 

SNYMAN, C.R., Criminal Law, 1st ed., Durban : Butterworths, c1984, 545 p., and see "Impossibility" at pp. 95-96, ISBN: 0409056170 and   0409056189 (pbk.); note there is now a now a 4th ed.: Durban : Butterworths, 2002, xii, 616 p., ISBN: 0409056278;
 

___________A Draft Criminal Code for South Africa with a Commentary,  Cape Town: Juta, 1995, xl, 133 p., see "Impossibility" at p. 3 with comments at p. 51, ISBN: 0702133345;

"Impossibility
    2.3  A person does not commit an offence by omitting to perform an act if it is impossible for him to perform the act required and the impossibility is not due to his own culpability." (p. 3)

------

"The defence of impossibility can succeed only if the legal rule infringed by the accused requires him to perform a 'positive act' -- in other words, if his conduct consisted of an omission ....  A similar view is taken of the defence of impossibility in section 3(1)(a)(ii) of the new Draft Canadian Penal Code." (p. 51)

WAILING, Cornélie, Ingeborg M. Koopmans, Marianne Rutgers, Jan M. Sjöcrona, Nastja van Strien and Peter J.P. Tak, "Pays-Bas [Netherlands]: Crimes against the Environment", (1994) 65 Revue internationale de droit pénal / International Review of Penal Law 1065-1099; article in English; part of the Preparatory Colloquium, Section 1, Crimes against the Environment -- General Part, Ottawa (Canada), November 2-6, 1992;

"Defences of physical impossibility
   
    According to Section 40 PC, a person who commits an act that he was forced to by necessity is not punishable.  This provision does not seem to be relevant if what happened was totally impossible to prevent (force majeur), in which event there is no question of having committed a criminal offence.  But when it concerns omission offences, a defence of absolute necessity may offer a solution.  This can be significant in the sphere of environmental offences, many of which consist of failure to carry out an administrative regulation or the terms of a licence.  It is conceivable that the responsible member of staff within an industrial enterprise is required by the terms of a licence to take specific action under particular circumstances, because otherwise dangerous waste products might be released.  If he is rendered physically unable to reach the business premises (and futhermore modern methods of communication are also blocked) and a dangerous situation results, then a defence of force majeur may not [sic] apply." (pp. 1088-1089)


WILLIAMS, Glanville, 1911-1997,  Criminal Law: The General Part, 2nd ed., London: Stevens & Sons, 1961, liv, 929 p., see "Impossibility", at pp. 746-748;

"Impossibility

     A defence that is rarely met with in the situation of criminal law, but that appears to be valid where applicable, is impossibility of compliance with the legal duty.  The maxim Lex non cogit ad impossibilia, which is of limited force in civil law, would appear to be a compelling principle of humanity and justice where punitive sanctions are in question.  Although closely related to necessity, the defence of impossibility is theoretically distinct.

    Thus it may be laid down as a general proposition that where the law imposes a duty to act, non-compliance with the duty will be excused where compliance is physically impossible." (pp. 746-747)

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